NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

MARIKI EARL, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________

2019-2144 ______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:19-cv-00901-VJW, Senior Judge Victor J. Wolski. ______________________

Decided: December 9, 2019 ______________________

MARIKI EARL, Missouri City, TX, pro se.

ISAAC B. ROSENBERG, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. ______________________

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges. 2 EARL v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM. Mariki Earl appeals a decision of the U.S. Court of Fed- eral Claims (Claims Court) dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Earl v. United States, No. 19-901, 2019 WL 2714837 (Fed. Cl. June 28, 2019) (Opinion). Because the Claims Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm. BACKGROUND Mr. Earl filed a complaint in the Claims Court on June 20, 2019 alleging price fixing by unspecified oil companies. As the grounds for jurisdiction, the complaint references a lawsuit Mr. Earl filed against the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking compen- sation for alleged “encroachments of [his] constitutional rights.” Supplemental Appendix at 6. The complaint also mentions a claim he allegedly filed with the United States Department of Labor under the McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act. Id. at 7. The Claims Court dismissed Mr. Earl’s complaint sua sponte on June 28, 2019 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Opinion at *1–2. Mr. Earl timely appeals. We have jurisdiction pursu- ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). DISCUSSION We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of sub- ject matter jurisdiction de novo. M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In determining whether the Claims Court has jurisdiction, we accept as true all undisputed factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Tucker Act gives the Claims Court jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive depart- ment, or upon any express or implied contract with the EARL v. UNITED STATES 3

United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

Mr. Earl fails to identify a statutory or constitutional basis for his claims. Supplemental Appendix at 7. He nei- ther alleges a contract with the United States nor alleges that the federal government violated a money-mandating statute. The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act, un- der which he purportedly filed a complaint with the United States Department of Labor, regulates the wage practices of federal contractors and subcontrators. 41 U.S.C. §§ 6701–07. It does not compel payments by the federal gov- ernment. With respect to the alleged “encroachments of [his] constitutional rights” by the Southern District of Texas, the Claims Court is without jurisdiction to scruti- nize the actions of another tribunal. Vereda Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, the Claims Court correctly determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. CONCLUSION Because the Claims Court lacks subject matter juris- diction, we affirm. AFFIRMED COSTS No costs.