Case: 22-2011    Document: 41     Page: 1   Filed: 02/12/2024




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

  SIMON A. SOTO, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND
   ALL OTHER INDIVIDUALS SIMILARLY SITU-
                     ATED,
                Plaintiff-Appellee

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellant
                  ______________________

                        2022-2011
                  ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Southern District of Texas in No. 1:17-cv-00051, Judge
 Rolando Olvera, Jr.
                 ______________________

                Decided: February 12, 2024
                 ______________________

     JOHNNET SIMONE JONES, Sidley Austin LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by
 ANKUR SHINGAL, EMILY MILY WEXLER, Chicago, IL; RO-
 CHELLE BOBROFF, RENEE A. BURBANK, BARTON FRANK
 STICHMAN, I, National Veterans Legal Services Pro-
 gram, Arlington, VA.

    JENNIFER UTRECHT, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
 United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC,
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 2                                                  SOTO v. US




 argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH.
                ______________________

     Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES.
 Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.
     The government appeals a decision from the United
 States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
 holding that the six-year statute of limitations in the Bar-
 ring Act, 

, does not apply to claims for un-
 paid combat-related special compensation governed by 10
 U.S.C. § 1413a. Because we conclude that the district court
 erred by holding that the Barring Act did not apply to the
 settlement of those claims, we reverse the district court’s
 grant of summary judgment and remand for further pro-
 ceedings consistent with this opinion.
                               I
                               A
      Under 38 U.S.C. §§ 5304–05, retired veterans gener-
 ally may not receive both their retired pay and VA disabil-
 ity compensation and must waive a portion of their military
 retired pay to receive disability pay. However, retired vet-
 erans who establish that their disability is attributable to
 a combat-related event may receive additional compensa-
 tion (combat-related special compensation, or CRSC) up to
 the amount of waived retired pay. 10 U.S.C. § 1413a (the
 CRSC statute).
     Before January 1, 2008, CRSC was only available to
 veterans who had completed at least twenty years of mili-
 tary service. See National Defense Authorization Act for
 Fiscal Year 2008, 

div. A, tit. VI, § 641,
 

, 156. But effective January 1, 2008, Congress
 expanded eligibility to retirees with fewer than twenty
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 SOTO v. US                                                 3



 years of military service if they were medically retired un-
 der 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201–22. 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(b)(3)(B).
     The CRSC statute directs the Secretary of Defense to
 “prescribe procedures and criteria under which a disabled
 uniformed services retiree may apply” for CRSC. Id.
 § 1413a(d). As part of these procedures, a service member
 must elect to receive CRSC, and the appropriate military
 department will determine whether the service member is
 eligible (which, generally, requires being in retired status
 and having a combat-related disability rated at least 10%).
 Department of Defense Financial Management Regula-
 tion, DoD 7000.14-R, vol. 7B, ch. 63, at 63-7. CRSC can be
 granted retroactively, and agency regulations state that re-
 tired service members “may submit an application for
 CRSC at any time” and CRSC will be paid “for any month
 after May 2003 for which all conditions of eligibility were
 met, subject to any legal limitations.” Id. at 63-6 (emphasis
 added).
     Section 3702 of title 31, known as the Barring Act, pro-
 vides a mechanism for settling 1 military-related claims
 against the government that are not covered in other stat-
 utory provisions. In particular, the Secretary of Defense
 has authority to settle all “claims involving uniformed ser-
 vice members’ pay, allowances, travel, transportation, pay-
 ments for unused accrued leave, retired pay, and survivor



     1   “Settling” a claim “means to administratively de-
 termine the validity of that claim.” See Adams v.
 Hinchman, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S.
 General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropri-
 ations Law 11-6 (1982) and citing Illinois Sur. Co. v. United
 States ex rel. Peeler, 

 (1916) (“The word
 ‘settlement,’ in connection with public transactions and ac-
 counts, has been used from the beginning to describe ad-
 ministrative determination of the amount due.”)).
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 4                                                  SOTO v. US




 benefits.” 

(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). As
 relevant here, the Barring Act contains a six-year statute
 of limitations. 

(b)(1) (providing that all
 claims falling within the scope of the statute “must be re-
 ceived by the official responsible . . . within 6 years after
 the claim accrues”). The Secretary of Defense can waive the
 statute of limitations for claims not in excess of $25,000 as
 long as a waiver is requested. 

(e)(1), (3);
 see also Procedures for Settling Personnel and General
 Claims and Processing Advanced Decision Requests, DoD
 Instruction 1340.21, enclosure 6, ¶ 6.4 (outlining procedure
 permitting a claimant to apply for a waiver of the statutory
 time limit where a claim was untimely).
                               B
     With that background in mind, we turn to the facts of
 this case. Simon A. Soto is a retired member of the United
 States Marine Corps with a combat-related disability rated
 at least 10%. He was medically retired from active duty in
 April 2006 with less than twenty years of military service.
 Although he was eligible for CRSC as of June 2009 (when
 he received his disability rating), he did not apply until
 June 2016. At that time, the Navy informed Mr. Soto that
 his claim was limited under the Barring Act, and as a re-
 sult, he received six years of retroactive CRSC payments,
 dating back to roughly July 2010. Mr. Soto did not request
 a waiver of the statutory time limit under § 3702(e)(1).
     Mr. Soto filed a class action lawsuit 2 in the Southern
 District of Texas under 

(a)(2) (the Little
 Tucker Act) on behalf of himself and others similarly



     2   The other plaintiffs in this class are similarly situ-
 ated: they have all received six years of retroactive CRSC
 payments but were eligible for CRSC for more than six
 years before they applied. None of the class members ap-
 plied for a waiver of the statutory time limit.
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 SOTO v. US                                                  5



 situated, arguing that the Barring Act does not apply to
 settling claims for CRSC. Mr. Soto claimed that, based on
 Congress’s expansion of CRSC to veterans with less than
 twenty years of military service, he was entitled to compen-
 sation dating back to the effective date of the amended stat-
 ute, or January 1, 2008, rather than July 2010, six years
 prior to his application for CRSC.
      The government moved for judgment on the pleadings,
 which the district court denied. In denying the motion, the
 district court held that the Barring Act did not apply to the
 settlement of CRSC claims because the CRSC statute was
 a “specific” statute that superseded the terms of the Bar-
 ring Act. See Morton v. Mancari, 

, 550–51
 (1974) (“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a spe-
 cific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general
 one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”); Hernandez
 v. Dep’t of Air Force, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
 (holding that the Barring Act’s “general background provi-
 sions restricting recovery against the government” were
 “inapplicable” because of the more specific period of recov-
 ery in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemploy-
 ment Rights Act). The district court also applied the pro-
 veteran canon of statutory interpretation to hold that the
 Barring Act did not apply. See Brown v. Gardner, 

, 117–18 (1994) (“[I]nterpretive doubt is to be resolved
 in the veteran’s favor.”). The district court later granted
 summary judgment in favor of the class for the same rea-
 sons.
     The government appealed, asking us to consider
 whether the six-year statute of limitations in the Barring
 Act applies to settling claims for CRSC. We have jurisdic-
 tion under 

(a)(2).
                               II
     Because there are no disputed issues of fact and the
 only question on appeal is the proper interpretations of the
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 6                                                 SOTO v. US




 Barring Act and the CRSC statute, we review the district
 court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Massie v.
 United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
                             III
     The government argues that the district court erred in
 holding that the Barring Act does not apply to the settle-
 ment of CRSC claims because the CRSC statute does not
 contain its own settlement mechanism that displaces the
 Barring Act. We agree.
      The district court held that the CRSC statute “provides
 its own settlement mechanism because it defines eligibility
 for CRSC, helps explain the amount of benefits and in-
 structs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures
 and criteria for [prospective claimants] to apply for CRSC.”
 J.A. 5. But establishing eligibility for CRSC payments does
 not confer settlement authority independent of the Barring
 Act. See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO-08-
 978SP, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 14-25
 n.54 (2008) (GAO Red Book) (“While section 3702 provides
 an independent administrative claims handling procedure,
 it does not provide an independent basis for paying
 claims.”). To confer settlement authority and displace the
 Barring Act, a statute must explicitly grant an agency or
 entity the authority to settle claims. See, e.g., Honorable
 Slade Gorton, B-215494, 

, at *2 (Comp.
 Gen. Sept. 4, 1984) (explaining that “[t]he head of the Fed-
 eral agency or department concerned is specifically author-
 ized by statute to settle administratively claims brought
 under” the Military Claims Act or Federal Tort Claims Act
 (emphasis added)); GAO Red Book 14-20–14-22 (describing
 claims settlement and listing specific statutes that allow
 agencies to administratively settle claims).
     For example, settlement claims brought pursuant to
 the FTCA are not subject to the Barring Act because the
 FTCA explicitly provides that the heads of federal agencies
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 SOTO v. US                                                   7



 have the right to “consider, ascertain, adjust, determine,
 compromise, and settle any claim for money damages” fall-
 ing within the scope of the statute. 

 (em-
 phasis added). The FTCA further allows agencies to use
 various means of adjudication, such as arbitration or alter-
 native dispute resolution, to settle claims. 

 § 2672 (“Each
 Federal agency may use arbitration, or other alternative
 means of dispute resolution under the provisions of sub-
 chapter IV of chapter 5 of title 5, to settle any tort claim
 against the United States . . . .”). Similarly, the Military
 Claims Act provides the Secretary of Defense the authority
 to “settle, and pay in an amount not more than $100,000, a
 claim against the United States” that falls within the pur-
 view of that statute. 

(a) (emphasis added).
     By contrast, the CRSC statute conveys no such author-
 ity—it only establishes who may be eligible for CRSC pay-
 ments, not how claimants can have those claims settled.
 See 

 § 1413a (providing the Secretary authority to,
 among other things, “pay to each eligible combat-related
 disabled uniformed services retiree who elects benefits” but
 not mentioning settlement (emphasis added)); see also Illi-
 nois Sur. Co., 240 U.S. at 218–19 (“The pivotal words are
 not ‘final payment,’ but ‘final settlement,’ and in view of the
 significance of the latter term in administrative practice, it
 is hardly likely that it would have been used had it been
 intended to denote payment.”). A statute setting out who is
 eligible for payment is not the same as a statute establish-
 ing how eligible claims may be settled. Without specific
 language authorizing the Secretary of Defense to settle a
 claim—which will typically be done by use of the term “set-
 tle”—the CRSC statute cannot displace the Barring Act,
 unless another statute provides a “specific” provision set-
 ting out the period of recovery. See Hernandez, 498 F.3d at
 1331–32. As we have explained, the CRSC statute does not
 meet either of these requirements.
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 8                                                  SOTO v. US




     The dissent focuses on our allegedly narrow under-
 standing of a “claim” and “settlement.” Dissenting Op. 3,
 7–8. The dissent would read the CRSC statute to permit
 the Secretary to settle claims, thereby displacing the Bar-
 ring Act’s six-year statute of limitations, because it defines
 which veterans are eligible for CRSC (10 U.S.C.
 § 1413a(c)), provides that the Secretary “shall pay” CRSC
 to eligible veterans (id. § 1413a(a)) in a certain amount (id.
 § 1413a(b)), and designates the source of payments (id.
 § 1413a(h)). Dissenting Op. 3–5. But these provisions es-
 tablish a veteran’s substantive right to CRSC and author-
 ize its payment. They do not authorize the Secretary to
 “administratively determine the validity” of a claim. Ad-
 ams, 

 (citation omitted). The CRSC statute
 lacks the sort of clear language authorizing the Secretary
 to settle CRSC claims sufficient for an exception to the Bar-
 ring Act. 3
      Mr. Soto argues that the DoD’s Program Guidance suf-
 fices to displace the Barring Act’s statute of limitations be-
 cause it explains that a veteran “may submit an application
 for CRSC” and will be paid “for any month after May 2003,
 for which all conditions of eligibility were met.” Appellee’s
 Br. 24 (quoting the Department of Defense’s 2004 Program
 Guidance). But this program guidance cannot grant settle-
 ment authority where, by statute, there is none. The pro-
 gram guidance Mr. Soto cites does nothing more than
 authorize the agency to grant retroactive payments, which
 is already authorized in the CRSC statute.



     3   The dissent would also rely on the pro-veteran
 canon to resolve what it views as interpretive doubt about
 the meaning of the CRSC statute. Dissenting Op. 5 n.4 (cit-
 ing King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 

 (1991)).
 We need not reach the pro-veteran canon because there is
 no interpretative doubt to resolve.
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 SOTO v. US                                                 9



      Mr. Soto also contends that the Barring Act should not
 apply to the CRSC statute because 

(a)(1)
 only applies to claims involving “retired pay,” and para-
 graph (g) of the CRSC statute specifies that “[p]ayments
 under this section are not retired pay.” Appellee’s Br. 13.
 This is unpersuasive. The Barring Act extends to claims
 involving retired pay—there can be no dispute that the
 CRSC statute “involves” retired pay, because the amount
 of compensation awarded under the CRSC statute is de-
 pendent upon the amount of retired pay a service member
 may receive. 

(a)(1)(A) (“The Secretary of
 Defense shall settle . . . claims involving uniformed service
 members’ pay, allowances, travel, transportation, pay-
 ments for unused accrued leave, retired pay, and survivor
 benefits.” (emphasis added)); 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(b)(3)(B)
 (providing “the amount of the payment under para-
 graph (1) for any month may not, when combined with the
 amount of retired pay payable to the retiree . . . cause the
 total of such combined payment to exceed the amount equal
 to the retired pay percentage” (emphasis added)). And even
 if the CRSC statute somehow did not “involve” retired pay,
 paragraph (a)(1) of the Barring Act only sets forth which
 agency is responsible for adjudicating claims: subpara-
 graph (a)(4) confers authority to the Office of Management
 and Budget to settle all other claims not covered by para-
 graphs (a)(1)–(3), meaning that, if Mr. Soto’s argument is
 accepted, it would only change which agency settles CRSC
 claims, not the applicable statute of limitations. 

(a).
     Finally, Mr. Soto argues that the statute of limitations
 in the Barring Act should be tolled because we have been
 continuously at war since 1990 and 

(b)(2)
 provides that a claim brought by a “member of the armed
 forces [which] accrues during war or within 5 years before
 war begins” is tolled until “5 years after peace is estab-
 lished.” This argument lacks merit. The phrase “member of
 the armed forces” in the current Barring Act replaced the
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 10                                                  SOTO v. US




 phrase “person serving in the military or naval forces of the
 United States” in the prior version of the Barring Act. 

, 

, 970 (repealing the prior
 version of the Barring Act, then codified at 31 U.S.C. § 71a,
 and recodifying the Act at 

); see also H.R.
 Rep. No. 97-651, at 131 (1982) (“In subsection (b)(2), the
 words ‘member of the armed forces’ are substituted for ‘per-
 son serving in the military or naval forces of the United
 States’ for consistency with title 10.”). The now-operative
 enacted public law expressly states that the recodification
 “may not be construed as making a substantive change in
 the laws replaced.” 

(a), 96 Stat. at
 1067; see also id. § 1, 96 Stat. at 877 (“An Act [t]o revise,
 codify, and enact without substantive change certain gen-
 eral and permanent laws.”). Thus, the term “member of the
 armed forces” in 

(b)(2) still refers only to
 service members who are on active duty during times of
 war.
     Indeed, the DoD has consistently interpreted that lan-
 guage to apply only to service members who are on active
 duty during times of war. See Charles V. Waldron, 

, 463 (1980) (“The exception to the 6-year
 statute of limitations . . . tolling the running of the 6-year
 period for members of the armed forces in wartime, is ap-
 plicable only to members on active duty.”); 

 (“[I]f
 an individual serving in the armed services had a claim
 which accrued during war or his claim accrued and subse-
 quently war broke out, such individual is granted addi-
 tional time following the establishment of peace to file a
 claim because of the potential inability to file because of his
 duties in wartime.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs offer no
 persuasive reason why we should interpret the Barring Act
 differently. If we were to accept Mr. Soto’s argument here,
 that would mean that all claims for any kind of military
 compensation, brought by any service member, would be
 indefinitely tolled until the Persian Gulf War is officially
 ended. We decline to interpret the statute so broadly.
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 SOTO v. US                                                11



     Accordingly, we hold that the Barring Act applies to
 settlement claims regarding CRSC because the CRSC stat-
 ute does not explicitly provide its own settlement mecha-
 nism and these claims are therefore subject to the
 settlement mechanisms laid forth in the Barring Act. And
 as relevant here, we hold that the six-year statute of limi-
 tations contained in the Barring Act applies to CRSC set-
 tlement claims. 4
                              IV
     We have considered the remainder of Mr. Soto’s argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we re-
 verse the district court’s grant of summary judgment, and
 remand to the district court for further proceedings con-
 sistent with this opinion.
                REVERSED AND REMANDED
                            COSTS
 No costs.




     4    The dissent characterizes our decision as
 “den[ying] benefits to a highly-deserving class of veterans,”
 Dissenting Op. 8, but veterans will receive the benefits
 they are owed unless they accrued outside of the Barring
 Act’s six-year period of recovery. And even for those outside
 the limitations period, a veteran may request that the Sec-
 retary waive the time limitation as long as their claim is
 not in excess of $25,000. 

(e).
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    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

   SIMON A. SOTO, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND
      ALL OTHER INDIVIDUALS SIMILARLY
                   SITUATED,
                 Plaintiff-Appellee

                               v.

                     UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellant
                   ______________________

                         2022-2011
                   ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Southern District of Texas in No. 1:17-cv-00051, Judge
 Rolando Olvera, Jr.
                 ______________________

 REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
      Today, the majority holds that Mr. Soto and other sim-
 ilarly-situated veterans injured as a result of combat can-
 not recover more than six years of retroactive Combat-
 Related Special Compensation (CRSC). I believe that the
 CRSC statute addresses the settlement of claims against
 the government and displaces the Barring Act’s six-year
 statute of limitations. I would affirm the lower court deci-
 sion finding that the Barring Act does not apply to CRSC
 claims.
     I respectfully dissent.
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 2                                                 SOTO v. US




     By its own terms, the Barring Act and its six-year stat-
 ute of limitations can be superseded. The Barring Act’s
 statute of limitations does not apply to limit the available
 compensation if “another provision of law” addresses how
 “claims of or against the United States Government shall
 be settled.” 

(a)(4); see also 

 § 3702(a);
 see, e.g., Hernandez v. Dep’t of Air Force, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2007). As demonstrated below, the CRSC
 statute is another provision of law that addresses how
 claims of or against the United States government shall be
 settled.
      In considering the limits on the Barring Act’s applica-
 bility when settling a government claim, it is important to
 address what it means to “settle” a “claim” against the
 United States. As the district court recognized, there is no
 dispute in this case regarding what it means to “settle”
 such a claim. Soto v. United States, No. 1:17-CV-00051,
 

, at *2 & n.2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2021).
 “[T]o settle a claim means to administratively determine
 the validity of that claim.” Adams v. Hinchman, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)
 (quoting U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Principles
 of Federal Appropriations Law 11-6 (1982)); see also Illinois
 Sur. Co. v. United States, 

 (1916) (defining
 “settlement” in the context of public transactions).
     The meaning of a “claim” itself has also been defined in
 the federal appropriations context. In Hobbs v. McLean,
 the Supreme Court describes a claim as “a right to demand
 money from the United States . . . . which can be presented
 by the claimant to some department or officer of the United
 States for payment, or may be prosecuted in the court of
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 SOTO v. US                                                    3



 claims.” 1 

 (1886); GAO, Principles of Fed-
 eral Appropriations Law 14-10 (2008).
     “Settling a claim,” therefore, means administratively
 determining the validity of the demand for money against
 the government and the amount of money due. This defi-
 nition contrasts with a use of the term “settlement” to
 solely refer to resolving a conflict, often one involving a law-
 suit or anticipated lawsuit. And this broader understand-
 ing of “settling a claim” deserves more than just the
 footnote’s worth of discussion rendered in the majority
 opinion. See Maj. Op. 3 n.1. Indeed, it must guide any
 analysis of whether a statute supersedes the Barring Act’s
 six-year statute of limitations.
      Here, the CRSC statute permits the government to ad-
 ministratively determine the validity of a veteran’s de-
 mand for CRSC, as well as the amount of CRSC due to the
 veteran in retroactive and future monthly compensation.
 In light of these provisions, the Barring Act does not apply.
     First, the CRSC statute defines eligible retirees, 2 in-
 cluding by clarifying what constitutes a “combat-related



     1   Mr. Soto and the class filed their case in district
 court under the Little Tucker Act, 

, which
 gives the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the
 Court of Federal Claims to entertain certain types of mon-
 etary claims against the United States for amounts not ex-
 ceeding $10,000.
     2   The CRSC statute defines eligible retirees in sub-
 section (c), which states:
     (c) ELIGIBLE RETIREES. —For purposes of this sec-
     tion, an eligible combat-related disabled uniformed
     services retiree referred to in subsection (a) is a
     member of the uniformed services who—
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 4                                                  SOTO v. US




 disability.” 3 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(c), (e). Veterans thus are
 informed whether they have a right to demand money un-
 der the statute—that is, whether they have a “claim.” See
 also id. § 1413a(d).
     Second, the CRSC statute specifically grants the “Sec-
 retary concerned” authority to pay eligible retirees “a
 monthly amount” for the combat-related disability covered
 by the statute. Id. § 1413a(a) (emphasis added). This grant



         (1) is entitled to retired pay (other than by rea-
     son of section 12731b of this title); and
         (2) has a combat-related disability.
 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(c).
     3    A “combat-related disability” is defined in subsec-
 tion (e) of the CRSC statute:
     (e) COMBAT-RELATED DISABILITY.—In this sec-
     tion, the term “combat-related disability” means a
     disability that is compensable under the laws ad-
     ministered by the Secretary of Veterans Af-
     fairs and that—
       (1) is attributable to an injury for which the
     member was awarded the Purple Heart; or
         (2) was incurred (as determined under criteria
     prescribed by the Secretary of Defense)—
             (A) as a direct result of armed conflict;
             (B) while engaged in hazardous service;
             (C) in the performance of duty under con-
             ditions simulating war; or
             (D) through an instrumentality of war.
 Id. § 1413a(e).
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 SOTO v. US                                                5



 of authority is not limited to future monthly payments and
 is directed to more expansive authority for the Secretary to
 determine an “amount” due to an eligible veteran.
     Third, the CRSC statute describes how the Secretary
 must determine the “monthly amount to be paid.” Id.
 § 1413a(b)(1). In other words, it provides instructions on
 the administrative calculation of the amount due to satisfy
 an eligible veteran’s claim. See id. In this regard, while
 the CRSC statute states that CRSC is not “retired pay,” id.
 § 1413a(g), it allows the veteran to maximize the amount
 of compensation she would receive, including as a result of
 reductions in retired pay for a particular month, id.
 § 1413a(b). See also id. § 1413a(f).
     Finally, the CRSC statute specifies the “source of pay-
 ments” for CRSC. Id. § 1413a(h). The statute is careful to
 specify that members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
 Corps, and Space Force will be paid out of the Department
 of Defense Military Retirement Fund. Id. “[A]ny other
 member for any fiscal year shall be paid out of funds ap-
 propriated for pay and allowances payable by the Secretary
 concerned for that fiscal year.” Id. These provisions give
 the Secretary further guidance for administratively provid-
 ing a veteran with the “monthly amount” due to her, no
 matter the year in question for which compensation is
 owed.
     By these common and plain terms, the CRSC statute
 specifies the “settlement” of a “claim” against the govern-
 ment. 4 It therefore takes precedence over the Barring Act,



     4   The majority asserts that the pro-veteran canon
 has no application because there is “no interpretive doubt.”
 Maj. Op. 8 n.3. This statement, however, is belied by the
 majority’s search for “clear language,” a requirement that
 I find to be an expression of doubt. Id. at 8. Given this
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 6                                                 SOTO v. US




 such that a veteran eligible to receive CRSC is not subject
 to the Barring Act’s six-year statute of limitations. 

(a), (a)(4). Instead, an eligible veteran may
 seek retroactive CRSC back to the original date that she
 first became eligible for it. And because the majority opin-
 ion is incorrect in its conclusion that the Barring Act and
 its six-year statute of limitations applies, we need not
 reach the question of whether the Barring Act’s wartime
 exception might otherwise toll that Act’s statute of limita-
 tions. 5 See 

 § 3702(b)(2). Instead, it is here that the


 expression of interpretive doubt as to whether there is
 “clear language” in the statute under the proper definitions
 of “settling” and “claim,” the pro-veteran canon applies and
 supports that the Barring Act does not apply given the re-
 medial nature of the CRSC statute. King v. St. Vincent’s
 Hosp., 

 (1991).
      5   Although I reach this conclusion, I note my con-
 cerns with the majority’s analysis of the Barring Act’s war-
 time exception. There is no dispute that the term
 “uniformed service member” in subsection (a)(1)(A) of the
 Barring Act applies to both active and retired military per-
 sonnel. Indeed, the majority finds that this subsection of
 the Barring Act applies to Mr. Soto’s claim for CRSC. See
 Maj. Op. 9. Yet the majority concludes that the similar
 phrase “member of the armed forces” in subsection (b), the
 wartime exception, only applies to “service members who
 are on active duty during times of war.” 

 at 9–10. It
 bases this conclusion on a non-binding Comptroller Gen-
 eral decision interpreting a prior version of the Barring
 Act’s wartime exception, as well as on a general statement
 in the legislative history regarding omnibus amendments
 to a series of statutes, including this provision of the Bar-
 ring Act. This conclusion relies on inapplicable authority
 and tenuous evidence that at most support ambiguity in
 the meaning of the phrase “member” where, again, the
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 SOTO v. US                                                 7



 inquiry should end. See Paige v. United States, 

, 386–87 (2022); Soto, 

, at *3 n.3.
     The majority opinion concludes that the CRSC statute
 does not address the settlement of government claims and
 that the Barring Act’s six-year statute of limitations thus
 applies. See, e.g., Maj. Op. 7. To reach its decision, the
 majority applies an incorrect interpretation of the phrase
 “settling a claim,” creates new requirements for determin-
 ing when a statute settles a government claim, and ignores
 the plain language of the CRSC statute itself.
      Citing to the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and the
 Military Claims Act (MCA), the majority praises their use
 of the words “settle” and “claim” and faults the CRSC stat-
 ute for not “convey[ing]” the same “authority.” 

 at 6–7.
 The majority overlooks that both the FTCA and the MCA
 involve circumstances where an individual believes that
 the government or a government representative has in-
 jured or caused harm to the individual or the individual’s
 property. 

; 

. These stat-
 utes specify how the government can recompense the indi-
 vidual for a “claim” of alleged harm caused by the
 government, and thus resolve the conflict between the gov-
 ernment and the individual through, for example, a “settle-
 ment.” They do not involve claims arising from combat
 related disabilities. By finding fault with the CRSC stat-
 ute’s language compared to the language of these statutes,
 the majority effectively turns to a narrower definition of
 “settling” a “claim.” But “settling a claim” against the gov-
 ernment can involve a more general remediation of benefits
 that is not reflected in these statutes or their use of the
 word “settle,” and the CRSC statute is an example of a stat-
 ute that provides the Secretary with authority to do so.




 pro-veteran canon should play a role in its ultimate inter-
 pretation.
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 8                                                  SOTO v. US




     The majority exacerbates its error by then asserting
 that “specific language” is required for a statute to settle a
 government claim: a statute should “typically” use the
 word “settle.” Maj. Op. 7. If it does not, the majority con-
 tends that it can still settle a claim only if it provides a
 “specific” provision setting out the period of recovery. 

 But the long-understood meaning of “settling” a “claim”
 against the government includes no such limitations. Rais-
 ing these new requirements, the majority also raises the
 bar to a new and unprecedented standard for what a stat-
 ute must state to supersede the Barring Act. Although a
 statute involving resolution of conflict may “typically” use
 the words “settle” and “claim,” the majority does not ex-
 plain why this phrasing should be “typical” for statutes
 that involve a more general, remedial, administrative de-
 termination of eligibility for money from the government
 and the amount due. And the majority’s alternative re-
 quirement—that a statute state a “specific” period of recov-
 ery—requires a level of specificity in statutory language
 that finds no support in our canons of statutory interpreta-
 tion.
     The majority asserts that the CRSC statute only estab-
 lishes who may be eligible for CRSC, not how eligible vet-
 erans’ claims are settled. 

. This is belied by the
 provisions of the CRSC statute itself, which provide infor-
 mation regarding eligibility for CRSC as well as how to cal-
 culate the “monthly amount” of CRSC owed to the veteran.
 But the majority similarly discounts these provisions, fall-
 ing back on its demand for “clear language” authorizing the
 Secretary to “settle” claims. 

.
     The majority’s decision today is contrary to both the
 common meaning of “settling” a “claim” against the govern-
 ment and to the CRSC statute itself. The majority opinion
 reviews select language from unrelated statutes and relies
 on that language to redefine these terms and legislate its
 preferences. And in rendering this decision, the majority
 denies benefits to a highly-deserving class of veterans
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 SOTO v. US                                                  9



 seeking compensation granted by statute for combat-re-
 lated injuries incurred in service to this country.
     I would affirm the decision of the district court conclud-
 ing that the Barring Act’s six-year statute of limitations
 does not apply to the CRSC statute and its judgment hold-
 ing the government liable to Mr. Soto and the class for ad-
 ditional CRSC. I respectfully dissent.