Consideration of this appeal leads to the following conclusions:

The evidence was sufficient to support the granting of a limited divorce for cruelty in favor of appellee.

The court had jurisdiction under its general equity powers to adjudicate and settle a dispute between the parties concerning their respective rights in funds and property which had been acquired by them during marriage, or incident thereto. 11 D. C.Code (1940) § 325; Baxt v. Baxt, 1946, 320 Mass. 762, 70 N.E.2d 799; Novick v. Novick, 1937, 299 Mass. 15, 11 N.E.2d 481; Gibbons v. Gibbons, 1936, 296 Mass. 89, 4 N.E.2d 1019.

Title 16, § 409, District of Columbia Code (1940) does not apply. Its provision for apportionment relates only to property in which a tenancy, joint or by entireties, dissolves by operation of the aforegoing statute through a decree for absolute divorce or nullity of marriage.

*109 In this case, agreeably to rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., the general equity powers of the court were invoked by joining in a single action prayers for a limited divorce and for adjudication of an existing dispute between the parties concerning property rights. MacLennan v. MacLennan, 1942, 311 Mass. 709, 42 N.E.2d 838; Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 1940, 373 Ill. 352, 26 N.E.2d 108, certiorari denied, 311 U.S. 651, 61 S.Ct. 22, 85 L.Ed. 417; Cohagan v. Cohagan, 1920, 294 Ill. 439, 128 N.E. 494. See Note, 93 A.L.R. 327.

The judgment is

Affirmed. •