Democratic Central Committee v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission
Democratic Central Committee v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission
Opinion of the Court
Once again we are requested to stay Order No. 1052 of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, this time pending its judicial review on the merits. That order, issued last June 26 for effective operation on June 28, authorizes D. C. Transit System, Inc., to increase its fares for bus transportation in the District of Columbia and its Maryland suburbs. On June 27, upon motions of the present petitioners, we stayed the order until final decision by the Commission on petitioners’ respective applications for reconsideration.
Unlike the proceeding leading to our earlier stay, which hinged on resolution of a single legal problem, the instant motions invoke our general authority to suspend an administrative order pen-dente lite. The criteria by which the decision thereon is to be guided appear in four inquiries framed in our leading case on the subject.
On yesterday, we conducted a full hearing on the motions for stay, in which counsel for all parties participat
The legal arguments against Order No. 1052 are numerous and somewhat variegated. Some question the breadth of the Commission’s investigation into the proposed increases. Others object to the Commission’s treatment, or lack of treatment, of particular factors.
Emerging from the voluminous data of record are circumstances that give one pause when the realities of suspending Order No. 1052 are faced. Transit has sustained net income losses exceeding $2 million during the calendar years 1967-69. By the Commission’s estimates, Transit will incur a further loss of $3,974,990 if existing fares are continued during the future annual period. Transit’s equity has dwindled from a high of $4,291,706 in 1964 to a low of $1,282,336 near the end of 1969. Already Transit faces a severe shortage of operating funds resulting from its inability to accommodate its day-to-day expenses from the revenues generated by those fares. It is small wonder, then, that the Commission doubted whether Transit, without fare increases, could stay in business. Petitioners do not challenge the Commission’s statistics as far as they go, or the Commission’s conclusion if properly rested on them, but urge that the Commission’s probe should have gone much deeper. We, however, cannot ignore the prospect, to which the record lends credence, that the increases are essential to Transit’s continued existence, nor can we treat lightly the serious constitutional question that denial of the increases would pose in these circumstances.
We have been cited to no authority, and we know of none, which would justify ordering Transit to continue operations at a loss. To do so would be to deprive Transit of its property without due process of law, in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition. In' considering the alternatives
We are mindful, too, that a stay order can represent no more than an informed judgment as to what the future holds for the litigants. The experience of the past warns constantly that such judgments, however well conceived, may sometimes succumb to the fallibility of human perception. So it is that “[t]he possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”
Lastly, we look to the public interest considerations involved, and these fall partly on each side of the line. Indisputably, execution of Order No. 1052 will engender foreseeable hardships. The hike in fares will be felt, in varying degrees, over a broad segment of the District’s citizenry, with its most severe impact upon the poor. By one estimate, there will be a decrease of about eight million of some 112 million rides per year. On the other hand, the Commission’s findings portray an absolute necessity for additional revenue if Transit is to meet its operating expenses and costs of debt service, and a very real threat that without the authorized increases Transit may be forced to discontinue or curtail its existing public service. We are unable to see how the pubic interest would be worse served by a higher fare than by no public transportation system at all.
We also note that the 40-cents fare rate is not higher than in other cities comparable in population and extent to Washington, D.C. Of the 46 largest United States and Canadian cities the maximum fare within the city, including transfer charges where applicable, is 40 cents or greater in 23 of these cities.
The Commission’s investigation of the proposed fare increases extended over a period of three months. During the five days of hearings it held, it heard testimony consuming more than 800 pages of the transcript, and examined a large number of exhibits. Comparatively little countervailing evidence was introduced by protesting parties. The Commission also explored alternatives to a fare increase, but the opponents of the increase offered no alternative and the Commission found none; failing in that regard, it specified safeguards against diversions of funds for special purposes to other uses.
Our present ruling does not immunize Order No. 1052 from petitioners’ attacks, nor will it hinder remedial action if latent errors should later come to light. All we decide today is that, on the basis of the showing made and on balance of the relevant considerations, there is insufficient cause to upset it now. We will, however, exert our energies with a view to an early disposition of the litigation on the merits. We will streamline the briefing schedule for the parties, set a special date for oral argument and lend our best efforts to expedite the final decision. And we take this action in reliance upon the representation made by the Transit Company that it will not pay any dividends to stockholders during the current operating year.
Motions denied.
Of the 46 largest U. S. and Canadian Cities (Not including Washington D. C.)
1. The maximum fare within the city, including transfer charges where applicable is $.40 or greater in 23 of these cities.
2. 1 of these cities have a basic cash fare of $.50
3 of these cities have a basic cash fare of $.40
10 of these cities have a basic cash fare of $.35
19 of these cities have a basic cash fare of $.30
10 of these cities have a basic cash fare of $.25
3. 1 of these cities has a $.10 transfer charge
1 of these cities has a $.10 or $.20 transfer charge (depending on where transfer is used.)
18 of these cities have a $.05 transfer charge
5 of these cities have a $.02 transfer charge
20 of these cities have free transfers
1 of these cities does not use transfers
4. 22 of these cities use a zone system within the city
5. The average maximum fare within the city, including transfer charges where applicable, for all systems on which maximum fares are shown, is $.39
. Black United Front v. WMATC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. -, 436 F.2d 227 (Opinion filed July 2, 1970).
. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (1958).
. Id. at 110, 259 F.2d at 925.
. Our hearing was set as soon as practicable in view of the need to afford the parties an opportunity for filings. As we have pointed out, Order No. 1052 is currently scheduled to take effect one minute after midnight tonight.
. See D. C. Transit System, Inc. v. WMATC, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 350 F.2d 753 (en banc 1965).
. See Williams v. WMATC, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 415 F.2d 922 (en lane 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081, 89 S.Ct. 860, 21 L.Ed.2d 773 (1969) ; Payne v. WMATC, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 415 F.2d 901 (1968).
. See, e. g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S.Ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819 (1898); Railroad Commission Cases (Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 6 S.Ct. 334, 388, 1191, 29 L.Ed. 636 (1886).
. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, supra note 2, 104 U.S.App.D.C. at 110, 259 F.2d at 925.
. See Williams v. WMATC, supra note 6; Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm., 115 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 318 F.2d 187 (en banc), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 1304, 10 L.Ed.2d 414 (1963).
. Notable difficulties are that the group of busriders who earlier paid higher fares . is not identical to the group reaping the future benefit, and that a riders' fund is no help to one whose economic circumstances are such that a fare increase puts bus transportation beyond his reach.
. See Williams v. WMATC, supra note 6, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 360-361, 415 F.2d at 940-941.
. See appendix hereto. The comparable fares for purposes of this case are set forth in column (4) because D. C. transit fares include transfer privileges.
. A prominent example, among several, was the Commission’s requirement that $620,000 of Transit’s net operating income be escrowed to enable down payments on purchases of new buses.
. Transit’s average rate of return for the period 1956-68 has been 3.2 percent on gross operating revenues. Under the fares authorized by Order No. 1052, Transit expeetably will generate a rate of return of 5.21 percent. It must be remembered, however, that $620,000 of the projected net operating income of $2,440,-284 must be devoted, under Commission supervision, to down payments on new buses, see note 13, supra; moreover, $1,-533,138 will be required for interest payments. Transit’s indebtedness considered, the Commission felt that it was “highly unlikely” that Transit could pay any dividends to its investors in the current operating year, and Transit has represented to the court that it will not undertake to do so.
. Transit has not earned any return since 1968. Transit attributes this to overestimates in revenues and underestimates in expenses in the process of projecting the returns.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION, D. C. Transit System, Inc., Intervenor DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION, D. C. Transit System, Inc., Intervenor The BLACK UNITED FRONT v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION
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- 6 cases
- Status
- Published