Lloyd v. Facebook, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 31 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SUSAN LLOYD, No. 25-268 D.C. No. 3:21-cv-10075-EMC Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* FACEBOOK, INC.; META PLATFORMS, INC.; MARK ZUCKERBERG, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 25, 2026** Before: SILVERMAN, N.R. SMITH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Susan Lloyd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her breach of contract claim in her diversity action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15 F.4th 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Lloyd’s breach of contract claim because Lloyd failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants breached a contractual provision or promise. See Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Cal. 2011) (stating the elements of a breach of contract claim under California law); see also Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “[o]ur case law does not permit plaintiffs to rely on anticipated discovery to satisfy Rules 8 and 12(b)(6); rather, pleadings must assert well-pleaded factual allegations to advance to discovery”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend upon remand or dismissing without leave to amend because Lloyd was previously granted leave to amend and further amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation and internal quotations marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lloyd’s requests for

2 25-268 discovery because the district court determined that Lloyd failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of [Rule] 12(b)(6) is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting themselves to discovery”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lloyd’s motion for reconsideration because Lloyd failed to set forth grounds for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).

We reject as without merit Lloyd’s contention that the district court erred in dismissing the action instead of scheduling a mediation or settlement conference.

AFFIRMED.

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