The appellants, who are receivers and trustees, were ordered to sell certain realty. Their tenant, William B. Smith, was interested in acquiring the property because he did not want to be dispossessed. As he did not have sufficient funds, he induced the appellee, Richard H. Beckley, an uncle of his friend lone Lane, to agree to furnish the money. Beckley suggested that title be taken in his name but, when Smith pointed out his advanced age, agreed that it be taken in the name of his niece.

Under this arrangement, lone submitted to the appellants in her own name a written bid of $20,000. Having received another written bid of $23,500, the appellants submitted the larger offer to the court and an order nisi was entered. Some time prior to the return day fixed in the order, Smith and Beck-ley agreed to have lone bid orally at the hearing and that Beckley would advance the money for the purchase, to be secured by a first deed of trust, payable at the rate of $400 per month, applicable first to interest and then to the reduction of principal. Pursuant to this arrangement, the three appeared in court on return day. Beckley told the others then, for the first time, that he would lend no more than $30,000. When oral bidding began, lone made several bids which were authorized by signals from Beckley after he and Smith had conferred. Finally she made the high bid of $33,500 1 and made a deposit of $500 from her own funds, but failed to pay the balance when, after confirmation, a deed was tendered to her by the trustees.

At a second sale, ordered to be held at the risk of the defaulting purchaser, the property brought a price so much lower that a deficiency of more than $11,000 resulted. In the present proceeding, the receivers and trustees alleged that in making the bid of $33,500, lone Lane “was acting either in a joint venture with or as an agent, or so called ‘straw’, for * * * Richard H. Beck-ley and * * * William B. Smith, or one”, and sought to recover the deficiency from them.

After hearing evidence, the trial judge made findings of fact upon which the foregoing recital is based. He concluded as a matter of law (a) that lone, as agent for an undisclosed principal, is liable for the deficiency; (b) that she was acting for Smith, who as the real purchaser is also liable for the deficiency; (c) that Beckley was merely to lend the money for the purchase, that he was not a joint venturer, that lone was not his agent when she b'id $33,500, and that he is therefore not liable for the deficiency.

On their appeal, the receivers and trustees concede the correctness of the court’s findings of fact, but challenge its conclusions of law. It seems clear that after lone’s written bid of $20,000 was rejected, a new and different agreement was made, by the terms of which Beckley was to have no share in the purchase but was to lend the money on a first deed of trust. That being true, the court’s conclusions of law were correct.

Affirmed.