United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT



Argued April 15, 2025                Decided August 15, 2025

                         No. 24-5122

       VIRGIN ISLANDS HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY,
                       APPELLANT

                              v.

       FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
                     APPELLEE


        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                    (No. 1:23-cv-02845)



     Michael Bhargava argued the cause for appellant. On the
briefs was Robert Nichols.

     Sarah Smith, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued
the cause for appellee. On the brief were Brian M. Boynton,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, at the time the
brief was filed, Mark B. Stern, Attorney, at the time the brief
was filed, and Kelsey Fraser, Attorney. Gerard J. Sinzdak,
Attorney, entered an appearance.
                               2
    Before: WALKER, PAN, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.

     GARCIA, Circuit Judge: This case arises out of a
reimbursement dispute between the Virgin Islands Housing
Finance Authority and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. The Authority chose to arbitrate the dispute before
the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Dissatisfied with the
award it received, the Authority moved to vacate the Board’s
decision under the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act. The district court held that the
Authority had missed the deadline for serving the FAA motion
and that the APA claim was precluded. We agree on both
fronts and affirm.
                               I
     In 2017, two Category 5 hurricanes struck the U.S. Virgin
Islands. President Trump declared them “major disaster[s]”
and authorized the allocation of emergency funding to the
territory. Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster for the
U.S. Virgin Islands, 

, 43066 (Sep. 13,
2017); Virgin Islands; Major Disaster and Related
Determinations, 

, 46813 (Oct. 6, 2017); see
42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207.
    FEMA spearheaded the disaster-relief effort. Among
other programs, FEMA provided funding to repair damaged
homes across the islands. The territory could request
reimbursement for eligible work. See 

,
206.202, 206.223.
     The Virgin Islands Housing Finance Authority contracted
for thousands of restoration projects, incurring several hundred
million dollars in expenses. After those projects were
completed, the Authority submitted a reimbursement request to
                               3
FEMA, claiming more than $594 million in costs. FEMA
initially denied around $85 million of the claimed costs. The
Authority appealed to a FEMA administrator and recouped
another $8.5 million.
     The Authority then sought to recover the remainder, and
had two procedural options. It could take another appeal within
FEMA, see 

 § 206.206(b)(2), or it could request arbitration
before the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, an
administrative tribunal within the General Services
Administration, see id. § 206.206(b)(3); 42 U.S.C.
§ 5189a(d)(1). The Authority chose arbitration, and the Board
assigned the case to a three-judge arbitration panel, which held
a hearing in early 2023. After the hearing concluded and the
record closed, however, one judge took “extended leave” and
was “unable to participate in the arbitration decision.” J.A. 4
n.1. The two remaining panel members then issued a decision
on June 28, 2023, determining that the Authority was not
entitled to full reimbursement.
     A month later, the Authority asked the Board to vacate the
panel’s decision. The award was invalid, the Authority
claimed, because the arbitrators had no authority to issue a
decision without all three panel members present. The Board
declined the Authority’s request.
     The Authority then moved to vacate the award in federal
district court under the Federal Arbitration Act, raising the
same quorum issue. The motion also included a claim under
the Administrative Procedure Act. The Authority filed its
motion on September 26, 2023 and served notice on FEMA on
September 29.
     The district court denied the motion. It held that relief
under the FAA was unavailable because the Authority had
failed to timely serve FEMA. V.I. Hous. & Fin. Auth. v. FEMA,

, 21 (D.D.C. 2024). It also held that relief
                                4
under the APA was unavailable because the FAA precludes
APA review in this setting. Id. at 30. The Authority appeals,
challenging both points.
                               II
                                A
     We first consider whether the Authority timely served
notice of its FAA motion. We agree with the district court that
it did not.
     Under the FAA, once an arbitration award has issued, a
party to the arbitration can move to vacate the award in federal
district court. 

(a). But the time to bring such a
motion is limited. The party challenging the award must serve
notice of its motion on the other side “within three months after
the award is filed or delivered.” 

 § 12.
    The Authority did not meet this deadline. The award here
was issued, “filed,” and “delivered” on June 28, 2023. And the
Authority failed to serve notice of its motion “within three
months” of that date: It mailed a copy of the motion to FEMA
on September 29, 2023—one day outside the three-month
window.
     Even so, the Authority insists that its notice was timely. It
claims that the arbitration panel had no authority to issue an
award without all three members present. That flaw, the
Authority argues, renders the award “void ab initio” (or invalid
from the beginning). Appellant’s Brief 34. And, the Authority
submits, a void award is no “award” at all and so cannot start
the FAA’s three-month notice deadline. Instead, an award
issued without authority can be challenged at any time, without
limit.
                               5
    We disagree. Whether or not the panel had the authority
to make the award, the FAA’s three-month deadline would
apply all the same.
     To start, the FAA’s text offers no support for the
Authority’s proposed carveout. By its terms, the notice
deadline applies to any motion to vacate “an award,” and is
triggered when the award is “filed or delivered.” 

.
It does not distinguish between different kinds of arbitration
awards. Nor does it mention any exceptions. Instead, the
notice provision creates what has been “consistently
interpreted” as “a strict deadline.” Argentine Republic v. Nat’l
Grid Plc, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
     If Congress intended to exempt awards that arbitrators
lacked authority to issue from the three-month deadline, it
presumably would have said so. Congress plainly had such
awards in mind when it enacted the FAA. After all, that the
“arbitrators exceeded their powers” is one of the few grounds
the FAA specifies for vacating an award, and that provision
encompasses the type of challenge made here. 

(a)(4). We are skeptical that Congress expressly permitted
such “exceeded their powers” challenges on the one hand and
silently exempted them from the notice deadline on the other.
    The potential breadth of the Authority’s proposed
exemption adds to our skepticism. By some accounts, the
“exceeded their powers” ground is the “most frequent” basis
for motions to vacate. Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation,
Construction and Application of § 10(a)(4) of Federal
Arbitration Act (

(a)(4)) Providing for Vacating
of Arbitration Awards Where Arbitrators Exceed or
Imperfectly Execute Powers, 

, § 2[a]
(1997). Arbitrators derive their authority from the parties’
agreement, and many challenges to an arbitration award can be
framed as suggesting “the arbitrator act[ed] outside the scope
                               6
of his contractually delegated authority.” Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter, 

 (2013) (citation modified).
An arbitration panel exceeds its powers, for instance, when it
decides an issue that the parties did not submit to arbitration,
grants relief beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, or
(as alleged here) acts without a quorum. See, e.g., 2 Jay E.
Grenig, Domke on Commercial Arbitration § 39:13 (3d ed.
2025); 21 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 57:145
(4th ed. May 2025 update); see also J.P. Greathouse Steel
Erectors, Inc. v. Blount Bros. Constr. Co., 

(D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that arbitrators “exceeded their
authority” by granting “an award that is not authorized by the
contract”). We will not, as the district court aptly put it, read
“such a gaping exception” into the FAA’s notice provision
without some textual basis for it. 728 F. Supp. 3d at 24.
     Principles of arbitration enshrined in the FAA make us all
the more hesitant to accept the Authority’s position. The FAA
sought to “maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving
disputes straightaway.” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,

 (2008). The statute’s three-month
limitations period furthers that purpose by giving challengers a
limited window within which to challenge an arbitration award.
See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers,
Loc. Union No. 135 v. Jefferson Trucking Co., 

 (7th Cir. 1980); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 

 (2d Cir. 1984). The Authority’s proposed exception,
by contrast, would invite long-delayed challenges to an
arbitration award’s validity, undermining the FAA’s interests
in speed and finality.
     The reality that we are interpreting a procedural deadline
reinforces the point. We generally do not assume that Congress
crafts procedural rules that will “invite extensive threshold
litigation.” Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 

, 464 n.13
(1980) (citation modified). Courts and parties, we have said,
                                7
“should be able to answer a simple procedural question” (like
when service is due) “without having to answer a complex
merits question” (like whether an arbitration panel exceeded its
authority). New York Stock Exch. LLC v. SEC, 

(D.C. Cir. 2021). So to the extent we have any doubts about
what Congress meant, interests in “predictability and clarity”
favor “an easily ascertained bright line.” 

 All of this
confirms that Congress did not silently build an “exceeded their
powers” exception into the FAA’s notice deadline.
     So far as we can tell, every court to confront this issue has
reached the same conclusion. Many courts have held that the
FAA’s notice deadline applies to motions arguing that the
arbitrators lacked authority to issue the award or otherwise
exceeded their powers. See, e.g., Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs, Loc. No. 841 v. Murphy Co., 

 (7th Cir.
1996); DeLorto v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 

 (D. Mass. 1975); Hill v. Aro Corp., 

, 486–
87 (N.D. Ohio 1967); SBRMCOA, LLC v. Beachside Assocs.,
LLC, 

, 851 ¶ 14 (2024). More have said the same
about similarly worded state arbitration statutes. See, e.g.,
Sullivan v. Gilchrist, 

 (7th Cir. 1996); New
Med. Horizons II, Ltd. v. Jacobson, 

, 430 & n.6
(Tex. App. 2010); Springfield Tchrs. Ass’n v. Springfield Sch.
Dirs., 

 (Vt. 1997); Loc. 589, Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 

 (Mass. 1986); Bingham Cnty. Comm’n v. Interstate Elec.
Co., 

 (Idaho 1983); Schroud v. Van C.
Argiris & Co., 

, 105–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
Textile Workers Union v. Uncas Printing & Finishing Co., 

 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1956). No court, to our
                                 8
knowledge, has taken a different view on the exact question
before us.1
    The Authority’s counterarguments lack merit.
     For starters, the Authority argues that the “exceeded their
powers” ground for vacatur covers only purportedly final
awards that “fail[] to reach all the issues presented by the
parties.” Appellant’s Brief 37. This argument is difficult to
track. For one thing, as we have explained, the “exceeded their
powers” ground is not nearly so narrow. It applies whenever
an arbitrator “acts outside the scope of his contractually
delegated authority.” Oxford Health Plans, 

(citation modified). For another, if the Authority were correct,
the argument would completely backfire. The Authority itself
moved for relief under the FAA solely on the ground that the
panel members had “exceeded their powers.” See Pet’r’s Mem.
Supp. Mot. Vacate at 5, Dkt. No. 1-1. If an arbitration panel
could exceed its authority only by “fail[ing] to reach all the
issues presented by the parties,” Appellant’s Brief 37, then the
Authority no longer has a hook for FAA review. Either way,
the FAA motion fails.
    Seeking a textual hook for its position, the Authority
argues that an award exceeding the arbitrator’s authority is no
“award” at all within the meaning of the FAA, and thus cannot

    1
       Some decisions, we note, have held that the FAA’s three-
month deadline does not apply if “there was no written agreement to
arbitrate” in the first place. E.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
Exalon Indus., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 1998). We do not
decide whether that rule complies with the FAA: The Authority does
not rely on these cases, and they do not go so far as to embrace the
Authority’s much broader “exceeded their powers” exception. See

 Moreover, by their terms, these decisions apply only if the
challenger “did not participate” in the underlying arbitration
proceeding. 

. That condition is not met here.
                                9
trigger the statute’s notice provision. But the FAA’s text
disproves that theory. The statute, as discussed, expressly
contemplates that an “award” can exist (and be vacated)
“where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” 

(a)(4). It envisions that a party to the arbitration may apply
to vacate such an “award” and that a district court “may make
an order vacating the award.” 

 § 10(a). An award exceeding
the arbitrator’s powers, in other words, must be an “award”
under the FAA.
     Trying a different angle, the Authority insists that this
award could not trigger the FAA’s time limit because it was
“void ab initio.” But incanting the word “void” does not alter
anything we have said thus far. Many arguments that an
arbitrator exceeded his powers can be cast as arguments that
the award is “void” because the arbitrator had no contractually
delegated authority to issue it. See, e.g., In re Friedman, 

 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926) (“The law is well
settled that, where arbitrators act beyond the scope of their
authority, their acts are void and without effect.”). The
Authority, for its part, does not suggest that the category of
awards it would deem “void” is meaningfully narrower than the
category of awards in which arbitrators “exceeded their
powers.” So an exception for “void” awards, just like an
exception for awards where the arbitrators “exceeded their
powers,” would contravene the statutory text and basic
arbitration principles.
     Without support from the FAA’s text or cases addressing
arbitration awards, the Authority turns to the common law. It
suggests that an exception to the time limit for “void” awards
honors traditional common-law principles, drawing an analogy
to district court judgments in civil cases. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require that any motion for relief from a final
judgment “be made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c)(1). But that limitation, we have held, does not apply to
                               10
“void” judgments. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2013). A civil
judgment that is “void” because it suffers from certain
jurisdictional or constitutional defects is a “legal nullity.”
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 

, 270–
71 (2010). And such a judgment, we have explained, can be
challenged at any point, in view of the traditional principle that
a “void judgment” cannot “acquire validity” through the
passage of time. Austin v. Smith, 

 (D.C. Cir.
1962); see also 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2862 (3d ed. May 2025 update); In re Vista-Pro
Auto., LLC, 

 (6th Cir. 2024) (explaining that
before the last substantive amendments to Rule 60(b) there was
a “well-established rule that void judgments could be vacated
at any time”).
    We appreciate the parallels between that context and this
one. Still, we do not think that the FAA’s three-month notice
deadline incorporates the Authority’s proposed approach.
     When interpreting a statute, we do generally assume that
Congress intends to retain “long-established and familiar
principles” from the common law. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson,

 (1952). But this assumption comes into play
only if those common-law principles were “well-established”
at the time of the statute’s enactment and only if they “clearly”
applied to the subject matter at hand. Pasquantino v. United
States, 

 (2005); see also United States v.
Craft, 

 (2002). Otherwise, we cannot assume
“with any reasonable certainty” that Congress acted with those
principles in mind. Pasquantino, 

; see also
Ryan v. ICE, 

, 24 (1st Cir. 2020).
     The Authority’s proposed voidness exception does not
satisfy those conditions. Whatever the rule may be in other
contexts, the notion that a void arbitration award cannot trigger
                                11
a procedural deadline was not a well-settled common-law
principle in 1925, when the FAA became law. See Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 

 (2001). The Authority
cites no pre-1925 case that “held or clearly implied” that a
voidness exception exists for arbitration awards. Pasquantino,

. We have not found one either. If anything,
we have instead come across sources suggesting (just like
every post-1925 authority we can find) the exact opposite—
that a statutory deadline to bring a motion to vacate an
arbitration award applies regardless of the grounds invoked.
See, e.g., Shores v. Bowen, 

 (Mo. 1869) (“To
suffer a term to intervene is to waive this remedy, whatever
ground for relief he may have under it.”); see also, e.g., Francis
Russell, A Treatise on the Power and Duty of an Arbitrator and
the Law of Submissions and Awards pt. 3, ch. IX, § 2, at 636
(4th ed. 1870) (“[T]he limitation given by the statute applies to
all objections, intrinsic as well as extrinsic, and . . . an award,
however defective on its face, cannot be set aside on any
grounds after the time allotted by the act.”); William Henry
Watson, A Treatise on the Law of Arbitration and Awards ch.
IX, § 1, at *268 (3d ed. 1848) (“[O]f whatever nature the
objection to the award may be, . . . the motion under the statute
must be made within the time limited.”); Sidney Billing, A
Practical Treatise on the Law of Awards and Arbitrations *178
(1846) (“The Court will set aside an award for other causes than
corruption, but in all cases the motion must be made before the
last day of the term next after that in which the award is made.”
(emphasis added)). These authorities cast doubt on the
existence of any “well-settled” pre-1925 rule that motions to
vacate void arbitration awards can be brought at any time.
Kousisis v. United States, 

 (2025).2

    2
      For more modern sources that survey cases addressing the
FAA’s time limit but likewise contain no hint of the Authority’s
proposed exception, see, for example, 4 Ian R. MacNeil et al.,
                                12
    We are especially hesitant to read a voidness exception
into the FAA’s timing requirements because “a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Solimino, 

 (1991) (citation
modified). Such a broad exception, as we have explained,
would undermine the virtues of “speed and simplicity” that
Congress embraced in the FAA. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 

 (2018). That conflict adds yet another reason to
doubt that Congress intended to transplant a common-law
voidness exception into the FAA.
     At bottom, the Authority claims the right to vacate an
arbitration award under the FAA at any time, simply by
challenging the arbitrator’s authority to make it. Because we
see nothing in the statute, historical practice, or modern
precedent to support that sweeping view, we affirm the district
court’s conclusion that service was untimely.




Federal Arbitration Law § 38.4.2 (1999); 2 Jay E. Grenig, Domke on
Commercial Arbitration § 40.2 (3d ed. Jan. 2025 update); 31
Moore’s Federal Practice § 908.03 (3d ed. 2025); 13D Wright &
Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3569 (3d ed. May 2025
update); Restatement (Third) U.S. Law of Int’l Com. & Inv.-State
Arb. § 4.30 (A.L.I. Oct. 2024 update); 21 Richard A. Lord, Williston
on Contracts § 57:153 (4th ed. May 2025 update); 6 C.J.S.
Arbitration § 225 (May 2025 update); 3 Eric C. Surette, Federal
Procedure, Lawyer’s Edition §§ 4:97, 4:99 (June 2025 update); 1 Jay
E. Grenig, Alternative Dispute Resolution § 26:14 (4th ed. Sep. 2024
update); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution § 232 (May
2025 update).
                                13
                                B
    We next consider whether the FAA precludes the
Authority’s APA claim. We agree with the district court that it
does.
     “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action,” the APA says, “is entitled to judicial review thereof.”

. This provision “embodies the basic
presumption of judicial review” across “a broad spectrum of
administrative actions.” Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 

 (1967).
     But “Congress did not intend the general grant of review
in the APA to duplicate existing procedures for review.”
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 

 (1988). Section
704 of the APA limits judicial review under that statute to
agency action “for which there is no other adequate remedy in
a court.” 

. Consistent with that limitation, APA
review is not available if Congress has provided a “special and
adequate review procedure” elsewhere. Bowen, 

 (citation modified).
     The question is whether the FAA contains such a review
procedure. Because Congress’s judgment is what matters, we
assess whether review under the FAA is “adequate” by looking
for “clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent to
create a special, alternative remedy and thereby bar APA
review.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation modified).
     Several considerations guide our inquiry. See 

 at 1244–
45. Does the FAA contain its own “independent cause of
action” or “alternative review procedure”? El Rio Santa Cruz
Neighborhood Health Ctr., Inc. v. HHS, 

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Does the FAA provide at least “the same
genre” of relief as the APA, even if that relief is not “identical”
                                14
to or as “effective” as relief under the APA? Garcia v. Vilsack,

, 522–25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
Are APA and FAA review “incompatible in major respects”?
Env’t Def. Fund v. Reilly, 

 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
    The answer is “yes” all the way down.
     First, the FAA contains its own process for reviewing
arbitration awards. As discussed above, the statute “supplies
mechanisms” for challenging arbitration awards. Hall St.
Assocs., 

; see 

, 10(a).
     Second, in a case like this, the FAA offers relief of “the
same genre” as the APA, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics, 

 (citation modified): Under the FAA, a district court
may issue “an order vacating the award.” 

. That
is the same exact remedy that the Authority seeks under the
APA (to “set aside” the award). J.A. 35[; see also J.A. 22–23].
     Third, review under the APA is wholly incompatible with
review under the FAA. The FAA strictly limits judicial review
of arbitration awards to a narrow, “exclusive” set of grounds.
Hall St. Assocs., 

; see 

(a), 11.
And the statute, as discussed above, sets a prompt deadline for
bringing motions to vacate. See 

. Through these
features, the statute implements “a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed” to resolve
disputes efficiently. Hall St. Assocs., 

.
     APA review of arbitration awards would undercut that
statutory scheme at every turn. Judicial review under the APA
(though deferential) is not as limited as judicial review under
the FAA. Under the APA, for example, a court may set aside
agency action for any material legal error. See 

(2). The FAA sets a higher bar for judicial intervention,
mindful of the parties’ bargain to have an arbitrator, not a court,
                              15
settle their disputes. See Oxford Health Plans, 

.
Proving material “error”—even “grave error”—in the
arbitrator’s legal reasoning does not suffice. 

.
Moreover, parties generally have several years—not just three
months—to challenge agency action under the APA. 

(a).
     Together, these differences confirm that review through
the FAA is not just an “adequate” means of challenging
arbitration awards “but in fact the proper means” for doing so.
Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 

(D.C. Cir. 1990). The Authority cannot “circumvent” the
FAA’s unique “requirements and limitations by resorting to the
catchall APA.” Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of
Governors, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying
similar reasoning to funnel challenges to agency employment
actions through the Civil Service Reform Act).
    None of this is to say, of course, that the FAA is “the only
way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration
awards.” Hall St. Assocs., 

. Our decision means
only that one particular route to judicial review—through the
APA—is not available under these circumstances.
    The Authority’s responses are unpersuasive.
     Most fundamentally, the Authority has no answer to the
basic point that permitting broader and more-delayed review of
arbitration awards under the APA would undermine the FAA’s
scheme of limited and prompt review. And it bears repeating
that the FAA applies only because the Authority chose to
arbitrate its dispute with FEMA, rather than pursue additional
appeals within FEMA followed by judicial review under the
APA.
    The Authority instead focuses on remedial disparities
between the FAA and APA. It notes that the APA generally
                                16
permits various remedies not available under the FAA, such as
declaratory, injunctive, and habeas relief. See 

.
But the Authority has not sought those forms of relief in this
case. Its APA claim asks only that a court “set aside” the
arbitration award, J.A. 35—a remedy that the FAA already
affords, see 

. We see no reason to measure the
adequacy of relief under the FAA based on the absence of
remedies that no party has asked for. Rather, adequacy turns
on whether a “yawning gap” exists “between the relief sought
and the relief available.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics, 

. No such gap exists here.
     The Authority adds that, under the APA, a court could stop
FEMA from enforcing the arbitration award against anyone,
not just the Authority. But it is unclear how FEMA could try
to enforce the award against anyone else—the Authority was
the only other party to the arbitration. So again, to the extent
this remedial disparity exists in the abstract, it is immaterial in
this case.
     Next, the Authority argues that only statutes providing for
de novo review can displace the APA. True, some of our cases
identifying forms of adequate alternative relief involved
statutes with de novo review provisions. See, e.g., Env’t Def.
Fund, 

. But those precedents do not state that
only a scheme providing de novo review can displace the APA.
The reason de novo review might preclude APA review, those
cases explain, is because the two are “incompatible in major
respects,” a sign that Congress did not intend “concurrent use
of both.” 

 And, as we have described, the FAA’s review
scheme is likewise “incompatible” with APA review “in major
respects.”
     Last, the Authority claims that the FAA cannot preclude
its APA claim because the FAA does not even apply to the
arbitration award at issue. That theory is forfeited twice over.
                               17
The Authority never raised it below. See District of Columbia
v. Air Fla., Inc., 

 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(restating the “well settled” rule that “issues and legal theories
not asserted at the District Court level ordinarily will not be
heard on appeal”). Nor did the Authority raise the argument in
its opening brief on appeal. See Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that a party “forfeits an
argument by failing to raise it in his opening brief”).
                               III
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
                                                     So ordered.