United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT



Argued November 2, 2022             Decided August 18, 2023

                        No. 22-3018

                UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                        APPELLEE

                              v.

                       JAMES LITTLE,
                        APPELLANT


        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                   (No. 1:21-cr-00315-1)


     Joshua B. Carpenter, Federal Public Defender for the
Western District of North Carolina, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for appellant.

     James I. Pearce, Appellate Counsel, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief
were Matthew Graves, U.S. Attorney for the District of
Columbia, Kenneth A. Polite, Assistant Attorney General, Lisa
H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and John Crabb
Jr., Chief, Capitol Siege Section.

   Before: WILKINS and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and
ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.
                                   2

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.

     Dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

    WALKER, Circuit Judge: James Little committed a petty
offense. The district court sentenced him to prison, followed
by probation. The only question on appeal is whether that
sentence is authorized by statute.

    It is not. Probation and imprisonment are alternative
sentences that cannot generally be combined. So the district
court could not impose both for Little’s petty offense.

                          I. Background

A. James Little’s Offense and Sentence

     On January 6, 2021, James Little rioted inside the United
States Capitol. In his own words, he “took over the Capital
[sic]” because “[s]tealing elections is treason.” JA 32. He later
pleaded guilty to a petty offense: Parading, Demonstrating, or
Picketing in a Capitol Building. 

(e)(2)(G).

     That crime carries a sentence of six months in prison, a
fine, or both.1 

 § 5109(b). As an alternative sentence, a court
may give a defendant up to five years of probation, with or
without a fine. 

(b), 3561. But here, the
district court chose to mix and match those options, sentencing


1
 Because that offense carries a prison term of six months, it is a Class
B misdemeanor. 

(a)(7). That makes it a “petty
offense.” 

 (defining “petty offense” to include Class
B misdemeanors).
                              3
Little to sixty days in prison followed by three years of
probation.

    To support Little’s sentence, the district court relied on
§ 3561(a)(3), which describes some of the circumstances in
which probation is available.        Before introducing that
provision, we first discuss the federal sentencing scheme and
probation’s role within it.

B. Authorized Sentences

     The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 “comprehensively”
outlines the federal sentencing scheme. Cunningham v.
California, 

 (2007). The Act’s opening
section lists a menu of “authorized sentences” under the
Federal Criminal Code:

       An individual found guilty of an offense shall
       be sentenced . . . to —
          (1) a term of probation as authorized by
               subchapter B;
          (2) a fine as authorized by subchapter C; or
           (3) a term of imprisonment as authorized
               by subchapter D.
       A sentence to pay a fine may be imposed in
       addition to any other sentence.

Pub L. No. 98-473 § 212(a)(2), 

, 1988 (codified
at 

(b)).

     That menu makes five sentences available. The first is
probation — which lets a court sentence a defendant to a term
of court supervision, with an option for short periods of
intermittent confinement. 

(b)(10). The
                                 4
second is a fine. The third is imprisonment. The fourth is
probation plus a fine. And the fifth is imprisonment plus a fine.

     Notice that imprisonment plus probation is not an
available option. That’s because the list of sentences is
disjunctive (“probation . . . fine . . . or . . . imprisonment”),
indicating that the options on the menu are alternatives that
cannot be combined. 

 § 3551(b) (emphasis added).2

     The provision following the list confirms that reading.
Notwithstanding the disjunctive menu, “a fine may be imposed
in addition to any other sentence.” Id. That exception allows
a sentencing judge to combine a fine with probation or
imprisonment. Congress’s decision to make an exception for
fines but not probation strongly suggests that probation cannot
be combined with imprisonment. Nasdaq Stock Market LLC v.
SEC, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“mention of one
thing” implies the “preclusion” of others).

    In other words, the Code’s text and structure show that
probation and imprisonment may not be imposed as a single
sentence. They are separate options on the menu.3


2
  The Code’s chapter on sentencing mirrors the structure of the menu,
dividing probation, fines, and imprisonment into three separate
subchapters. 18 U.S.C. ch. 227. Subchapter A houses general
provisions. Subchapter B discusses probation. Subchapter C covers
fines. And Subchapter D lays out the rules for imprisonment.
3
  To be sure, Congress can make exceptions to that general rule.
Indeed, the Code’s chapter on sentencing applies “[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided.” 

(a). So when we
say that a court may not impose probation and imprisonment for a
single offense, we mean that § 3561(a)(3) does not allow it — not
that there are no exceptions to that general rule elsewhere in the
                                 5
C. Probation and Petty Offenses

     To ensure that probation remains a standalone
sentence — not       a      punishment     in     addition    to
imprisonment — the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 put a
further restriction on its use. Under the Act, a defendant could
not get probation if he was “sentenced at the same time to a
term of imprisonment for the same or a different offense.” 

(a)(2), 

, 1992 (emphasis added).

    Put differently, in 1984, sentencing judges could not
impose probation and imprisonment for a single offense — the
general rule discussed above. Nor could they impose probation
for one offense and imprisonment for a different offense
sentenced at the same time. 

 4

Code. But there is no exception for Little’s offense. See 

(e)(2)(G).
     Pushing back, the Government says 

(a)(3) is
the kind of specific exception contemplated by § 3551(a), allowing a
sentencing court to impose probation and imprisonment for a single
petty offense. We disagree. First, § 3551(a) contemplates that
exceptions will generally be found outside the Code’s chapter on
sentencing. See id. § 3551(a) (noting that the “provisions of this
chapter” apply “except as otherwise specifically provided”
(emphasis added)). Second, as we explain, § 3561(a) is not an
exception to the general rule. See infra Part II.
4
  Though the Sentencing Reform Act made probation a sentencing
option distinct from imprisonment — and barred giving a defendant
probation after imprisonment — it put in place a separate mechanism
for monitoring offenders after they are released from prison:
supervised release. 

; see United States v.
Granderson, 

, 43 n.3 (1994) (“before 1984, probation
[was] an alternative to a sentence,” but the Sentencing Reform Act,
“for the first time, classified probation as a sentence”). We discuss
supervised release in greater detail in Section II.B.
                                6

   But that regime proved too restrictive.          So in 1994,
Congress amended the statute. It now reads:

       A defendant who has been found guilty of an
       offense may be sentenced to a term of probation
       unless . . . the defendant is sentenced at the
       same time to a term of imprisonment for the
       same or a different offense that is not a petty
       offense.

, 

, 2096 (codified
at 

(a)(3)) (emphasis added).

      This case turns on those six new words. Does the italicized
phrase modify only “a different offense”? If so, a court may
not impose both imprisonment and probation for a single
offense (though it can impose imprisonment for one petty
offense and probation for a different offense). Or does the
italicized phrase modify “the same or a different offense”? In
that case, a sentencing court may impose both probation and
imprisonment for a single petty offense.

     The district court adopted the latter reading and sentenced
Little to sixty days in prison plus three years of probation for a
single petty offense.

       II. A Defendant May Not Get Probation and
          Imprisonment for a Single Petty Offense

     We disagree with the district court’s reading of
§ 3561(a)(3). See United States v. Cordova, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (we review the district court’s
interpretation of a statute de novo).
                                 7
A. Text

    Like many statutory lists, § 3561(a)(3) poses a problem:
Does a qualifier at the end of the list modify just the list’s final
item, or all the items that come before it?

      The Supreme Court’s “typical[ ]” approach to that problem
is to apply “the rule of the last antecedent.” Lockhart v. United
States, 

 (2016). That rule commands “that
a limiting clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as
modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately
follows.” 

 (cleaned up). Thus, when Chief Justice
Marshall interpreted a statute defining “piracy” as committing
“upon the high seas . . . murder or robbery, or any other
offense . . . punishable with death,” he held that all robberies at
sea were piracies — not just robberies punishable by death.
United States v. Palmer, 

 (1818) (cleaned up).

     Applied here, the last-antecedent rule tells us that the
qualifier “that is not a petty offense” modifies only the phrase
that immediately precedes it: “a different offense.” 

(a)(3). Read like that, the statute bars a court from
imposing probation and imprisonment for a single offense. A
court may impose both only if a defendant gets imprisonment
for one petty offense and probation for a different offense.

     Of course, the last-antecedent rule is not inexorable. See
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 

 (2021) (“The
rule of the last antecedent is context dependent.”). And the
Government contends that this statute is a poor fit for the rule.
It says we can’t divide up the phrase “the same or a different
offense” and apply the qualifier to only part of it. In the
Government’s view, “the same or a different” is an adjectival
phrase modifying the noun “offense.” If that’s correct, then
                                     8
there is only one noun (“offense”) for the qualifier (“that is not
a petty offense”) to modify:

    the same or a different      offense      that is not a petty offense
    [________________________]   [________]   [___________________________]
       adjectival phrase           noun                qualifier

    Read that way, it is natural to read the qualifier to reach
“the same.” And it would follow that prison plus probation is
an authorized sentence for a single petty offense.

     But that is not the only plausible interpretation of the
statute. Rather than reading “the same” as part of an adjectival
phrase, “the same” can be read as a pronoun. That’s because
“the same” is often used as a pronoun meaning “something that
has previously been defined or described.” Same (pronoun,
def. 2), Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993).5
For example, when describing a recent meal at my favorite
restaurant, I could say: “My friend had a steak, and I had the
same.”


5
  True, Webster’s Third doesn’t list that meaning of “same” as the
first definition, instead giving precedence to the adjectival meaning.
Cf. Dissenting Op. 9-10. But that just shows that the adjectival
meaning of “same” has been in use for longer. Webster’s Third,
supra, at 4a (“In definitions of words of many meanings, the earliest
ascertainable meaning is given first. Meanings of later derivation are
arranged . . . by dated evidence and semantic development.”).
   It also may be true that using “the same” as a pronoun is “legalese.”
Dissenting Op. 10. But Congress often borrows established legal
phrasing when it writes statutes. See FAA v. Cooper, 

 (2012). And “the same” has been used as a pronoun in some of
this nation’s most important legal documents. See, e.g., U.S. Const.
art. I, § 5 (“Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same . . . .”).
                                   9
     If “the same” takes that meaning in § 3561(a)(3), the
statute makes perfect sense. The first part reads: “A defendant
who has been found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to a
term of probation unless . . . [he] is sentenced at the same time
to a term of imprisonment for the same.” 

(a)(3) (emphases added). The final phrase then adds an
item to the list: “or a different offense that is not a petty
offense.” 

     Reading “the same” as a pronoun also explains why
Congress used different articles before the items in the list in
§ 3561(a)(3) (“the same”; “a different”). By using the definite
article “the” before “same,” Congress made clear that it was
referring to the offense mentioned earlier in the provision. And
by using the indefinite article “a” before “different,” Congress
captured the universe of other offenses for which a defendant
might be sentenced. See Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani,

, 1440 (2023) (relying on Congress’s use of the
“definite article” to interpret a statute).

    If “the same” is a pronoun, the end of § 3561(a)(3) is
grammatically structured in a way that makes the last-
antecedent rule a natural fit:

 the same      or   a different   offense     that is not a petty offense
 [_________]        [_________]   [_______]   [_________________________]
 pronoun            adjectival     noun                qualifier
                     phrase

     As with other statutory lists, it is less awkward “to apply
th[e] modifier only to the item directly before it” than to all the
preceding items. Lockhart, 

; see FTC v. Mandel
Brothers, Inc., 

 (1959). That is
particularly true here because there is an intervening adjectival
phrase (“a different”) between the qualifier (“that is not a petty
offense”) and the first item in the list (“the same”). Cf. Antonin
                               10
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts, 147 (2012) (reading a qualifier to apply to a whole
list is most appropriate “[w]hen there is a straightforward,
parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a
series”).

    Little offers a third interpretation of the text. He suggests
that “the same or a different offense” is an “elliptical
construction.” Little Br. 16-17. An elliptical construction is
one in which a word or phrase is omitted from a sentence
because it is implied from context — for instance, “I went to
dinner, and John went [to dinner] too.” Thus, Little says,
§ 3561(a)(3) should be read as if Congress had written “the
same offense or a different offense.” If correct, that reading
would also make the rule of the last antecedent a natural fit
because there are two nouns (one implied and one express)
preceding the qualifier (“that is not a petty offense”).

    To be sure, § 3561(a)(3) is no model of clarity. The text
alone struggles to supply an answer to today’s case. But we
don’t read text in a vacuum. And the rest of the statutory
scheme confirms that the Government’s reading is second best.

B. Structure

    Courts “must read the words Congress enacted in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.” Turkiye Halk Bankasi v. United States, 

,
275 (2023) (cleaned up). Doing so here confirms — for four
reasons — that a court cannot impose both imprisonment and
probation for a single petty offense.

    First, the Government’s reading would subvert the
Sentencing Reform Act’s general rule that probation is a
                               11
standalone sentence, combinable only with a fine, not with
imprisonment.

    The Act sets up that rule by listing a menu of “[a]uthorized
sentences” for a single offense. 

. Those
sentences are (1) probation, (2) a fine, (3) imprisonment, (4)
probation and a fine, or (5) imprisonment and a fine. Id.; see
supra Section I.B. That menu is the cornerstone of the
Criminal Code’s chapter on sentences. 18 U.S.C. ch. 227.

     So when the Government reads § 3561(a)(3) to add a new
option — probation plus imprisonment — it’s a heavy lift.
Unlike mystery novels, statutes rarely end with a surprise twist.
And here, the surprise would be especially strange. It would
attach a double punishment to petty offenses but not to felonies.
So you could get probation plus prison for speeding in a
national park, but not for assaulting a park ranger.

    Second, the Government’s reading would turn a limit on
probation into an expansion of its availability.

     Section 3561(a) is a restriction on a sentencing court’s
power. It lists three limits on a sentencing court’s authority to
select probation as a sentence from the menu in § 3551(b).
Those limits are:
       (1) when a defendant is sentenced for “a Class
           A or B felony”;
       (2) when     another     statute       “expressly
           preclude[s]” probation; or
       (3) when “the defendant is sentenced at the
           same time to a term of imprisonment for the
           same or a different offense that is not a
           petty offense.”
                                 12

(a).

    From the third of those limits, the Government would
forge an expansion of probation’s availability. That’s an odd
way to read a limit. Imagine your friend said, “You can borrow
my car when I’m out of town, except for three scenarios when
you cannot.” Would you read into the third scenario an
occasion to borrow his car when he’s in town? Probably not if
you wanted to stay friends.                   That’s because
speakers — including legislatures — do not typically hide new
expansions of authority within limits on a grant of authority.

    Third, the Government’s reading of the statute would turn
the Sentencing Reform Act’s post-confinement-monitoring
scheme on its head, subverting two of Congress’s deliberate
choices.

     Choice 1: Congress made supervised release, not
probation, the mechanism for court supervision after time in
prison. Supervised release is a term of “postconfinement
monitoring,” which runs from the time a defendant is released.
Johnson v. United States, 

 (2000). It is
not a standalone sentence, but rather is imposed as “part of” the
defendant’s term of imprisonment. 

(a).
Unsurprisingly, the rules governing supervised released are
housed within the Code’s subchapter on imprisonment. 

ch. 227, subch. D (imprisonment). By contrast, probation is a
distinct sentence, housed in its own subchapter. See 

§ 3551(b); ch. 227, subch. B (probation).6

6
  Probation and supervised release thus play different roles in the
sentencing scheme. “Probation is a standalone sentence that might
allow for intermittent imprisonment during its term, while supervised
release . . . follows a term of imprisonment that has been completed
                               13

     Choice 2: Congress expressly barred supervised release for
petty offenses. 

(b)(3). And because
supervised release is the Code’s exclusive form of post-
confinement monitoring, that choice ruled out monitoring after
prison for single-count petty offenders. Once a petty offender
is done with imprisonment he may move on with his
life — whereas more serious offenders may be supervised to
keep them on the straight and narrow.

     The Government’s reading of § 3561(a)(3) subverts both
those choices. In its view, whenever a defendant is sentenced
to imprisonment for a petty offense, the court may also impose
a term of probation to follow time in prison. Yet that turns
probation into a form of post-confinement monitoring. Cf.
U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, note 2(b) (“[t]he conditions of supervised
release” are almost “the same as those for . . . probation”). And
it imposes post-confinement monitoring on single-count petty
offenders even though Congress expressly exempted them
from it. 

(b)(3).

     Fourth, the Government’s reading of § 3561(a)(3) would
let a court impose more post-confinement monitoring for a
petty offense than for more serious misdemeanors and most
felonies.

     The maximum term of supervised release increases with
the severity of the offense. 

(b). The most
serious felons get five years, some other felons get three years,
nonpetty misdemeanants get one year, and petty offenders get
none. 

in full.” United States v. Panayiotou, 

, at *2
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2023).
                                  14
     Reading § 3561(a)(3) to prohibit probation and
imprisonment for a single petty offense — as we
do — preserves that neat correspondence between the severity
of the offense and the length of post-confinement monitoring.
By contrast, because the Government’s reading turns probation
into a form of post-confinement monitoring, it would let a court
impose more monitoring for a petty offense than for more
serious misdemeanors and most felonies:

       Offense          Term of Post-confinement Monitoring

                         Our Reading           Government Reading

    Class A felony          5 years                   5 years

    Class B felony          5 years                   5 years

    Class C felony          3 years                   3 years

    Class D felony          3 years                   3 years

    Class E felony          1 year                     1 year
    Nonpetty
                            1 year                     1 year
    misdemeanor
    Petty offense            None                    5 years*


     If Congress wanted to impose more post-confinement
monitoring for petty offenses than for all but the most serious
felonies, it could. But we would expect clear language
authorizing that bizarre result. Instead, we’re left with

*
   That’s five years of probation, to run after a defendant’s
confinement. In contrast, the table’s other figures refer to supervised
release, also to run after a defendant’s confinement.
                                15
§ 3561(a)(3) — and its text is at best equivocal. See supra
Section II.A; cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,

 (2001).

     To sum up, there are two possible readings of
§ 3561(a)(3). Our reading keeps probation and imprisonment
as separate sentences. 

(b). It takes seriously
Congress’s instruction not to impose post-confinement
monitoring on petty offenders. 

 § 3583(b)(3). And it gives
§ 3561 a serious role to play in the statutory
scheme — allowing imprisonment for one petty offense and
probation for a different offense, while confirming that prison
plus probation is not an available sentence for the same offense.
Id. § 3561(a)(3).

     The other possible reading is the Government’s. It is at
odds with the Act’s opening list of available sentences. It turns
a limit on probation into an expansion of it. It sidesteps the bar
on supervised release for petty offenders. And it subjects petty
offenders to a term of post-confinement monitoring five times
longer than the term imposed on some felons.

     That cannot be right. Congress isn’t in the business of
putting a statute “at war with itself.” United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 

 (1911). We thus avoid that
unnecessary conflict by reading § 3561(a)(3) to preserve the
statutory scheme’s bar on sentences of prison plus probation
for the same offense.7

7
   As a fallback, the Government argues that Little’s sentence is
authorized by 

(b)(10), which lets a sentencing court
require a defendant on probation to “remain in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons during nights, weekends, or other intervals of
time.” So the Government says the district court’s reliance on
§ 3561(a)(3) was harmless. See United States v. Simpson, 

                             *    *    *

     Section 3561(a)(3) is no model of clarity. For that reason,
thoughtful district judges have divided over the best reading of
it. See United States v. Panayiotou, 

, at *1 &
n.2 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2023) (disagreeing with the Government,
even though “nine judges have adopted [its] position”).

    But the Government’s interpretation is second best. It says
§ 3561(a)(3) lets a sentencing court impose probation plus
imprisonment for a single petty offense. Yet that reading
conflicts with the statutory scheme. Congress made probation
and imprisonment separate options for separate offenses;
barred supervised release for petty offenders; and linked the



1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (setting out harmless error test for both
constitutional and nonconstitutional errors). But the Government has
not shown that § 3563(b)(10) authorizes a sixty-day stint in custody
at the start of a defendant’s sentence. Indeed, the statute
contemplates short periods of confinement like “nights” and
“weekends” interspersed throughout probation.             

(b)(10); see United States v. Forbes, 

 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“a straight sentence of six months is not the intermittent
incarceration that this statute permits”). In any event, the district
court expressly ruled out imposing intermittent confinement as a
condition of probation. It noted that “the government did not . . .
request [it] in Little’s case.” JA 130-31. And it said intermittent
confinement “would be unwise” because there were “COVID-19
safety concerns inherent in repeatedly entering and leaving detention
facilities.” 

 So the Government cannot show, as it must, that the
district court “would have” imposed the same sentence had it not
misunderstood its sentencing power under § 3561(a)(3). United
States v. Ayers, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (emphasis
added).
                                 17
length of post-confinement monitoring to the severity of an
offense. The Government’s reading subverts those choices.

     We cannot divorce § 3561(a)(3)’s hazy text from that
clarifying context. So we vacate Little’s sentence and remand
to the district court for resentencing.8

                                                        So ordered.




8
  In his plea agreement, Little waived most of his appellate rights.
But he reserved the right to appeal a sentence “above the statutory
maximum.” JA 22-23. Little argues that reservation allows this
appeal. Little Br. 38. Because the Government “opted not to
enforce” Little’s waiver, we need not decide whether Little reserved
the right to bring this appeal. Govt. Br. 17 n.4; see United States v.
Ortega-Hernandez, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (appellate
waiver not jurisdictional).
     WILKINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: James Little pleaded
guilty to a petty offense under 

(e)(2)(G)
related to his participation in the January 6, 2021 insurrection
at the United States Capitol. The District Court sentenced him
to 60 days’ imprisonment, followed by three years of
probation. On appeal, Little offers several different reasons
why his split sentence violates federal sentencing statutes. The
majority agrees. Because I believe that the majority and Little
are mistaken, I respectfully dissent.

                               I.

     A few weeks after the 2020 election, Little uploaded an
almost 23-minute YouTube video contesting the election
results and mentioning a potential civil war. On January 5,
2021, Little traveled from North Carolina to Washington, D.C.
to attend former President Trump’s “Stop the Steal” rally the
following day—January 6. J.A. 54; Appellant Br. 8.

     “January 6, 2021, marked a tragic day in American history.
The peaceful transfer of power—one of our most important and
sacred democratic processes—came under a full-fledged
assault.” United States v. Little, 

, 342
(D.D.C. 2022). While Congress assumed its constitutional
duty to certify the results of the 2020 election, “[r]ioters”
forced their way into the Capitol building. 

 This violent
attack resulted in multiple deaths, injuries, and “inflicted
millions of dollars in damage to the Capitol.” Trump v.
Thompson, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Little joined the
other rioters who forced their way into the Capitol.

     While inside the building, Little smiled and first-bumped
other rioters, took photographs of himself, J.A. 13, and sent a
text message stating, “We just took over the Capital [sic]!” J.A.
12. The individual who received the message responded, “And
you are bragging? ‘We’? THIS IS TREASON!!! IF YOU
DON’T CONDEMN THIS, NEVER BOTHER SPEAKING
                               2
TO ME AGAIN! HORRIBLE, HORRIBLE PEOPLE. IT’S A
COUP! YOU OBVIOUSLY HATE AMERICA!!!” 

 To
this, Little stated, “We are stopping treason! Stealing elections
is treason! []We’re not going to take it anymore!” and “[y]ou’ll
thank me for saving your freedom . . . later!” 

     Although Little “did not directly assault officers[,]” his
participation was essential because those who did engage in
violence “were able to do so because they found safety in
numbers.” Little, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 342.

     Little was ultimately arrested and charged with four
counts: (1) entering and remaining in a restricted building or
grounds in violation of 

(a)(1); (2) disorderly
and disruptive conduct in a restricted building or grounds in
violation of 

(a)(2); (3) disorderly conduct in a
Capitol building or grounds in violation of 

(e)(2)(D); and (4) parading, demonstrating, or picketing
in a Capitol building in violation of 

(e)(2)(G).
J.A. 16–17.

      In November 2021, Little pleaded guilty to one count of
parading, demonstrating, and picketing in a Capitol building in
violation of 

(e)(2)(G). See J.A. 19–33. As a
Class B misdemeanor carrying a six-month statutory maximum
penalty, this is a petty offense. See 

 (defining
petty offenses as including Class B); 

 § 3559(a)(7)
(establishing Class B misdemeanors as offenses carrying a
maximum of six months’ imprisonment). Little was sentenced
to a term of 60 days’ imprisonment, followed by a term of three
years’ probation. J.A. 227–28. In doing so, the District Court
noted that this sentence was necessary to “not only punish
Little for his conduct but also ensure that he will not engage in
similar conduct again during the next election.” Little, 

                            3
Supp. 3d at 344 (“Only a split sentence would adequately serve
the goals of sentencing described in 

.”).

                               II.

     Little contends that his sentence of incarceration, followed
by a term of probation (commonly called a “split sentence”) is
illegal. Resolution of the issue turns on the interpretation of 

(a), which provides as follows:

       (a) In general.--A defendant who has been
       found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to
       a term of probation unless--

               (1) the offense is a Class A or
                   Class B felony and the
                   defendant is an individual;

               (2) the offense is an offense for
                   which probation has been
                   expressly precluded; or

               (3) the defendant is sentenced at
               the same time to a term of
               imprisonment for the same or a
               different offense that is not a
               petty offense.

As we see, Section 3561(a) is a list of exceptions—instances
when the district judge cannot impose a sentence of probation.
It provides that a defendant “may be sentenced to a term of
probation unless” one of the three enumerated exceptions in
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) applies.
                               4
     The District Court found that the probation exception in
§ 3561(a)(3) did not apply to Little, and thus the court imposed
a split sentence, a term of imprisonment followed by a term of
probation.
                               A.

     To understand the probation exception in § 3561(a)(3), we
need to take a step back. Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, federal prison sentences were by default
indeterminate: if the court imposed a prison sentence, the
defendant would be eligible for parole after serving one-third
of the prison term, but whether and when the defendant was
released on parole was solely within the discretion of the U.S.
Parole Commission. See generally United States ex rel.
D'Agostino v. Keohane, 

, 1169–70 (3d Cir.
1989). Hence, even though the court imposed the prison term,
the amount of time that the defendant would actually spend in
prison was “indeterminate” at the time of sentencing. As the
Supreme Court explained, “under the indeterminate-sentence
system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a
sentence within the statutory range (which [the judge] usually
could replace with probation), and the Executive Branch’s
parole official eventually determined the actual duration of
imprisonment.” Mistretta v. United States, 

(1989).

    On the other hand, “[d]eterminate sentences are those
whose length can be measured with relative certainty at the
time they are imposed.” ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF
SENTENCING § 4:3 (3d ed. 2022). To impose a determinate
sentence prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, courts used split
sentences. In a split sentence, the court imposed a term of
imprisonment, but suspended the execution of all except a
specific number of days or months, followed by a term of
probation. In this manner, the court could determine exactly
                               5
how much time the defendant spent in prison, and the
defendant was supervised on probation, rather than parole, after
his release. If the defendant violated probation, the court could
then impose the remainder of the prison term that was
suspended.

     The preceding example is how the court imposed a split
sentence in a single-count case. In a multiple-count case, the
court could impose a split sentence by imposing a prison term
on one count and a probation term on the second count. See,
e.g., United States v. Nunez, 

, 770–72 & n.5 (2d
Cir. 1978) (finding split sentence in a single-count case was
lawful where court imposed a three-year term of imprisonment
with all but six months suspended, followed by a four-year
term of probation and noting that “[a] judge could achieve this
result . . . on a multi-count indictment by giving a prison
sentence on one count and a period of probation on another[]”);
Green v. United States, 

, 231–33 (9th Cir. 1961)
(affirming a split sentence imposed in a multiple-count case).

     The Sentencing Reform Act “makes all [prison] sentences
basically determinate. A prisoner is to be released at the
completion of his sentence reduced only by any credit earned
by good behavior while in custody.” Mistretta, 

(citing 

(a), (b)). Upon release from prison,
the defendant is placed on supervised release, and if the
defendant violates those terms and conditions, supervised
release can be revoked and the defendant can be sent back to
prison. See 

. As a result, split sentences were
no longer needed to achieve determinate sentences—every
prison term imposed was now determinate, and post-release
supervision was handled by supervised release, rather than
parole or probation.
                                6
    The Sentencing Reform Act basically replicated the split
sentencing method of imposing a determinate sentence by
creating its “functional equivalent,” which used “a term of
imprisonment followed by a period of supervised release.”
U.S.S.G. § 5.B1.1 cmt. background (citing former 

 (repealed 1984); 

; and quoting S. S.
REP. NO. 98–225 (1983)).

     Because the use of split sentences was no longer necessary
to achieve determinate sentencing, the Sentencing Reform Act
eliminated split sentences in single-count and multiple-count
cases. The Act did so by prohibiting the imposition of
probation when “the defendant is sentenced at the same time to
a term of imprisonment for the same or a different offense.”

Title II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 

 (emphasis added). (This was the original language of
§ 3561(a)(3) in the Sentencing Reform Act.).

    For reasons it never articulated, Congress eliminated the
option of imposing supervised release following a term of
imprisonment for petty offenses shortly after the October 1,
1987, effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act. Sentencing
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–182, § 8, 

 (1987)
(amending the supervised release statute, 

(b)(3), to add the words “other than a petty offense”).

     It thus appears undisputed that as of the end of 1987,
Congress abolished split sentences for all offenses, whether
effectuated by imposing imprisonment and probation in a
single-count case or by doing so in a multiple-count case. It is
also undisputed that as of the end of 1987, Congress eliminated
supervised release as an option for court supervision following
a prison sentence for petty offenses, whether in a single-count
case or a multiple-count case.
                                7
                               B.

     In 1994, Congress amended the prohibition on split
sentences appearing at 

(a)(3) “by inserting
‘that is not a petty offense’ before the period.” Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, Title XXVIII, § 280004, 

 (1994). Thus, the
provision now prohibits the imposition of probation when “the
defendant is sentenced at the same time to a term of
imprisonment for the same or a different offense that is not a
petty offense.” 

(a)(3) (emphasis added). The
present dispute centers on how to interpret the 1994
amendment.

     As described above, Little was given a split sentence on a
single petty offense count: 60 days’ imprisonment followed by
three years of probation. Little concedes that the 1994
amendment created an exception to allow for split sentences in
cases involving petty offenses, but he contends that Congress
only intended to allow split sentences in multiple-count petty
offense cases—not in single-count petty offense cases:

       If the restrictive phrase (“that is not a petty
       offense”) modifies only the phrase that precedes
       it (“a different offense”), then the provision
       permits a defendant convicted of two petty
       offenses to receive a sentence of imprisonment
       on one offense and probation on the other, but
       prohibits dual punishment—imprisonment and
       probation—for a single petty offense.

Appellant Br. 14–15.

    For several reasons, Little’s interpretation of the statute is
untenable.
                                 8

     Recall the text of 

(a)(3) following the
1994 amendment: probation may be imposed “unless . . . the
defendant is sentenced at the same time to a term of
imprisonment for the same or a different offense that is not a
petty offense.” Importantly, the adjectives “same” and
“different” modify the same word: “offense.” Immediately
after the word “offense[,]” we find the restrictive clause at
issue: “that is not a petty offense.” Invoking the last antecedent
rule, Little argues that the restrictive clause, “that is not a petty
offense,” modifies the phrase that precedes it, “a different
offense,” but not the word “same.”

      This is an improper application of the rule of the last
antecedent. The rule provides that “a limiting clause or phrase
. . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or
phrase that it immediately follows.” Jama v. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 

 (2005) (quoting Barnhart v.
Thomas, 

 (2003)). The most obvious
application of the rule is to construe the limiting clause “that is
not a petty offense” as modifying the noun that it immediately
follows: “offense.” Alternatively, we could consider the
limiting clause as modifying the prepositional phrase that
precedes it—“for the same or a different offense”—because
“the most natural way to view the modifier is as applying to the
entire preceding clause” since “that clause hangs together as a
unified whole . . . .” Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret.
Fund, 

 (2018). Thus, whether the limiting
clause modifies “offense” or “for the same or a different
offense,” either construction results in an exception to the split
sentence prohibition in both single-count and multiple-count
petty offense cases.

    Little’s argument that the limiting clause instead modifies
only the phrase “different offense” turns the sentence into a
                                    9
grammatical jumble. The adjective “same” still modifies the
exact word as the adjective “different,” but in Little’s construct,
the identical word now means “any offense” when modified by
“same,” and it means “any offense that is not a petty offense”
when modified by “different.” The word “offense” cannot
have two different meanings when simultaneously modified by
separate adjectives. Further, Little’s construct gives meaning
to “different offense,” but it makes the adjective “same” an
orphan, because it no longer has a noun to modify. When used,
the last antecedent rule must be applied “without impairing the
meaning of the sentence[,]” NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:33 (7th ed. 2022) (citation
omitted). Little’s application of the last antecedent rule fails
this fundamental test. 1

    The majority tries to evade this grammatical confusion by
asserting that Congress used “same” as a pronoun rather than
an adjective. Maj. Op. 8. However, at the time of the 1994
1
  If Congress had intended to reach the result sought by Little, it
would have set forth “same offense” separately, so that “different
offense” could be considered a separate referent for the limiting
clause that follows. For instance, Congress could have added the
word “offense” and said that probation may be imposed “unless . . .
the defendant is sentenced at the same time to a term of imprisonment
for the same offense or a different offense that is not a petty offense.”
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 148–49 (2012) (comparing
“Institutions or societies that are charitable in nature (the institutions
as well as the societies must be charitable)[]” with the alternative
drafting, “An institution or a society that is charitable in nature (any
institution probably qualifies, not just a charitable one)[]”). Even if
Congress had added the word “offense” after “same,” the sentence
would still only “probably” have the meaning that Little would
prefer. Id. at 149. But it is a moot point, because that is not what
Congress did here.
                               10
amendment at issue, every major English dictionary (including
the one cited by the majority) listed “same” in its adjective form
as the first definition.        See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2007 (1993); OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 427 (1989); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1033 (1993); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1088 (1985); RANDOM HOUSE
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1165 (1982).

     The majority also relies on Congress’s use of the definite
article as support for the contention that “same” is being used
as a pronoun. Maj. Op. 8-9. That is rather weak sauce, given
that the definite article almost always precedes “same,” even
when the word is clearly used as an adjective. No one says,
“My friend had a steak, and I had a same steak.”

     Thus, “same” as an adjective was indisputably the most
common usage of the word at the time Congress wrote the
statutory text at issue. As one prominent commentator has put
it, using same as a pronoun is “legalese” that should be
“avoided by all that have any skill in writing,” because “[t]he
words it, them, and the noun itself . . . are words that come
naturally to us all; same or the same is an unnatural English
expression[.]” BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF
LEGAL USAGE 796 (3d ed. 2011) (citation omitted). Of course,
“the same” can be used as a pronoun properly in some
instances, but just because “a definition is broad enough to
encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word
is ordinarily understood in that sense.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac.
Saipan, Ltd., 

 (2012) (emphasis in original).
Consequently, I cannot agree with the majority’s attempt to
shoehorn the usage of “same” as a pronoun into the statutory
text to support Little’s interpretation.
                                 11
     My interpretation of the statute also comports more with
the purpose of the 1994 amendment, as reflected in its title
“Authorization of Probation for Petty Offenses in Certain
Cases.” See Dubin v. United States, 

, 1567
(2023) (noting that a title can be used to find meaning of a
statute); accord Yates v. United States, 

, 539–40
(2015); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 

(1998). With the 1994 amendment, Congress clearly intended
to authorize probation “for petty offenses” in instances where
probation was not previously allowed. The one instance in
which we are guaranteed to manifest Congress’s intent is in a
single offense case. Let me explain.

     Suppose Mr. Little had stopped at a bank on his way to the
Capitol on January 6, 2021 and handed the teller a note
demanding cash, violating 

, a felony. If Little
pleaded guilty to bank robbery and the instant petty offense—
the district judge could sentence Little to three years’ probation
for the bank robbery, if the judge sentenced Little at the same
time to 90 days’ imprisonment for the petty offense of parading
and demonstrating at the Capitol. This is so pursuant to either
my or the majority’s interpretation of Section 3561(a)(3),
because the statute allows a sentence of probation to be
imposed for the bank robbery “unless . . . the defendant is
sentenced at the same time to a term of imprisonment for . . . a
different offense that is not a petty offense.” Because the
“different offense” (parading and demonstrating) is a petty
offense, the judge could impose probation for the felony bank
robbery, to follow the prison sentence for the petty offense. 2
2
  Conversely, if the judge instead sentenced Little to 90 days’
imprisonment on the bank robbery, he could not sentence Little to
three years’ probation on the parading and demonstrating charge.
Because bank robbery is not a petty offense, the exception in Section
3561(a)(3) would apply that disallows a probationary sentence to be
imposed at the same time as a prison sentence for a different offense.
                              12
Thus, even though Congress apparently intended to
“authoriz[e] . . . probation for petty offenses” with the
amendment, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
§ 280004, the language authorizes probation for any offense,
including felonies, so long as the probation is imposed at the
same time as a prison sentence for a petty offense. And while
this is perhaps an unintended consequence—yet nevertheless
the result of Congress’s drafting—it remains true because the
limitation to petty offenses was placed on the offense that
received the prison term, but no similar limitation was placed
on the offense that could simultaneously receive the
probationary term.

     Where the defendant is convicted of only a single petty
offense, such as in this case, my reading of the statute would
authorize probation to be imposed for that petty offense where
it was previously prohibited and in accordance with the intent
of Congress as described in the title of the 1994 amendment.
Indeed, cases in which there is only a single petty offense are
the only instances where that outcome is guaranteed. Where
there are two different offenses, application of the 1994
amendment could not only authorize probation when there are
two petty offenses, but it could also authorize probation for a
felony that is sentenced at the same time as a petty offense, as
shown in the hypothetical above. Thus, construing the 1994
amendment to apply to a single offense not only comports with
the natural and ordinary meaning of “same,” it also ensures that
Congress’s desire to authorize probation for petty offenses
where it had previously been prohibited can actually occur in
those instances where that outcome is guaranteed.

    Construing the text to modify the split sentence exception
to apply regardless of whether there is one petty offense or
multiple petty offenses also comports with the statutory
scheme. In 1984, Congress drafted § 3651(a)(3) in a manner
                                13
to prohibit split sentences in all instances, regardless of whether
the defendant was being sentenced on one count or multiple
counts. It would stand to reason that when Congress made an
exception to the split-sentence prohibition for petty offenses, it
would do so for all split sentences involving petty offenses,
regardless of whether the defendant was being sentenced on
one count or multiple counts.

     Indeed, precluding split sentences for single petty offenses
affirmatively frustrates the purposes of sentencing as set forth
in the Sentencing Reform Act. “When meting out sentences,
judges must consider the goals of punishment, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” United States v. Godoy,

 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing 

(a)(2)).        “These four considerations—retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four
purposes of sentencing generally, and a court must fashion a
sentence ‘to achieve the[se] purposes ... to the extent that they
are applicable’ in a given case.” Tapia v. United States, 

 (2011) (quoting 

(a)). See also
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 

 (2018);
Rita v. United States, 

, 347–48 (2007). However,
Congress’s message in the Sentencing Reform Act was, “Do
not think about prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender,”
Tapia, 

, because the Act “expressly prohibited
a district court in crafting an initial sentence from considering
a defendant’s need for rehabilitation in support of a prison
sentence.” Concepcion v. United States, 

, 2400
(2022) (citing 

(a)). See also Mistretta, 488
US. at 367 (explaining that the Act “rejects imprisonment as a
means of promoting rehabilitation”). Rather than prison,
probation and supervised release are the proper means of
effectuating the rehabilitative purposes of sentencing under the
Act. See Tapia, 

.
                               14
     The district judge has a duty to “consider all of the.
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the
sentence requested by a party,” Gall v. United States, 

, 49–50 (2007), when sentencing a defendant for a single
petty offense, just as in any other case. See 

(b)
(in absence of a sentencing guideline, “court shall impose an
appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes set
forth in subsection (a)(2)”); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.9 (sentencing
guidelines do not apply to Class B and C misdemeanors or
infractions). Accordingly, when imposing a sentence for a
single petty offense, the judge must consider “the overarching
sentencing purposes of “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation.” Rosales-Mireles, 

(quoting Tapia, 

). The judge could reasonably
conclude that a short prison sentence is necessary as a means
of retribution and deterrence in a single petty offense case. But
what if the judge also finds that the defendant needs
rehabilitation? The Sentencing Reform Act “instruct[s]
sentencing courts to consider rehabilitation as one of the
purposes of sentencing but bars them from seeking to achieve
rehabilitation through imprisonment.” In re Sealed Case, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 

(a) and

(a)). Consequently, where supervised release
is not an option, the only way that the judge can comply with
the foundational requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act is
to impose a sentence of imprisonment to be followed by a term
of probation – a split sentence. Indeed, in this very case, the
district judge found that “[o]nly a split sentence would
adequately serve the goals of sentencing described in 

,” Little, 590 Supp. 3d at 344.

    The majority’s interpretation prevents this district judge
from complying with Section 3553(a), a bedrock mandate of
the Sentencing Reform Act. That’s a colossal lift for a
secondary definition of a word.
                                15

     If petty offenders need a short prison sentence to punish
them, to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to deter them
from future criminal conduct, they need it regardless of
whether they committed one petty offense or two. If petty
offenders need rehabilitation following imprisonment, they
need it regardless of whether they committed one petty offense
or two. If Congress no longer wanted to force judges to choose
either punishment or rehabilitation for petty offenses – contrary
to the dictates of Section 3553(a) – there is no reason to believe
it intended to eliminate this Hobson’s choice only when the
defendant was convicted of two petty offenses, but not one. It
should go without saying that Congress intended for district
judges to comply with Section 3553(a) in every sentencing of
a petty offense, whether for a single count or for multiple
counts.      The majority points to nothing indicating that
Congress intended to render Section 3553(a) impotent in single
petty offense cases when it enacted the 1994 amendment. We
should not do so here. See Ali v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 

 (2008) (construction of
a statutory term “must, to the extent possible, ensure that
the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent”); Hibbs v.
Winn, 

 (2004) (“[a] statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant ....”)
(quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §
46.06, pp.181–186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)).

    The majority makes much of the anomalies between
imprisonment followed by supervised release and
imprisonment followed by probation. Maj. Op. 11-14. But the
majority must concede that, notwithstanding any such
anomalies that might result, Congress intended to allow
imprisonment followed by probation for defendants sentenced
to multiple offenses, whether it is two petty offenses or a felony
                                16
and a petty offense. That concession seriously undermines any
concern about anomalies and incongruities, given that there is
no question that Congress intended to allow one form of split
sentences (the multiple-count form involving at least one petty
offense). The only question is whether we must override the
most natural reading of the text based on something never
uttered by Congress: it could live with the resulting anomalies
created by split sentences in multiple offense cases, but the
anomalies that result in the other form of split sentences (the
single-count form) were simply a bridge too far. The majority
points to no such evidence, and I find none.

                          ***
    In sum, the majority has departed from the natural and
common reading of the statutory text, and in doing so, has
undermined 

(a), the foundational provision
governing the crafting of sentences under the Sentencing
Reform Act. The District Court should be affirmed, 3 and I
respectfully dissent.




3
  Following vacatur of the sentence on remand, it appears that the
district judge could impose a sentence of imprisonment or probation,
and that he would not be limited to the 90 days or three years that
were imposed before if he concluded that either a longer prison or
probationary term were required to meet the goals of 

. See Davenport v. United States, 

 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (per curiam) (“[A] defendant who successfully attacks an
invalid sentence can ‘be validly resentenced though the resentence
increased the punishment.’”) (quoting Hayes v. United States, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).