United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

                                      ____________

No. 25-5157                                                 September Term, 2024

                                                                       1:25-cv-00935-PLF


                                                       Filed On: May 16, 2025


National Treasury Employees Union,


              Appellee

       v.

Donald J. Trump, President of the United
States, et al.,


              Appellants


       BEFORE:       Henderson, Walker, and Childs*, Circuit Judges

ORDER

     Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending appeal and an
immediate administrative stay, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

       ORDERED that the motion for stay be granted. The Government has met the
requirements for a stay pending appeal. See Nken v. Holder, 

 (2009).
A stay applicant must show that (1) it “is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) it “will be
irreparably injured absent a stay,” (3) a stay will not “substantially injure” other
interested parties, and (4) a stay is in the “public interest.” Id.

        1. The Government is likely to prevail in its appeal of the district court’s
preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that it will suffer irreparable harm while the case is pending. See Winter v. NRDC, 

 (2008). The National Treasury Employees Union failed to establish



* A statement by Circuit Judge Childs, dissenting from this order, is attached.
                  United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                       ____________
No. 25-5157                                                 September Term, 2024

irreparable harm. That is a sufficient basis for vacating a preliminary injunction.1 See
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(“movant’s failure to show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds for refusing to issue a
preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors . . . merit such relief”).

       The Union says it will suffer two irreparable harms. Neither qualifies.

        First, the Union asserts that without a preliminary injunction it will lose bargaining
power and suffer reputational harm that will deter present and future membership. But
those harms are speculative because they would materialize only after an agency
terminates a collective-bargaining agreement, and the Government directed agencies to
refrain from terminating collective-bargaining agreements or decertifying bargaining
units until after the litigation concludes. Ex. 1-B, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Trump, No. 25-cv-0935, 

 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025), ECF No. 26-1; see
also Winter, 

 (irreparable harm must be “likely,” not merely “possib[le]”).2
So the Union was not entitled to equitable relief on this basis.3

      Second, the Union says it will suffer an irreparable financial injury from the loss of
automatically withheld union dues. But such “financial injuries are rarely irreparable
because they are presumptively remediable through monetary damages.” Clevinger v.
Advocacy Holdings, Inc., __ F.4th __, No. 23-7116, 

, at *2 (D.C. Cir.
2025). Here, the Union can seek to recover missing dues in subsequent Federal Labor


       1
         Because the district court’s preliminary injunction is likely to be vacated for lack
of irreparable harm, we need not address the Government’s arguments regarding the
Union’s likelihood of success on the merits.
       2
          On this point, Judge Childs’ thoughtful dissent implies agreement. A version of
her question to the Government can be addressed to the Union: “How” is it possible that
the absence of “the district court injunction will cause irreparable injury when the
Government itself voluntarily imposed that same constraint?” Dissenting Statement at
5. On appeal, when the Government will prevail if it shows the Union does not need a
preliminary injunction to avoid irreparable injury, the Union will struggle to “show its own
injury from the district court” declining to enjoin “an already-paused Executive Order.”
Id. at 6.
       3
         To be clear, if a specific agency or subagency deviates from that self-imposed
rule, individual units may seek injunctive relief appropriately tailored to any non-
speculative, irreparable harm. But absent ongoing irreparable harm, the Union is not
entitled to equitable relief.

                                           Page 2
                  United States Court of Appeals
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                       ____________
No. 25-5157                                                  September Term, 2024

Relations Authority (FLRA) proceedings if the Union ultimately prevails in this
litigation. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, Ohio National Guard, 

, 830 (2020) (ordering reimbursement of dues that an agency unlawfully failed to
withhold); see also 

(a)(7) (authorizing the FLRA to issue an order that
gives a collective-bargaining agreement “retroactive effect” and to take “such other
action as will carry out the purpose” of the Civil Service Reform Act).

       Moreover, it is speculative that the Union will suffer a significant financial injury in
the interim. To start, the Union will continue collecting dues from some 54,000
employees who are not covered by the Executive Order. See National Treasury
Employees Union v. Trump, No. 25-cv-0935, 

, at *17 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2025) (“the Executive Order covers 65.9% of all NTEU-represented employees, or
approximately 104,278 employees”). In addition, nothing prevents Union members
covered by the Executive Order from voluntarily paying the dues they owe; that is, after
all, how most other voluntary membership organizations collect dues. Cf. Alachua
County Education Association v. Rubottom, No. 23-cv-111, 

, at *3
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2023) (noting that after one public employer “ceased deducting
membership dues from payroll,” “about half of dues-paying members . . . transitioned to
paying dues via another method,” and after another public employer did so, “60% of
members . . . signed up to pay dues through [an] alternative payment method”).

      2. The district court’s preliminary injunction inflicts irreparable harm on the
President by impeding his national-security prerogatives, which were explicitly
recognized by Congress. See 

(b).

        The Union contends that if the Government suffers any harm, it would be self-
inflicted, and therefore not attributable to the preliminary injunction. That argument fails
for two reasons.

        First, the preliminary injunction is broader than the Government’s self-imposed
restrictions. It prohibits agency heads from obeying Section 2 of the Executive Order
and the associated Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance. That guidance
instructs agency heads to “consult with their General Counsels as to how to implement
the President’s directive” and to “consider” specified changes and “any others that
agencies deem necessary, consistent with the President’s national security
determination.” Ex. 1-A at 3, National Treasury Employees Union v. Trump, No. 25-cv-
0935, 

 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025), ECF No. 26-1. In effect, the
preliminary injunction enjoins the entire implementation process, including preparatory
work. The Government’s self-imposed restrictions, by contrast, recommend only that
agency heads refrain from terminating CBAs and decertifying bargaining units.


                                            Page 3
                 United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                      ____________
No. 25-5157                                                 September Term, 2024

       Second, the Government suffers irreparable harm even to the extent the
preliminary injunction overlaps with the Government’s self-imposed restrictions. The
injunction eliminates the President’s control over the decision to pause implementation
of the Executive Order and, by consequence, his flexibility to respond to future
developments, at least without returning to the district court. In other words, the
preliminary injunction ties the government’s hands. That transfer of control, from the
Executive to the Judiciary, is more problematic where, as here, we are operating in the
national security context, an area “in which the President generally enjoys ‘unique
responsibility.’” Hedges v. Obama, 

 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 

 (2003)); see also Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (declining to
enter a stay against the government because the court was “in no position . . . to enter a
stay order that would interject the Court into national security matters that lie outside its
province”).

      3. Other parties, including the Union, will not be harmed by a stay, largely for the
same reasons that the Union will not be harmed without a preliminary injunction. The
Union claims that a stay will “nullify the collective-bargaining rights of over one-hundred
thousand NTEU-represented federal workers.” Opp. 15. But that ignores the
Government’s self-imposed restrictions, so it misses the mark.

        4. Finally, preserving the President’s autonomy under a statute that expressly
recognizes his national-security expertise is within the public interest. To hold otherwise
would give to the courts what the Constitution gave to Congress and the President.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 

 (2017) (“National-security policy is the prerogative of
the Congress and President.”); Winter, 

 (vacating a preliminary injunction,
in part because there was “no basis for jeopardizing national security”).




                                           Page 4
                 United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                     ____________
No. 25-5157                                                September Term, 2024

                                         *     *      *

       For these reasons, the Government has met its burden for a stay pending appeal.4


                                       Per Curiam


                                                          FOR THE COURT:
                                                          Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

                                                   BY:    /s/
                                                          Selena R. Gancasz
                                                          Deputy Clerk




       4
          Separately, we clarify that injunction bonds are generally required. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65(c) (“The court may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives
security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages
sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”
(emphasis added)). Here, the district court denied the Government’s request for an
injunction bond because “each of the preliminary injunction factors weigh[ed] heavily in
[the Union’s] favor” and requiring a bond would conflict with the Union’s “right to seek
judicial review.” National Treasury Employees Union, 

, at *21. But
that logic would apply any time a district court grants a preliminary injunction — an
exception that swallows the rule. Accordingly, we doubt that $0 was the “appropriate
bond” in this case. National Kidney Patients Association v. Sullivan, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Edgar v. Mite Corp., 

 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (an injunction bond “is the moving party’s warranty that the law will
uphold the issuance of the injunction”); Monzillo v. Biller, 

 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (“Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the filing of a
security bond by a party who benefits from a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction”); Habitat Education Center v. United States Forest Service, 

 (7th Cir. 2010) (because the “costs of government are borne ultimately by
taxpayers,” Rule 65(c) applies no less when a “government agency” is subject to a
preliminary injunction).

                                             Page 5
CHILDS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The Government moves
for a stay pending appeal. In that posture, the burden is on the
Government to justify a disruption to the ordinary course of
litigation. We take such “extraordinary” action only if the
Government makes the “critical” showing that it will suffer
irreparable injury before the appeal concludes. Citizens for
Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam). But the Government
provides only a passing, generalized assertion of harm in its
attempt to justify a stay. Even more telling, the Government
purports to have already self-inflicted the same injury it claims
a stay is necessary to prevent: it directed agencies not to
implement the Executive Order until litigation concludes.
Because the Government has not satisfied a threshold
requirement for a stay, I respectfully dissent.

                               I.

                               A.

     The Federal Service-Labor Management Relations Statute
(FSLMRS) grants collective-bargaining rights to certain
federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7135. The FSLMRS
reflects Congress’s determination that “labor organizations and
collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public
interest.” Id. § 7101(a); see Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms v. FLRA, 

 (1983) (“Congress
unquestionably intended to strengthen the position of federal
unions and to make the collective-bargaining process a more
effective instrument of the public interest”).

     The President may exclude an agency or subdivision from
the scope of the FSLMRS if “(A) the agency or subdivision has
as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence,
investigative, or national security work, and (B) the provisions
of [the FSLMRS] cannot be applied to that agency in a manner
consistent with national security requirements and
                              2
considerations.” 

 (b)(1). Presidents have
previously excluded subdivisions of agencies or departments,
such as the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Department of
Defense and the National Background Investigations Bureau in
the Office of Personnel Management. See Exec. Order No.
12,171, § 1-205(a), 

, 66,565 (Nov. 19,
1979); Exec. Order No. 13,741, § 3(b), 

,
68,291 (Oct. 4, 2016). No prior designation has excluded an
entire Cabinet-level agency or department.

                              B.

     In March 2025, President Trump issued an Executive
Order excluding from the FSLMRS over thirty agencies or sub-
divisions, including entire Cabinet-level agencies and
departments like the Environmental Protection Agency; the
Department of Justice; the Department of Veterans Affairs; the
Department of the Treasury, except the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing; and the Department of Energy, except the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. See Exec. Order No. 14,251,
§§ 1–3, 

, 14,553–55 (Mar. 27, 2025). Also
excluded are the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of
Health, the Bureau of Land Management, the National Science
Foundation, and the Federal Communications Commission,
among others. 

 Altogether, the Executive Order covers
about “two-thirds of the federal workforce.” A09 ¶ 35. The
Executive Order states that the excluded agencies and
subdivisions “have as a primary function intelligence,
counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work,”
and that the FSLMRS “cannot be applied to those subdivisions
in a manner consistent with national security requirements and
considerations.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 14,553.
                               3
     Three documents were released alongside the Executive
Order. The White House published a “Fact Sheet,” which
states that the FSLMRS “enables hostile Federal unions to
obstruct agency management” and that certain unions “have
declared war on President Trump’s agenda.”1 The Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) issued guidance stating that
excluded agencies “are no longer subject to the collective-
bargaining requirements” of the FSLMRS and “are no longer
required to collectively bargain with Federal unions.” Dkt. 26-
1 at 6. An interagency forum led by the OPM Director
distributed a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) document to
the excluded agencies, advising that agencies should not
terminate any collective-bargaining agreements or file any
petitions to decertify bargaining units until litigation
concludes. Dkt. 26-1 at 13.

    A federal employee labor organization, the National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), filed suit, and the district
court issued a preliminary injunction. The Government
appealed and sought a stay pending appeal.

                              II.

     As the party seeking a stay pending appeal, the
Government must (1) make a “strong showing that [it] is likely
to succeed on the merits” of the appeal; (2) demonstrate that it
will be “irreparably injured absent a stay” before the appeal
concludes; (3) show that issuing a stay will not “substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding”; and (4)
establish that “the public interest” favors a stay. Nken v.

1
 The White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Exempts
Agencies with National Security Missions from Federal Collective
Bargaining Requirements (Mar. 27, 2025), https://perma.cc/Y7HR-
4W3H.
                                4
Holder, 

 (2009) (quoting Hilton v.
Braunskill, 

 (1987)). “Although the
plaintiff[] must show irreparable injury to secure an injunction,
it is now the defendant[s] who—seeking relief from an
injunction so obtained—must show irreparable injury absent a
stay of the injunction.” J.G.G. v. Trump, 

, at
*11 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring).

     Accordingly, the Government’s “showing of irreparable
harm is a necessary prerequisite for a stay.” KalshiEX LLC v.
CFTC, 

, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2024). “[T]he injury must
be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.
Injunctive relief will not be granted against something merely
feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time.” Wisconsin
Gas Co. v. FERC, 

, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(quotations omitted).

     Despite this weighty burden, the Government glides over
its obligation to show irreparable injury. In one brief
paragraph, the Government claims that a stay would protect the
President’s ability “to guarantee the effective operation of
agencies relevant to national security without the constraints of
collective bargaining.” Stay Mot. 26–27. But the district
court’s injunction maintains the state of affairs that has existed
for nearly half a century: NTEU has bargained on behalf of
federal workers since the 1970s. A14–16 ⁋⁋ 47–57. The
Government does not explain why irreparable injury will result
from continuing this decades-long practice for a short period of
time while we adjudicate the merits of this appeal. Instead, it
relies only on a generalized statement that interference with
“the government’s investigation, intelligence, and national-
security functions—or . . . the government’s ability to supervise
the employees engaged in such work—would appreciably
injure the Nation’s interests.” Stay Mot. 26–27 (cleaned up).
                                  5
Such vague assertions of harm dependent on the merits of the
dispute are insufficient to show irreparable injury.

     The one specific representation the Government offers
regarding the consequences of the Executive Order undercuts
its own argument.2 Relying on OPM’s FAQ document, the
Government asserts, and the majority accepts, that the excluded
agencies have been directed not to act on the Executive Order
during the pendency of this litigation. The FAQ document
states that excluded agencies “should not terminate any
[collective-bargaining agreements] until the conclusion of
litigation or further guidance from OPM directing such
termination” and “should not file any [petitions to decertify
bargaining units] until litigation regarding Exclusions has been
resolved.” Dkt. 26-1 at 13. But this very representation casts
doubt on the Government’s own asserted injury. How can the
Government argue that the district court injunction will cause
irreparable injury when the Government itself voluntarily
imposed that same constraint? At this stage, it is the
Government’s obligation to provide an answer, and it offers
none.

     And while the Government claims injury from its inability
to implement the Executive Order, at the same time it claims
the Executive Order will remain without effect even in the
absence of the district court injunction. The Government
asserts that NTEU does not suffer irreparable harm to justify

2
  I make no conclusions about the Government’s likelihood of
success on the merits of its appeal because, even accepting the
Government’s representations, it is unable to make the requisite
showing of irreparable injury to justify a stay. See Wisconsin Gas
Co., 758 F.2d at 674 (“We believe that analysis of the second factor
disposes of these motions and, therefore, address only whether the
petitioners have demonstrated that in the absence of a stay, they will
suffer irreparable harm.”).
                                6
the district court’s injunction and will not be harmed by a
temporary stay on appeal because, per the FAQ document,
“agencies have been advised not to terminate collective
bargaining agreements at this time and not to decertify
bargaining units until ‘litigation is final.’” Stay Mot. 27
(quoting Dkt. 26-1 at 13). But the Government does not
explain how it can show its own injury from the district court
enjoining an already-paused Executive Order. To grant a stay,
we would need to find with one hand that the Executive Order
still has real-world operation for purposes of the Government’s
irreparable harm, but with the other hand that the Executive
Order has none at all for purposes of NTEU’s. The
Government fails to even address this inconsistency.

     The majority offers two possibilities to resolve the
contradiction the Government has teed up: (1) that the
preliminary injunction is broader than the Government’s self-
imposed restrictions, and (2) that the preliminary injunction
eliminates the Government’s ability to adjust its self-imposed
restrictions in the future. I am not persuaded either is enough.

     First, the majority teases out a gap between the scope of
the district court’s injunction and the Government’s own,
resting its finding of irreparable harm on the Government’s
inability to operate within that gap. The Government has not
put forth this argument. Nor has the Government represented
that it actually intends to take any action within that gap during
the course of this appeal. Or how an inability to take such
action causes an irreparable, cognizable injury. At this stage,
before granting emergency relief, I would require the
Government provide us with more.

    Second, the possibility of some future harm stemming
from the Government’s inability to rescind its own directive is
insufficient. The district court order may well tie the
                               7
Government’s hands at some point in the future, but we do not
issue preemptive relief.        Courts have long held that
“[i]njunctions . . . will not issue to prevent injuries neither
extant nor presently threatened, but only merely feared.”
Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Sal. v. Sessions, 

, 745–46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted); see
KalshiEX LLC, 119 F.4th at 65 (“Perhaps the Commission will
amass more evidence substantiating its fears . . . but, on the
evidence provided to this court, those fears—as yet—fail to rise
beyond the speculative level.” (quotations omitted)). The
Government cannot carry its burden for a stay pending appeal
based only on the possibility that someday there could be a risk
of irreparable harm.

                              III.

    The Government does not identify imminent harm
warranting emergency relief. An extraordinary use of our
equitable powers requires more than the vague assertions of
harm provided here. In the absence of irreparable injury, the
Government’s merits arguments are better suited to the panel
designated to hear them.