Case: 23-1163   Document: 57     Page: 1   Filed: 05/16/2024




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

 RACHEL CREAGER IRELAND, RAEVENE ADAMS,
 DARCEAL TOBEY, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES
    AND ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
               INDIVIDUALS,
             Plaintiffs-Appellants

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2023-1163
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Texas in No. 1:21-cv-01049-LY, Judge
 Lee Yeakel.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: May 16, 2024
                 ______________________

     CHARLOTTE SCHWARTZ, James & Hoffman, P.C., Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also repre-
 sented by RYAN EDWARD GRIFFIN, DANIEL M. ROSENTHAL;
 LEON DAYAN, JOSHUA A. SEGAL, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC,
 Washington, DC; CHRISTOPHER J. WILLIAMS, National Le-
 gal Advocacy Network, Chicago, IL.

    STEVEN A. MYERS, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
 United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC,
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 2                                     CREAGER IRELAND v. US




 argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN
 M. BOYNTON, MICHAEL S. RAAB.

     JIM DAVY, All Rise Trial & Appellate, Philadelphia, PA,
 for amicus curiae Unemployed Workers United.
                  ______________________

      Before LOURIE, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 STOLL, Circuit Judge.
     This appeal is about whether Pandemic Unemploy-
 ment Assistance remains available to a group of Texans af-
 ter the Texas governor informed the Department of Labor
 that Texas would withdraw from its agreement with the
 Secretary of Labor to participate in the PUA program.
      Plaintiffs appeal the decision of the United States Dis-
 trict Court for the Western District of Texas granting the
 Federal Government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
 a claim. Appellants allege that the Federal Government
 violated the mandate in PUA that the Secretary of Labor
 “shall provide . . . assistance” to “any covered individual.”
 

(b). We affirm because PUA does not re-
 quire the Secretary to pay PUA benefits to individual citi-
 zens; rather, the Secretary must provide assistance
 through agreements with the states.
                         BACKGROUND
                               I
     In March 2020, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pan-
 demic, Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
 Economic Security (CARES) Act, 

 Stat. 281 (2020). The CARES Act created several tem-
 porary unemployment benefit programs, including Pan-
 demic Unemployment Assistance (PUA), 

;
 Federal    Pandemic     Unemployment       Compensation,
 

;    and    Pandemic      Emergency
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 CREAGER IRELAND v. US                                      3



 Unemployment Compensation, 

. This ap-
 peal concerns PUA.
     PUA provided up to 79 weeks of benefits to individuals
 who were unemployed or otherwise unable to work for var-
 ious reasons relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and who
 were not otherwise eligible for state unemployment insur-
 ance benefits. See 

(a)(3). This covered, for
 instance, independent contractors, freelancers, individuals
 without sufficient work history to qualify for state unem-
 ployment benefits, and individuals who qualified for, but
 had exhausted all rights to, regular unemployment com-
 pensation.
     Under PUA, “covered individual”:
     (A) means an individual who—
     (i) is not eligible for regular compensation or ex-
     tended benefits under State or Federal law or pan-
     demic emergency unemployment compensation
     under section 9025 of this title, including an indi-
     vidual who has exhausted all rights to regular un-
     employment or extended benefits under State or
     Federal law or pandemic emergency unemploy-
     ment compensation under section 9025 of this title.
 

 § 9021(a)(3)(A)(i). To receive benefits, a “covered indi-
 vidual” must self-certify an inability to otherwise work due
 to COVID-19, see id. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii), and provide:
     documentation to substantiate employment or self-
     employment or the planned commencement of em-
     ployment or self-employment not later than
     21 days after the later of the date on which the in-
     dividual submits an application for pandemic un-
     employment assistance under this section or the
     date on which an individual is directed by the State
     Agency to submit such documentation in accord-
     ance with section 625.6(e) of title 20, Code of Fed-
     eral Regulations, or any successor thereto . . . .
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 4                                      CREAGER IRELAND v. US




 Id. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(iii). For covered individuals that pro-
 vide the requisite documentation, “[a]ssistance for unem-
 ployment as a result of COVID-19” is available:
     Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary shall pro-
     vide to any covered individual unemployment ben-
     efit assistance while such individual is
     unemployed, partially unemployed, or unable to
     work for the weeks of such unemployment with re-
     spect to which the individual is not entitled to any
     other unemployment compensation (as that term is
     defined in section 85(b) of title 26) or waiting period
     credit.
 Id. § 9021(b). To get the benefit assistance from the Secre-
 tary of Labor to covered individuals, PUA contemplates
 agreements with states that provide funds to the states for
 administration through existing state agencies:
     (f) Agreements with States
     (1) In general
     The Secretary shall provide the assistance author-
     ized under subsection (b) through agreements with
     States which, in the judgment of the Secretary,
     have an adequate system for administering such
     assistance through existing State agencies, includ-
     ing procedures for identity verification or valida-
     tion and for timely payment, to the extent
     reasonable and practicable.
     (2) Payments to States
     There shall be paid to each State which has entered
     into an agreement under this subsection an
     amount equal to 100 percent of—
     (A) the total amount of assistance provided by the
     State pursuant to such agreement; and
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 CREAGER IRELAND v. US                                          5



     (B) any additional administrative expenses in-
     curred by the State by reason of such agreement (as
     determined by the Secretary), including any ad-
     ministrative expenses necessary to facilitate pro-
     cessing of applications for assistance under this
     section online or by telephone rather than in-per-
     son and expenses related to identity verification or
     validation and timely and accurate payment.
     (3) Terms of payments
     Sums payable to any State by reason of such State’s
     having an agreement under this subsection shall
     be payable, either in advance or by way of reim-
     bursement (as determined by the Secretary), in
     such amounts as the Secretary estimates the State
     will be entitled to receive under this subsection for
     each calendar month, reduced or increased, as the
     case may be, by any amount by which the Secretary
     finds that his estimates for any prior calendar
     month were greater or less than the amounts which
     should have been paid to the State. Such estimates
     may be made on the basis of such statistical, sam-
     pling, or other method as may be agreed upon by
     the Secretary and the State agency of the State in-
     volved.
 Id. § 9021(f). With respect to implementation, PUA also
 incorporates the regulations governing Disaster Unem-
 ployment Assistance (DUA) under the Stafford Act:
     Except as otherwise provided in this section or to
     the extent there is a conflict between this section
     and part 625 of title 20, Code of Federal Regula-
     tions, such part 625 shall apply to this section . . . .
 Id. § 9021(h).
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 6                                     CREAGER IRELAND v. US




                               II
     Following enactment of the CARES Act, Texas entered
 into an agreement with the Department of Labor to pay
 PUA benefits to Texas residents. However, after extending
 the program’s expiration date twice, the Texas governor in-
 formed the Department of Labor that it would withdraw
 from the PUA agreement in June 2021.
     Plaintiffs are each Texas residents. And each alleges
 that after Texas withdrew from the PUA program, Texas
 ceased paying the PUA benefits for which he or she had
 previously been eligible.
     Plaintiffs then filed a complaint under the Little
 Tucker Act, 

(a)(2), in November 2021. In
 June 2022, the magistrate judge recommended that the
 case be dismissed. Magistrate Judge Howell explained
 that “[t]he plain language of the CARES Act states that the
 payment of benefits under the Act is predicated on the ex-
 istence of an agreement with a state” because “[t]he states
 are responsible for ‘provid[ing] [the assistance] . . . pursu-
 ant to such agreement,’ and then are reimbursed by the
 Secretary.” Appx 1 37 (quoting 

(f)(2)).
 Plaintiffs argued that “nothing in the CARES Act permit-
 ted states to withdraw from the program,” but Magistrate
 Judge Howell determined that “the CARES Act does not
 include a mechanism for the Secretary to pay out benefits
 under the Act in the absence of an agreement with the rel-
 evant state.” 

 The magistrate judge reasoned that “Con-
 gress did not appropriate funds for the Secretary to provide
 benefits in the absence of state action,” which “shows Con-
 gress intended for the funds to solely be administered by
 the states.” 

 Continuing, he explained that “Congress’s
 failure to identify an alternative payment method supports



     1    “Appx” refers to the appendix that the Appellants
 filed concurrently with their brief.
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 CREAGER IRELAND v. US                                       7



 a plain reading of the statute that participation by the
 states is required for receipt of benefits under the CARES
 Act.” Appx 38–39. Magistrate Judge Howell further ex-
 plained that “[t]he DUA regulations made applicable to the
 PUA through 

(g)” confirmed this conclu-
 sion because “benefits are payable ‘only by an applicable
 State . . . and . . . [o]nly pursuant to an Agreement’ with
 the state.” Appx 39 (citing 

(b)(1)).
     The district court entered an order adopting the report
 and recommendation “for substantially the reasons stated
 therein” and dismissed Plaintiffs’ case under Federal Rule
 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Ire-
 land v. United States, No. 1:21-CV-1049-LY, 

, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2022). The district
 court determined that the “magistrate judge properly con-
 strued the [CARES] Act, finding that nothing in the Act
 allows the United States Department of Labor, which ad-
 ministers the Act, to bypass the states and pay benefits di-
 rectly to citizens when states opt out.” 

    Plaintiffs appeal.       We have jurisdiction under
 

(a)(2).
                           DISCUSSION
     We review a district court’s dismissal under Federal
 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) according to the law of the
 regional circuit. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 

, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Here, that is the Fifth Cir-
 cuit, which “review[s] de novo the district court’s dismissal
 of Plaintiffs’ complaint.” United States ex rel. Lemon
 v. Nurses To Go, Inc., 

, 158–59 (5th Cir. 2019).
 “We accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the
 complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to
 Plaintiffs” to “evaluate whether the factual allegations, to-
 gether with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible
 claim to relief.” 

.
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 8                                     CREAGER IRELAND v. US




     “In statutory construction, we begin with the language
 of the statute.” Kingdomware Techs. v. United States,
 

 (2016) (internal quotation marks omit-
 ted). But “‘we are not guided by a single sentence or mem-
 ber of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
 law, and to its object and policy.’” Dole v. United Steelwork-
 ers of Am., 

 (1990) (quoting Massachusetts
 v. Morash, 

 (1989)). If the statute pro-
 vides a clear answer, the inquiry ends there. Hughes Air-
 craft Co. v. Jacobson, 

 (1999). “Beyond
 the statute’s text, [the traditional tools of statutory con-
 struction] include the statute’s structure, canons of statu-
 tory construction, and legislative history.” Timex V.I., Inc.
 v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
     We must address whether 

 requires
 the Secretary to provide unemployment benefit assistance
 directly to any covered individuals in the absence of a state
 agreement. We conclude the Secretary has no obligation to
 pay PUA benefits to individuals in the absence of an agree-
 ment with the state. Read in its entirety, the plain lan-
 guage of § 9021 is dispositive: the “Secretary shall provide
 to any covered individual unemployment benefit assis-
 tance,” and “[t]he Secretary shall provide the assistance
 authorized under subsection (b) through agreements with
 States.” 

(b), (f)(1) (emphases added). For
 the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs have failed to state a
 claim under the Little Tucker Act.
     On appeal, Plaintiffs set forth three main argu-
 ments: (1) subsections 9021(a), (b), and (c) require the Sec-
 retary to ensure payment of benefits to eligible persons in
 the absence of a state agreement, notwithstanding the lan-
 guage of § 9021(f); (2) the statute’s incorporation of certain
 DUA regulations does not limit the payment mandate; and
 (3) Congress made PUA different from related CARES Act
 programs because PUA, unlike the other CARES Act pro-
 grams, does not require agreement with the states. We ad-
 dress each in turn.
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 CREAGER IRELAND v. US                                       9



                               I
     First, Plaintiffs argue that, read together, subsec-
 tions 9021(a), (b), and (c) require the Secretary to ensure
 payment of benefits to every eligible person, irrespective of
 state agreement and participation, and that § 9021(f) does
 not limit the payment mandate. Starting with § 9021(b),
 Plaintiffs contend that this subsection creates a payment
 obligation between the “Secretary” and “any covered indi-
 vidual” because “shall” is a mandatory term. 

(b). “Section 9021(b) pairs the mandatory term
 ‘shall’ with the expansive phrase ‘any covered individual,’”
 which Plaintiffs argue is “materially identical” to the stat-
 ute at issue in SAS Institute, where “the Supreme Court
 held . . . the combination of ‘shall’ and ‘any’ creates a ‘di-
 rective [that] is both mandatory and comprehensive.’” Ap-
 pellants’ Br. 17, 18 (first quoting 

(b), then
 quoting SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 

 (2018)).
     Consistent with a “comprehensive” mandate, Plaintiffs
 point to the definition of “covered individual” in § 9021(a)
 and argue that “the express terms of subsection (a)(3)(A)”
 coupled with “the absence of any pertinent exclusion in
 subsection (a)(3)(B) confirm that the statute’s payment ob-
 ligation is not conditional on any state agreement.” Appel-
 lants’ Br. 19.     Section 9021(a)(3)(A) defines “covered
 individual” to include anyone in the United States unem-
 ployed due to COVID-19 and ineligible for state unemploy-
 ment benefits.        See 

(a)(3).       And
 § 9021(a)(3)(B) contains certain exclusions, such as tele-
 working individuals. See id. § 9021(a)(3)(B). Plaintiffs
 note “nowhere in th[is] subsection, or elsewhere in the stat-
 ute, did Congress exclude individuals whose state has de-
 clined to administer benefits.”         Appellants’ Br. 19.
 Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, “[w]here Congress explicitly
 enumerates certain exceptions to a general requirement,
 additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence
 of a contrary legislative intent.”        Appellants’ Br. 19
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 10                                     CREAGER IRELAND v. US




 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Allied Tube & Con-
 duit Corp. v. United States, 

, 784 (Fed. Cir.
 1990)). Last, Plaintiffs argue that § 9021(c) bolsters their
 position because “[n]either subsection [§ 9021](c) nor any
 other provision of the statute provides for early termina-
 tion of benefits based on state decisions about participa-
 tion.” Appellants’ Br. 19. Rather, like subsections 9021(a)
 and (b), Plaintiffs broadly read § 9021(c) to require that
 “the assistance authorized under subsection (b) shall be
 available to a covered individual” up until “September 6,
 2021,” irrespective of state agreement. 

(c);
 see Appellants’ Br. 19.
      We are not persuaded. Although the language of sub-
 sections 9021(a), (b), and (c) appear to provide a broad
 mandate, when each subsection of the PUA statute is read
 together, i.e., “‘the whole law’” is read together, Dole,
 

 (quoting Massachusetts, 

), it
 creates no obligation to provide PUA benefits directly to in-
 dividuals living in states that lack active agreements to ad-
 minister PUA benefits. The plain language of § 9021(b)
 does not create a mandatory payment obligation between
 the Secretary and “any covered individual” because
 § 9021(f)—Agreements with States—is clear: “The Secre-
 tary shall provide the assistance authorized under subsec-
 tion (b) through agreements with States.” 

(f)(1). When subsections (b) and (f) are read to-
 gether, it is difficult to ignore § 9021(f)(1)’s clear instruc-
 tion. Subsection (f) expressly refers to subsection (b) and
 specifies that the mandate in subsection (b) requires state
 participation. The assistance mandated by subsection (b)
 “shall” be provided “through agreements with States.” Id.
 Given this express reference to subsection (b), we see no
 merit to Plaintiffs’ contention that subsection (f) is an “an-
 cillary procedural provision[]” that “do[es] not limit the
 core substantive obligations of [the] statute.” Appellants’
 Br. 26. It is the opposite. Subsection (f) also provides a
 core substantive obligation—agreements with the states.
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 CREAGER IRELAND v. US                                       11



     The entirety of § 9021(f) supports an interpretation
 where the states play a central role in administering the
 PUA benefits. For instance, beyond subsection (f)(1),
 § 9021(f)(2)—Payments to States—authorizes the Secre-
 tary to make payments, i.e., the funds for unemployment
 benefit assistance, only to states. See 

(f)(2)
 (“There shall be paid to each State which has entered into
 an agreement under this subsection . . . .”).            And
 § 9021(f)(3)—Terms of Payments—provides that the pay-
 ments to states may be made “either in advance or by way
 of reimbursement.” Id. § 9021(f)(3). We agree with the
 Government that had Congress meant to authorize pay-
 ments directly to individuals, it “knew how to say so.” Ru-
 bin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

 (2018).
 For example, when Congress intended an unemployment
 program to be administered by the Federal Government, it
 has made that intention clear. See, e.g., 

(a)
 (Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees).
      Subsections 9021(a), (c), (d), (g), and (h) also contain
 language that suggests an agreement with the states is re-
 quired to administer PUA benefits to covered individuals.
 The PUA statute expressly refers to state involvement and
 relies on existing state infrastructure to administer PUA
 benefits. Under § 9021(a)(3)(A)(iii), a “covered individual”
 must provide documentation of eligibility to “the State
 Agency.” 

(a)(3)(A)(iii). Under § 9021(c)—
 which § 9021(b) is subject to—“[a]s a condition of continued
 eligibility for assistance under this section,” a covered indi-
 vidual must submit “a recertification to the State for each
 week after the individual’s 1st week of eligibility that cer-
 tifies that the individual remains” eligible for the program.
 Id. § 9021(c)(6). Subsection (c) also indicates that “the
 State agency” is responsible for the “determination or rede-
 termination regarding the rights to pandemic unemploy-
 ment assistance,” id. § 9021(c)(5)(A), and that “the
 applicable State” will handle “[a]ll levels of appeal” regard-
 ing those determinations, id. § 9021(c)(5)(B). Further,
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 12                                    CREAGER IRELAND v. US




 should a covered individual receive an overpayment, “the
 State shall require such individuals to repay the amounts
 of such pandemic unemployment assistance to the State
 agency,” subject to limited waiver authority.         Id.
 § 9021(d)(4).
      Under § 9021(g), “[f]unds in the extended unemploy-
 ment compensation account . . . shall be used to make pay-
 ments to States pursuant to subsection (f)(2)(A).” Id.
 § 9021(g)(1)(A); see also id. § 9021(g)(2)(A). And under
 § 9021(h), Congress incorporated 

, which re-
 lates to DUA under the Stafford Act. Under those regula-
 tions, disaster unemployment assistance “is payable to an
 individual only by an applicable State” and “[o]nly pursu-
 ant to an Agreement entered into pursuant to the Act and
 this part.” 

(b)(1); accord 

 § 625.4(b)
 (assistance is available only if “[t]he applicable State for
 the individual has entered into an Agreement which is in
 effect with respect to that week”). We agree with the dis-
 trict court that “in the absence of an agreement between
 the State of Texas and the Secretary, the regulations sup-
 port that Plaintiffs are not eligible to receive PUA pay-
 ments” because “the DUA regulations that permit the
 payment of DUA benefits only where the applicable state
 has signed an agreement with the Secretary also apply to
 the PUA program.” Appx 39. Thus, it is clear the statute
 indicates throughout that the pandemic unemployment as-
 sistance is to be provided through agreements with
 states—the only entities the Secretary is authorized to
 make payments to. See 

(f)(1), (2).
                              II
      Next, we turn to Plaintiffs’ argument that “[§ 9021](h)
 does not explicitly or implicitly limit the unconditional
 mandate of [§ 9021](b)” because the DUA “regulation con-
 flicts with the PUA statute and does not apply.” Appel-
 lants’ Br. 37; 

(h) (applying the DUA
 regulations to PUA except “to the extent there is a conflict
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 CREAGER IRELAND v. US                                       13



 between this section and part 625 of title 20”). To reach
 this conclusion, Plaintiffs contrast 

(b)
 with 

(b). They argue that the DUA regu-
 lation and PUA statute conflict because the DUA regula-
 tion requires the “applicable State for the individual [to
 have] entered into an Agreement which is in effect with re-
 spect to that week [of unemployment],” 

(b), whereas the PUA statute requires the Secretary
 to provide benefits to “any covered individual,” 

(b), without reference to any state agreement. There
 is no such conflict.
     To start, Plaintiffs’ comparison of the DUA regulation
 and PUA statute is amiss. As discussed above, subsec-
 tions 9021(b) and (f) must be read together, and when read
 together, they establish that the “Secretary shall provide
 the assistance authorized under subsection (b) through
 agreements with States.” 

(f)(1). This is
 like the language in the Stafford Act. See 

(a) (“The President is directed to provide such assis-
 tance through agreements with States . . . .”). And this
 language is consistent with the DUA regulation. See
 

(b) (“An individual shall be eligible to re-
 ceive a payment of DUA . . . if: . . . (b) The applicable State
 for the individual has entered into an Agreement . . . .”).
 Thus, there is no conflict, and the DUA regulations are ap-
 plicable to the PUA statute. It follows, as the Federal Gov-
 ernment correctly notes, “that payments by the United
 States may be made only to states, and that only states
 may make payments to individuals.” Appellee’s Br. 29.
                               III
     Last, we address Plaintiffs’ statutory context argu-
 ment—that Congress differentiated PUA from four related
 CARES Act programs in that PUA, unlike the other
 CARES Act programs, generally does not require agree-
 ments with states. Plaintiffs urge us to “give effect to the
 distinctive language Congress used to create PUA” because
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 14                                    CREAGER IRELAND v. US




 where “Congress includes particular language in one sec-
 tion of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
 Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intention-
 ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
 Appellants’ Br. 20 (quoting Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.,
 

, 196–97 (2021)). Plaintiffs assert that PUA
 differs in “three critical ways” from other CARES Act pro-
 grams. None, however, supports the reading that Plaintiffs
 insist on: “that the Secretary’s obligation to provide PUA is
 not contingent on state participation.” Appellants’ Br. 21.
     First, Plaintiffs contend “PUA is the only program not
 expressly subject to each state’s ‘desire[]’ to participate.”
 Appellants’ Br. 21. Plaintiffs note that, unlike the PUA
 statute, other CARES Act programs “expressly provide
 that states may ‘terminate’ such participation at their dis-
 cretion.” Appellants’ Br. 20–21 (citing 

(a)
 & (b), 9024(a), 9025(a), 9027(a)). But this distinction over-
 looks § 9021(h), which incorporates the DUA regulation
 under the Stafford Act that contemplates termination of
 any agreement. See 

(b)(1) (authorizing
 payment by an applicable state “[o]nly . . . with respect to
 weeks in which the Agreement is in effect”).
     Second, Plaintiffs assert “PUA is the only program that
 directly charges the Secretary with providing assistance to
 ‘individual[s].’”   Appellants’ Br. 21 (citing 

(b)). Whereas, in Plaintiffs’ view, “other programs
 only require the Federal Government to reimburse states
 for payments voluntarily made by those states.” Appel-
 lants’ Br. 21–22 (citing 

(d)(1)(A) (requir-
 ing that the Federal Government “shall . . . pa[y] to each
 State” the amount of increased benefits), 9025(c)(1) (same),
 9024(c)(1) (same), 9027(c)(1) (same)). However, as we note
 above, the PUA statute does not direct the Secretary to
 make payments directly to individuals; it provides pay-
 ments “shall” be made “to each State which has entered
 into an agreement under this subsection.” 

(f)(2). Further, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the
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 CREAGER IRELAND v. US                                       15



 other CARES Act statutes contain similar language to the
 PUA statute with respect to “Payments to States.” Com-
 pare 

 § 9023(d), with id. § 9021(f)(2). See also id.
 §§ 9023(d), 9024(c), 9025(c), 9027(c). And like PUA, the
 other CARES Act statutes are structured such that funds
 flow from the Secretary to the states, which in turn provide
 PUA benefits to qualified individuals. See, e.g., id.
 § 9023(d).
      Third, Plaintiffs argue that “PUA is the only program
 that sets forth its own Congressionally-determined eligibil-
 ity criteria through its definition of ‘covered individual’ in
 subsection (a).” Appellants’ Br. 22. To Plaintiffs, this is
 unlike “the four other CARES Act programs,” where eligi-
 bility is set by the states and each program “enhance[s]
 benefits for existing state unemployment programs.” Ap-
 pellants’ Br. 22. PUA eligibility “is available to anyone who
 is unable to work due to Covid-19 and is not eligible for
 regular unemployment compensation.” Appellants’ Br. 22.
 Compare 

(b)(1), 9024(c)(1)(A), 9025(a)(2),
 and 9027(b)(1), with 

 § 9021(a)(3). But this distinction
 misses the mark because it does not address the separate
 question before us—whether the Secretary had an obliga-
 tion to pay PUA benefits to individuals without state par-
 ticipation. It is true that § 9021(a) sets forth eligibility
 criteria for PUA benefits, but eligibility criteria bear no re-
 lation to the Secretary’s purported obligation to provide
 PUA benefits. As such, we afford this distinction little
 weight and fail to see how it supports Plaintiffs’ view that
 the Secretary’s obligation to provide PUA is not contingent
 on state participation.
                         CONCLUSION
      We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons above, we
 affirm the district court’s decision granting the Federal
 Government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
                         AFFIRMED