Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump
Opinion of the Court
RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge *12In this action, Plaintiffs Public Citizen, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("NRDC"), and Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("CWA") challenge the lawfulness of Executive Order 13771, issued by President Trump on January 30, 2017, and two guidance documents issued by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") implementing the Executive Order. Pending before the Court are the government's motion to dismiss, Dkt. 15, and Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 16.
The Executive Order imposes three new restrictions on the administrative process. It requires Executive Branch agencies to identify two existing regulations to be repealed for every new regulation, requires agencies to offset the private costs of compliance posed by new regulations by eliminating the costs associated with existing regulations, and imposes an annual regulatory cap (set at zero for 2017) on incremental regulatory costs that each agency may introduce. According to Plaintiffs, these requirements trammel on an array of federal statutes, all of which require federal agencies to consider statute-specific factors in deciding whether to promulgate or to repeal regulations, and none of which permits the implementing agencies-or the President-to premise those decisions on the adoption or repeal of other, unrelated regulations.
Before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' challenge, however, the Court must first satisfy itself that it has Article III jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't ,
Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that they have "organizational standing" to sue-that is, that they have standing to sue in their own right. They allege, in particular, that Executive Order 13771 has a chilling effect on their missions to encourage agencies to adopt regulations designed to protect public health and safety (Public Citizen), to protect the environment (NRDC), and to protect workers' rights (CWA). Plaintiffs assert that, as things now stand, if they contemplate proposing *13a new rule, they must evaluate whether the cost of the new rule-the loss of two or more unknown existing rules-is worth the benefit of the new rule. The burden of merely considering the issue, however, is insufficient to establish organizational standing. And Plaintiffs do not assert that they have actually declined-or will actually decline-to pursue a new rule out of concern that the Executive Order will require the relevant agency to rescind two existing rules.
This is not to say that a plaintiff-or, indeed, that the present Plaintiffs-will never be able to establish standing to challenge the Executive Order. On the present record, however, the Court must conclude that it lacks jurisdiction. The Court, accordingly, will grant the government's motion to dismiss, Dkt. 15, and will deny Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 16.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Executive Order 13771
On January 30, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13771, entitled " Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs." Exec. Order No. 13771,
Under the "two for one" requirement, "whenever an executive department or agency ... publicly proposes for notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation," the agency must "identify at least two existing regulations to be repealed." Exec. Order No. 13771 § 2(a). This requirement works in tandem with the "offset" requirement, which requires agencies to offset "any new incremental cost associated with new regulations" by eliminating "existing costs associated with at least two prior regulations."
The Executive Order states that it "shall be implemented consistent with applicable law" and that "[n]othing in th[e] [O]rder shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect ... the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency." Exec. Order No. 13771 § 5. Similar provisos appear *14within particular provisions. See
B. OMB Guidance
OMB issued interim guidance on February 2, 2017, and followed up with final guidance on April 5, 2017. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Executive Order of January 30, 2017 (2017) [hereinafter Interim Guidance]; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Guidance Implementing Executive Order 13771 (2017) [hereinafter Final Guidance]. Several important clarifications and refinements are set forth in these guidance documents.
First, the Executive Order does not apply to all regulatory actions, but only to "significant regulatory action[s]" and "significant guidance document[s]." Final Guidance, Q & A 2. A regulatory action or guidance document is "significant" if it is likely to "[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more" or to meet other criteria.
Second, unlike prior executive orders, cf. Exec. Order No. 12866, Executive Order 13771 focuses only on compliance costs borne by regulated parties, without regard to the public benefit of the existing or proposed rule. Accordingly, a regulation that imposes $100 million in costs, but that saves $1 billion in losses, is not treated as generating a net savings of $900 million; rather, its adoption would be treated as a $100 million cost, and its repeal would count as $100 million in savings. See Final Guidance, Q & A 21, 32; Interim Guidance at 4. The guidance provides additional details on accounting. In calculating costs and savings for purposes of the Executive Order, agencies are required to determine the present value of the costs or savings of the regulatory action (or deregulatory action) "over the full duration of the expected effects of the action." Final Guidance, Q & A 25. An agency's "total incremental cost" for a fiscal year "means the sum of all costs from" significant regulatory actions and guidance documents "minus the cost savings from ... deregulatory actions." Final Guidance, Q & A 8.
Third, the Executive Order recognizes that certain federal statutes prohibit agencies *15from considering costs in determining whether a significant regulatory action is warranted. With respect to those regulatory actions, the OMB guidance acknowledges that the Executive Order cannot-and does not-"change the agency's obligations under [such a] statute." Final Guidance, Q & A 18. But, even though agencies are not permitted to consider costs in deciding whether to promulgate these regulations, they are still "generally ... required to offset the costs of such regulatory actions through other deregulatory actions taken pursuant to statutes that do not prohibit consideration of costs."
Fourth, agencies are permitted to "bank" cost savings and deregulatory actions "for use in the same or a subsequent fiscal year" to offset significant regulatory actions or guidance documents and to meet their "total incremental cost allowance[s]." Final Guidance, Q & A 29. An agency that, for example, takes four deregulatory actions in fiscal year 1 may take two covered regulatory actions in year 1 or in future fiscal years.
Finally, as counsel for the government acknowledged at oral argument, neither the Executive Order nor the OMB guidance provides a clear mechanism for notifying members of the public whether and when a proposed (or possible) regulatory action might be delayed or abandoned due to the requirements of the Executive Order. See Dkt. 56 at 64 (Tr. Oral Arg. 64:7-22) ("I suspect [that information on delayed or abandoned regulatory actions] will not be public."). With respect to deregulatory actions, the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions should "include, to the extent practicable, ... deregulatory actions that ... are sufficient to offset [any] regulatory actions" subject to the Executive Order. Final Guidance, Q & A 37. And when a regulatory action is allowed under the Executive Order, the Federal Register notice must indicate that the action is subject to the Executive Order.
C. Procedural History
On February 8, 2017, Plaintiffs filed this action against the President, the Director *16of OMB, the heads of thirteen federal agencies, and the United States. Dkt. 1. Plaintiffs are Public Citizen, which is a national consumer advocacy group, NRDC, which is a national environmental and public health organization, and the CWA, which is an international labor union. Dkt. 14 at 4-7 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14). Each of these organizations has hundreds of thousands of members and seeks to advance its members' interests by, among other things, securing legal and regulatory protections through litigation and advocacy before federal agencies.
Two months after Plaintiffs filed suit, the government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim, Dkt. 9, and fourteen states filed an amicus brief in support of the government addressing the merits of the dispute, Dkt. 12. In response, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as of right that, among other things, added further allegations relating to their standing to sue.
The centerpiece of Plaintiffs' case-and the foundation for their five claims-is their contention that Executive Order 13771 necessarily "impose[s] rulemaking requirements beyond and in conflict with the requirements of the" Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and "the statutes from which ... federal agencies derive their rulemaking authority." Dkt. 14 at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 8); see id. at 17-43 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-124) (describing potential applications of the Executive Order that demonstrate "how the ... Order directs agencies to act unlawfully and why it is unconstitutional"). As a result, Plaintiffs allege, the Executive Order (1) exceeds the President's authority under Article II and usurps Congress's power to legislate; (2) conflicts with the President's duty to execute legislation under the Take Care Clause; and (3) directs federal agencies to take action that is ultra vires. Id. at 43-46 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 125-51). Plaintiffs further allege (4) that the OMB guidance documents are also ultra vires and (5) that the guidance documents violate the APA. Id. at 47-49 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 152-65). Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Executive Order is unconstitutional and that it and the OMB guidance are invalid, and they seek an injunction barring the OMB Director and various agencies from implementing the Executive Order. Id. at 49 (Am. Compl. Prayer).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing" each of the elements of Article III standing, although "the manner and degree of evidence required" varies with "the successive stages of the litigation." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife ,
*17Feldman v. FDIC ,
III. ANALYSIS
"Because Article III limits federal judicial jurisdiction to cases and controversies, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, federal courts are without authority" to decide disputes unless the plaintiff has standing-that is, " 'a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [sufficient] to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.' " Chamber of Commerce v. EPA ,
When an association seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, it can establish standing in one of two ways. It can assert "associational standing" to sue on behalf of its members. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.Comm'n ,
A. Associational Standing
"Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members." Warth v. Seldin ,
In contrast, the first element-the requirement that at least one member of the association have standing to sue in her own right-is not so easily satisfied. In an impressive effort to do so, Plaintiffs point to over a dozen putative regulatory actions that they contend would benefit their members and that, they further assert, have been or will be delayed, weakened, or barred as a result of Executive Order 13771 and the OMB guidance. For ease of discussion, the Court will consider these putative regulatory actions in categories corresponding to the reasons why Plaintiffs fail to meet the first element of the Hunt test.
1. Regulatory Actions Affecting Unidentified Members
At the threshold, the first element of the Hunt test requires that the plaintiff-association identify at least one specific member who has suffered, or is likely to suffer, an injury in fact. Summers ,
With respect to several of the putative regulatory actions Plaintiffs identify, they have made no effort-either in their complaint or in the multiple declarations they have submitted-to identify a specific member who has suffered, or who is likely to suffer, an injury in fact due to the Executive Order's effect on the regulatory action.
*19Instead, "[a]t the very least, the identity of the party suffering an injury in fact must be firmly established."
2. Unspecified Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions
Plaintiffs also assert that their members will be injured by agencies' decisions to forgo or weaken potential regulatory actions and by the repeal of existing regulations. With respect to foregone or weakened regulatory actions, Plaintiffs have not alleged or otherwise proffered any facts identifying specific regulatory initiatives that have been, or are likely to be, discarded or weakened as a result of Executive Order 13771. Quoting a former Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") Administrator, Plaintiffs do contend that it is "likely" that "the EPA and other agencies will stop seeking new regulations so they can protect existing rules." Dkt. 47 at 23. The Court must, of course, accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Arpaio v. Obama ,
Plaintiffs also allege that members of Public Citizen (including two identified members) will suffer injury because the Executive Order will cause agencies to "repeal regulations that protect their concrete interests," Dkt. 14 at 4-5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 12), and that members of the CWA (including two identified members) will suffer injury because the Executive Order will "caus[e] agencies" to "repeal regulations that protect the members' health and safety at work" or that otherwise protect "workplace rights," id. at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 14). See also id. at 5-6 (Am. Compl. ¶ 13) (alleging that agencies will "repeal ... important health [and] environmental regulations" due to the Executive Order). Neither the complaint nor the declarations offered by the two members of Public Citizen and the two members of the CWA, however, identify any specific regulations that have been repealed, or are likely to be repealed, as a result of the Executive Order. See Dkt. 16-7 at 2-3 (Fleming Decl. ¶¶ 4-6) (Public Citizen member asserting only that the Executive Order will likely cause agencies "to delay, weaken, or forgo" regulations); Dkt. 16-10 at 2-3 (T. Weissman Decl. ¶¶ 4-6) (same); Dkt. 16-5 at 2 (Abbott Decl. ¶ 7) (CWA member asserting only that the Executive Order may cause agencies to delay, weaken, or forgo "a new standard for workplace exposure to infectious diseases"); Dkt. 16-6 at 2-5 (Bauer Decl. ¶¶ 6-8) (CWA member asserting only that various workplace protections would not have been obtained "without the existence of the [Occupational Health and Safety Administration's] Lead Standard and CWA making sure Verizon was complying with the law"); see also Dkt. 16-2 at 3 (LeGrande Decl. ¶ 8) (noting that Bauer "would be harmed by the repeal of such an existing standard" but failing to aver that such a repeal was likely to occur). Absent greater specificity, such predictions are too abstract and too speculative to support standing. See Arpaio , 797 F.3d at 21.
In any event, it appears that Plaintiffs have abandoned their contention that their members will be injured by the repeal of beneficial regulations pursuant to the Executive *20Order. The government's motion to dismiss argues, for example, that Plaintiffs' asserted concern about the repeal of favorable regulations "is entirely speculative." Dkt. 15-1 at 28. Plaintiffs, in turn, offer no response to this argument, and, indeed, make no mention of their allegation that specific members will be harmed by the repeal of regulations. See Dkt. 47 at 19-30 (omitting mention of injury due to repeal); see also Dkt. 16 at 26-30 (same). The government, in reply, concludes that "Plaintiffs [have] abandon[ed] any claim of injury on behalf of their members from the potential future repeal of regulations." Dkt. 51 at 13. The Court agrees. See Local Civil Rule 7(b) ; see also Sandoval v. U.S. Dep't of Justice ,
3. Delay of Regulatory Actions
The lion's share of Plaintiffs' efforts is directed at showing that Executive Order 13771 has already delayed-and will continue to delay-the issuance of new regulatory actions. Plaintiffs offer eight examples of putative regulatory actions that, they say, have been or will be delayed due to the Executive Order:
(1) An unspecified regulation on greenhouse gas emissions. See Dkt. 47 at 25; Dkt. 16-13 at 9 (Winegrad Decl. ¶ 18).
(2) A citizen petition filed by Public Citizen requesting that the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") "withdraw approval of the use of medically important antibiotics in livestock and poultry." Dkt. 16-3 at 5-6 (R. Weissman Decl. ¶¶ 12-13).
(3) A request for information on occupational exposure to infectious diseases in healthcare settings from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"). See Dkt. 14 at 23-25 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 78, 81); Dkt. 16 at 28; Dkt. 47 at 21-22.
(4) A proposed rule banning the use of certain chemicals in paint remover from the EPA. See Dkt. 14 at 28-30 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 95); Dkt. 47 at 22-23.
*21(5) A proposed rule setting energy efficiency standards for residential conventional cooking products from the Department of Energy. See Dkt. 14 at 34-36 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106, 109); Dkt. 47 at 20-21, 25.
(6) A proposed rule mandating vehicle-to-vehicle ("V2V") communications technology on light vehicles from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). See Dkt. 14 at 19-20 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 69); Dkt. 47 at 25.
(7) A proposed rule mandating speed-limiting devices on certain commercial vehicles from NHTSA. See Dkt. 14 at 18-20 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67, 69); Dkt. 47 at 25.
(8) A proposed rule requiring certain railroads that transport petroleum oil to develop oil spill response plans from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ("PHMSA"). See Dkt. 14 at 31-33 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98, 102); Dkt. 47 at 25.
Plaintiffs contend that the delay of each of these potential or proposed rules will prolong their members' exposure to the risks the putative rules are designed to mitigate, such as death, bodily injury, or financial loss. Dkt. 47 at 24-25. And they argue that these risks would likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 29-30.
Plaintiffs are correct that injuries that have not yet occurred, but that are "threatened," may at times satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Warth ,
Plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege that the delay in finalizing the regulatory actions at issue here will certainly cause their members injury; instead the delay will, at most, increase the risk that the identified individuals might someday suffer an injury. Although the D.C. Circuit has recognized that "increases in risk can at times be 'injuries in fact' sufficient to confer standing," Nat. Res. Def. Council v.EPA ,
In the present context, these requirements mean that Plaintiffs must plausibly allege or show, first , that the relevant agency intended to issue the regulation in question; second , that Executive Order 13771 will likely cause the agency to delay issuance of the regulation; third , that-with the relevant period of delay taken into account-an identified member of one of the associations will face a substantial probability of a concrete injury; and, finally , that the period of delay attributable to the Executive Order will substantially increase that risk of harm. As explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the relevant agencies otherwise intended to issue two of the eight regulatory actions they identify, and their allegations regarding a third putative regulatory action only barely, if at all, clear this first hurdle. With respect to the remaining five putative regulatory actions, however, Plaintiffs have met that burden, and have also plausibly alleged that the Executive Order has delayed, or is likely to delay, the regulatory action. They have not, however, plausibly alleged that at least one of their members faces a substantial risk of a concrete harm due to the delay in finalizing any of the identified regulatory actions.
a. Whether the Agency Otherwise Intended To Take the Regulatory Action
Plaintiffs must first plausibly allege or show that the putative regulatory actions that they have identified would have been taken in the absence of Executive Order 13771. That is a difficult task because it implicates "how independent decisionmakers"-here, executive agencies-"will exercise their judgment." Clapper ,
First , Plaintiffs contend that at least one member of NRDC is suffering a harm due to the delay of "rules to curb climate change." Dkt. 47 at 25. NRDC member Gerald Winegrad avers that "global warming and [the] consequent sea level rise could deprive [him] of water supply, use of [his] land and home, and recreational opportunities." Dkt. 16-13 at 8-9 (Winegrad Decl. ¶ 17). He "believe[s] that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is important to ... prevent exacerbating the global warming problem and its effects on [him] and [his] property." Id. at 9 (Winegrad Decl. ¶ 18). Finally, he expresses concern that the Executive Order "will reverse, halt or delay these crucial regulations, to [his] detriment." Id. (Winegrad Decl. ¶ 18). Plaintiffs, however, have not identified any proposed rule or other specific putative regulatory action that might address Winegrad's concerns. As a result, the Court cannot determine whether any identifiable regulatory action has been-or likely will be-delayed due to the Executive Order and, if so, how that delay might have affected Winegrad. Any injury allegedly stemming from the prospect that the Executive Order has delayed the issuance of unspecified regulations relating to a broadly defined area of concern is too abstract and speculative to support standing.
Second , Plaintiffs rely on a citizen petition in which Public Citizen asked the FDA to "withdraw approval of the use of medically important antibiotics in livestock and poultry." Dkt. 16-3 at 5-6 (R. Weissman Decl. ¶ 12). Public Citizen member Dr. Anthony So, a physician, attests that "the use of antibiotics in animal feed increases [his] risk of infection and lowers the effectiveness of available treatments for infections from antibiotic-resistant bacteria." Dkt. 16-8 at 2-3 (So Decl. ¶ 7). Public Citizen member Terri Weissman shares that concern, averring that she and her children "would benefit directly" if the FDA granted Public Citizen's petition. Dkt. 16-10 at 2-3 (T. Weissman Decl. ¶ 6). Plaintiffs, however, have not alleged or provided any evidence that the FDA ever intended to grant or seriously considered granting the petition. Plaintiffs jump over this antecedent question, arguing instead that delay is inevitable. Delay, however, is possible only if the FDA was otherwise inclined to withdraw its approval for the use of medically important antibiotics in livestock and poultry.
Third , Plaintiffs contend that OSHA "is developing a standard to protect healthcare employees and employees in other high-risk environments from exposure to dangerous pathogens" and that the Executive Order "will necessarily delay issuance of [any such] new health or safety standards." Dkt. 47 at 21-22. Unlike the prior two examples, Plaintiffs' complaint and other submissions suggest that OSHA was poised to take this regulatory action prior to issuance of the Executive Order. Their complaint alleges that OSHA was in the process of developing the infectious disease standard and that the agency anticipated issuing a proposed rule in October *242017. Dkt. 14 at 23 (Am. Compl. ¶ 78). Public records, moreover, support that allegation.
It is not obvious what follows from these facts and allegations, and neither party has briefed the issue. On one hand, there is evidence that OSHA intended to issue an NPRM (and, presumably, eventually a final rule) before the Executive Order was issued. On the other hand, the rulemaking process is inherently inchoate until an agency issues an NPRM, which then serves as a benchmark for agency action and triggers the requirement that the agency offer a reasoned explanation if it ultimately decides not to go forward as proposed. See Williams Nat'l Gas Co. v. FERC ,
Because the parties have not addressed this issue, the Court will assume (without deciding) for present purposes that the infectious disease standard would have issued but for the Executive Order. As explained below, however, that assumption will prove insufficient to permit Plaintiffs to establish standing using the infectious disease standard as their hook.
Finally , the remaining five potential regulatory actions more easily clear *25this first hurdle. Each involves a proposed rule, and the NPRMs shed significant light on "whether the [agencies] [intended to] issue ... final rule[s]." R.J. Reynolds ,
b. Whether Executive Order 13771 Has Caused Delay
Plaintiffs devote most of their attention to the next question: whether the delay in finalizing the OSHA infectious disease standard and the five proposed rules was caused by Executive Order 13771. See Dkt. 47 at 19-30. The Court must, of course, avoid any undue intrusion on the discretion of the Executive Branch to set policy priorities, see Allen v. Wright ,
With respect to the OSHA standard and the five proposed rules, there is some rule-specific evidence that Executive Order 13771 has contributed to delay. As to the OSHA standard, prior to issuance of the Executive Order, OSHA indicated that it was developing a standard and that it anticipated issuing an NPRM in October 2017.
To be sure, these delays might be attributed to a change in administration and a shift in policy priorities, without regard to the Executive Order. The government's own statements, however, arguably undercut this theory. Three of the NPRMs that Plaintiffs identify, for example, were proposed by the Department of Transportation. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; V2V Communications,
The likelihood that the Executive Order will cause delay, moreover, is highlighted by information provided by the White House regarding implementation of the Executive Order. In fiscal year 2017, 635 planned regulatory actions were "withdrawn," 244 were "made inactive," and 700 were "delayed." White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Is Delivering on Deregulation (Dec. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Deregulation Fact Sheet ].
*27Two-for-One Report at 1. The 67 deregulatory actions taken in 2017 yielded regulatory cost savings of $570 million per year ($8.1 billion in lifetime cost savings) across all agencies.
Although these statistics would appear to leave room for new regulatory actions, the numbers must be considered in light of the fact that the Executive Order requires an offset for the costs of a new rule, without regard to the benefits of that rule. Although undoubtedly costly, NHTSA's proposed rule on V2V communications technology illustrates the obstacle posed by the Executive Order. The proposed rule would "require all new light vehicles to be capable of [V2V] communications, such that they [can] send and receive Basic Safety Messages to and from other vehicles." V2V Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 3854. When it proposed the rule, NHTSA asserted that V2V technology "has the potential to revolutionize motor vehicle safety ... [and to] reduce the number and severity of motor vehicle crashes." Id. at 3855. The agency estimated that the proposed rule would, on an annual basis, save $54.7 to $73.9 billion, id. at 3996, while costing $2.2 to $5 billion, id. at 3981. Under the Executive Order, however, only the costs are relevant. As noted above, the sum of the annual cost savings generated by all deregulatory actions across all agencies in the eight months from the end of January (when the Executive Order issued) through the end of September (when the fiscal year ended) tallied only $570 million. See Two-for-One Report at 1. At that rate, agencies would have achieved $855 million in cost savings had the Executive Order been in effect for a full year. Comparing the estimated costs of the V2V rule ($2.2 to $5 billion annually) with the estimated cost savings from all deregulatory actions taken in one fiscal year ($855 million annually) suggests that it would take the Executive Branch as a whole two or three years to accumulate cost savings sufficient to offset even the most conservative estimated cost of the V2V rule.
Although this may be an extreme example, it shows that the Executive Order meaningfully restricts agencies' latitude to issue rules and, absent waivers, is likely to delay "significant regulatory actions." Nor is the Court convinced that the authority of the Director of OMB to grant waivers adequately answers this concern. To be sure, that authority does introduce some uncertainty, but, at least to date, there is no indication that the Director has exercised his waiver authority with respect to the six regulatory actions Plaintiffs have identified, none of which has moved forward since the Executive Order took effect.
*28One might reasonably argue that Plaintiffs can only speculate that the delay in issuance of the identified rules has been caused by the Executive Order. It is conceivable, for example, that the delay stems from greater scrutiny of regulatory action or skepticism that the federal government should try to fix every problem. That, however, is not what the government has said. No one has said, for example, that the V2V rule is a bad idea or that it is too costly. Executive Order 13771, in contrast, speaks directly to the issue and says that agencies may not take new regulatory actions without first identifying deregulatory actions sufficient to offset the relevant cost. Exec. Order No. 13771 § 2(c). And "experience and common sense" suggest that compliance with that mandate will, in fact, cause delay. Attias ,
Finally, statements from Executive Branch officials corroborate Plaintiffs' theory that the offset requirement will likely cause delay. After the Executive Branch released statistics on the Executive Order's implementation in fiscal year 2017, the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs delivered a press briefing on the results. See White House, Press Briefing by Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Administrator Neomi Rao on the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Dec. 14, 2017).
[D]eregulation ... takes time .... [I]f we're doing things in a way that is careful and consistent with law, it takes time to undo the [existing regulations]. Because for many rules that are undone, you need a new rule, and then you need a new regulatory impact assessment, and you need to create a rule that then can pass through the [procedural] standards.
This combination of factors-Executive Branch statements regarding the Executive Order, a common-sense understanding of the effect of the offset requirement, see Iqbal ,
c. Whether Plaintiffs' Members Face a Substantial-and Substantially Increased-Risk of Harm
Although Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged delay, they devote scant attention to the core of the injury-in-fact requirement: actual or imminent harm. See Lujan ,
Although the standard is a demanding one, the D.C. Circuit "has not closed the door to all increased-risk-of-harm cases." Pub. Citizen ,
OSHA Infectious Disease Standard
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
Plaintiffs contend that at least two of their members face an increased risk of harm as a result of this delay. Denise Abbott is a member of the CWA and is employed as a registered nurse in an emergency department. Dkt. 16-5 at 1-2 (Abbott Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4). She attests that her work "involves exposure to many and varied infectious diseases;" that adoption of "the proposed OSHA Infectious Disease Standard" would "minimize risks associated with the introduction of and exposure to such infectious diseases;" and, finally, that "by delaying ... a new standard for workplace exposure to infectious diseases, Executive Order 13771 will negatively impact [her] ability to avoid such exposure."
Although "experience and common sense," Iqbal ,
Even if the Court could know what the NPRM would have said, Plaintiffs' current showing still fails to meet the two-part test for increased-risk-of-harm standing. Plaintiffs have not averred or offered any evidence about Abbott or Soverow's current risk of exposure or about the degree to which the OSHA standard would decrease that risk. To take just one issue, the OSHA request for information suggested that voluntary standards currently exist and that the problem may lie, at least in part, in noncompliance by certain hospitals with those standards. See
The Court, accordingly, concludes that Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the OSHA standard are insufficient to establish associational standing.
EPA Proposed Rule on Paint Removers
Plaintiffs' reliance on the EPA's proposed rule on paint removers fares no better. Under the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"),
Applying the TSCA, the EPA proposed a rule on January 19, 2017, that would prohibit or restrict the use of methylene chloride and N-methylpyrrolidone ("NMP") in paint and coating removers. See Methylene Chloride and N-Methylpyrrolidone; Regulation of Certain Uses Under TSCA Section 6(a),
One of my hobbies is oil painting, and I use paint remover in connection with that work. In addition, I paint around my house, which also sometimes requires me to use paint remover. For example, I recently used paint remover to remove semigloss paint from a wall that needed flat paint, because painting over the semi-gloss would not work in that situation. In addition, my husband and I are hoping to buy a fixer-upper in the next year or two, which will likely require us to use a variety of painting products, including paint thinner. I am aware that, in January 2017, the [EPA] proposed a rule to regulate certain toxic chemicals in paint removers. When finalized, the rule would either prohibit those chemicals for consumer paint removal or impose a series of restrictions, such as limitations on the amount of the substances in paint removal products and a requirement of warning labels for consumers. My family and I would directly benefit from such a rule, which would help us avoid exposure to dangerous chemicals. Because of [the Executive Order], however, ... my family and I will lose the protections proposed and be subjected to a higher risk of harm ....
Dkt. 16-7 at 2-3 (Fleming Decl. ¶ 6).
For present purposes, the negative health consequences of exposure to methylene chloride and NMP constitute the "the ultimate alleged harm." Food & Water Watch ,
Plaintiffs make no allegations about the extent of the risk posed by occasional consumer use of paint remover containing methylene chloride or NMP. See Pub. Citizen ,
Department of Energy Proposed Energy Efficiency Standards for Residential Conventional Cooking Products
Plaintiffs' claim of standing based on delay in finalizing energy efficiency standards suffers from similar flaws. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,
Plaintiffs allege that Public Citizen, NRDC, and their members "benefit from improved appliance energy efficiency, including improved energy efficiency for residential conventional cooking products;" that they and their "members use these products;" and that "improved energy efficiency standards will reduce [their utility bills and their] members' utility bills" and will "lessen air pollution to which [their] members are exposed and that adversely affects [their] members' health, recreation, aesthetic, and economic interests." Dkt. 14 at 35-36 (Am. Compl. ¶ 109). With respect to pollution-related or environmental harms, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any other facts or to provide any evidence regarding the nature of the harm, let alone the magnitude or imminence of the risk.
Plaintiffs do, however, offer two declarations on the risk of higher utility bills. First, NRDC Sustainability Manager Eileen Quigley attests that NRDC intends to achieve "net-zero energy use by ... 2020" in part by "increasing [its] energy efficiency." Dkt. 16-12 at 1-2 (Quigley Decl. ¶ 4). She fears, however, that the Executive Order will "delay much-needed federal energy efficiency standards," thus "forc[ing] NRDC to purchase more renewable energy."
It makes no difference to the Court's analysis that these alleged injuries are asserted by the organizations themselves, rather than their members. See Warth ,
Department of Transportation Proposed Rules on V2V Communications Technology, Speed-Limiting Devices, and Railroad Oil Spill Response Plans
Finally, Plaintiffs identify three rules that the Department of Transportation proposed prior to issuance of the Executive Order. The first of these NPRMs was issued in January 2017 by NHTSA pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
The second Department of Transportation NPRM was issued by NHTSA and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, another component of the Department, on September 7, 2016, pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
*34The third Department of Transportation NPRM was issued by the PHMSA on July 29, 2016, pursuant to the Clean Water Act,
Each of these NPRMs seeks to mitigate risks to public safety, health, or the environment, and Plaintiffs plausibly aver that at least one of their members (or their children) falls within the zone of risk to which the NPRMs are directed. But, again, establishing standing based on an increased risk of harm requires more. The injury or loss that one might suffer in a car accident, for example, is a cognizable harm; the difficulty lies in demonstrating that the risk of such an event is sufficiently imminent to satisfy Article III and that the government's failure to regulate (or its delay in regulating) has significantly increased that risk. Pub. Citizen ,
Starting with the V2V rule, the Court does not doubt that this innovation offers a promising means of reducing traffic accidents. It is far from clear, however, how delay of the rule is likely to affect Fleming or Weissman. Both say that they are likely to purchase a new car in the next 5 years (or so), and, perhaps, if the final rule was issued in 2019-as NHTSA initially anticipated-the new technology would be available to them. But, at least as the Court understands it, the technology's value in reducing accidents is dependent on the number of other cars equipped with the technology. Plaintiffs, however, say nothing about how long it will take before there is a "substantial" decrease in the risk of accidents, how that risk will decline over time, "how many accidents would be avoided by" finalizing the proposed rule, Pub. Citizen ,
The same can be said of Fleming's concern about delay of the speed-limiting device regulation and Coward's concern about the risk of a crude oil rail accident. Plaintiffs offer no specific allegations or evidence addressing whether any delay caused by the Executive Order has substantially increased or will substantially increase Fleming's or Coward's risk of harm, nor do they address whether either Fleming or Coward ultimately faces a substantial probability of harm when that increased risk is taken into consideration. Plaintiffs say nothing, for example, about the risk posed to Fleming's children and, more importantly, about the extent to which the delay in finalizing the speed-limiting device rule might increase that risk. Indeed, they say nothing about *35whether the school bus that Fleming's son currently rides weighs 26,000 pounds or more (which would trigger application of the proposed speed-limiting device requirement), or whether there is any basis to believe that without the device, her son's bus driver is likely to drive at an excessive or dangerous speed. Similarly, Plaintiffs say nothing about how often rail-related oil spills occur, about the likelihood that Coward might be affected by such a spill, or about the extent to which delay of the oil spill response plan rule might increase the risk of harm to Coward. See
* * *
Having separately considered each link in Plaintiffs' theory of associational standing, it is worth stepping back to consider the ramifications of this theory as a whole. As the D.C. Circuit observed in Public Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ,
[m]uch government regulation slightly increases a citizen's risk of injury-or insufficiently decreases the risk compared to what some citizens might prefer. Under [Plaintiffs'] theory of probabilistic injury, after an agency takes virtually any action, virtually any citizen-because of a fractional chance of benefit from alternative action-would have standing to obtain judicial review of the agency's choice. Opening the courthouse to these kinds of increased-risk claims would drain the "actual or imminent" requirement of meaning in cases involving consumer challenges to an agency's regulation (or lack of regulation); would expand the "proper-and properly limited"-constitutional role of the Judicial Branch beyond deciding actual cases or controversies; and would entail the Judiciary exercising some part of the Executive's responsibility to take care that the law be faithfully executed.
The Court, accordingly, concludes that Plaintiffs have failed plausibly to allege that they meet the essential elements of associational standing.
B. Organizational Standing
Plaintiffs also allege that they have standing to sue in their own right. They contend, in particular, that the Executive Order is causing them harm because it chills their advocacy activities. That is, because the Executive Order requires a trade-off-at least two offsetting deregulatory actions for every new regulatory action-it forces Plaintiffs to choose between "advocating for new regulations, at the cost of potential loss of other beneficial regulations, and refraining from advocating for necessary new public protections." Dkt. 14 at 4-5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 12); see also id. at 6-7 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14). In support of this theory of standing, Plaintiffs offer declarations from officers from each of the Plaintiffs. Robert Weissman, the President of Public Citizen, attests that the Executive Order
forc[es] Public Citizen to choose between urging agencies to adopt new regulations, which would trigger the requirement to repeal existing regulatory safeguards, or refraining from advocating *36for new public protections to avoid triggering the need to repeal existing ones.
Dkt. 16-3 at 4 (R. Weissman Decl. ¶ 8). Andrew Wetzler, NRDC's Deputy Chief Program Officer, attests that "NRDC does not know what deregulatory actions an agency will take if NRDC's advocacy for a new rule is successful" and that, as a result, it cannot determine "whether its advocacy might end up doing more harm than good to health and the environment." Dkt. 16-4 at 6 (Wetzler Decl. ¶ 11). This conundrum, Wetzler adds, transforms NRDC's "constitutionally protected" right to petition the government or to sue an agency to compel action "into a game of regulatory Russian roulette." Id. (Wetzler Decl. ¶ 11). Like Weissman, he avers that the risk posed by trade-offs embodied in the Executive Order "will require NRDC to think twice, and even more carefully, before suing an agency for its failure to act." Id. at 10 (Wetzler Decl. ¶ 19). David LeGrande, the Occupational Safety and Health Director of CWA, sounds the same theme, averring that "[t]he Executive Order puts CWA in a lose-lose situation, and forces it to make an untenable choice whether to advocate in favor of a new workplace safety and health regulation without knowing what existing protection would be revoked if the new one were issued."
Article III requires an organization, just "like an individual plaintiff, to show actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision." Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc. ,
1. Injury in Fact
According to Plaintiffs, Executive Order 13771 not only conflicts with their missions, it also imperils their ability to advocate on behalf of their members and chills their First Amendment right to petition the government. Dkt. 47 at 16-19. To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, an organization must establish that it "has suffered a 'concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] activities.' " PETA , 797 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Equal Rights Ctr. ,
In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , the Supreme Court held that a "concrete and demonstrable injury to [an] organization's activities"-there, providing "counseling and referral services"-can support Article III standing if the organization can show a "consequent drain on [its] resources" and "more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social *37interests."
It is unsettled, however, how these principles apply to "issue-advocacy injuries," like the injuries that Plaintiffs assert here. In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Department of Agriculture , the D.C. Circuit explained that standing is not found "when the only 'injury' arises from the effect of the [challenged act] on the organization['s] lobbying activities," 797 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Ams. for Safe Access v. DEA ,
[t]his Court has not found standing when the only "injury" arises from the effect of the regulations on the organization['s] lobbying activities (as opposed to the effect on non-lobbying activities): "[C]onflict between a defendant's conduct and an organization's mission ... alone [is] insufficient to establish Article III standing. Frustration of an organization's objectives is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing."
The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged, however, that it has, at times, taken a less definitive view about whether injury to "pure issue-advocacy" can support standing. PETA , 797 F.3d at 1094 & n.4. In American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. , the defendant relied on Center for Law & Education to support its contention that "injury to an organization's 'advocacy,' as opposed to its provision of concrete services or programs, is insufficient to support [organizational] standing."
This Court, likewise, need not resolve that issue. Although Plaintiffs stress the "untenable choice" that they face in deciding whether to advocate for new regulations, they have neither alleged nor offered any evidence that any of them have, in fact, declined-or are imminently likely to decline-to advocate for a new rule out of fear that the Executive Order would compel the repeal of existing rules. Instead, they merely assert that they have been forced to consider the issue. Dkt. 14 at 4-7 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14); Dkt. 47 at 16; Dkt. 16-2 at 6 (LeGrande Decl. ¶ 17); Dkt. 16-3 at 4 (R. Weissman Decl. ¶ 8); Dkt. 16-4 at 6 (Wetzler Decl. ¶ 11). As counsel explained at oral argument, all that Plaintiffs can say at this point is that they "discuss the [E]xecutive [O]rder and take it into account when they're thinking about what to do." Dkt. 56 at 33 (Tr. Oral Arg. 33:12-13). But merely having "to think twice" before engaging in advocacy, Dkt. 16-4 at 10 (Wetzler Decl. ¶ 19), does not constitute a cognizable injury in fact.
2. Causation
Plaintiffs have also failed plausibly to allege causation. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA , the plaintiffs claimed that "the risk of surveillance" by the government "require[d] them to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications" and that these expenditures were fairly traceable to the statute authorizing the surveillance of which they complained.
For present purposes, the Court will assume that Plaintiffs have alleged that they are presently suffering an injury (namely, the chilling of their advocacy) out of the fear that, by advocating for a particular rule, they may contribute to the rescission of unidentified rules. According to Plaintiffs, a chill of that type is distinguishable from the chill in Clapper . They assert that their underlying fear, unlike the fear of surveillance in Clapper , is not "speculative" or subjective;" rather, they assert, their concern about causing the repeal of beneficial regulations "necessarily" flows from the Executive Order. Dkt. 47 at 19; see also Lyons ,
The principal takeaway from Clapper is that plaintiffs may not turn an unduly speculative or hypothetical injury into a concrete injury "by inflicting harm *39on themselves based on their fears of [the] hypothetical future harm." Clapper ,
Finally, Plaintiffs suggest that the chill at issue here is particularly troublesome because it implicates their First Amendment right to petition government. Dkt. 47 at 17-18. That argument, however, carries little force in the face of the Supreme Court's decisions in Clapper and Laird v. Tatum , both of which also involved First Amendment activities. In Clapper , the plaintiffs alleged that the fear of surveillance "compel[led] them to avoid certain e-mail and phone conversations" and "to tal[k] in generalities rather than specifics." Clapper ,
The two cases that Plaintiffs cite in support of their contention, moreover, involved very different circumstances. Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett considered an Arizona campaign finance system under which, if a privately financed candidate exceeded "a set spending limit," her publicly financed opponent would receive "roughly one dollar for every dollar [she] spent."
Plaintiffs rely on Virginia v. American Booksellers Association, Inc. ,
The Court, accordingly, concludes that Plaintiffs have failed plausibly to allege or otherwise show that they meet the essential elements of organizational standing.
C. Disposition
Having concluded that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of plausibly alleging or otherwise demonstrating that they have standing to sue, the Court must determine the proper disposition of the matter. The Court, of course, cannot consider the merits of the dispute without first concluding that it has jurisdiction. Steel Co. ,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss, Dkt. 15, is hereby GRANTED for lack of jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 16, is hereby DENIED . It is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall appear before the Court on March 1, 2018, at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 19 to address appropriate next steps, including whether the Court should enter final judgment.
SO ORDERED .
Available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/FINAL_TOPLINE_All_20171207.pdf.
In full, a "significant regulatory action" is an action likely (1) to "[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more" or to "adversely affect in a material way the economy, ... the environment, public health or safety, or [s]tate, local, or tribal governments or communities;" (2) to "[c]reate a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency;" (3) to "[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof;" or (4) to "[r]aise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in [Executive Order 12866 ]." Exec. Order No. 12866 § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). The OMB guidance incorporates the definition of "significant regulatory action" set forth in Executive Order 12866 and the definition of "significant guidance document" from OMB's Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices. See Final Guidance, Q & A 2-3. There are no material differences between these definitions.
For concision, the Court will refer to Plaintiffs' amended complaint as "the complaint."
These include (1) two Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") proposed rules that would "phase out trichloroethylene ... for use in vapor degreasing, aerosol degreasing, and spot cleaning in dry cleaning facilities," Dkt. 14 at 28 (Am. Compl. ¶ 90); (2) "critical life-saving and environment-protecting air pollution limits" from the EPA, id. at 42-43 (Am. Compl. ¶ 124); (3) a possible "occupational health standard for styrene, an industrial chemical that can harm workers[,]" from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, id. at 23 (Am. Compl. ¶ 77); (4) a Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") proposed rule "requiring underground coal mine operators to equip [certain mobile] equipment with proximity detection systems" designed to "reduce mining deaths from pinning, crushing, or striking injuries," id. at 26 (Am. Compl. ¶ 84); (5) "potential" MSHA rules that would "protect miners against diesel exhaust emissions and silicosis," Dkt. 16-17 at 8 (Wagner Decl. ¶ 20); (6) a citizen petition filed with the Food and Drug Administration relating to the tracking of tobacco sales, Dkt. 16-3 at 5-6 (R. Weissman Decl. ¶ 12); (7) a Department of Transportation withdrawn proposal "to require air carriers and ticket agents to clearly disclose to consumers certain information about fees for checked bags," Dkt. 61 at 2, and other unspecified Department of Transportation rules, Dkt. 16 at 27; and, finally, (8) five Department of Housing and Urban Development withdrawn proposals, "including one entitled 'Floodplain Management Protection of Wetlands Minimum Property Standards for Flood Hazard Exposure; Building to the Federal Flood Risk Management Standard,' " Dkt. 61 at 2-3.
Two other proposed rules on which Plaintiffs rely cannot support standing because those rules are now final. According to Plaintiffs, an EPA rule regulating mercury discharges from dental offices was delayed due to the Executive Order. Dkt. 47 at 24; see Dkt. 16 at 27; Dkt. 16-4 at 6-7 (Wetzler Decl. ¶¶ 13-14); Dkt. 47-3 at 2 (Heimbinder Decl. ¶ 8). As Plaintiffs concede, however, "delay of this rule is no longer ongoing." Dkt. 47 at 24 n.7. Plaintiffs also claim standing based on the delay of a rule from the National Marine Fisheries Service designating certain areas along the East Coast as critical habitat for the Atlantic sturgeon. See Dkt. 14 at 38-40 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 113-17); Dkt. 47 at 25; Dkt. 16-4 at 9 (Wetzler Decl. ¶ 17); Dkt. 16-13 at 9-11 (Winegrad Decl. ¶¶ 19-23). That rule, however, is also now final. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Endangered New York Bight, Chesapeake Bay, Carolina and South Atlantic Distinct Population Segments of Atlantic Sturgeon,
The Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, issued in the spring and fall of each year, provides information on the status of "regulatory and deregulatory activities under development throughout the Federal Government." Office of Mgmt. & Budget, About the Unified Agenda , https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_About.jsp. The various editions of the Unified Agenda illuminate the progress of a potential rule over time and are available online. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Reginfo.gov , https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/index.jsp. The status of a particular rulemaking at a certain point in time can be ascertained by searching OMB's website using the Regulatory Identification Number ("RIN") corresponding to the rulemaking and then selecting the appropriate edition of the Unified Agenda. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Search of Agenda/Regulatory Plan , https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch. For concision, when discussing the regulatory history of a particular rulemaking, the Court will provide the RIN in a footnote and cite the relevant version of the Unified Agenda (e.g., "Fall 2017 Agenda") in the text. The Court may take judicial notice of Executive Branch statements and reports pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao ,
RIN: 1218-AC46.
Plaintiffs have offered even less with respect to a potential rule "amend[ing] energy efficiency standards for consumer refrigerators and freezers." Dkt. 16-12 at 3 (Quigley Decl. ¶ 10). They aver that the Department of Energy was "expected to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking in 2017."Id. (Quigley Decl. ¶ 10). They offer no basis to conclude, however, that the Department intended to amend the relevant standards. The Spring 2017 edition of the Unified Agenda stated that the Department "may propose and adopt more stringent standards" or, alternatively, that it "may ... issue a determination that no amendments to the current standards are required." Spring 2017 Agenda (RIN: 1904-AD80) (emphasis added). And the most recent edition indicates that the Department intends to issue a request for information at an undetermined date. Fall 2017 Agenda. Plaintiffs, accordingly, have not plausibly alleged that the Department planned to issue a final rule "amend[ing] [the relevant] energy efficiency standards." Dkt. 16-12 at 3 (Quigley Decl. ¶ 10).
RIN: 1218-AC46.
RINs: 2070-AK07 (proposed EPA rule banning the use of certain chemicals in paint remover); 2127-AK92 (proposed NHTSA rule mandating speed-limiting devices on certain commercial vehicles); 2127-AL55 (proposed NHTSA rule mandating V2V communications technology on light vehicles).
RIN: 1904-AD15 (proposed Department of Energy rule setting energy efficiency standards for residential conventional cooking products).
RIN: 2137-AF08 (proposed PHMSA rule requiring certain railroads that transport petroleum oil to develop oil spill response plans).
Available at https://cms.dot.gov/regulations/significant-rulemaking-report-archive.
RINs: 2127-AL55 (proposed NHTSA rule mandating V2V communications technology on light vehicles); 2127-AK92 (proposed NHTSA rule mandating speed-limiting devices on certain commercial vehicles); 2137-AF08 (proposed PHMSA rule requiring certain railroads that transport petroleum oil to develop oil spill response plans).
Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-delivering-deregulation.
The actual calculations are more complicated than this. See, e.g. , Final Guidance, Q & A 25 (requiring agencies to calculate the present value of regulatory and deregulatory actions "over the full duration of [their] expected effects" using appropriate discount rates). These estimates, however, are close enough to illustrate that the Executive Order curtails the ability of agencies to adopt significant new rules, even when the benefits of the new rules would vastly outweigh the costs.
Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-office-information-regulatory-affairs-administrator-neomi-rao-unified-agenda-regulatory-deregulatory-actions.
RIN: 1218-AC46.
NRDC member Gerald Winegrad avers that he has "several electric appliances in [his] home, including an oven, an electric water heater, and an electric heat pump" and that "[s]ome of these appliances are very old ... and will need to be replaced soon." Dkt. 16-13 at 11 (Winegrad Decl. ¶ 24). "For example," he explains, he "expect[s] that [he] will need to replace [his] heat pump very soon."
LeGrande also attests that CWA suffers another injury to its advocacy efforts: if a health or safety standard "is not set by the federal rulemaking process" due to the Executive Order, "CWA must expend its own resources" on obtaining "protections for represented workers in a particular workplace" or on "establish[ing] violations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act's general duty clause." Dkt. 16-2 at 5-6 (LeGrande Decl. ¶ 16). Plaintiffs, however, do not press (or even mention) this point in their briefs, see Dkt. 51 at 10 n.1, and, in any event, LeGrande's assertion, which fails to identify any expenditures, is too abstract and too hypothetical to support Plaintiffs' standing, see Food & Water Watch ,
Reference
- Full Case Name
- PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC. v. Donald J. TRUMP, President of the United States
- Cited By
- 32 cases
- Status
- Published