Olson v. Federal Election Commission
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision. The 14 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Turner v. ILG Technologies LLC (District Court, W.D. Missouri 2021)
- Jackson v. Noem (District Court, District of Columbia 2026)
- Wallace v. United States of America (District Court, District of Columbia 2026)
- Perales v. Harris (District Court, District of Columbia 2026)
- Chaves v. United States Department of Education (TV1) (District Court, E.D. Tennessee 2025)
- The WRX LLC v. BSI Group America Inc. (District Court, W.D. Michigan 2025)
- Strong v. Su (District Court, District of Columbia 2025)
- Webb v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (District Court, District of Columbia 2024)
- Bullock v. Hana Security Services (District Court, District of Columbia 2024)
- HICKSON v. PECO ENERGY (District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 2022)
- Kanam v. Secretary of the Interior (District Court, District of Columbia 2021)
- Johnson-Richardson v. University of Phoenix (District Court, District of Columbia 2020)
- Hardy v. Joseph I. Sussman, P.C. (District Court, District of Columbia 2013)
- Judd v. Federal Communications Commission (District Court, District of Columbia 2011)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. BACKGROUND
David E. Olson, a resident of Idaho’s First Congressional District, ran for the office of United States Representative in 2006. See Compl. at 1. After the election, Mr. Olson filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) alleging that some of his opponents violated a regulation promulgated by the FEC to implement notice and filing requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et seq. (“FECA”).
During the 2006 election cycle, candidates were required to file “Declarations of Intent” with the FEC and each opposing candidate within 15 days of becoming a candidate. See 11 C.F.R. § 400.20(a)(1) (2006).
Mr. Olson then filed suit in this Court, seeking judicial review of the FEC’s decision. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8). Mr. Olson’s complaint asserts that the FEC’s interpretation of 11 C.F.R. § 400.20 represents “an impermissible interpretation of the Federal Campaign Act, or ... was arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion.” Compl. at 4.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Insufficient Service of Process
Rule 4(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that service may be effected by “[a]ny person who is ... not a party [.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 4(c)(2) is violated when a plaintiff personally attempts to serve a defendant — including the United States — by mail. See, e.g., Reading v. United States, 506 F.Supp.2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2007); Foster v. United States, Civil Action No. 05-1759, 2006 WL 2473615, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2006); Otto v. United States, Civil Action No. O5-2319, 2006 WL 2270399, at *1-2 (D.D.C. June 28, 2006) (and cases cited therein). Courts may dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails to comply with the Federal Rules governing service. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(4), (5); see generally 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1353 (3d ed. 2004) (“Wright & Miller”).
Here, the FEC asserts (and Mr. Olson does not deny) that Mr. Olson attempted to serve the FEC by mailing the summons and complaint to the agency. See Mot. at 8 n. 6; see also Opp. at 6. Mr. Olson offers no explanation for his failure to effect proper service — either before or after the FEC noted his failure to do so. The Court therefore will grant the FEC’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for insufficient service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).
B. Mootness
It bears noting that the regulation at issue in this case was recently repealed by the FEC. See Repeal of Increased Contribution and Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits for Candidates Opposing Self-Financed Candidates, 73 Fed.Reg. 79597, 79602 (Dec. 30, 2008).
A separate Order will issue this same day.
SO ORDERED.
. The papers submitted in connection with this matter include: Defendant Federal Election Commission's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Mot.”); Plaintiff's Rebuttal to Motion to Dismiss Complaint ("Opp.”); and Defendant Federal Election Commission's Reply Memorandum In Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Reply”).
. In these Declarations of Intent, candidates were required to declare whether they intended to spend in excess of $350,000 of their own funds on their campaigns and, if so, the amount in excess of $350,000 that they intended to spend.
This [regulation arose] from the “Millionaire's Amendment” to FECA, which, in some circumstances, permitted] the campaign committee of a candidate whose opponent makes large personal expenditures on her own behalf to receive larger contributions than would otherwise be permissible.
Mot. at 2. Candidates' Declarations of Intent were "noted on the candidate’s Statement of Candidacy, FEC Form 2." 11 C.F.R. § 400.20(b)(2) (2006).
. The FEC in fact relies on Rule 12(b)(4), but the Court treats its motion as a motion under Rule 12(b)(5) because "a Rule 12(b)(4) motion is proper only to challenge noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 4(b) or any applicable provision incorporated by Rule 4(b) that deals specifically with the content of the summons. A Rule 12(b)(5) motion is the proper vehicle for challenging the mode of delivery or the lack of deliv-eiy of the summons and complaint," as the FEC does here. Wright & Miller § 1353, at 334.
. The FEC repealed 11 C.F.R. § 400.20 and related regulations because the statutory basis for those regulations — that is, the "Millionaire's Amendment” to FECA, see supra at 9 n. 2 — was invalidated by the Supreme Court. See Davis v. FEC,-U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.