*122Jonathan G. Axelrod, Justin P. Keating, Beins, Axelrod, P.C., Washington,
DC, for Plaintiff., Gony Frieder Goldberg, American Federation of Government Employees,
Washington, DC, for Defendant., JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge
*123Plaintiff Eugene Hudson, Jr. brought this action alleging that he was improperly
removed from his position as National Secretary-Treasurer for Defendant American
Federation of Government Employees. Although this litigation has featured some twists
and turns-e.g. , Hudson's reinstatement via preliminary injunction and his subsequent
removal after the Order was vacated-AFGE now files a straightforward Motion to Dismiss.
The Court will largely grant the Motion, aside from one count alleging retaliatory
termination in violation of Plaintiff's statutory free-speech rights., The Court
first sets out the conduct for which Hudson was removed and then charts both the
Union's procedures and the history of the litigation., At this juncture, the Court,
as it must, treats the allegations in the Complaint as true. AFGE is a national
labor organization with over 1000 affiliated local unions. Its elected national
officers include a National President, National Secretary-Treasurer, and National
Vice-President for Women and Fair Practices. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 3. Hudson
was elected National Secretary-Treasurer (NST) for consecutive three-year terms
in 2012 and 2015. Id., ¶ 6. In August 2016, Plaintiff announced that he would again
run for national office at the next Convention, to be held in August 2018. At the
time, he did not specify the position he sought, but he clarified in December 2016
that he would run for President. Id., ¶ 8., Id., Exh. 1 (November 15 Email) at 1-2.
The email then lists four items for consideration: 1) "Recognize that we must fight;
we have no choice"; 2) "Rethink the way *124that we operate as an organization";
3) "We need to build our support within the larger community"; and 4) "[T]his is
a time for AFGE to join with other unions operating in the federal sector in coordinated
responses to the attacks." Id. at 2-3. According to Hudson, the "email was not part
of [his] campaign for AFGE office" but rather "valid commentary on public affairs
involving AFGE as an entity and AFGE's members." Compl., ¶ 10., Nearly one month
later, National Vice-President Keith Hill filed an internal charge against Hudson,
including, among other allegations, an accusation that Plaintiff's dispatch of
the November 15 email was "a supreme case of multiple violations." Compl., Exh.
3 at 1. Hill believed that, by assigning an AFGE employee the task of sending the
email, Hudson had violated the "ethical conduct requirements for all NEC members"
and "exposed AFGE to certain civil and/or administrative liability." Id. at 2. "In
addition," Hill continued, "the use of AFGE's e-mail directories for personal use
is a violation of the policies on official use of AFGE resources." Id. He did not,
however, cite to any portions of the AFGE Constitution or other Union guidelines
that prohibit such activity. The charge also alleged that Hudson had violated the
Union's Constitution on three other occasions, not at issue here. Id. at 1-2. Hill
did not serve Hudson with a copy of the charge as required by the Constitution,
but Borer sent it to him on February 22, 2017. See Compl., ¶¶ 15-17., The charge
proceedings then followed the relevant AFGE guidelines. See Compl., Exh. Nos. 4
(AFGE Constitution); 6 (Committee of Investigation Guidelines and Procedures Manual).
A three-member Committee of Investigation was appointed and, upon consideration,
dismissed all the charges except the one based on the November 15 email. With regard
to that, the COI found that "probable cause exists for the specific charge of malfeasance
of office," and it cited three sections of the AFGE Constitution that it believed
Hudson had violated. See Compl., Exh. 10 (COI Findings) at 1., The Committee then
referred the charge to the National Executive Council, the Union's governing body,
which consists of the three national officers as well as the National Vice-Presidents
for the twelve AFGE districts. See Compl., ¶ 3. (Plaintiff did not participate in
the NEC's deliberations as he was the accused.) Cox promptly informed Hudson of
the Committee's decision and called a special meeting of the NEC for August 8,
2017, to vote on the referred charges. See Compl., Exh. 13 (July 19, 2017, Letter
from Cox to NEC). The NEC adopted the Committee's report, deliberated, and found
Hudson guilty by a vote of 12 to 1 (Cox and Hudson did not vote). See ECF No. 8-1
(August 8 NEC Transcript) at 52-54, 70-72, 82-84. By the same margin, it then voted
to remove him from his position as NST but did not restrict his union-membership
rights. Id. at 94-96. The NEC has not released a written *125explanation of the
decision. Hudson has appealed the ruling to the National Convention, which will
take place in August 2018., On September 12, 2017, Plaintiff then filed this suit,
alleging four ways in which his discharge violated the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). First, he asserted a claim under Section 101(a)(5) of
the Act, which safeguards union members against improper disciplinary actions, for
a denial of a full and fair hearing. Plaintiff next claimed that AFGE had improperly
retaliated against him for exercising free-speech rights guaranteed in Section 101(a)(2).
Count III also alleged unlawful retaliation, but was premised on Section 609, which
prohibits unions from disciplining members for exercising their LMRDA rights. Hudson's
last count invoked Section 301, which allows a union to sue or be sued for certain
breaches of contract. Hudson therein alleged that Defendant had violated several
provisions of the AFGE Constitution and the COI Manual., Five days after filing
the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, asking the Court
to order Defendant to reinstate him as NST, process the charges anew, conduct a
new hearing without the allegedly biased NEC members, and pay monetary damages.
See ECF No. 4. After a hearing, the Court granted Hudson's Motion in a written
Opinion. See Hudson v. Am. Fed. of Gov't Empls., 292 F.Supp.3d 145, 2017 WL 5449806
(D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2017). The Opinion began and ended with Hudson's first count, which
alleged that he had been denied a full and fair hearing. Based on the "historical
animosity" between Hudson and a member of the COI, the Court concluded that "a reasonable
jury would likely find that [the COI member] was biased against Hudson, precluding
him from receiving a full and fair hearing." Id. at 155, 2017 WL 5449806, at *7.
Along with this likely success on the merits, the Court also found that Hudson had
satisfied the other three preliminary-injunction factors-i.e. , irreparable harm
to him, balance of the equities, and the public interest. Having determined that
Plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction based on Count I, the Court reinstated
him without addressing the other three causes of action. Id. at 152-53, 2017 WL
5449806, at *5. AFGE, as a result, began to reprocess the charges and has called
a Special National Executive Council meeting for February 6, 2018, to take action
on the new Committee of Investigation Report. See ECF No. 32 (Motion to Stay Briefing),
¶¶ 3-4., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of
an action where a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
In evaluating Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court must "treat the complaint's
factual *126allegations as true ... and must grant [P]laintiff 'the benefit of
all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.' " Sparrow v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United
States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ) (citation omitted); see also Jerome
Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The pleading
rules are "not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff," Dura Pharm., Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005), and she must
thus be given every favorable inference that may be drawn from the allegations of
fact. Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113., The standard to survive a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1) is less forgiving. Under this Rule, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. See Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
A court also has an "affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the
scope of its jurisdictional authority." Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police
v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). For this reason, " 'the [p]laintiff's
factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving
a 12(b)(1) motion' than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim."
Id. at 13-14 (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987) (alteration in original) ). Additionally, unlike
with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "may consider materials
outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction." Jerome Stevens, 402 F.3d at 1253 ; see also Venetian Casino Resort,
L.L.C. v. E.E.O.C., 409 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2005)., AFGE now seeks dismissal
of the remaining two counts-Count II, alleging that the Union removed Hudson in
retaliation for exercising his free-speech rights protected under the LMRDA, and
Count IV, alleging that Defendant's removal decision breached its contract with
Hudson by violating the AFGE Constitution and the COI Manual. The Court takes each
count in turn., Section 101 of the LMRDA includes a bill of rights, which, inter
alia , protects every union member's "right to ... express any views, arguments,
or opinions," 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), so long as the speech does not run afoul of
the union's "reasonable rules and regulations." Id. § 411(a)(1). While the parties
may have *127stipulated that § 101(a)(5)'s procedural protections are not applicable
to a removed union officer whose membership rights remain intact, the case law is
clear that Plaintiff's alleged "retaliatory removal state[s] a cause of action
under § 102." Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355, 109
S.Ct. 639, 102 L.Ed.2d 700 (1989) (removal of elected officer based on speech).
As a result, while Count I does not go forward, Count II is not similarly prohibited.
AFGE admits that Plaintiff "ha[d] the right to express his views and opinions" but
argues that he did "not have a right to do so in a manner that violates AFGE policies."
MTD at 22. According to Defendant, therefore, Hudson was removed for his "conduct,"
not his words. Id. At this juncture, the Court cannot agree., In enacting § 101(a),
Congress sought to provide "general protection [for] union members who spoke out
against the union leadership," United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Sadlowski,
457 U.S. 102, 109, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982), allowing them to "say
what they think, or perhaps discuss what should be done to straighten out union
affairs ... without being punished for doing it." Id. (quoting 105 Cong. Rec. 6477
(1959) (Statement of Sen. McClellan) ). The LMRDA's bill of rights is not boundless,
however; a union may adopt "reasonable rules and regulations" limiting members'
freedom of speech and assembly. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). While the bill of rights
was "intended ... to restate a principal First Amendment value-the right to speak
one's mind without fear of reprisal[-] ... there is absolutely no indication that
Congress intended the scope of § 101(a)(2) to be identical to the scope of the First
Amendment." Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 111, 102 S.Ct. 2339. Unlike government regulations,
which must be narrowly tailored, "[u]nion rules ... are valid under § 101(a)(2)
so long as they are reasonable." Id., Both sides agree that Hudson had the right
to express his views on the incoming administration. See MTD at 22; Compl., ¶ 68.
The only issue, then, is whether some "reasonable rule" limited that right. It is
here that AFGE's argument falters. While Defendant asserts that "Plaintiff does
not have a protected right to use AFGE's email system and AFGE resources to send
a personal or political message," MTD at 22, the Court does not see (and in multiple
briefs AFGE has not shown) where it has adopted such a rule. The only reasonable
inference the Court can draw at this point, therefore, is that one does not exist.
In its Reply, Defendant makes a passing reference to its insurance policy, which
requires that the General Counsel's Office review certain AFGE publications, see
Reply at 4, but that does not suffice here. First, courts frequently decline to
consider arguments raised for the first time in a movant's reply. See, e.g., Herbert
v. Nat'l Academy of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Even if the Court
were to entertain this position, it still fails. AFGE has not connected this insurance
policy to any promulgated rule, nor has it explained why an email would be considered
a "publication" that necessitates GCO review., Undeterred, AFGE next asserts that
Count II "will soon be rendered entirely moot" because the Union is "now re-processing
the internal disciplinary charges" with an unbiased panel. See MTD at 32. This Court
certainly acknowledges that it may only decide live cases or controversies and that
events may occur while a case is pending that wither a once-fresh suit. See Chafin
v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). "But a case
'becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual *128relief
whatever to the prevailing party.' " Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Empls., 567 U.S.
298, 307, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012) ). Even if the outcome of AFGE's
second hearing somehow cures the defects that Hudson alleges in Count II, the Complaint's
request for lost wages and damages means that he could still seek relief for alleged
retaliation in the first hearing. See Compl., ¶ 99(b). In other words, were the
Court to decide that AFGE's original hearing improperly disciplined Plaintiff for
exercising his free-speech rights, Hudson could obtain a financial recovery. Count
II thus survives., AFGE next attacks Count IV, an LMRDA breach-of-contract claim.
Section 301 of the Act provides a federal cause of action for "violation of contracts"
in certain circumstances. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Complaint alleges that, in
removing Plaintiff from his elected position, AFGE breached two sections of both
its Constitution and its Committee of Investigation Manual. In his Opposition, Hudson
also argues that Defendant violated the "implicit premise that internal discipline
proceedings be free of bias." Opp. at 16. The Court addresses each separately and
ultimately finds them all lacking in merit., Article 23 of the AFGE Constitution
provides certain procedural rights for accused Union members, including the right
to a hearing transcript and a written decision. See AFGE Constitution, Art. 23,
§§ 5, 8. The Complaint alleges that AFGE violated the Constitution by not delivering
either of these to Hudson. See Compl., ¶¶ 84-98. As to the first, the Court notes
that AFGE has since provided him with a transcript of the proceedings, see ECF No.
8, rendering that claim moot. As to his right to a written decision, AFGE argues
that Article 23, which governs the processing of internal disciplinary charges for
regular members and local officers, is inapplicable to Plaintiff's hearing process.
As a national officer, the Union argues, the procedural protections available to
Hudson are embodied in Article 13, not Article 23., First, Article 13 states that
"[a]ny officer of the Federation may have a charge filed against him or her for
violations of Article 23." AFGE Const., Art. 13, § 7. It then goes on to outline
how charges against such officers should be processed. Id., §§ 7(a)-(d). Article
23, by contrast, plainly states that its "due process provisions ... shall govern
at the council level when a council officer is charged and tried in his or her capacity
as a council officer." Id., Art. 23, § 1. Implicit in that statement is that any
due-process provisions of Article 23 do not attach to charges against national officers
like Hudson. Reading these two articles together, AFGE's interpretation-namely
that Article 23 details only the offenses for which a national officer can be accused,
but the actual hearing process for national officers is fully embodied in Article
13-is reasonable and entitled to deference., *129Second, Articles 13 and 23 detail
similar, but not identical, charge procedures. For example, charges filed against
a national officer "must be filed in writing with the National President and a copy
thereof served by registered mail or personal service upon the officer charged."
AFGE Const., Art. 13, § 7(a). Article 23, by contrast, requires a member to file
written charges "with the local of which the accused is a member" and serve them
"upon the accused by registered or certified mail at his or her last known address[,]
and the local of which the accused is a member also shall be served at its office
or address of its highest ranking officer." Id., Art. 23, § 3. If Article 23 applied
in toto to charges against national officers, it would make little sense for each
article to have its own slightly different service provision. The Court thus finds
that AFGE's interpretation should be credited, and, as Plaintiff does not suggest
this interpretation is made in bad faith, the only procedural protections he can
rely on are those contained in Article 13. Because the right to a written decision
does not appear there, the Constitution does not support his breach-of-contract
claim.