Henderson v. Gilpin
Henderson v. Gilpin
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court:
Appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an intei’ference proceeding in which priority of invention was awarded to the patentee Charles 1). Gilpin by each of the three tribunals of the Patent Office. We reproduce claims 1, 5, and 6, which are representative of the six claims involved:
“1. In a motor-control system, a motor, a set of resistance sections, automatic acceleration switches for controlling said resistance sections, a switch to connect a source of current to one pole of the armature for rotating the same in one direction, and a pair of reversing switches, the members of one switch connecting the armature in a dynamo braking circuit and the members of the other switch connecting the source of current to the remaining pole of the armature.”
“5. In a motor-control system, a motor, a switch to connect a source of current to one pole of the armature for rotating the same in one direction, and a pair of reversing switches, the members of one switch connecting the armature in a dynamic braking circuit and the members of the other switch connecting the source of current to the remaining pole of the armature.”
“6. In a motor-control system, a set of resistance sections, acceleration switches for controlling said resistance sections, a switch to connect a source of current to one pole of the armature for rotating the same in one direction, and reversing switch mechanism to connect the source of current to the remaining pole of the armature at a point between the armature and the resistance sections.”
As the patent to Gilpin was issued prior to the filing of Olark T. Henderson’s application, the burden of proof was heavily upon Henderson in the Patent Office. It is even greater here because of the concurrent decisions of the Patent Office tribunals.
Appellant further contends that, even assuming Gilpin’s priority of conception and reduction to practice, appellant is nevertheless entitled to be considered the prior inventor because, as he says, Gilpin was guilty of laches, while he was diligent. This point is not well taken. Prior to the act of 1836, he who first reduced to practice was, in the eyes of the law, the prior inventor. The act of 1836, now sec. 4920, Rev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3394, permitted one “who was using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting” his invention to prove priority, notwithstanding his opponent has'been the first to reduce to practice. In this case, however, Gilpin was the first to conceive and the first to perfect -his invention. In those circumstances, he is entitled to the invention unless he abandoned it to the public or secreted and suppressed it for such a period as to forfeit his rights to another. Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D. C. 86; Howard v. Bowes, 31 App. D. C. 619; Fowler v. McBerty, 27 App. D. C. 41; Reed v. Cutter, 1 Story, 590, Fed. Cas. No. 11,645; Cristie v. Seybold, 5 C. C. A. 33, 6 U. S. App. 520, 55 Fed. 69. As there is no evidence of suppression or concealment, the decision must be affirmed. Affirmed.
Reference
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- HENDERSON v. GILPIN
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- Syllabus
- Patents; Interference; Burden of Proof; Reduction to Practice;. Tests; Diligence. 3. A patent having been issued to one applicant prior to the filing of another’s application, the burden of proof in an interference is heavily upon the latter in the patent office; and it is even greater in the-court when the decisions of the tribunals of that office are concurrent and adverse to him. 2. To constitute reduction to practice, a test must amount to a demonstration in fact, as contradistinguished from one in theory; and it is not enough to constitute reduction to practice that shop tests of a motor-controlling system indicate that the operation of the device-will be successful; the system not being within that class of simple-devices that demonstrate their own operativeness. 3. Prior to the act of Congress of 1836, he who first reduced to practice-was, in the eyes of the law, the prior inventor; but the act of 1836,. now sec. 4920, Rev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3394, permits one “who was using reasonable diligence in adopting and perfecting”' his invention to prove priority notwithstanding his opponent has. been the first to reduce to practice'. 4. In an interference proceeding the party who first conceived and perfected a motor-controlling system is entitled to an award of priority of invention, where he has not abandoned it to the public or concealed and suppressed it for such a period as to forfeit his rights to another. (Citing Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D. C. 86; Fowler v. McBerty, 27 App. D. C. 31, and Howard v. Bowes, 31 App. D. C. 619.