Karl Boehm v. Office of Alien Property
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision. The 7 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Oliver T. Carr, Jr. v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation (D.C. Cir. 1976)
- United States v. Melichar (District Court, E.D. Wisconsin 1972)
- Bill J. Gambocz v. John W. Ellmyer, Jr., Lillian Apel, Louis La Plaga and Marie Keller (3d Cir. 1971)
- Hale v. Ralston Purina Company (8th Cir. 1970)
- Hale v. Ralston Purina Co. (8th Cir. 1970)
- Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. First RepublicBank Corp. (5th Cir. 1993)
- Noland v. Flohr Metal Fabricators, Inc. (United States District Court for the District of Alaska 1984)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
This action was filed in the District Court under Section 34(f) of the Trading With The Enemy Act 1 to review the dismissal by the Director of the Office of Alien Property of appellant’s claim against vested property of the Deutsche Reichsbank for damage caused him and his two sons by the illegal acts of the German Government.
On December 7, 1960, a voluntary stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41, FED.R.CIV.P., was signed and filed by appellant. On February 6, 1964, appellant filed a motion to vacate the voluntary dismissal on the ground that he was induced by mistake to consent thereto. The District Court denied the motion, and appellant here alleges that it abused its discretion in so doing.
ing prejudice arising from a possible conflict of interest deriving from Laughlin’s dual status.
*195 Since appellant’s motion alleges mistake as the basis for relief, the one-year limitation under Rule 60(b) (1), Fed.R.Civ.P., is applicable. Here the motion was filed more than three years after the dismissal of his action. Appellant’s argument that the dismissal may also be vacated under Rule 60(b) (6), Fed.R.Civ.P., which permits the setting aside of final judgments for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment,” is without merit. There is no showing here of the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b) (6). See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950).
Affirmed.
. 60 Stat. 927, 50 U.S.C.App. § 34(f).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.