Finney v. Pennsylvania Iron Works Co.
Finney v. Pennsylvania Iron Works Co.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court:
We find no merit in this appeal. The plaintiff’s declaration and affidavit are not models of good pleading; but we cannot say that they are insufficient. The only defect in this regard which would seem to require any serious consideration is the apparent variance between the note sued on in the body of the declaration and that set forth in the particulars of demand annexed ther&to. The latter is plainly a negotiable instrument, while the former is claimed to be non-negotiable, as it does not purport to be payable “to the order” of anyone, or “to bearer,” but only to a certain named payee. This objection, although plausible, is not substantial. The declaration is undoubtedly defective; and, as we have said, we cannot regard it as a model of good pleading. But the bill of particulars is part of the declaration, and serves to remove any uncertainty inherent in the latter. Moreover, it was competent for the trial court to allow an amendment; and it
The principal reliance of the appellant seems to be upon the ■supposed insufficiency of the plaintiff’s affidavit to warrant a judgment under the 73d rule of the court below. The contention is that, while the plaintiff declares upon the note as indorsee, yet the affidavit shows that it should have sued as guarantor. But this contention is plainly fallacious. The plaintiff’s guaranty was to the bank, and it has served its purpose and is out of the ■case. It did not concern the defendant in any manner. The allegation in the affidavit in regard to it may well he regarded as surplusage. The plaintiff became the holder and owner of the note in due course of business by the transfer of it by the bank, subject, of course, to such equitable rights as the defendant might "have against the payee in regard to it; and there was no necessity for any writing upon it, such as is claimed on behalf of the defendant, to give title to the plaintiff and to warrant suit by it, since by the indorsement in blank of the electric company, it ■could pass thereafter by mere delivery.
Objection also is made on behalf of the appellant that the note was not filed with the declaration, or produced in evidence before the court at the time of the rendition of judgment. But it is not the practice, and it would be unreasonable to require, that a promissory note which is the subject of suit should be filed with the declaration. It is sufficient if it is produced at the trial or at the hearing on motion for judgment; and we must presume that this was done, since there is nothing in the record to show the contrary. And if it was not done, it was the duty of the defendant and his right to resist the entry of judgment for that reason, and to have the omission made matter of record, if he desired to preserve the point for this court. He has done nothing
The claim of the appellee appears to be a just one. There is; no pretense that the appellant has any just defense to it. The-objections raised against the claim are of the most technical character, and wholly unsubstantial. . We think that the judgment of the court below was right and just, and that it should be affirmed, with costs. And it is accordingly so ordered. Affirmed-
Reference
- Full Case Name
- FINNEY v. PENNSYLVANIA IRON WORKS COMPANY
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Practice; Amendments; Promissory Notes; Affidavits of Defense. 1. Where the declaration in' a suit on a promissory note by an indorsee against the maker states that the defendant promised to pay to the payee, but fails to state that the note was payable to the order of the payee so as to make it negotiable; but the bill of particulars attached to the declaration, consisting of a copy of the note, shows that the note was payable to the order of the payee, and was therefore negotiable, — the declaration, aided by the bill of particulars, will be regarded as setting forth a negotiable note, on an a-ppeal by the defendant from a judgment against him for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, — especially as it was competent for the trial court, as it would be for this court, to allow an amendment of the declaration if it were necessary. 2. Where the affidavit under the 73d rule of the lower court, in an action by an indorsee of a promissory note against the maker, states that the plaintiff received the note from the payee and discounted it in bank, guaranteeing that it would be paid, but that it was not paid; and it was thereupon taken up by the plaintiff in accordance with his guaranty; and that it has not been paid, — it cannot be successfully contended by the defendant, in resisting a motion for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, that the plaintiff should have declared on the note as guarantor, and not as indorsee. The defendant, as maker, has nothing to do with the guaranty, and the allegation in the affidavit with regard to it may be regarded as surplusage. 3. In a suit on a promissory note it is not necessary to file the original note with the declaration, but it is sufficient if it be produced at the trial, or at a hearing on a motion for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, if such a motion be made; and, on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in such a case for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, in the absence of anything in the record to show to the contrary or that the defendant resisted the entry of judgment on the ground that the note was not produced on the hearing of the motion for judgment, it will be presumed that it was so produced.