Case: 22-1176   Document: 90    Page: 1   Filed: 09/07/2023




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

  FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN
   INSTITUTE OF STEEL CONSTRUCTION, LLC,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                           v.

    UNITED STATES, CORNERSTONE BUILDING
  BRANDS, INC., BLUESCOPE BUILDINGS NORTH
     AMERICA INC., JINHUAN CONSTRUCTION
    GROUP CO., LTD., WISON (NANTONG) HEAVY
 INDUSTRY CO., LTD., SHANGHAI MATSUO STEEL
 STRUCTURE CO., LTD., YANDA (HAIMEN) HEAVY
     EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.,
      SHANGHAI COSCO KAWASAKI HEAVY
    INDUSTRIES STEEL STRUCTURE CO., LTD.,
   MODERN HEAVY INDUSTRIES (TAICANG) CO.,
   LTD., DICKERSON ENTERPRISES, INC., STEEL
           CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC,
                Defendants-Appellees

 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY, A DIVISION
 OF EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, GULF COAST
         GROWTH VENTURES, LLC,
                  Defendants
            ______________________

                       2022-1176
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of International
 Trade in No. 1:20-cv-00090-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.
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 2   FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US




                  ______________________

                Decided: September 7, 2023
                  ______________________

     THOMAS M. JOHNSON, JR., Wiley Rein, LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
 by STEPHEN JOSEPH OBERMEIER, ALAN H. PRICE, ADAM
 MILAN TESLIK, ENBAR TOLEDANO, CHRISTOPHER B. WELD.

     JOHN DAVID HENDERSON, Office of General Counsel,
 United States International Trade Commission, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States. Also
 represented by ANDREA C. CASSON.

     DANIEL MARTIN WITKOWSKI, Akin Gump Strauss
 Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-
 appellees Cornerstone Building Brands, Inc., BlueScope
 Buildings North America Inc., Jinhuan Construction
 Group Co., Ltd., Wison (Nantong) Heavy Industry Co.,
 Ltd., Shanghai Matsuo Steel Structure Co., Ltd., Yanda
 (Haimen) Heavy Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd.,
 Shanghai Cosco Kawasaki Heavy Industries Steel Struc-
 ture Co., Ltd., Modern Heavy Industries (Taicang) Co.,
 Ltd., Dickerson Enterprises, Inc., Steel Construction
 Group, LLC. Cornerstone Building Brands, Inc., also rep-
 resented by MATTHEW R. NICELY.

     DANIEL L. PORTER, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt &
 Mosle LLP, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee
 BlueScope Buildings North America Inc. Also represented
 by JAMES BEATY, CHRISTOPHER A. DUNN.

    NED H. MARSHAK, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Sil-
 verman & Klestadt LLP, New York, NY, for defendants-
 appellees Jinhuan Construction Group Co., Ltd., Wison
 (Nantong) Heavy Industry Co., Ltd., Shanghai Matsuo
 Steel Structure Co., Ltd., Yanda (Haimen) Heavy
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US       3



 Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd., Shanghai Cosco Ka-
 wasaki Heavy Industries Steel Structure Co., Ltd., Modern
 Heavy Industries (Taicang) Co., Ltd., Dickerson Enter-
 prises, Inc., Steel Construction Group, LLC. Also repre-
 sented by MAX F. SCHUTZMAN; JORDAN CHARLES KAHN,
 Washington, DC.
                   ______________________

 Before REYNA, BRYSON, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
 REYNA, Circuit Judge.
     Appellant appeals from the judgment of the United
 States Court of International Trade that affirms a final
 negative determination reached by the United States In-
 ternational Trade Commission in an antidumping duty in-
 vestigation. On March 1, 2020, the Commission issued a
 final negative determination that the U.S. (domestic) fab-
 ricated structural steel (“FSS”) industry was not materially
 injured or threatened with material injury by reason of
 sales in the United States of certain FSS imports from,
 among other countries, China. Appellant appealed to the
 Court of International Trade, raising three principal is-
 sues: (1) that the Commission erred by declining to resolve
 a purported ambiguity in the scope of the investigation in
 view of the parties’ dispute, (2) that the Commission legally
 erred in its determination that the captive production ex-
 ception in 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1)(A)(i) did not apply in the
 investigation, and (3) that the Commission erred in its
 price effects analysis under 

(7)(C)(ii). The
 Court of International Trade upheld the Commission’s fi-
 nal negative determination, and Appellant appealed to this
 court. We conclude that the Commission’s determination
 as to the issues raised on appeal is reasonable, supported
 by substantial evidence, and in accordance with the law.
 On that basis, we affirm the judgment of the Court of In-
 ternational Trade.
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 4   FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US




                        BACKGROUND
      Appellant, Full Member Subgroup of the American In-
 stitute of Steel Construction, LLC (“AISC”), is an associa-
 tion of U.S. producers and manufacturers of fabricated
 structural steel (“FSS”) products. In February 2019, AISC
 filed antidumping duty petitions before the United States
 International Trade Commission (“Commission”) and the
 United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), al-
 leging unfair trade practices involving the importation and
 sales in the United States of FSS from Canada, China, and
 Mexico. See [FSS] from Canada, China, & Mexico, USITC
 Inv. Nos. 701-TA-615 and 701-TA-616 (Mar. 1, 2019). 1 This


     1   In general, antidumping duty investigations are
 commensurately, but separately, conducted by Commerce
 and the Commission. The object of Commerce’s investiga-
 tion is to determine the extent to which imports of the
 goods under investigation are sold in the United States at
 less than fair value, i.e. “dumped.” See Cleo Inc. v. United
 States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2007). An early task
 of Commerce is to define the goods, or merchandise, that
 are subject to its investigation, the “subject merchandise.”
 See Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 

, 1374–75, 1374 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also 

(25).
      The Commission does not investigate whether sales are
 at less than fair value. Rather, the Commission investi-
 gates whether a U.S. industry that produces goods or prod-
 ucts that are like the products under investigation by
 Commerce (these products are referred to as “domestic like
 product”) are materially injured or threatened with mate-
 rial injury. Cleo, 501 F.3d at 1294–95.
     Central to both investigations, and this appeal, are the
 agencies’ respective definitions or identification of the
 products under their respective investigation. These
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US         5



 appeal only involves the investigation on FSS imports from
 China.
     On February 4, 2019, the Commission initiated its pre-
 liminary phase of its investigation. See Institution Notice
 for [FSS] From Canada, China, & Mexico, 

 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Feb. 11, 2019). The period of in-
 vestigation was set for January 2015 through September
 2018. [FSS] from Canada, China, & Mexico, Investigation
 Nos. 701-TA-615-617 and 731-TA-1432-1434 (Prelim.) at
 12, USITC Pub. 4878, (Mar. 2019). The Commission issued
 questionnaires to, among other entities, the AISC member-
 ship, other domestic producers, U.S. importers, and Chi-
 nese producers and manufacturers, seeking information
 and data related to production, shipment, consumption,
 and pricing of products under investigation during the pe-
 riod of investigation.




 determinations are critical because they define both the
 scope of the investigations and the scope of any resulting
 trade relief, such as the assessment of antidumping duties.
 See, e.g., 

(b)(5) (“[T]he subject merchan-
 dise . . . defines the requested scope of the investigation.”);
 

(a)(2)(C) (“The determination under this
 paragraph shall be the basis for the assessment of counter-
 vailing or antidumping duties on entries of merchandise
 covered by the determination and for deposits of estimated
 duties.”); Hitachi Metals, Ltd. v. United States, 

 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2018), aff'd, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Commerce’s scope rulings assess fac-
 tors in relation to the foreign like product and subject mer-
 chandise produced in the country(ies) subject to
 investigation, whereas the [Commission’s] domestic like
 product determinations assess factors in relation to the
 production and sale of domestic like product by the domes-
 tic industry.”).
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 6   FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US




     The Commission received questionnaire responses
 providing trade and commercial data, composed of propri-
 etary and business confidential material. See [FSS] from
 Canada, China, & Mexico, USITC Inv. Nos. 701-TA-615
 and 701-TA-616, at *5 (Mar. 1, 2019).
     During the preliminary phase of the investigation, the
 interested parties in the investigation addressed issues
 pertinent to the methodologies they used for reporting the
 data, as well as comment and argument regarding the
 Commission’s analysis and treatment of the data. For ex-
 ample, AISC requested that the Commission adopt a do-
 mestic like product determination that was coextensive
 with the subject merchandise definition adopted by Com-
 merce, which expressly excluded pre-engineered metal
 building systems, or “PEMBs.” 2 J.A. 120–21.
    Relevant to this appeal, AISC also argued for the Com-
 mission to disregard certain data provided by two U.S. pro-
 ducers. According to AISC, NCI Group, Inc. (“NCI”) and
 BlueScope Buildings North America, Inc. (“BlueScope”)
 submitted information for products that were not


     2    Commerce defined the subject merchandise scope
 as “carbon and alloy” FSS that “have been fabricated for
 erection or assembly into structures, including, but not lim-
 ited to, buildings.” J.A. 2495–96. Commerce’s subject mer-
 chandise determination provided several categories of
 exclusions, such as completed PEMBs. J.A. 2496; J.A.
 8363–64.
     For purposes of this appeal, PEMBs are “defined as
 complete metal buildings that integrate steel framing, roof-
 ing and walls to form one, pre-engineered building system
 and are designed and manufactured to [meet] Metal Build-
 ing Manufactures Association guide specifications.” J.A.
 111. PEMBs “are typically limited in height to no more
 than 60 feet or two stories.” 

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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US      7



 “domestic like products” and thus should be rejected by the
 Commission. J.A. 8331–33 & n.47. AISC argued, in the
 alternative, that to the extent that the data were not re-
 jected, the NCI and BlueScope data should be excluded un-
 der the captive production provision set out in 

(7)(C)(iv). J.A. 8800 & n.180.
     On January 30, 2020, Commerce reached a final af-
 firmative determination, concluding that FSS from China
 was sold in the United States at less than fair value. Cer-
 tain [FSS] from [China], 

, 5379 (Dep’t of
 Commerce Jan. 30, 2020).
     On March 1, 2020, the Commission issued the final
 negative determination, concluding that the domestic FSS
 industry was not materially injured or threatened with ma-
 terial injury by imports of subject FSS from China. [FSS]
 from Canada, China, & Mexico, USITC Inv. No. 701-TA-
 616 (Mar. 1, 2020). 3 The Commission reached the following
 determination relevant to this appeal.
     First, the Commission took steps to exclude purport-
 edly out-of-scope domestic industry data provided by NCI
 and BlueScope. J.A. 8418 n.304. Second, the Commission
 determined that the captive production provision was in-
 applicable because there was no “production of a down-
 stream article,” as required by the statute. J.A. 8800–8801.
 And third, the Commission determined that “[t]he record
 consequently does not support a finding that the subject
 imports significantly undersold the domestic like product.”
 J.A. 8415. The Commission also concluded that there was
 “no evidence of price depression on th[e] record.” 

     AISC appealed the Commission’s final negative deter-
 mination to the United States Court of International Trade
 (“Court of International Trade”). Full Member Sub. of the


    3  Three Commissioners voted in the negative and
 two Commissioners voted in the affirmative.
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 8   FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US




 Am. Inst. of Steel Constr., LLC v. United States, 

 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2021). On appeal before the
 Court of International Trade, AISC moved for judgment on
 the agency record based on four arguments: that the Com-
 mission erred by (1) failing to exclude NCI and BlueScope
 domestic industry data related to PEMB material, (2) de-
 termining that the captive production provision is inappli-
 cable, (3) failing to seek out additional pricing product
 data, and (4) concluding that there were no significant
 price effects by FSS imports. 

 at 1218–31.
     In September 2021, the Court of International Trade
 sustained the Commission’s final negative determination.
 

. AISC timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
 under 

(a)(5).
                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
      We review de novo the Court of International Trade’s
 judgments on the agency record. Timken U.S. Corp. v.
 United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In do-
 ing so, we apply the same standard of review applied by the
 Court of International Trade when it reviews the Commis-
 sion’s antidumping determinations. Zhejiang Mach. Imp.
 & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 

, 1369 (Fed.
 Cir. 2023). As such, we review whether the Commission’s
 determination is supported by substantial evidence or oth-
 erwise not in accordance with the law. Siemens Energy,
 Inc. v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
 “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a rea-
 sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
 clusion.” 

 (cleaned up).
                        DISCUSSION
     On appeal, AISC argues that the Commission erred by
 (1) declining to resolve a purported ambiguity in the defi-
 nition of the domestic like product scope, (2) determining
 that the captive production exception is not applicable, and
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US         9



 (3) concluding that there were no significant price effects
 by FSS imports.
                  I.     Domestic Like Product
      We first address AISC’s argument concerning the Com-
 mission’s domestic like product determination. AISC
 frames this issue as “[w]hether the Commission lawfully
 declined to resolve an ambiguity in the definition of the do-
 mestic like product.” Appellant Br. 2. Specifically, AISC
 asserts that the Commission is required “to resolve
 whether disputed products in fact met the definition of the
 domestic like product.” Reply Br. 2. AISC further argues
 that the Commission must “articulate a reason for any such
 determination” and that the Commission erroneously
 failed to do so in this case. 

      The domestic like product determination is critical to
 the framework of antidumping duty investigations. The
 statute charges the Commission with determining whether
 a domestic industry is materially injured or threatened
 with material injury by reason of imports sold in the
 United States at less than fair value. 

(a).
 To do so, the Commission investigates the economic and
 commercial health of a domestic industry, defined as “pro-
 ducers as a whole of a domestic like product.” 

 § 1677(4)(A). The statute defines “domestic like product”
 as a product “which is like or . . . most similar in character-
 istics and uses with, the article subject to an investigation.”
 Id. § 1677(10). Consequently, whether a U.S. producer is a
 member of the pertinent domestic industry is determined
 on the basis of whether it produces a domestic like product.
 If it does, then the Commission typically seeks data from
 that company to assist it in gauging whether the domestic
 industry is injured. If a company does not produce a do-
 mestic like product, then it is not part of the relevant do-
 mestic industry, and its data is not used in the
 investigation. See Pokarna Engineered Stone Ltd. v.
 United States, 

, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“The
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 10 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US



 term ‘industry’ is defined in the statute as ‘the producers
 . . . of a domestic like product, or those producers whose col-
 lective output of a domestic like product constitutes a ma-
 jor proportion of the total domestic production of the
 product.’ 

(4)(A).”). To be clear, the Com-
 mission does not decide which products or merchandise are
 subject to the investigation, that task belongs to Commerce.
 See supra note 1.
      The foregoing is important to understand because
 AISC’s arguments are directed to both the domestic like
 product and the subject merchandise determinations. Spe-
 cifically, AISC frames its argument in terms of the Com-
 mission’s determination related to the domestic like
 product, see Appellant Br. 22–28, but the core issue AISC
 raises is more appropriately framed in terms of Com-
 merce’s determination related to the subject merchandise.
      First, AISC argues that the Commission is legally obli-
 gated to redefine the like product definition whenever a
 dispute arises about whether a product in fact meets the
 domestic like product definition. Appellant Br. 2; Reply Br.
 2. AISC asserts that in addition to redefining the domestic
 like product, the Commission is obligated to articulate a
 reason for why any disputed product does or does not fall
 within the domestic like product scope. Appellant Br. 27;
 Reply Br. 2. AISC claims that the Commission erred by not
 addressing an “ambiguity” in the domestic like product def-
 inition because “[i]t does not follow . . . that every piece of
 fabricated steel in a structure is necessarily fabricated
 structural steel.” Appellant Br. 28 (citations omitted) (em-
 phasis in original).
     We observe that the Commission is not obligated as a
 matter of law to expressly redefine its domestic like prod-
 uct determination simply because a party disputes whether
 a particular product falls within the definition. See Hitachi
 Metals, Ltd. v. United States, 

, 717 (Fed. Cir.
 2020) (concluding that Commission was not “required to
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US      11



 compare tool steel to products outside of Commerce’s sub-
 ject merchandise determination”); cf. Rules of Practice and
 Procedure, 

, 30,602 (Int’l Trade
 Comm’n, June 5, 1998) (“[T]he Commission may revisit its
 like product determination when there have been signifi-
 cant changes in the products at issue since the original in-
 vestigation.”). Nor does a purported “ambiguity” require
 the Commission to modify the domestic like product scope
 to expressly articulate whether a single or multiple goods
 are included or excluded from the scope. AISC identifies
 no regulation, law, or precedent to the contrary—and we
 find none.
     Second, we conclude that the focus of AISC’s argument
 is not the domestic like product definition, but rather the
 subject merchandise scope. Indeed, AISC concedes that it
 does not challenge the domestic like product definition on
 appeal. Reply Br. 2 (“Nor does AISC take issue with the
 Commission’s defining the domestic like product coexten-
 sively with the scope, thereby challenging an issue as to
 which AISC prevailed below.”). As a result, we do not ad-
 dress whether the domestic like product definition itself is
 defective or otherwise ambiguous.
     AISC further argues that the Commission’s determina-
 tion is infirm and should be reversed because the Commis-
 sion included in its investigation certain information and
 data pertaining to products that did not meet the domestic
 like product definition. See Appellant Br. 25–26. AISC ar-
 gues that the Commission failed to resolve its argument
 during the investigation or to articulate the resolution of
 the issue in its final determination. 

. We disagree.
    AISC asserts that the Commission should not have
 sought and received information and data from two U.S.
 companies: NCI and BlueScope. According to AISC, the
 NCI and BlueScope submissions included “significant vol-
 umes of non-subject merchandise in their data.” 

.
 AISC asserts that NCI “reported data for complete PEMBs,
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 12 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US



 which are expressly out-of-scope, and both NCI and
 BlueScope appeared to have reported data for substantial
 volumes of non-FSS components of PEMBs (meaning [fab-
 ricated] steel that was used in a PEMB[], but which AISC
 did not believe met the criteria for the domestic like prod-
 uct).” 

 (emphasis added). AISC notes that the PEMB
 components at issue on appeal, e.g., insulated metal pan-
 els, roof panels, and trim, “were never contemplated as
 FSS” by the Commission or the parties. Reply Br. 4.
     The record belies AISC’s argument. As to the pur-
 ported “complete PEMBs” in NCI and BlueScope’s data,
 AISC’s argument hinges on equating “complete PEMBs”—
 which are the completed buildings—with PEMB kits. J.A.
 3741. We disagree with that premise. The Commission
 concluded that PEMB kits are in scope, and thus were per-
 missibly included in NCI and BlueScope’s data. J.A. 8774–
 76. The record reflects that NCI and BlueScope accord-
 ingly did not include complete PEMBs in their data, only
 kits. See, e.g., J.A. 8801 & nn.186–87; J.A. 3132; J.A. 5345;
 J.A. 3429
     As to the non-structural FSS, the record again runs
 counter to AISC’s argument on appeal. At Commerce,
 AISC’s proposed definition of subject merchandise pre-
 vailed. Commerce defined the subject merchandise scope
 as “carbon and alloy” FSS that “have been fabricated for
 erection or assembly into structures, including, but not lim-
 ited to, buildings.” J.A. 2495–96. Other parties argued
 that the FSS scope should be limited to FSS that only “pro-
 vide structural support” and “can bear certain loads or
 weight.” J.A. 5135. AISC disagreed with that narrowing,
 arguing that “the scope was not intended to cover only FSS
 that becomes the structure” or that are “essential to sup-
 port the design loads of the structure,” i.e., load bearing.
 

 Commerce agreed with AISC. It concluded that the
 subject merchandise scope had “no limitations regarding
 whether or not the FSS is essential to support the design
 loads of the structure.” J.A. 5136. As a result, non-load
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US      13



 bearing FSS was included within the subject merchandise
 scope. This matters because, per AISC’s request, the Com-
 mission defined the domestic like product as coextensive
 with the subject merchandise determination. Thus, a deci-
 sion by the Commission that non-load bearing FSS was
 within the domestic like product scope is supported by sub-
 stantial evidence and in accordance with the law.
      The record also supports the government’s argument
 that the Commission did not consider out-of-scope data in
 coming to its final determination, and that the Commis-
 sion’s domestic like product determination was supported
 by substantial evidence. See Appellee Br. 18–24. The
 Commission conducted a thorough and detailed investiga-
 tion, including with respect to its domestic like product de-
 termination. For example, it issued domestic producer
 questionnaires to 495 firms and reviewed over 100 ques-
 tionnaires from domestic producers. J.A. 7969; J.A. 8821–
 22 n.304. It issued importer questionnaires to 245 firms
 believed to be importers of FSS. J.A. 7910. The Commis-
 sion issued a preliminary determination, providing its pre-
 liminary analysis of the data and its preliminary domestic
 like product scope. J.A. 2167–2200; J.A. 2173 (noting that
 AISC argues the domestic like product scope should be co-
 extensive with Commerce’s subject merchandise scope).
 Before coming to its final determination, the Commission
 considered AISC’s concerns regarding the out-of-scope data
 by seeking additional information from producers, J.A.
 6612–13; J.A. 8521 n.9, providing instructions on how data
 should be reported, see, e.g., J.A. 5883–87, and then review-
 ing that data to ensure they did not include out-of-scope
 products, J.A. 8821–22 n.304. This record demonstrates
 that the Commission’s investigation was thorough, and
 that its domestic like product determination is supported
 by substantial evidence.
     The Commission’s domestic like product analysis is
 also in accordance with the law. The Commission—as re-
 quired by statute, 

(10)—properly
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 14 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US



 considered Commerce’s “subject merchandise” determina-
 tion as the starting point of its domestic like product anal-
 ysis. Hitachi, 949 F.3d at 717 (“The statute requires the
 Commission to consider Commerce’s subject merchandise
 determination in reaching its own like product determina-
 tion.”); see, e.g., J.A. 8765–71; J.A. 8822 n.304. It then con-
 ducted the required six-factor inquiry set out in Cleo Inc. v.
 United States, 

, 1294–95, 1298 (Fed. Cir.
 2007) to evaluate whether the subject FSS corresponds
 with a single domestic like product or multiple domestic
 like products. J.A. 8773–80. Based on Commerce’s scope
 and the Cleo inquiry, the Commission similarly concluded
 that “FSS components of PEMBs” are in scope, and “com-
 plete PEMBs” are “excluded from the scope.” J.A. 8774. In
 support of these findings, the Commission relied on evi-
 dence related to how FSS and FSS components of PEMBs
 are produced, J.A. 8775, how they are distributed (e.g., in
 kits), J.A. 8776, and how they are priced, 

     Finally, we are not persuaded that the Commission re-
 lied on inconsistent data that corrupted its investigative
 database. Appellant Br. 2. AISC vaguely contends that
 the Commission considered “non-structural PEMB compo-
 nents,” id. at 24, yet does not identify what those precise
 components are or which data it is referring to. AISC con-
 tends that it “did not believe [these components] met the
 definition of fabricated structural steel.” Id. (emphasis in
 original). To the extent that AISC is referring to non-load
 bearing FSS, that argument fails for the reasons articu-
 lated above. Otherwise, its mere belief overturns neither
 the Commission’s thorough investigation nor its analysis
 and conclusion, which the record establishes is supported
 by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.
     For the above reasons, we hold that the Commission’s
 domestic like product determination was reasonable, sup-
 ported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with the
 law. We find nothing on this record that suggests that the
 Commission declined to address the issue, or that the
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US       15



 Commission was obligated in this case to redefine the do-
 mestic like product scope merely in light of the parties’ dis-
 agreement.
                II.      Captive Production Provision
      We turn to AISC’s argument that the Commission
 erred in determining that the captive production provision
 under 

(7)(C)(iv) is inapplicable. According
 to AISC, the captive production provision applies because
 “PEMB producers ‘internally transferred’ significant quan-
 tities of FSS to make PEMBs,” which are downstream ar-
 ticles. Appellant Br. 30. We are not persuaded.
     Section 1677(7)(C)(iv) provides that:
     If domestic producers internally transfer signifi-
     cant production of the domestic like product for the
     production of a downstream article and sell signif-
     icant production of the domestic like product in the
     merchant market, and the Commission finds
     that—
         (I) the domestic like product produced that
         is internally transferred for processing into
         that downstream article does not enter the
         merchant market for the domestic like
         product, and
         (II) the domestic like product is the pre-
         dominant material input in the production
         of that downstream article,
     then the Commission, in determining market share
     and the factors affecting financial performance set
     forth in clause (iii), shall focus primarily on the
     merchant market for the domestic like product.
     Generally, the Commission considers the state of the
 domestic industry as a whole in its injury analysis. See 19
 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1)(A)(i). An exception to this rule is the
 captive production provision, which provides that, if
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 16 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US



 certain conditions are met, the Commission must “focus
 primarily on the merchant market for the domestic like
 product” when determining market share and assessing
 economic factors. See 

(7)(C)(iv). The cap-
 tive production provision addresses situations in which
 U.S. producers internally transfer a significant volume of
 the domestic like product for further internal processing
 into a separate, distinct downstream article. See 

 The
 rationale is that internally transferred domestic like prod-
 ucts neither compete with, nor are injured by, the imported
 merchandise subject to the investigation. When this provi-
 sion applies, the Commission’s investigation excludes per-
 tinent data received from a producer that internally
 consumes its domestic like product to create a downstream
 product. See 

     A downstream article is an article distinct from the do-
 mestic like product but that is produced from the domestic
 like product. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act: State-
 ment of Administrative Action, H. Doc. 103–316, at 852–53
 (1994) (“SAA”). 4 Thus, the captive production provision
 does not apply where both domestic like product and the
 purported downstream article both fall within the domestic
 like product scope. See 

     We conclude that the Commission correctly determined
 that the captive production provision does not apply here.
 The Commission reasonably determined that complete


     4   The SAA is an authoritative expression concerning
 the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round
 Agreements Act. 

(d); see Oral Arg. 29:55–
 30:21; see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement
 of Administrative Action, H. Doc. 103–316, at 656 (1994)
 (“[S]ince this Statement will be approved by the Congress
 at the time it implements the Uruguay Rounds agree-
 ments, the interpretations of those agreements included in
 this Statement carry particular authority.”); J.A. 26 n.15.
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US      17



 PEMBs are fully assembled buildings that are out-of-scope,
 whereas PEMB kits containing FSS components of PEMBs
 that are later assembled into complete PEMBs are in scope.
 See, e.g., J.A. 8371; J.A. 8398; J.A. 8801. Because both FSS
 components of PEMBs and PEMB kits are within the do-
 mestic like product scope, see, e.g., J.A. 8371; J.A. 8398;
 J.A. 8801, neither can qualify as a downstream article un-
 der the captive production provision, SAA at 852–53. The
 only product that could qualify as a downstream article is
 the complete PEMB, which is out of scope. Accordingly, as
 AISC concedes, for the captive production provision to ap-
 ply here, the producer that produces FSS components of
 PEMBs (or PEMB kits) must also internally transfer and
 process those domestic like products to produce the com-
 plete PEMB. See Appellant Br. 30–31. A “producer” must
 have sufficient product-related activities such that it has a
 “stake,” e.g., it actually makes the product in the domestic
 industry at issue. Pokarna, 56 F.4th at 1350–51.
       Those circumstances, however, do not exist here. NCI
 and BlueScope are both FSS and PEMB-kit producers. See,
 e.g., J.A. 8334. But they do not assemble the PEMB kits
 into complete PEMBs. Rather, the record establishes that
 unrelated third parties assemble the FSS components from
 the PEMB kits to make a building—the complete PEMB.
 J.A. 8801 & nn.186–87; J.A. 3132; J.A. 5345; J.A. 3429.
 These third-party builders are therefore complete-PEMB
 producers. See J.A. 5345–46 (referring to builders of
 PEMB kits as “PEMB builders”). Thus, the Commission
 properly concluded that the aggregation of components into
 PEMB “kits,” without assembly by a third-party builder to
 make a complete PEMB, is neither an “internal[] transfer”
 nor the “production of a downstream article” within the
 meaning of the captive production under the statute. J.A.
 8397–98 & n.180 (citing 

(7)(C)(iv)).
    For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by AISC’s ar-
 gument that “the Commission’s construction of the statute
 was arbitrary and not supported by the statute’s plain
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 18 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US



 language” because “the statute imposes no limit on who, in
 the internal transfer chain, must perform the final produc-
 tion/assembly, nor would such a limitation make sense.”
 Appellant Br. 34. We find no such ambiguity. The SAA is
 clear on this issue. The term “internally transfer[red]” for
 the “production of a downstream article” is defined to mean
 “processed into a higher-valued downstream article by the
 same producer.” SAA at 852 (emphasis added). Because
 FSS components of PEMBs, PEMB kits, and complete
 PEMBs are not made by the same producer, there is no in-
 ternal transfer as required by the captive production pro-
 vision.
      AISC also argues that “the Commission’s determina-
 tion undermines the statute’s clear purpose” when it “fix-
 ated arbitrarily on the word ‘production.’” Appellant Br.
 33–34. This argument is forfeited because it was not made
 before the Court of International Trade. Full Member Sub-
 group of Am. Inst. of Steel Constr., LLC v. United States,
 

, 1225 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2021) (“[AISC]
 does not contend that the threshold condition is unambig-
 uous or that the Commission’s construction of the thresh-
 old condition is contrary to the clear intent of Congress.”).
 Absent exceptional circumstances, we will not consider for-
 feited arguments on appeal. In re Google Tech. Holdings
 LLC, 

, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020). AISC offers no
 argument that exceptional circumstances exist here.
     We also find unpersuasive AISC’s argument that the
 Commission’s purported inconsistent labeling of certain
 parties as PEMB producers resulted in a final determina-
 tion that is unsupported by substantial evidence and not in
 accordance with the law. AISC points to the preliminary
 investigation where the Commission generically referred to
 both PEMB-kit producers and FSS-of-PEMB-components
 producers as “PEMBs producers.” Appellant Br. 33. But
 there is no dispute that the entities the Commission refer-
 enced were not the actual builders that assembled the kits
 to construct the complete buildings. The Commission’s
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US     19



 determination in this regard is supported by substantial
 evidence.
     For the above reasons, we hold that the Commission’s
 determination that the captive production provision is in-
 applicable is supported by substantial evidence and in ac-
 cordance with the law.
                      III.   Price Effects
      AISC argues on appeal that the Commission erred in
 its determination that the record does not support a finding
 that imports of FSS from China significantly undersold the
 domestic like product, or depressed prices of the domestic
 like product under 

(7)(C)(ii)(I)–(II). Ap-
 pellant Br. 32, 38; J.A. 8410–15.
     In evaluating the price effects of subject imports, the
 Commission assesses the impact on domestic like product
 prices by first establishing whether “there has been signif-
 icant price underselling by the imported merchandise as
 compared with the price of the domestic like products.” 

(7)(c)(ii)(I). If the Commission finds there is
 significant underselling, it must consider whether “the ef-
 fect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses
 prices to a significant degree or prevents price increases,
 which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant de-
 gree.” 

 § 1677(7)(c)(ii)(II).
     According to AISC, the Commission should have com-
 pared initial and final itemized bid data from purchasers
 and producers instead of relying on pricing data of FSS.
 Appellant Br. 37–38. AISC claims that where prices were
 not itemized, the Commission should have collected bid
 data from the FSS fabricators. Id. AISC contends that the
 Commission’s failure to obtain this information rendered
 the record inadequate and hobbled the Commission’s anal-
 ysis, and as a result, the determination is unsupported by
 substantial evidence. Id. at 40. Alternatively, AISC argues
 that even on the existing record, the Commission’s price
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 20 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US



 effects determination is not supported by substantial evi-
 dence. Id. at 43–55.
      Specifically, AISC contends that the Commission failed
 to consider the entirety of the record, and if it had, it would
 have found significant underselling and price depression.
 Id. at 43–48, 54. AISC claims that any limitation posed by
 any single data source alone (e.g., total bid data, average
 unit values (“AUV”) data, non-FSS component bid data)
 could be overcome by weaving together all the various data
 to find significant underselling. Id. at 47. We are not per-
 suaded.
     The Commission was not obligated to collect the addi-
 tional data that AISC points to, especially because the
 Commission found that data unreliable and unhelpful to
 the price effects inquiry. Once the Commission satisfies its
 obligation to conduct investigative activities under 

(b), 5 a decision not to collect additional




     5   The regulation states:
            The Director shall circulate draft ques-
            tionnaires for the final phase of an inves-
            tigation to parties to the investigation
            for comment. Any party desiring to com-
            ment on draft questionnaires shall sub-
            mit such comments in writing to the
            Commission within a time specified by
            the Director. All requests for collecting
            new information shall be presented at
            this time. The Commission will disre-
            gard subsequent requests for collection
            of new information absent a showing
            that there is a compelling need for the
            information and that the information
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US       21



 information does not alone render the Commission’s final
 determination unsupported by substantial evidence. See
 Hitachi, 949 F.3d at 718–19. “The Commission does indeed
 enjoy discretion to conduct its investigation and gather
 data it deems relevant.” Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United
 States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But “[t]here
 is no statutorily designated minimum standard that re-
 quires a particular degree of thoroughness in the Commis-
 sion’s investigation.” LG Elecs., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
 Comm’n, 

 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014).
 Moreover, “[i]t is not for this court on appeal to reweigh the
 evidence or to reconsider questions of fact anew.” Trent
 Tube Div., Crucible Materials Corp. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube
 AB, 

, 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992). And “[e]ven if it is
 possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from evi-
 dence in the record” this does not necessarily mean that the
 Commission’s determination is unsupported by substantial
 evidence. Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 

, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
     We hold that the Commission’s price effects analysis
 was reasonable and supported by substantive evidence. Af-
 ter considering product data, overall bid data, itemized bid
 data, AUV data, and lost sales, the Commission deter-
 mined that “[t]he record consequently does not support a
 finding that the subject imports significantly undersold the
 domestic like product.” J.A. 8415. The Commission first
 found that most FSS is sold in a multi-stage competitive
 bidding process. J.A. 8404. But the Commission ulti-
 mately determined, after requesting additional data, that
 overall and itemized bid data for these bidding processes
 was not reliable for several reasons. First, “while there is
 some correlation between the lowest total bidder and . . .



             could not have been requested in the
             comments on the draft questionnaires.
 

(b).
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 22 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US



 the successful bidder, lowest total bids do not always win
 the sale.” J.A. 8410. Second, “the available data concern-
 ing total bids do not provide sufficient information to per-
 mit [the Commission] to make a conclusion about the
 relative price levels of the domestic and subject FSS in-
 cluded in the bids.” 

 Third, it is not possible to “conclude
 that differences in total bid values necessarily reflect dif-
 ferences in the value of FSS included in the bid.” J.A.
 8411–12. This is primarily because purchasers do not re-
 ceive itemized bids that permit assessing the value of any
 standalone FSS. 

      The Commission also concluded that there was “no ev-
 idence of price depression on th[e] record.” J.A. 8415. The
 Commission considered AUVs, cost of goods sold (“COGS”),
 and raw material costs, but found each data set provided
 insufficient support to establish price depression. J.A.
 8415–17. For example, AUV data showed higher ship-
 ments and net sales within the domestic industry. J.A.
 8415. As to COGS, the data suggested that “the industry’s
 revenues increased by more than its COGS on both an over-
 all and per-unit basis.” J.A. 8415–16. And on raw materi-
 als, “the domestic industry as a whole was able to pass on
 the vast majority of its increases in raw material costs.”
 J.A. 8417. These findings are supported by substantial ev-
 idence of no significant underselling and price depression
 and inform the reasonableness of the conclusion of no in-
 jury. We decline AISC’s invitation to reweigh the Commis-
 sion’s factual findings.
      We hold that the Commission satisfied its obligation
 under 

(b) to conduct investigative activ-
 ities and to collect data necessary to conduct its analysis
 under the statute. It issued questionnaires and sought
 comment and argument on the best method to evaluate the
 pricing of the domestic like product. J.A. 8407–08. It then
 weighed the evidence it received, determined that the ad-
 ditional evidence promoted by AISC would not provide bet-
 ter clarity, and determined that the evidence did not
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 FULL MEMBER SUBGROUP OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE v. US       23



 support a finding of significant underselling or price sup-
 pression. J.A. 8408. “It is of course well within the [Com-
 mission’s] discretion to discount or dismiss incomplete or
 unreliable data.” Chr. Bjelland Seafoods A/S v. United
 States, 

, 54 n.22 (1995). On this record, the
 Commission’s refusal to seek out additional data as re-
 quested by AISC was reasonable and supported by sub-
 stantial evidence.
     The remainder of AISC’s arguments are at their core
 requests for this court to reweigh the evidence, which is
 outside this court’s purview. See Trent Tube, 975 F.2d at
 815; see also Am. Silicon Techs., 261 F.3d at 1376. Again,
 we decline the invitation to reweigh the evidence consid-
 ered by the Commission. Given the Commission’s exten-
 sive review and analysis of the record, its determination
 that it lacked sufficient evidence to support a finding of un-
 derselling or price suppression is reasonable and supported
 by substantial evidence.
                         CONCLUSION
     We have considered AISC’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
 firm the judgment of the Court of International Trade.
                         AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 Each party shall bear its own costs.