Rynn v. Jennings

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 28 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RICHARD RYNN; GELLIANA DAVID No. 25-1951 RYNN; MARCELLA RYNN, D.C. No. 4:24-cv-00594-JGZ Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v. CRAIG JENNINGS, for actions outside of his official capacity as judge of Avondale City Court; CITY OF AVONDALE; PATRICK CAMUNEZ; FIRST TRANSIT, INC.; LYNN McLEAN; DOMINIC LANZA, District Judge, for actions outside of his official capacity as judge of District Court; JOHN TUCHI, District Judge, for actions outside of official capacity as judge of the District Court; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; LITTLER MENDELSON, PC; CHILDREN’S BUREAU; COMTRANS; PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF PHOENIX; AVONDALE CITY COURT; TRANSDEV; UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; CATHY COTTEE; CANDY ZAMMIT; RENEE MILLER; INTERMOUNTAIN; DANIEL WASHBURN, for actions outside of his official capacity judge of Pinal County Superior court; UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as: ABC Corporations I-X and Black and White Partnerships and/or Sole Proprietorships I-X; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 25, 2026** Before: SILVERMAN, N.R. SMITH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Richard Rynn, Gelliana David Rynn, and Marcella Rynn appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing without leave to amend their action alleging federal and state law claims arising from prior court proceedings and an interaction with Border Patrol. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Rynns’ action because the operative complaint failed to comply with Rule 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1288 (9th Cir. 2026) (explaining that “a complaint that asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against” violates Rule 8); Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that a complaint that is “verbose, confusing and conclusory” violates Rule 8).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Rynns’ complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that dismissal without leave to amend is proper where amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rynns’ motion to compel the setting of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) conference because the Rynns have not shown prejudice resulting from the denial. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that the district court’s discovery rulings “will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

3 25-1951 The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction on the Rynns under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) given the Rynns’ litigation history. See Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 675-76 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for Rule 11 sanctions); Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding sanctions may be imposed against a pro se plaintiff).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

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