Wilson v. Stowers

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 31 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MICHAEL WILSON, No. 24-1789 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:21-cv-06306-DOC-DFM v. MEMORANDUM* CAROL STOWERS, Peace Officer, individual; Peace Officer, official capacity; et al., Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 25, 2026** Before: SILVERMAN, N.R. SMITH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Michael Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

We review de novo. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Wilson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Stowers acted with a retaliatory motive in filing a rules violation report against Wilson. See id. at 1269 (setting forth elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient” and that specific evidence of a causal connection between the protected conduct and adverse action is required).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilson’s motions for appointment of counsel because Wilson did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

2 24-1789