United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT



Argued November 4, 2024               Decided April 18, 2025

                        No. 22-1184

                 FAHMI AHMED MOHARAM,
                       PETITIONER

                              v.

 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND ADAM
STAHL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING ADMINISTRATOR
   OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
                       RESPONDENTS




                 Consolidated with 23-1198


         On Petitions for Review of a Final Decision
        of the Transportation Security Administration



     James Sigel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were Naz Ahmad, Ramzi Kassem, and Robert S. Litt.

     Koren Bell, Michael J. Gottlieb, and Mark T. Stancil were
on the brief for amici curiae Asian Americans Advancing
Justice, et al. in support of petitioner.
                                2
    Joshua P. Waldman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for respondents.      With him on the
supplemental brief were Brian M. Boynton, then-Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Sharon Swingle,
Attorney.

    Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, MILLETT and WILKINS,
Circuit Judges.

    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

     WILKINS, Circuit Judge:          Petitioner Fahmi Ahmed
Moharam is a dual United States-Yemeni citizen who has lived
in the United States for decades, but whose family resides in
Yemen. Moharam frequently travels between the two
countries to visit family and for religious study. In 2017, when
returning to the United States from Yemen via Saudia Arabia,
Moharam was stopped, interviewed, and denied boarding his
flight. Through the redress process administered by
Respondent Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”), he
learned that he had been placed on the No Fly List.

     Moharam sought to discover why he was on the No Fly
List so as to advocate for his removal. The Government
supplied only a sparse statement that Moharam’s designation
was based on his travel to, and activities in, Yemen between
2011–2017. Providing further detail, the Government claimed,
would reveal classified or otherwise-restricted national
security information. After Moharam petitioned for review in
this Court, though, the Government notified him that he was no
longer on the No Fly List and would not be relisted based on
the currently available information. Moharam’s removal from
the No Fly List deprives us of jurisdiction over his Petitions for
Review. We thus dismiss them as moot.
                                3
                                I.

                               A.

     The TSA is required by statute to establish policies and
procedures “to identify individuals on passenger lists who may
be a threat to civil aviation or national security; and if such an
individual is identified, notify appropriate law enforcement
agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or
take other appropriate action with respect to that individual.”

(h)(3)(A)–(B). Congress further provided that
the TSA shall “assume the performance of the passenger
prescreening function of comparing passenger information to
the . . . no fly lists and utilize all appropriate records in the
consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by
the Federal Government in performing that function.” 

§ 44903(j)(2)(C)(ii).      The TSA must also “establish a
procedure to enable airline passengers . . . to appeal such
determination and correct information . . . in the system,” id. §
44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I). That program, currently known as the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Traveler Redress
Inquiry Program (“TRIP”), allows individuals to “request
redress if they believe they have been . . . [d]enied or delayed
boarding transportation due to DHS screening programs.” 

 (2023).

     Through TRIP, “requesters [are] provided an opportunity
to request and receive additional information regarding their
status.” J.A. 363. “Such additional information will include,
where possible[,] when national security and law enforcement
interests at stake are taken into account, an unclassified
summary of information supporting the individual’s No Fly
List status.” 

 That said, “[t]he amount and type of
information provided will vary on a case-by-case basis[,]” and
“[i]n some circumstances, an unclassified summary may not
                                4
be provided when the national security and law enforcement
interests at stake are taken into account.” 

     About “98% of DHS TRIP inquiries are found to be
cleared of any connection with terrorist watchlisted identities.”
J.A. 362 (emphasis omitted). But if the TSA affirms
designation on a watchlist, “it will state the basis for the TSA
Administrator’s decision (to the extent feasible in light of the
national security and law enforcement interests at stake).” J.A.
363.

                               B.

     The parties do not materially contest the facts supporting
Moharam’s petition, which we accept as true for the purposes
of this appeal. On October 25, 2017, Moharam was denied
boarding on a Saudia Arabian Airlines flight departing from
King Abdulaziz International Airport. He appealed to TRIP on
October 29, 2017, and on February 14, 2018, was notified that
he was on the No Fly List because he was identified as
potentially posing a “threat to civil aviation or national
security.” J.A. 27 (quoting 

(h)(3)(A)).
Moharam lives in the United States, but his mother, wife, and
four of his five children all reside in Yemen.

     On March 13, 2018, he requested additional information
and administrative review of his status on the No Fly List. He
sought “the specific criterion under which [he] ha[d] been
placed on the No Fly List, the nominating agencies and any
information pertaining to [his] placement on the No Fly List,
and the timeline and process for [his] placement on the No Fly
List.” J.A. 42. Moharam stated his expectation that the agency
would provide an unclassified summary of the information
relied upon to maintain him on the List. Over the following
months, he repeatedly followed up with TRIP, including by
identifying intervening authority and noting that he was
                                5
represented by cleared (Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented
Information) counsel.

     On February 20, 2020, TRIP supplemented its response,
declaring that it “determined that [Moharam was] an individual
who represents a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent
act of terrorism and [was] operationally capable of doing so.”
J.A. 70. The only information in the “unclassified summary”
was that “the Government has concerns about [Moharam’s]
activities during frequent and extended travel to Yemen
between 2011 and 2017” and that “[t]he information [he]
shared during [his] interview at the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah
in November 2017 did not assuage the Government’s
concerns.” J.A. 70–71. TRIP stated that it was “unable to
provide additional disclosures, beyond the summary” due to
“national security concerns.” J.A. 70. Moharam reiterated his
requests that cleared counsel be granted access to any classified
information supporting the agency’s decision, and asked for a
copy of the interview described in the decision. The agency
replied that the “TSA does not disclose to redress applicants,
or the applicant’s counsel, classified information,” and as to the
interview, “DHS TRIP [was] unable to provide that
information.” J.A. 93.

     Moharam protested that he could not meaningfully
respond to the unclassified summary that did not specify which
“activities” formed the basis for his placement on the No Fly
List. In support of his removal from the List, he filed a sworn
affidavit attesting, among other things, that he went to Yemen
during the relevant time period to visit his family and to pursue
religious study. He also submitted an affidavit from his wife
and an expert declaration.

    Meanwhile, on October 6, 2021, Moharam filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia “seek[ing] an
                               6
order that requires defendants to remedy their constitutional
and statutory violations, including by (1) removing Mr.
Moharam from the No Fly List . . . and (2) providing a
declaration that Mr. Moharam is no longer on the No Fly List
or in the [Terrorist Screening Database,] TSDB[,] and will not
be placed back on such list or in such database based on
currently available information.” Compl. ¶ 1, No. 21-cv-2607
(JDB) (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2021), ECF No. 1. Those proceedings
have been stayed pending this appeal.

     On June 9, 2022, the TSA issued its final order
determining that Moharam was properly included on the No
Fly List. The agency stated that it considered Moharam’s
responsive evidence but ultimately concluded that the totality
of the information supported his placement on the List.

     Moharam timely petitioned for review of that decision on
August 5, 2022. He challenges the TSA’s decision to maintain
him on the No Fly List as arbitrary and capricious and in
violation of his procedural due process rights, and he “requests
that this Court hold the Final Decision unlawful and set aside,
modify, or amend it, and/or remand.” Pet’n for Review, No.
22-1184, ECF No. 1958969, at 1–2. Moharam also separately
sought review of the agency’s decision to withhold certain
information in the Administrative Record. Pet’n for Review,
No. 23-1198, ECF No. 2010233. The petitions were held in
abeyance pending resolution of Busic v. TSA, which was
decided on March 20, 2023. 

 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (per
curiam).

     On March 19, 2024, the Supreme Court unanimously
decided Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) v. Fikre,
concluding that the Government’s representation that the
plaintiff “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future
based on the currently available information” did not deprive
                                7
the court below of Article III jurisdiction, as such a statement
did not demonstrate that the challenged conduct could not
reasonably be expected to recur. 

, 240–45 (2024).
On May 2, 2024, the Government notified Moharam that he
was removed from the No Fly List and will not be placed on
the No Fly List in the future based upon the currently available
information, an identical representation. That notice was
issued by TRIP in a letter, which stated in relevant part that it
had “been advised that, based on an assessment of the currently
available information, you have been removed from the No Fly
List and that you will not be placed back on the No Fly List
based on the currently available information.” Mot. to File
Suppl. Br. & Add’l R. Materials Addressing Potential
Mootness Attach. 1, ECF No. 2053200, at 12 [hereinafter Mot.
to File Suppl. Br.]. It further stated, “This letter supersedes the
letter sent to you on June 9, 2022.” Id.

     The Government sought leave to file a supplemental brief
regarding mootness, see id. at 6, but ultimately declined to do
so. The Court later sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing
to address whether it retained jurisdiction over the petitions for
review following the Government’s removal of Moharam from
the No Fly List.

                                II.

     Moharam’s removal from the No Fly List moots both his
petitions for review and deprives us of jurisdiction to decide
the merits of his claims, notwithstanding FBI v. Fikre, 

 (2024), because the petitions are no longer redressable
based on the relief requested.

                                A.

    As a threshold matter, Moharam disputes that the TRIP
Letter conveying his removal from the No Fly List has the legal
                                8
effect of rescinding the TSA’s final order maintaining him on
the No Fly List. Specifically, he questions the authority of
TRIP to revoke a TSA final order because if the administrative
order remains in effect, we can redress his injury by setting that
order aside.

    Per the Government, since the TSA does not maintain the
watchlists, it can only remove an individual from the No Fly
List as part of the TRIP process. Outside of the redress
procedures, removal of individuals from the No Fly List is the
exclusive province of the Terrorism Screening Center (“TSC”),
a subdivision of the FBI.

     Prior to 2015, an individual who suspected they were on
the No Fly List could seek redress through TRIP, which “would
forward the complaint to TSC . . . [to] determine whether the
complainant was on the No Fly List and, if so, whether the
complainant’s continued inclusion on the list was justified.”
Kashem v. Barr, 

 (9th Cir. 2019). “After TSC
made this determination, [] TRIP would advise the complainant
by letter that the review was complete.” 

 Following
litigation, the procedures were revised. Today, TRIP still
forwards redress requests to TSC for review, and TSC
continues to provide TRIP with a recommended disposition.
But now, “[t]his recommendation, along with the
complainant’s complete DHS TRIP file, is provided to the TSA
Administrator, who is the final decisionmaker.” 

 “[T]he
TSA Administrator may either remand the case to TSC with a
request for additional information or issue a final order, a copy
of which is provided to the complainant.” 

     But once the redress process is complete—i.e., the TSA
has issued its final order—the TSC continues to independently
review the No Fly List as a matter of course. As the sole agency
in control of the List, TSC alone retains authority to remove
                               9
individuals from the No Fly List, separate and apart from the
TSA’s implementation of TRIP, which is only triggered by a
redress request. The Government has explained that TSC’s
independent removal of Moharam from the No Fly List
supersedes any legal effect of the TSA Administrator’s prior
final order.

     The TSC thus had the authority to remove Moharam from
the No Fly List following a routine review. TRIP’s letter
informing Moharam that he had been removed did not conflict
with the TSA Administrator’s prior final order maintaining him
on the List, because the former was the result of an independent
and contemporaneous review, whereas the latter was an
administrative decision rendered at a particular point in time
based on a static record. And TRIP’s letter updating
Moharam’s status on the No Fly List supersedes the TSA’s
prior final order.

     And, as described further infra Section III.B, the operative
issue is whether Moharam remains on the No Fly List: no one
disputes that he does not, or that he will not be returned to the
List based only on the information supporting his initial
designation.

                               B.

     Article III requires Moharam to show that he “(1) suffered
an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision.” Fore River Residents Against
the Compressor Station v. FERC, 

 (D.C. Cir.
2023) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

(2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A case is moot if
a decision will neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor
have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the
future.” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 

 (D.C.
                               10
Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“This occurs when, among other things, the court can provide
no effective remedy because a party has already obtained all
the relief that it has sought.” Schmidt v. United States, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). “[T]he Government,
not petitioners, bears the burden to establish that a once-live
case has become moot.” West Virginia v. EPA, 

,
719 (2022).

     “We must assume that the plaintiff will ‘prevail’ unless her
argument that the relief sought is legally available and that she
is entitled to it is ‘so implausible that it is insufficient to
preserve jurisdiction.’” Almaqrami v. Pompeo, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 

 (2013)). Here, Moharam has expressly disclaimed seeking
certain relief, namely declaratory or injunctive relief. Pet’r’s
Opening Suppl. Br. 11. 1 Instead, he asks us to “amend, modify,
or set aside” the agency’s decision maintaining him on the No
Fly List, 

(c), by clarifying “that the TSA
Administrator had, in fact, erred either in concluding that Mr.
Moharam could be properly placed on the No Fly List, in
depriving him of the information necessary to challenge that
placement, or both,” Pet’r’s Opening Suppl. Br. 12.
Specifically, he seeks a “holding that the agency had, in fact,
violated [his] rights to procedural due process,” arguing that
such a ruling “would ensure that the agency could not continue
to apply these unconstitutional procedures if the government
again places [him] on the No Fly List.” 

 at 14–15. The crux
of this request is that Moharam seeks a judicial decision setting
aside the reasoning that animated the TSA’s order, which



1
   Because Moharam disclaims any request for declaratory or
injunctive relief, we need not decide whether 

(c)
permits this Court to order such remedies.
                               11
would “have effect if and when he was placed again on the No
Fly List.” Oral Arg. 7:42–8:07.

     But what Moharam describes is a classic advisory opinion.
As the Government notes, “It is a federal court’s judgment, not
its opinion, that remedies an injury; thus it is the judgment, not
the opinion, that demonstrates redressability.” Haaland v.
Brackeen, 

 (2023). Because here, Moharam
asks “for nothing more than an opinion, [he] cannot satisfy
Article III.” 

 We do not have jurisdiction to issue rulings
that cannot “be carried into effect” and “to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the
case before it.” Loc. No. 8-6, Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Missouri, 

 (1960)
(cleaned up); see also, e.g., Louie v. Dickson, 

, 55–
56 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (dismissing petition for review under
§ 46110 as moot where agency’s withdrawal of action had the
same effect as an order remanding to the agency to “withhold
its concurrence” written in support of the action); Amerijet
Int’l, Inc. v. Pistole, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(dismissing petition for review under § 46110(c) as moot
where challenged training protocols expired, reasoning that
“[n]othing remains at stake in a dispute over a proposed
amendment to a document that no longer has legal effect,” such
that the Court has “no power to resolve the dispute”); Pub.
Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
(petition was moot where only remedy available was “an
advisory opinion addressing the Commission’s underlying
interpretation of its jurisdiction so that our opinion might be
applied to other currently hypothetical projects”).

    And, in any event, such an advisory opinion would not
have the preclusive effect Moharam suggests. Although he
argues that he could engage in similar categories of conduct
and be listed again for the same reasons as before, in the
                                12
national security context, repeating identical conduct can pose
a greater national security concern and constitute “new”
intelligence. Otherwise stated, we could not issue an opinion
regarding the decision based on the administrative record
below that would bind the Government and foreclose it from
placing Moharam back on the No Fly List if he engaged in the
same or similar conduct because that would present a different
and novel informational record for the TSA’s review. See infra
Section III.C (explaining why Moharam’s claims are not
reasonably likely to recur).

     Moharam’s procedural due process claim does not change
this analysis because the constitutional issue revolves around
Moharam’s ability to meaningfully contest his designation on
the No Fly List under the procedures used below. This is why
Moharam’s citation to Connecticut Light & Power Co. v.
FERC, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is unavailing. In that
case, the Court determined that a settlement offer did “not
resolve all the issues presented in the petition,” and thus did not
moot the case because it did not “reveal the reason” behind the
agency’s challenged decision, which, if disclosed, would have
allowed petitioner to “fashion future rate filings to avoid such
lengthy suspensions and file meaningful rehearing petitions.”

. But at issue there was a statutory requirement that
the agency disclose the rationale for its decisions, such that the
court’s ruling could redress a distinct injury (the violation of
the statute). See 

 at 470 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976),
which provides that FERC shall supply “a statement in writing
of its reasons for such suspension”). Here, however, any right
Moharam may have to obtain information regarding his
placement on the No Fly List is incidental to his ability to use
it to contest his listing, not a freestanding statutory right.
Because he is no longer on the List, he has no need to contest
such a designation. His only interest in the information is in
furtherance of his challenge to the TSA’s final order, the effect
                                  13
of which has been extinguished. That claim too is moot, and
for the same reason, so is his second Petition for Review.

     Fikre is not to the contrary. That case arose from a civil
lawsuit that, among other things, argued that “the government
placed [the plaintiff] on the No Fly List for constitutionally
impermissible reasons” and sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. 

. Per his complaint, if
successful, Fikre could obtain a declaration that the
Government’s reliance on particular evidence (e.g., attendance
at a mosque) violated his constitutional rights, as well as an
injunction against future consideration of such evidence. See
Fifth Am. Compl. at 41–45, Fikre v. FBI, No. 13-cv-899 (D.
Or. Sept. 28, 2016), ECF No. 87 [hereinafter Fikre Compl.];
Fikre, 

. By contrast, Moharam has made
explicit that he is not seeking declaratory or injunctive relief; 2

2
  Moharam argues that the relief requested is “the functional
equivalent” of a declaratory judgment, citing to Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurrence in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris
Chiropractic, Inc., 

 (2019), for the proposition that the “set
aside” language in Section 46110 allows the Court to issue a
declaratory-type judgment that “an agency has acted unlawfully.”
Pet’r’s Reply Suppl. Br. 6. But there, the jurisdictional statute
provided “exclusive jurisdiction to make and enter, on the petition,
evidence, and proceedings set forth in the record on review, a
judgment determining the validity of, and enjoining, setting aside, or
suspending, in whole or in part, the order of the agency.” 

(a). Section 2349 authorizes injunctive relief, specifically
“enjoining, setting aside, or suspending” an agency order, and then
separately confers authority to enter a declaratory judgment (i.e., “a
judgment determining the validity of” agency action). When Justice
Kavanaugh wrote that “[t]he Act says ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ to
‘enjoin, set aside, suspend,’ or ‘determine the validity’ of the order,”
and that “[t]hose phrases afford the court of appeals exclusive
jurisdiction to issue an injunction or declaratory judgment regarding
                                  14
nor does he challenge the legality of the bases the Government
used to initially list him. “Fikre [did] not challenge the TSA
Administrator’s decision made at the end of the DHS TRIP
process or seek a court order requiring the TSA Administrator
to remove him from the No Fly List.” Fikre v. FBI, 

, 775 (9th Cir. 2022). “Rather, his claims concern[ed] the
Screening Center’s role in assigning him to the No Fly List in
the first place.” 

 Fikre thus does not control.

     For many of the same reasons, Wall v. TSA, No. 21-1220,

, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2023) (per curiam),
does not help Moharam, either. That case involved a challenge
to an agency policy that the TSA expressly stated it would
likely re-invoke in the future. See 

. But here, the
agency has confirmed it will not re-list Moharam based on the
information it initially used to designate him on the No Fly List.
Moreover, Wall involved a request for injunctive relief, which
Moharam has disclaimed. See Pet’rs’ Jt. Opening Br. 22, Wall
v. TSA, No. 21-1220 (Apr. 19, 2022), ECF No. 1943488. And
finally, the Wall decision concluded that claims that were
tethered to the underlying administrative record were moot
“because, even if the TSA reissues its masking directives, it
will necessarily create a new administrative record underlying
those orders,” such that “the administrative records before” the
panel would “not have any continuing legal consequence.” 

In other words, the claims in Wall that challenged a continuing
government practice and sought prospective remedies (like
Fikre) were not moot, whereas those concerning particular
agency decisions rendered based on static administrative
records (like here) were moot.



the agency’s order,” he did not interpret the statutory term “set aside”
as authorizing declaratory relief. PDR Network, 588 U.S. at 20–21
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
                               15
    Moharam’s petitions for review are therefore moot.

     Nor does Moharam’s claim of reputational injury override
the mootness of his challenge. While he claims that the TSA’s
challenged order maintaining him on the No Fly List caused
him reputational harm, that order has now been superseded and
is no longer in effect. To the extent Moharam believes that he
continues to suffer some lingering reputational harm from the
now-superseded order, we have held that “where reputational
injury is the lingering effect of an otherwise moot aspect of a
lawsuit, no meaningful relief is possible and the injury cannot
satisfy the requirements of Article III.” Anderson v. Carter,

 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

                               C.

     “Typically, an end to offending behavior moots a case.
But there are exceptions.” PETA v. USDA, 

(D.C. Cir. 2019). Although “a defendant’s voluntary cessation
of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its
power to determine the legality of the practice,” Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs, 

 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted), “[a] case might become
moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
to recur,” United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n,

 (1968). That is, a case is moot if “(1) there
is no reasonable expectation that the conduct will recur and
(2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably
eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” True the Vote,
Inc. v. IRS, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted).

    Notwithstanding the Government’s voluntary cessation
here, the petitions are moot. At the outset, we clarify that this
decision does not endorse voluntary cessation that aims to moot
                                 16
future, potentially redressable claims by removing individuals
from the No Fly List following the initiation of litigation.
Instead, our ruling today is rooted in the narrow relief sought
under these petitions for review.

     First, there is no reasonable expectation that the conduct
will recur. Core to this inquiry “is the task of defining the
wrong that the defendant is alleged to have inflicted.” Clarke
v. United States, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
Here, the conduct challenged is the agency’s determination,
based on the public record and procedures below, that
Moharam warranted placement on the No Fly List. Of note,
Moharam does not challenge the lawfulness of the agency’s
criteria or its reliance on any category of information, he
merely contends that it acted unlawfully when it denied him
access to the information and that the record did not support his
inclusion on the List. The Government has provided
“sufficient assurance” that it will not place Moharam on the
List based on the record before it as of May 2024. Porup v.
CIA, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2021). While additional
information might cause the Government to once again place
Moharam on the List, and Moharam may seek to challenge that
decision as arbitrary and capricious, this would be a distinct
legal wrong because the agency’s decision would be based on
a different record. 3

    Again, Fikre does not counsel otherwise. There, the
challenged conduct was different: the plaintiff had filed a
lawsuit before the District Court, in which he relied on different
causes of action, namely constitutional claims regarding his
substantive due process right to international travel, rights to
counsel and against self-incrimination, freedom of association,

3
  The Government’s representations are critical to our disposition of
the case and we expect it to adhere to its submissions fully going
forward.
                              17
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and torts of
false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and torture.
See Fikre Compl. at 23–37. Fikre also brought various
statutory claims challenging the investigation that yielded the
contested information. 

 at 38–40. The Court’s mootness
analysis focused on Fikre’s allegation that “the government
placed him on the No Fly List for constitutionally
impermissible reasons.” 

. Regardless of his
removal from the List, the Court held that the challenged
conduct (e.g., unconstitutionally listing him for his religious
identity) could be expected to recur. 

 at 242–43 (holding
that the declaration did not “speak[] to whether the government
might relist him if he does the same or similar things in the
future—say, attend a particular mosque or refuse renewed
overtures to serve as an informant”).

     This case is different. Since the Government has made
clear that it will not put Moharam on the No Fly List based on
the same information as before, if TSC re-lists Moharam based
on some other evidence, the propriety of which Moharam does
not challenge, and the TSA Administrator upholds that
determination, the record before the TSA would be different.
If Moharam were to later challenge his placement on the List
as arbitrary and capricious, that claim would assert that a
different legal wrong had occurred: that the new record before
the agency rendered its decision unreasonable. Thus, unlike
Fikre, where the same wrong (considering religious affiliation
as evidence of terrorism) could repeatedly reoccur and support
future placement on the list, Moharam’s challenge is limited
to the record before the agency when it upheld his status on the
List, which will not be the subject of future designation on the
List. “A legal controversy so sharply focused on a unique
factual context does not present a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same
actions again.” Spivey v. Barry, 

, 1234–35 (D.C.
                                18
Cir. 1981) (cleaned up); Armstrong v. FAA, 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he issue presented—whether it was
arbitrary and capricious for the Administrator to make an
emergency determination under the specific factual
circumstances of this case—will never arise again.”) (citation
omitted).

     Second, the interim relief has completely eradicated the
effects of the violation. Moharam’s petition for review
“request[ed] that this Court hold the Final Decision unlawful
and set aside, modify, or amend it, and/or remand.” Pet’n for
Review, No. 22-1184, ECF No. 1958969, at 2. The agency has
set aside its determination that current information warranted
Moharam’s placement on the List. As described, “[a]ny
opinion regarding the [propriety of the former order] would be
merely advisory.” Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Moharam’s stated
injury was that he could not fly internationally to “visit[] his
mother, wife and children,” Pet’r’s Opening Br. 19, but now,
he can do so. He has been removed from the No Fly List. The
effects of the violation are thus eradicated.

     Nor are the claims here capable of repetition, yet evading
review, as Moharam urges. That doctrine “permits departure
from settled rules of mootness only in an exceptional
situation,” Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. FAA, 

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (cleaned up), such as when “(1) the challenged
action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again,” Sec’y of Lab., Mine Safety
& Health Admin. v. M-Class Mining, LLC, 

 (D.C.
Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The party invoking the exception
must prove it applies. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 

, 1350–51 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
                               19
     Just as there is no reasonable expectation that the conduct
will recur, the challenged conduct—listing Moharam on the No
Fly List based on identical information as his initial
designation—is not capable of repetition. Cf. M-Class Mining,

 (case not capable of repetition because “it
present[ed] a legal controversy regarding the validity of the
terminated Order’s issuance that is so sharply focused and
highly dependent upon a series of facts unlikely to be
duplicated that M-Class is not reasonably likely to face the
same actions again”) (cleaned up). When we have found
conduct capable of repetition, as in British Caledonian Airways
v. Bond, the petitioners’ challenge was to facial policies, such
as the FAA’s statement that it “ha[d] the legal authority, under
such circumstances, to disregard valid airworthiness
certificates issued by nations with whom the United States has
entered into binding aviation agreements,” which meant that,
as a result of this policy, petitioners “reasonably c[ould] expect
to be subjected to the same action at some time in the future.”

, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Moharam’s challenge
is to the since-eradicated effects of procedures and outcomes
of a particular agency action. That challenge is incapable of
repetition in light of the Government’s representations.

    Neither exception to mootness applies.

                               III.

     We thus dismiss the petitions for review as moot. We
further dismiss the Government’s motion to file portions of its
brief and the record ex parte as moot. See In re GTE Serv.
Corp., 

 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

                                                     So ordered.