Morse v. United States

U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Morse v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 374 (D.C. Cir. 1914)
1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 2187

Morse v. United States

Opinion of the Court

Mr. Justice Robb

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The defendants have never questioned the form of this proceeding, and, of course, it is too late to do so now. Mrs. TIine having a life interest in said fund, the son a vested remainder, “subject to open and let in testator’s brothers and sisters and to be devested upon the death of Robert E. Hiñe and remarriage of the life tenant” (United States use of Hine v. Morse, 218 U. S. 504, 54 L. ed. 1127, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37), they were proper parties to act for all interests in the suit for the recovery of the fund, since “parties are sufficiently made when the holder of the first vested estate of inheritance is reached and included.” Story, Eq. PI. sec. 145. When, therefore, the- jury determined that no agreement for the retention of *379the fund existed between Mrs. Hine and Waggaman, plaintiff's were entitled to a verdict for the entire fund, with interest thereon from the day of its conversion. Such was the theory of the declaration, for it is therein averred that the defendants “have not paid, nor has either of them paid, the said sum or any part thereof into registry of the said court, or to any officer of the said court, or to any other person authorized to receive the same.” Had the verdict and judgment been in that form, there -would have been no room for the complaint which the defendants now make, to the effect that the contingent interests remain outstanding. The.case, however, was submitted to the jury upon a different theory, and with the acquiescence of the defendants. There was competent evidence before the jury on the question of the present worth of Mrs. Hino’s interest and the remainder interest of her son, and, because the jury in its computation evidently considered the interest of the contingent remaindermen negligible, we do not think the defendants may now complain. Evidently they acquiesced in the theory upon which the case was submitted to the jury, in the hope that they ■would thereby escape payment of a part of the fund. The verdict of the jury being in the aggregate no greater than their legal liability, they cannot now be permitted to raise any question as to the contingent remaindermen. They took their chances, and must abide the result.

It is immaterial that interest was figured on two sums aggregating the amount of the fund, since the recovery should have been for that fund, with interest. Nor does it now concern the defendants that the life tenant has been given too much and the remainderman too little, or vice versa.

The point is made in the defendants’ brief that a bar appears on the record to the entry of judgment in favor of Mrs. Hine. Without going into details, it is sufficient to say that it is contended that on the pleadings Mrs. Hine was estopped to deny said alleged arrangement between her and Waggaman. No such contention has heretofore been made, and it is now too late, after this issue of fact was submitted to and determined by the jury, to raise the question.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs. Affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
MORSE v. UNITED STATES
Status
Published
Syllabus
Appeal and Error; Parties; Trusts and Trustees; Bonds; Estoppel. 1. Objections to the form of a proceeding are of no avail when made for the first time on appeal. 2. All interests in a suit to recover the proceeds of a sale of land may be represented by the life tenant and the remainderman, whose remain- . der is subject to open and let in others, and to be devested by bis death and the marriage of the life tenant. 3. The contingent interests in a fund held by a trustee for the benefit of a life tenant and the remainderman, whose remainder is subject to open and let .in others, and to be devested by the death of the remainderman and marriage of the life tenant, cannot be asserted on appeal by the defendants, in an action by the life tenant and remainderman on the trustee’s bond for misappropriating the fund, where the defendants suffered the case to go to the jury, without objection, on the theory that the plaintiffs could, if the evidence did not support the defense made, recover the entire fund, and the amount recovered does not exceed the defendants’ legal liability. 4. The inclusion of interest from the date of default, on the amount awarded a remainderman in an action by the life tenant and himself on the bond of the defaulting trustee of the fund which was the subject of their estate, is not subject to objection by the defendants, where they are liable for interest on the entire fund, although the remainder was subject to open and let in others, and to be devested by the remainderman’s death and the marriage of the life tenant. 5. An erroneous apportionment as between a life tenant and a remainder-man of a fund, of the recovery in their action on the bond of the defaulting trustee of the fund, is not subject to objection by the defendants. 6. The objection that a party is estopped on the pleadings to assert a vital fact cannot be successfully interposed for the first time on