Cox v. Democratic Central Committee of District of Columbia
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Drew Pearson (D.C. Cir. 1968)
- Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Capital Transit Co. (D.C. Cir. 1954)
- National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell (D.C. Cir. 1954)
- Armour and Company v. Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture (D.C. Cir. 1962)
- National Organization For Women v. Social Security Administration (D.C. Cir. 1984)
- National Organization for Women v. Social Security Administration of the Department of Health & Human Services (D.C. Cir. 1984)
- Society for Animal Rights, Inc. v. James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense of the United States (D.C. Cir. 1975)
- A Quaker Action Group v. Walter J. Hickel (D.C. Cir. 1969)
- Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior v. D. C. Transit System, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1968)
- Peter Maas v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1966)
- Gustitus v. Fenty (D.C. Cir. 2007)
- Nedrick Young v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1962)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
The ultimate question before the Court is whether or not we should reverse the denial by the District Court of an application for a preliminary injunction. It is settled law that a Court of Appeals will not set aside the action of a District Court in either denying or granting an application for a preliminary injunction unless the action of the District Court was in clear error or in abuse of discretion. If we assume, without deciding, that the Democratic non-statutory primary election in the District of Columbia is a part of the governmental *357 election machinery and that it therefore must be conducted in a manner which does not infringe any constitutional right in such primary election, still we cannot conclude that the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction should be set aside. The complaint does not charge that any elector will be forbidden to vote, but attacks action of the Central Committee, admittedly the governing body in the matter, in making rules and regulations and otherwise acting upon preliminary phases of the primary election scheduled for tomorrow. The alleged improprieties and irregularities do not amount, upon the showing thus far made, to violations of rights which require reversal of the judgment of the trial court denying preliminary injunctive protection. We therefore affirm.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.