United States Court of Appeals
                                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                          ____________
No. 25-5091                                                     September Term, 2024
                                                                            1:25-cv-00381-ABJ
                                                           Filed On:    April 28, 2025
National Treasury Employees Union, et al.,

                Appellees

        v.

Russell T. Vought, in his official capacity as
Acting Director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau,

                  Appellants
------------------------------

Consolidated with 25-5132

        BEFORE:          Pillard, Katsas, and Rao*, Circuit Judges

ORDER

      Upon consideration of the emergency motion to enforce or clarify the court’s April
11, 2025 order, the response thereto, and the reply, it is

        ORDERED that the emergency motion be granted in part. Defendants seek
clarification of what constitutes a “particularized assessment” that employees subject to
a proposed reduction in force (RIF) are unnecessary to the performance of defendants’
statutory duties, as that term is used in this court’s April 11, 2025 order partially granting
defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal. That term was not clearly defined in our
stay order, so we define it now. Such a “particularized assessment” involves a
determination, conducted by the decisionmaker responsible for the RIF, that each
division or office within the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will be able to
perform any statutorily required duties of that division or office without the employees
subject to the RIF. The declaration filed by the CFPB’s Chief Legal Officer on April 18,
2025 states that the defendants conducted the requisite “particularized assessment.” It
is



* A statement by Circuit Judge Rao, dissenting from this order, is attached.
                  United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                       ____________
No. 25-5091                                                 September Term, 2024

        FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, that this court’s stay order be modified in
part to lift the partial stay of paragraph (3) of the preliminary injunction. Our partial stay
order permitted defendants to conduct RIFs of employees “whom defendants have
determined, after a particularized assessment, to be unnecessary to the performance of
defendants’ statutory duties.” The parties vigorously dispute whether this language
permits judicial review of the questions whether the assessment at issue was
“particularized” and whether the employees subject to the RIF are “unnecessary to the
performance of defendants’ statutory duties.” Defendants further argue that any such
judicial review would make the injunction impermissibly vague. In response, plaintiffs
highlight that the proposed RIF currently at issue, involving nearly 90 percent of agency
employees, exceeds the scope of the RIF that prompted the district court’s original
preliminary injunction. Given these ongoing disputes, we think it best to restore the
interim protection of paragraph (3) of the preliminary injunction, which ensures that
plaintiffs can receive meaningful final relief should the defendants not prevail in this
appeal, rather than continue collateral litigation over the meaning and reviewability of
the “particularized assessment” requirement imposed by this court’s stay order.
Reinforcing this conclusion, we have already accommodated the government’s interests
by substantially expediting the appeal, with oral argument scheduled less than three
weeks from today. At that time, we will carefully consider the separation-of-powers and
other arguments raised by the parties. For these reasons, paragraph (3) of the
preliminary injunction under review is now effective pending further order of this court.

                                        Per Curiam


                                                          FOR THE COURT:
                                                          Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

                                                  BY:     /s/
                                                          Michael C. McGrail
                                                          Deputy Clerk




                                           Page 2
     RAO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The panel today bars the
political leadership of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) from reducing its workforce in accordance
with President Trump’s directives. Because the preliminary
injunction entered by the district court raises serious separation
of powers concerns and has paved the way for ongoing judicial
supervision of an Executive Branch agency, I would continue
the stay pending appeal.

                              ***

     At the end of March, the district court entered a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the CFPB from carrying out
any reductions in force (RIFs), effectively freezing the staffing
of the CFPB as it existed under the previous administration.
The government sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal,
which we granted in substantial part on April 11. The stay
permitted RIFs consistent with the CFPB’s statutory
obligations. We also expedited consideration of the merits of
the preliminary injunction and scheduled oral argument for
May 16.

     The enjoined parties include the Acting Director and other
political leadership of the CFPB, appointed by the President to
implement his agenda. With the preliminary injunction largely
stayed, the CFPB’s leadership issued RIF notices to more than
80 percent of the agency’s workforce. In a statement filed
below, the agency’s Chief Legal Officer detailed the
particularized assessment underlying the RIF and attested that
the “employees retained were sufficient to perform the
Bureau’s statutory duties.” Declaration of Mark Paoletta,
NTEU v. CFPB, 25-cv-381, ECF 109, at 4 (D.D.C. Apr. 18,
2025). He further clarified that the employees subject to the
RIF would remain employed for sixty days, and that the
agency’s leadership would “continuously assess the Bureau’s
workforce needs” and “make appropriate changes to ensure
compliance with statutory duties.” Id.
                                2
     Rather than wait to see if any harm materialized, the
plaintiffs returned to the district court on the same day the RIF
notices were issued, demanding immediate judicial
intervention because it was “unfathomable” that the CFPB
could continue to provide statutorily required services if the
RIF were executed. But the plaintiffs did not allege they had
suffered any specific harm or loss of service from the RIF. Nor
could they, since the employees subject to the RIF had not yet
stopped working, much less been terminated.

     Without any finding of particularized harm, the district
court halted the RIF. Although the district court styled its
action as a temporary restraining order, “the label
attached ... by the trial court is not decisive.” Adams v. Vance,

 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (cleaned up); see also Dep’t
of Educ. v. California, 

, 968 (2025). I would
construe the district court’s order prohibiting the RIF as a
modification of its preliminary injunction. See Dunlap v.
Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“An order modifies an earlier
injunction when it actually changes the legal relationship of the
parties to the decree.”) (cleaned up). As such, the order is
immediately appealable. 

(a)(1). If the district
court abused its discretion in modifying the injunction, vacatur
is the appropriate remedy. Klayman v. Porter, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

                              ***

     In my view, the district court’s modification of the
injunction is inconsistent with the terms of this court’s April 11
stay and therefore an abuse of discretion.

   The April 11 stay did not create a preclearance regime
whereby the CFPB must obtain judicial approval for its
management decisions. Unfortunately, that is precisely what is
                                 3
unfolding below, as the district court has blocked a RIF while
it determines, by its own lights, whether the CFPB’s staffing
plans will be sufficient to fulfill general statutory requirements.
See NTEU v. CFPB, 25-cv-381, ECF 113, at 5–6 (D.D.C. Apr.
18, 2025) (enjoining RIF and scheduling evidentiary hearing to
determine whether planned staffing levels will leave agency
“unable to comply with its statutory duties”); 

 Minute Order
(D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2025) (requiring Chief Legal Officer to
appear at hearing and be available to testify about his
particularized assessment).

     The district court’s approach turns the separation of
powers on its head. The execution of the laws, including the
management of administrative agencies, is committed to
Executive Branch officials under the direction of the President.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (requiring the President to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”). When agency
action is challenged, courts have an essential obligation to say
what the law is. But whatever the merits of this underlying
lawsuit, the district court cannot erase the boundaries between
the courts and the Executive by setting up a temporary judicial
receivership of the CFPB. As the Supreme Court has
admonished, “it is not the role of courts, but that of the political
branches, to shape the institutions of government in such
fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.” Lewis
v. Casey, 

 (1996); see also Dan Dobbs, Law
of Remedies § 2.9(5) (2d ed. 1993) (“[J]udicial control of
legislative or executive branch decisions interferes
substantially with the separation of powers system of
government. If the judicial interference is substantial, judges
themselves may lose their distinctive judicial character if they
become managers of executive departments by way of
injunction.”).
                                4
     While the April 11 stay left some parts of the preliminary
injunction in place based on the government’s concessions, it
in no way authorized the district court to “inject[] [itself] into
day-to-day agency management” or to superintend the
personnel decisions of the CFPB’s political leadership. Norton
v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 

 (2004). I would
vacate the district court’s modification.

     To the extent the stay was unclear, I would clarify that if
the defendants’ actions cause a plaintiff to lose services
required by statute, the district court may issue appropriate
relief, targeted to that plaintiff’s specific injury, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d). See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.
v. Sw. Marine Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that “any action taken pursuant to Rule 62[(d)] may
not materially alter the status of the case on appeal”) (cleaned
up); Casey, 

 (“The remedy must of course be
limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that
the plaintiff has established.”). In the alternative, if a partial
stay is truly “unworkable,” I would put an end to these cat-and-
mouse games and stay the preliminary injunction entirely.
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 

, 585
(2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part).

                              ***

    The district court overstepped our stay. Rather than
remedy the judicial error, today’s order hamstrings the
Executive and prevents the CFPB from downsizing until the
merits of the appeal are resolved. The lack of judicially
manageable standards in this posture is a reason to leave
execution of the laws to the Executive, not the courts. I
respectfully dissent.