Assn Comm Ent v. FCC

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued October 11, 2000 Decided January 9, 2001 No. 99-1441 Association of Communications Enterprises, Appellant v. Federal Communications Commission, Appellee AT&T Corporation, et al., Intervenors Appeal of an Order of the Federal Communications Commission Charles C. Hunter argued the cause for appellant and supporting intervenor Competitive Telecommunications Asso- ciation. With him on the briefs were Catherine M. Hannan and Robert M. McDowell.

Peter D. Keisler argued the cause for intervenor AT&T Corp. With him on the brief were Mark C. Rosenblum, Roy E. Hoffinger and C. Frederick Beckner III.

John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for appellee.

With him on the brief were Christopher J. Wright, General Counsel, and Laurence N. Bourne, Counsel.

Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for intervenor SBC Communications Inc. With him on the brief were James D.

Ellis and Martin E. Grambow.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers, Circuit Judge, and Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.* Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge Silberman.

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge: The Association of Com- munications Enterprises appeals from an order of the Feder- al Communications Commission approving the transfer of Commission licenses from Ameritech Corp. to SBC Communi- cations Inc. in connection with the merger of the two compa- nies. The order allows the merged company to avoid statuto- ry resale obligations on certain advanced telecommunications services by providing those services through a subsidiary.

We vacate.

I.

As all observers of the American telecommunications sys- tem are well aware, when a 1982 consent decree dismantled the Bell monopoly over many telecommunications services, the Bell System's local exchange operations were severed from its other operations and split geographically among seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). Ameri- tech and SBC were both RBOCs and provided various states with local exchange and exchange access services, which depend critically on maintenance and operation of the "local loop," the physical infrastructure by which wire-based tele- ment that they offer advanced services at wholesale prices by merely creating a subsidiary--albeit a subsidiary that must operate somewhat separately from the ILEC. And according to appellant, Congress manifested a clear intent that the Commission not forbear from regulating any ILEC's telecom- munications services, including advanced services, unless cer- tain market conditions are met. Intervenor AT&T trains its fire on the Commission's interpretation of the phrase "succes- sor or assign," claiming that its construction of those terms is inconsistent with a number of cases in which those terms are defined as used in other statutes. The Commission insists that it is not actually utilizing its forbearance authority and that the phrase "successor or assign" is sufficiently ambigu- ous so that under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we are obliged to defer to the Commission's interpretation. As should be obvi- ous, these arguments are quite interrelated. For even if we conclude that the Commission has not formally used its forbearance authority and that the phrase "successor or assign" is ambiguous, the meaning of the statute, as revealed by its structure, may render the Commission's "successor or assign" construction unreasonable.

Section 10 of the Act provides in relevant part: ... [T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of this chapter to a telecom- munications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers or telecommunica- tions services, in any or some of its or their geographic markets, if the Commission determines that-- (1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifi- cations, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications ser- vice are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regu- lation is consistent with the public interest. 47 U.S.C. s 160(a). But the Commission "may not forbear from applying the requirements of section 251(c) ... until it determines that those requirements have been fully imple- mented." 47 U.S.C. s 160(d). Because those requirements have not been fully implemented here, the FCC (as it con- cedes) may not forbear.7 Appellant argues that the Merger Order is "the legal and practical equivalent" of forbearance. In other words, to apply s 251(c) as narrowly as the Commission has done is akin to forbearing from regulating. The Commission insists that it is not actually "forbearing" but rather interpreting s 251(c) not to apply to this affiliate structure. In other words, the definition of ILEC in s 251(h) does not explicitly mention affiliates, so the Commission claims authority to determine case by case whether a particular affiliate is an incumbent LEC or not. When it does so it is interpreting the statute rather than determining whether to forbear.

We think appellant's argument is a powerful one. Al- though the Commission has not explicitly invoked forbearance authority (in direct violation of s 10), to allow an ILEC to sideslip s 251(c)'s requirements by simply offering telecom- munications services through a wholly owned affiliate seems to us a circumvention of the statutory scheme. The Commis- sion justifies its order by drawing our focus to its definition of "successor and assign." The Commission reasons that the affiliate structure it approved would be illegal only if it were obliged to treat an affiliate as a successor and assign of an ILEC, because only under these circumstances would s 251(c)'s requirements carry over to the affiliate. And since "successors and assigns" is not defined in the Act, the Com- mission's definition is entitled to Chevron deference.

The Commission's approach gives rise to a fierce argument, mounted particularly by intervenor AT&T, that the Commis- sion's definition of successor and assign is impermissible.

AT&T draws particularly on NLRB cases to claim that the affiliate must be thought a successor or assign. See, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987); NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908, 911 (8th Cir. 1954). AT&T emphasizes that the affiliate markets the same category of services to the same body of potential customers as did SBC/Ameritech. The Commission decided the affiliate was not a successor or assign essentially because the company did not transfer its "traditional business operations"--its monopoly assets. Thus, the Commission has permitted, through the technique of defining successor and assign to exclude the transfer of advanced services to an affiliate, the very result it had previously rejected--allowing an incumbent LEC to avoid the resale obligation on its advanced services.

Paradoxically the Commission is using language designed by Congress as an added limitation on an ILEC's ability to offer telecommunications services as a statutory device to ameliorate s 251(c)'s restriction. We do not think that in the absence of the successor and assign limitation an ILEC would be permitted to circumvent s 251(c)'s obligations merely by setting up an affiliate to offer telecommunications services.

The Commission is thus using the successor and assign limitation as a form of legal jujitsu to justify its relaxation of s 251(c)'s restrictions.

That an ILEC would not be permitted to avoid the limita- tions on telecommunications services--including advanced services--through a wholly owned affiliate, even in the ab- sence of the "successor or assign" restriction, is evident by examination of the very provision on which the Commission relies to justify the affiliate structure in this case. The Commission looks to 47 U.S.C. s 272, which allows ILECs to provide certain maintenance and long-distance services--but not advanced services--through a separate affiliate. As set out in the Merger Order, the advanced services affiliate must "operate largely in accordance with the structural, transac- tional, and nondiscrimination requirements of [47 U.S.C. s] 272(b), (c), (e), and (g)." Merger Order p 364.

But s 272 applies only to manufacturing activities, telecom- munications services between different local access and trans- port areas (LATAs), and interLATA information services-- not advanced services. See 47 U.S.C. s 272(a)(2). It sets out a series of formal structural and transactional obligations intended to check LECs' incentive to leverage their bottle- neck assets into market power over other telecommunications services. LECs can provide the services covered by s 272 only through a separate affiliate, which must "operate inde- pendently" of its LEC; maintain separate books, records, and accounts; have separate officers, directors, and employees; and conduct all transactions with its parent LEC "on an arm's length basis ... reduced to writing and available for public inspection." Id. s 272(b)(1)-(3), (5). The LEC is prohibited from discriminating between its s 272 affiliate and other entities "in the provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities, and information, or in the establishment of stan- dards." Id. s 272(c)(1).

To be sure, obligations substantially similar to these bind the new company and its advanced services affiliate by force of the Merger Order. See Merger Order p 364.8 But s 272 is not only an inapt analogy, it actually undermines the Commission's position. As intervenor AT&T points out, s 272 affiliates are established primarily to provide interLATA telephone service, which an ILEC is generally barred from providing. See 47 U.S.C. s 271. Since the ILEC may not provide this service in the first place, the s 272 affiliate obviously does not succeed to an existing interLATA tele- phone service business or to the assets the ILEC used to provide that service. This point alone would render the s 272 comparison inapposite for advanced services, which were previously provided by the merged companies, see Merger Order p 475. Yet the s 272 comparison is even more damning than that, for s 272 evidences Congress' considered judgment as to when an ILEC may legally provide telecom- munications services through an affiliate and thereby avoid some of the Act's strictures. Since Congress prescribed no such affiliate structure for advanced services, we must as- sume that Congress did not intend for s 251(c)'s obligations to be avoided by the use of such an affiliate.

Congress thus has specified when conditions justify allow- ing an ILEC to provide telecommunications services without s 251(c)'s duties. And it has specified when an ILEC may avoid the Act's burdens by providing telecommunications services through a separate affiliate, and what services that affiliate may provide. In short, the Act's structure renders implausible the notion that a wholly owned affiliate providing telecommunications services with equipment originally owned by its ILEC parent, to customers previously served by its ILEC parent, marketed under the name of its ILEC parent, should be presumed to be exempted from the duties of that ILEC parent.9

That is not to say that the Commission would not be entitled to some running room in defining the terms successor and assign. For instance if an ILEC sold its advanced service to an unaffiliated company the Commission might well be entitled to conclude that the new company was not a successor and assign.

The real explanation for the Commission's rather tortured statutory interpretation in this case is set forth powerfully in intervenor SBC's brief. It is argued that the Commission's order is justified because the clear purpose of the Telecom- munications Act--particularly the requirements of s 251(c)-- is to prevent an ILEC from abusing its market power over the local loop to prevent competition. If an ILEC has no market power over advanced services, an affiliate structure to offer those services should be permitted by concluding it is not a successor or assign so long as the affiliate is sufficiently separate. Of course, if intervenor's economic analysis is correct it is not apparent why a separate affiliate would be necessary--or even useful. It could be thought that the affiliate structure is a non sequitur if an ILEC cannot use its local loop monopoly to leverage its position in the advanced service market.

But whether or not SBC's premise is economically sound, it is unfortunately not Congress' premise. As the Commission concedes, Congress did not treat advanced services different- ly from other telecommunications services. See Deployment Order p 11. It did not limit the regulation of telecommunica- tions services to those services that rely on the local loop.

For that reason the Commission may not permit an ILEC to avoid s 251(c) obligations as applied to advanced services by setting up a wholly owned affiliate to offer those services.

Whether one concludes that the Commission has actually forborne or whether its interpretation of "successor or as- sign" is unreasonable, the conclusion is the same: The Com- mission's interpretation of the Act's structure is unreasonable.

* * * * The order of the Federal Communications Commission is vacated.

So ordered.