United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                      ____________
No. 25-5197                                                 September Term, 2024
                                                                       1:25-cv-00542-RBW
                                                       Filed On: July 1, 2025
Travis LeBlanc and Edward Felten,

              Appellees

       v.

United States Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, et al.,

              Appellants


       BEFORE:       Katsas, Rao, and Walker, Circuit Judges

ORDER

      Upon consideration of the motion for a stay pending appeal and an
administrative stay, the opposition thereto, the reply, the Rule 28(j) letter, and the
response thereto, it is

        ORDERED that the motion for a stay pending appeal be granted and that the
district court’s order entered on May 21, 2025, be stayed pending further order of the
court. Appellants have satisfied the stringent requirements for a stay pending appeal.
See Nken v. Holder, 

 (2009); D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and
Internal Procedures 33 (2024).

       This appeal presents the question whether Congress has restricted the
President's power to remove members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLOB). The President removed PCLOB members Travis LeBlanc and Edward
Felten. The district court held that the removals were unlawful. LeBlanc v. U.S. Priv. &
C.L. Oversight Bd., No. 25-cv-542, 

 (D.D.C. May 21, 2025). The
government appealed and moved for a stay. Because it has met its burden under
Nken, 

, we grant the stay.

       Likelihood of Success on the Merits. The PCLOB is in the Executive Branch, 42
U.S.C. § 2000ee(a), and the President appoints its members with the Senate's advice
and consent, id. § 2000ee(h)(1). Because PCLOB members report to nobody except
the President, they are principal officers of the United States. See Edmond v. United
                United States Court of Appeals
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                    ____________
No. 25-5197                                               September Term, 2024

States, 

 (1997). Generally, such appointees must serve at the
President's pleasure. Trump v. United States, 

 (2024); Myers v.
United States, 

 (1926). The Supreme Court has recognized a narrow
exception for certain officers who serve on "multimember expert agencies that do not
wield substantial executive power." Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 

, 218 (2020);
see Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 

, 628 (1935). But a statute "must
use 'very clear and explicit language'" to restrict the President's removal power.
Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc., 

, ___ (June 27, 2025) (slip op.
at 19) (quoting Shurtleff v. United States, 

 (1903)) ("mere inference or
implication does not suffice” (cleaned up)); see Severino v. Biden, 

(D.C. Cir. 2023) ("Congress must make it clear in a statute if it wishes to restrict the
President's removal power."). PCLOB's organic statute contains no language restricting
the President's removal power.

        Nor does the statutory scheme support inferring such a restriction. The Supreme
Court occasionally has "read a removal restriction into" the governing statute, but only
for officials serving on an "adjudicatory body" with "a unique need for 'absolute freedom
from Executive interference.'" Collins v. Yellen, 

, 250 n.18 (2021) (quoting
Wiener v. United States, 

 (1958)); see Wiener, 

(members of the War Claims Commission, a non-Article III court). Where the officials
at issue do not have such adjudicatory functions, they enjoy no implied removal
protection. See Severino, 

 (members of Administrative Conference of
the United States); Collins, 

, 250 n.18 (Acting Director of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency) ("The FHFA is not an adjudicatory body, so Shurtleff, not
Weiner, is the more applicable precedent."); Shurtleff, 

 (general
appraisers of merchandise); Parsons v. United States, 

(1897) (United States Attorneys). The PCLOB does not adjudicate cases. Its function
is to analyze executive-branch actions and to advise the President and Congress. 42
U.S.C. § 2000ee(c)-(f). Because PCLOB is not an adjudicatory tribunal, its members
do not have implied protection from at-will removal by the President.

        Irreparable Injury Absent a Stay. Injunctions that require the President to work
with removed principal officers interfere with his constitutional power to supervise the
Executive Branch. Such interference is "obviously disruptive" and inflicts irreparable
injury. Sampson v. Murray, 

 (1974); Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5052,

, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2025) (per curiam). So in Trump v. Wilcox,

 (2025) (per curiam), the Supreme Court stayed preliminary injunctions
effectively reinstating removed members of the National Labor Relations Board and the
Merit Systems Protection Board to "avoid the disruptive effect of the repeated removal
and reinstatement of officers" while litigation is ongoing. Id. at 1415.

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                United States Court of Appeals
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                    ____________
No. 25-5197                                               September Term, 2024

        Harm to Others. Granting the stays in Wilcox, the Supreme Court concluded
that "the Government faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed
officer to continue exercising the executive power than a wrongfully removed officer
faces from being unable to perform her statutory duty." 145 S. Ct. at 1415. We can
discern no reason why this balance would be different in the case of removed PCLOB
members than it is in cases of removed NLRB or MSPB members.

       Public Interest. The public interest is harmed when an injunction wrongfully
insulates the President's Executive Branch appointees from his oversight. Such
injunctions sever a key constitutional link between the People and their elected
President. See Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 

, 224 (2020). LeBlanc and Felten
counter that their removals would deprive PCLOB of a quorum, preventing the agency
from performing its statutory duties. But the Supreme Court, when pressed with similar
arguments in Wilcox, nonetheless stayed orders restoring the removed officers. Cathy
A. Harris's Opp'n to Appl. for a Stay at 36-37, Wilcox, No. 24A966, 

(Apr. 15, 2025); Resp. of Gwynne A. Wilcox in Opp'n to the Appl. for a Stay at 26-27,
No. 24A966, Wilcox, 

 (Apr. 15, 2025). We do the same here.

                                      Per Curiam


                                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                                        Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

                                                BY:     /s/
                                                        Scott H. Atchue
                                                        Deputy Clerk




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