U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 1949

Proctor v. United States

U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Decided October 17, 1949 · Edgerton, Prettyman, Proctor

177 F.2d 656; 85 U.S. App. D.C. 341; 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3259 (Federal Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

Mr. William E. Owen, Washington, D. C. (appointed by the District Court) for appellant., Mr. Robert M. Scott, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. George Morris Fay, United States Attorney, and Joseph M. Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Cases that cite this one

16 later published cases cite this decision.

United States v. Luther L. Powell (D.C. Cir. 1971)
Frederick L. Salzman v. United States of America, James E. Lowery v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1968)
Paul J. Heideman v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1958)
State v. Shaw, No. Cr-91172 (Oct. 20, 1995) (Connecticut Superior Court 1995)
State v. Marion, No. Cr-11-95-91272s (Nov. 21, 1995) (Connecticut Superior Court 1995)
United States v. Williams (District Court, D. Maryland 1971)
Warfield Milo Goings v. United States (8th Cir. 1967)
James W. Parker v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1966)
State v. Dennis (Conn. 1963)
Harris v. District of Columbia (D.C. 1957)
Young v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1950)
United States v. Buchanan (District Court, District of Columbia 2025)
McNeil v. United States (D.C. 2007)
State v. Kane (Haw. Ct. App. 1982)
State v. Simmons (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)
United States v. Russell Eugene Jacobs (10th Cir. 1973)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This case presents the question whether voluntary drunkenness constitutes a defense *657 to a charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle, under § 2204 of Title 22, District of Columbia Code (1940), which provides, inter alia: “Any person who, without the consent of the owner, shall take, use, operate, or remove, * * * an automobile or motor vehicle, and operate or drive * * * the same * * * for his own profit, use or purpose shall be punished * *

No rule is more firmly established than that voluntary drunkenness is no defense for a criminal act, unless specific intent or knowledge is an element of the offense, when drunkenness may be shown to prove mental incapacity to form the specific intent.

It is contended here that the crime involves a specific intent to temporarily appropriate the vehicle for a use inconsistent with the rights of the owner. That, of course, is a necessary result—the natural consequence of taking and using a vehicle without consent. But nothing in the statutory definition makes that result a special element of the offense itself. In our opinion, violation of the statute involves only a “general criminal intent," which may be presumed from doing the prohibited acts. This view, we think, does not conflict with the decision in Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corporation v. Aldridge, 1941, 73 App.D.C. 161, 117 F.2d 774, 133 A.L.R. 914. The judgment is

Affirmed.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.