Lemmon v. Kirkland
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Lemmon v. Kirkland, 44 App. D.C. 512 (D.C. Cir. 1916)
1916 U.S. App. LEXIS 2638
Lemmon v. Kirkland
Opinion of the Court
delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court:
We fully concur in tbe view expressed in tbe foregoing opinion that, in substance and effect, this is an attempt by one faction of tbe “Loyal Orange Institution of tbe United States of America,” a fraternal order, to obtain recognition by tbe court as tbe “duly constituted bead of said order in tbe United States.” In other words, a careful reading of tbe bill leaves no room for doubt that this is merely a controversy between two factions of a fraternal order. For tbe reasons stated by tbe learned trial justice, tbe decree will be affirmed, with costs.
Affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- LEMMON v. KIRKLAND
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- Syllabus
- Equity; Injunction; Fraternal Associations; Names; Pleading. 1. Courts of equity do not exercise jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate the right of different charitable or religious associations to hold themselves out to be the regular and only accredited representative of some particular order or religious system, but there must be some pecuniary injury resulting from the use of a name that may have been adopted by another to warrant inquiry and justify equitable relief. (Following Most Worshipful Grand Lodge F. •& A. M. v. Grimshaw, 34 App. D. C. 383.) 2. Under a bill in equity-by one claiming to be the supreme grand secretary of a lodge of a fraternal order, and other members, against one who is said to be a member of a spurious lodge of the order, and who claims to be supreme grand secretary of such spurious lodge, and who, it is also claimed in the bill, is receiving money belonging to the institution which should be paid to the plaintiff supreme grand secretary, it will not be assumed that the defendant is receiving money belonging to the plaintiff’s lodge, but the bill will be interpreted to mean that the defendant is receiving money as supreme grand secretary of the so-called spurious lodge, which interpretation will negative the theory of pecuniary injury to the plaintiff; nor will allegations in such bill that the defendant has records and books in his possession belonging to plaintiffs’ order, which he refuses to turn over to the plaintiffs, constitute ground for equitable relief in the absence of any allegation to show that the books are of value, or that the plaintiffs have no copies of them; nor will allegations in such bill that the defendant has received assessments and contributions for support of a home for indigent and needy members of tlie order, which he has failed to turn over to the proper authorities of the order, entitled the plaintiff to equitable relief, where it also appears from the bill that the home is a separate and distinct enterprise managed by its own directors, so that if anyone is entitled to^demand an accounting by the defendant it is such board of directors; and where such a bill states that the defendant was formerly supreme grand secretary of the order, but fails to state the length of time for which he was elected, it will not be assumed that his term of office did not extend beyond the date of the election of his alleged successor.