United States v. Ramsey, Charles W.

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 9, 1998 Decided February 9, 1999

Nos. 97-3100 and 97-3184 United States of America,

Appellee v. Charles W. Ramsey,

Appellant Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00326-01) ---------

Francis D. Carter, appointed by the court, argued the cause for the appellant.

Charles W. Ramsey filed a brief pro se.

Michael Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney, ar- gued the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown and John P. Dominguez, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief for the appellee.

Before: Wald, Williams and Henderson, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson. Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Charles Ram- sey was convicted of one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii). Through counsel, Ramsey raises several issues, including whether the trial court erred: (1) in allowing the Government to introduce evidence of Ramsey's character; (2) in failing to find entrapment as a matter of law and (3) in sentencing Ramsey to 210 months' imprisonment. Ramsey pro se appeals the Government's use of Francisco Fierro as an informant witness. Finding no error, we affirm Ramsey's conviction and sentence.

I. Background On December 14, 1995, Ramsey was charged in a two-count indictment with one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii), and one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. s 846. The charges arose out of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) undercover operation that began earli- er in 1995 when Francisco Fierro agreed to assist DEA as an informant, following his arrest for attempted murder and various weapons offenses after a fight in a Miami restaurant. Although Fierro could provide no leads in Florida, DEA decided to use Fierro as an informant in the Washington, D.C. area because his main client had been a Washington- area drug dealer named Charles Ramsey. Fierro informed DEA Agent Ronald Woods that he had delivered substantial quantities of drugs to Ramsey in Washington at least eight times in 1993-94 and that Ramsey accounted for all of his kilogram-level sales.

The first transaction between Fierro and Ramsey took place in Georgetown in early 1993 when Fierro delivered approximately seven ounces of heroin to Ramsey. Seven times over the following year, Fierro delivered between one and ten kilograms of cocaine to Ramsey, selling him in toto 39 kilograms of cocaine for approximately $20,000 each.1 The two men used a delivery procedure that involved a meeting, usually in a hotel room, where Fierro "fronted" Ramsey one or two kilograms. Ramsey then left to sell the cocaine and returned later with payment. Fierro then fronted Ramsey another one or two kilograms and Ramsey repeated the procedure until all of the drugs had been sold, usually within one week. In mid-1994, at his wife's insistence, Fierro left the drug trade.

In September 1995 DEA decided to use Fierro in a "re- verse" undercover operation against Ramsey. DEA's initial plan was to conduct the transaction differently from the way Fierro and Ramsey had traditionally done business--by mak- ing Ramsey pay for the drugs up front. DEA also sought to increase its control over the operation by having DEA Agent Robert Valentine pose as a drug dealer. Fierro's role was to facilitate the exchange between Valentine and Ramsey.

Between mid-September 1995 and his arrest on November 21, 1995, Ramsey and Fierro had numerous recorded tele- phone and face-to-face conversations about drug transactions. Most of the conversations were recorded by DEA or by Fierro using DEA-supplied equipment. On September 25, 1995 Ramsey met Fierro in a hotel room. During a video- taped conversation, they discussed a five-kilogram transaction and the fact that Valentine, posing as the distributor, re- quired payment up front. While Ramsey was eager to move several kilograms, he did not have the cash to buy the drugs at delivery. On October 6, 1995 Valentine and Ramsey met without Fierro at a restaurant. Ramsey mentioned that Washington was currently "dry" of cocaine on both the whole- sale and retail levels, a fact consistent with DEA information. Ramsey wanted to know if the drugs could be fronted but Valentine refused. Nevertheless, Valentine assured Ramsey that he would contact him about selling five kilograms of cocaine.

On October 24, 1995 Valentine and Fierro met Ramsey at a hotel. They had cocaine with them. In an audio taped conversation Ramsey asked to see the cocaine but, after going "around and around" with Valentine, still refused to pay up front. Tr. at 506. The three men arranged to meet again on November 2, 1995. On November 2, in a videotaped conver- sation in Valentine's car, Valentine showed Ramsey five one- kilogram bricks. Ramsey said that he could move the cocaine quickly and offered to pay for one kilogram but not until 8:00 p.m. that evening. Becoming increasingly suspicious, Valen- tine rejected the offer.

After this transaction fell through, it was clear to DEA that Ramsey would not deal unless he was fronted the drugs and that Ramsey preferred to deal only with Fierro. Therefore, DEA changed its strategy by pulling Valentine out of the operation and instructing Fierro to arrange a buy using his old procedure. On November 15, 1995 Fierro contacted Ramsey and offered to front him five kilograms on November 21, 1995. When Ramsey arrived at Fierro's hotel room on the 21st, Fierro showed him the five one-kilogram bricks. Agreeing to a cost of $20,000 each, Ramsey decided to take two kilograms and said that he would return for the other three. Ramsey then placed the two bricks inside a black duffle bag and left the room. He was arrested by DEA agents in the hallway and the drugs were recovered from his bag.2

On May 14, 1996 Ramsey's jury trial commenced in the district court. On May 21, 1996 the jury returned a guilty verdict on the first count. Before sentencing, Ramsey filed a out a limiting jury instruction is plain error, citing United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d 1463, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Valentine, however, testified merely as to his agency's knowl- edge and intent at the time it decided to initiate an undercov- er operation against Ramsey to rebut defense counsel's sug- gestion that DEA relied solely on Fierro for information about Ramsey's willingness to deal drugs. See, e.g., Tr. at 550 (prosecutor affirming, "All I want to ask [Valentine] is if he has pertinent information that led him to believe that there was not going to be an entrapment issue....").

We next reject Ramsey's claim of entrapment as a matter of law because the record contains ample evidence that Ramsey was predisposed to commit a drug offense. See United States v. Neville, 82 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Budd, 23 F.3d 442, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995).6 The record reflects that __________

Nor did the district court err in counting the 39 kilograms of cocaine Ramsey purchased from Fierro in 1993-94 as part of the "same course of conduct" as Ramsey's offense of conviction under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3(a)(2) (requiring district court to determine offense level "solely with respect to offenses ... that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction"); see United States v. Ramsey, No. 95-326, at 3-6 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1997) (sentencing opinion); see also United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (clear error review of district court's determination that past conduct is related to offense of conviction). "Extraneous offenses qualify as part of the same course of conduct if 'they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.' " Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 438 (quoting U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3(a)(2), comment n.9(B)). Thus, the district court's inquiry must "focus[ ] on whether the defendant repeats the same type of criminal activity over time and engage[s] in an identifiable behavior pattern of specified criminal activity." Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the district __________ transaction, the pressure applied by the Government, any reluc- tance displayed by Ramsey and Ramsey's past illegal conduct. See Neville, 82 F.3d at 1107-08; Budd, 23 F.3d at 446; Burkley, 591 F.2d at 916. court went beyond an analysis of temporal proximity, noting that the transactions involved the same parties, see United States v. Jones, 948 F.2d 732, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1991), were of a similar character and nature and involved between one and ten one-kilogram bricks of cocaine, see Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 439, and that the temporary hiatus was Fierro's, rather than Ramsey's, decision. See United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1990) (transactions separated by 8-14 months while buyer was incarcerated were sufficiently similar in other respects to constitute same course of conduct). Since Ramsey's nine drug transactions with Fierro manifest- ed an ongoing relationship and pattern of criminal activity, the district court did not clearly err in counting 39 kilograms from previous transactions as part of the "same course of conduct" under U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3(a)(2).

Finally, Ramsey cannot establish sentencing entrapment because the district court correctly found that he was predis- posed to purchase five kilograms on November 21, 1995. See United States v. Shepherd, 102 F.3d 558, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (for sentencing entrapment "main element ... is ... the defendant's predisposition") (quotation omitted); Walls, 70 F.3d at 1329 (same); see also United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reviewing district court's findings of fact for clear error, "giving due deference to the district court's application of the Guidelines to the facts"), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 446 (1997). For instance, the record shows inter alia that Ramsey saw the five kilograms, asked Fierro to supply drugs weekly and routinely purchased up to ten, but ordinarily five, kilograms using the fronting method. See Shepherd, 120 F.3d at 566.7 __________

B.

Ramsey's pro se challenge8 requires a lengthier discussion not because of its merit but because our Circuit has not heretofore ruled on the challenge that our sister circuit courts have rejected. Ramsey asks this Court to consider whether the Government's use of Fierro as an informant violated 18 U.S.C. s 201(c)(2).9 Ramsey made his challenge after the Tenth Circuit, in an unprecedented10 decision, held that a federal prosecutor's agreement granting leniency to an ac- complice in return for truthful testimony as a government witness violated the plain language of section 201(c)(2). See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1352 (10th Cir. 1998). The court therefore held inadmissible the accomplice's testimony and reversed Singleton's conviction. See id. at 1347. The Tenth Circuit sitting en banc has since reversed the panel decision. See United States v. Singleton, 1999 WL 6469 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1999) (en banc). In the meantime, the Singleton panel's interpretation of section 201(c)(2) has been rejected by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and every federal district court to consider the issue, save three. See, e.g., __________ 31 & n.22. But see Sentencing Tr. at 13 (Ramsey's counsel in- formed court that relevant amount of drugs was "two kilograms of cocaine [Ramsey] walked out the door with"). According to U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(c)(3), however, "[a]t least 15 KG but less than 50 KG of [c]ocaine" places Ramsey at level 34. Thus, reducing the amount of cocaine attributable to Ramsey by four (or even five) kilograms is of no significance.

For several reasons, we hold that section 201(c)(2) does not prohibit the Government from granting leniency in exchange for truthful testimony.

We first look to the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. s 1, which is to be used "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise," and note that its definition of "whoever" does not expressly include the United States. 1 U.S.C. s 1 (defining "whoever" to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals"). Moreover, we conclude that the meaning of "[w]hoever" in section 201(c)(2) should be limited by the canon of construc- tion that a statute does not apply to the government or affect governmental rights unless the text expressly includes the government. In United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937), the Supreme Court declared, "[T]he cases in which [the canon] has been applied fall into two classes." First, the canon applies if application of the statute to the United States "would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established prerogative title or interest." Id. There are, according to Nardone, two exceptions to this class of cases. Under the first exception, "[t]he rule of exclusion of the sovereign is less stringently applied where the operation of the law is upon the agents or servants of the government rather than on the sovereign itself." Id.11

The Nardone canon also applies if application of the statute to public agents would create an obvious absurdity. See id. at 384; see also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 47 n.5 (1994) (statute's plain meaning disregarded if it "leads to an absurd result").12

We first conclude that application of section 201(c)(2) to the United States would deprive the sovereign of a critically important interest, one that is well established in our legal system and recognized by the courts, the Congress and, more recently, the United States Sentencing Commission. The __________

The Whiskey Cases (United States v. Ford), 99 U.S. 594, 599- 601, 604 (1878). Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue before us, it has consistently upheld the practice of plea bargaining. Other Supreme Court cases sanction by implication a prosecutorial promise of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony. See Delaware v. Van Ars- dall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-80 (1986) (concluding that court's refusal to allow defendant to question witness about dis- missed charge violated Sixth Amendment right to confronta- tion); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980) (affirming sentence due in part to defendant's refusal to cooperate with government in spite of being offered "favor- able disposition of his case"); id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissent- ing) (expressly upholding plea bargaining process); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding prosecution's failure to disclose promise of leniency to witness, provided in exchange for that witness's testimony, violated due process).

Circuit courts have been more explicit in their approval of a prosecutorial plea agreement with an accomplice or co- defendant conditioned on his truthful testimony for the Gov- ernment. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 956 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 (1987); United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 196 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that "[l]ong ago the courts rejected the notion that the testimony of co- defendants and other interested witnesses was so likely to be unreliable that it should be excluded"); United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 772 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974) (sanctioning grant of civil immunity in exchange for testimony and stating, "If the government can excuse crimi- nal or civil liability in settling a criminal case, surely it can use that power of compromise to obtain guilty pleas or to procure testimony in other proceedings. Both are legitimate objectives of plea bargaining.") (emphasis original), cert. de- nied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975). According to the Fifth Circuit, "No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence." United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Nelson v. United States, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988).

Moreover, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recog- nize and accept plea bargaining. Although Rule 11(e), which sets out the procedure governing plea agreements, does not identify the types of commitments the Government may ask of individuals in exchange for leniency, the Advisory Commit- tee notes recognize that an agreement may require more than relinquishing the right to trial. According to the notes to the 1975 amendments of Rule 11:

[It is apparent, though not explicitly stated, that Rule 11(e) contemplates that the plea agreement may bind the defendant to do more than just plead guilty or nolo contendere. For example, the plea agreement may bind the defendant to cooperate with the prosecution in a different investigation. The Committee intends by its approval of Rule 11(e) to permit the parties to agree on such terms in a plea agreement.]

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 Advisory Committee's notes (1975) (brackets in original); see also id. Advisory Committee's notes (1974) ("plea agreement[s] may also contribute to the successful prosecution of other more serious offenders").

In addition, both the United States Code and the Sentenc- ing Guidelines contemplate the prosecutor's use of a plea agreement in exchange for truthful testimony against a defen- dant. For example, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the United States Sentencing Commission and explicitly required it "to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 28 U.S.C. s 994(n). The 1984 Act also allows a court on the Govern- ment's motion "to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 18 U.S.C. s 3553(e). The Sentencing Guidelines themselves authorize the sentencing court to depart downward for any defendant who provides "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1. Among the factors the court may consider in determining whether to grant the Government's motion for downward departure are "the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant." U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1(a)(2).

Moreover, application of section 201(c)(2) to the Govern- ment obstructs the sovereign's, not the individual prosecu- tor's, interest in plea agreements inasmuch as the prosecutor brings federal criminal charges in the name of the United States. As the Sixth Circuit aptly noted:

When an assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) en- ters into a plea agreement with a defendant, that plea agreement is between the United States government and the defendant. When an AUSA uses at trial testimony obtained through a plea agreement or an agreement not to prosecute, he does so as the government. An AUSA who, pursuant to the provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, moves for a downward departure under s 5K1.1, does so as the government.

Ware, 161 F.3d at 421; see also 18 U.S.C. s 3553(e) (allowing sentence reduction "[u]pon motion of the government").

Nor are we persuaded by any assertion that the Congress intended section 201(c)(2) "to prevent fraud, injury, or wrong" arising from government offers of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony. A prosecutor is obligated to disclose any benefit conferred on any witness, see Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150, and a benefit conferred under a plea agreement must be approved by the district court. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e). Furthermore, any prosecutor who attempts to "corruptly" bribe a witness could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. s 201(b)(3).13 Such a prosecutor would not be acting as the United States because an ultra vires act implicates no sover- eign interest. Accordingly, having determined that neither of the exceptions to the first class of Nardone cases applies, we conclude that application of section 201(c)(2) to the Govern- ment would deprive the sovereign of a recognized and estab- lished prerogative and interest. See Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383.

In addition, we believe this case falls within the second class of cases to which the Nardone canon applies. Applica- tion of section 201(c)(2) to a federal prosecutor offering leniency in exchange for truthful testimony works obvious absurdities. To interpret section 201(c)(2) as the Tenth Cir- cuit originally did, see Singleton 144 F.3d at 1346-48, would expose to criminal liability any federal prosecutor who en- tered into a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(e) and any federal judge who either approved a Rule 11(e) plea agree- ment or reduced a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 3553(e) or U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1(a)(2) based in part on a witness's testimo- __________

The application of section 201(c)(2) to public officers also produces an absurd conflict with statutory schemes prescrib- ing reduced sentences and immunity for co-conspirators and accomplices who provide testimony for the Government. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C s 3521 (Witness Relocation and Protection Act authorizing Attorney General to exchange things of value for witness's agreement "to testify"); 18 U.S.C s 3553(e) (reduction below statutory minimum sentence authorized in exchange for "substantial assistance"); 18 U.S.C ss 6001-05 (federal immunity statutes); 28 U.S.C. s 994(n) (requiring Sentencing Commission to provide for sentencing guideline reductions); Gabourel, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (rejecting original Singleton interpretation after examining "the larger statutory context, its object and policy"). For instance, 18 U.S.C. s 6003, a provision of the Organized Crime Control __________

This result cannot be avoided by attempting to argue that the language of the statute forbids only the use of the testimony from a witness who has entered into the plea agreement, not the plea agreement itself. Because a defendant who enters into a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11 must appear before the court and enter his plea, the defendant's entry of that plea is testimony.

Ware, 161 F.3d at 421 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). Act of 1970, authorizes a United States Attorney, with the approval of the Attorney General or certain other federal officials, to seek a court order granting immunity to a witness whose testimony he considers necessary in the public interest. Yet a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 6003 is clearly "[some]thing of value" given "for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation," 18 U.S.C. s 201(c)(2). See Ware, 161 F.3d at 423 (concluding that more recently enacted statutes than section 201(c)(2) "specifically allow what [Singleton's original] broad interpretation of the more gener- ally applicable s 201(c)(2) would prohibit"). We therefore conclude that application of section 201(c)(2) to federal prose- cutors offering leniency in exchange for testimony works obvious absurdities. For these reasons, we apply the Nar- done canon "which provides that statutes do not apply to the government or affect governmental rights unless the text expressly includes the government," Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383, and interpret "[w]hoever" as used in 18 U.S.C. s 201(c)(2) to be exclusive of the United States.

If we were to find the language of 18 U.S.C. s 201(c)(2) ambiguous, which we do not, an examination of the relevant legislative history would be appropriate. See Saadeh v. Far- ouki, 107 F.3d 52, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("If the language is plain on its face, courts do not ordinarily resort to legislative history."). Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (If "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."). Noth- ing in section 201(c)(2)'s legislative history indicates that the Congress intended to apply the statute to the Government's plea arrangements. Moreover, a sub silentio change of this magnitude to the well-established prosecutorial practice of granting leniency in exchange for testimony would be virtual- ly unprecedented. Such a change ignores the rule of statuto- ry construction that "[a] party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change." Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989). Although House Report No. 87-748, notes that section 201(h) (the predecessor of section 201(c)(2)) "forbids offers of payments to a witness of anything of value 'for or because of' testimony given or to be given," the legislative history contains no indication that section 201, originally enacted in 1962 by Pub. L. No. 87-849, was designed to terminate the longstanding prosecutorial prerogative of exchanging leniency for truthful testimony. H.R. Rep. No. 87-748, at 16 (1961); see also S. Rep. No. 87-2213 (1961) (containing same language). The legislative history of the 1970, 1986 and 1994 amendments to section 201 is also silent on the issue. Nor do those amendments address the resulting contradiction in the statutory scheme if the Congress had intended section 201(c)(2) to apply to the Government. In particular, the 1986 and 1994 amendments were passed after 18 U.S.C s 3553(e) (reduction below statu- tory minimum sentence), 18 U.S.C s 6003 (immunity statute) and 28 U.S.C. s 994(n) (requiring Sentencing Commission to allow sentencing guideline reductions) but the potential con- flict with these statutes was never addressed. As the Sixth Circuit rightly concluded, "Clearly the explanation is that no such conflict exists as s 201(c)(2) was never intended to apply to the government." Ware, 161 F.3d at 423 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-570 s 1007, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat. 32707) 5393; Pub. L. No. 99-646 s 48, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N (100 Stat. 3592) 6139).

Finally, even if federal prosecutors were subject to section 201(c)(2), that fact would not justify excluding Fierro's testi- mony. The Congress prescribed a fine or imprisonment for a violation of section 201(c)(2). "Where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its violation, we would 'encroach upon the prerogatives' of Con- gress were we to authorize a remedy not provided for by statute." Ware, 161 F.3d at 424 (quoting United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 844 (1986)); see United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 1991) (court may not suppress testimony for statutory violation unless Congress explicitly or implicitly provided exclusion as a remedy for a violation), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1075 (1992); see also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 1983) (exclusionary rule fashioned to vindicate "specific, constitutionally protected rights"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v. Harrington, 681 F.2d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 1982) ("There must be an exceptional reason, typically the protection of a constitutional right, to invoke the exclusionary rule."). Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the "substantial" cost of exclusion which "hamper[s]" the enforcement of valid laws and keeps "concededly relevant and reliable evidence" from the jury. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) ("[U]nbend- ing application of the exclusionary sanction ... would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial.").

III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 18 U.S.C. s 201(c)(2) does not prohibit the Government from granting leniency in exchange for a witness's truthful testimony. As discussed earlier, Ramsey's other assignments of error are without merit. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction and sentence are

Affirmed.