Case: 22-1807   Document: 106    Page: 1   Filed: 06/21/2024




    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

  THE GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC, MARMEN INC.,
  MARMEN ENERGIE INC., MARMEN ENERGY CO.,
        THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA,
              Plaintiffs-Appellants

                            v.

       UNITED STATES, WIND TOWER TRADE
                  COALITION,
               Defendants-Appellees

          THE GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO,
                     Defendant
               ______________________

                       2022-1807
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of International
 Trade in Nos. 1:20-cv-00168-GSK, 1:20-cv-00170-GSK,
 1:20-cv-00172-GSK, Judge Gary S. Katzmann.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: June 21, 2024
                 ______________________

     NANCY NOONAN, ArentFox Schiff LLP, Washington,
 DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant Government of Quebec.
 Also represented by MATTHEW CLARK, JESSICA R. DIPIETRO.

     JAY CHARLES CAMPBELL, White & Case LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants Marmen Inc.,
Case: 22-1807   Document: 106     Page: 2   Filed: 06/21/2024




 2                              GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




 Marmen Energie Inc., Marmen Energy Co., Government of
 Canada. Marmen Inc., Marmen Energie Inc., and Marmen
 Energy Co. also represented by RON KENDLER, ALLISON
 KEPKAY.

     JOANNE OSENDARP, Blank Rome LLP, for plaintiff-ap-
 pellant Government of Canada. Also represented by
 CONOR GILLIGAN, ALAN KASHDAN, TYLER J. KIMBERLY.

     JOSHUA E. KURLAND, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States.
 Also represented by REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN
 M. BOYNTON, ROBERT R. KIEPURA, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY;
 ALEXANDER FRIED, United States Department of Com-
 merce, Washington, DC.

      MAUREEN E. THORSON, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington,
 DC, argued for defendant-appellee Wind Tower Trade Co-
 alition. Also represented by THEODORE PAUL BRACKEMYRE,
 TESSA V. CAPELOTO, ROBERT E. DEFRANCESCO, III, LAURA
 EL-SABAAWI, DERICK HOLT, ELIZABETH S. LEE, ALAN H.
 PRICE, JOHN ALLEN RIGGINS.
                   ______________________

     Before LOURIE, PROST, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
 REYNA, Circuit Judge.
     Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy
 Co., the Government of Québec, and the Government of
 Canada appeal from a decision of the U.S. Court of Inter-
 national Trade, which sustained the final affirmative de-
 termination of the U.S. Department of Commerce in a
 countervailing duty investigation concerning imports of
 certain utility scale wind towers from Canada. We affirm
 the judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 3    Filed: 06/21/2024




 GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                  3



                        BACKGROUND
     The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, authorizes the U.S.
 Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) to impose counter-
 vailing duties on imports that benefited from illegal subsi-
 dies provided by a foreign government. See 

(a). Such duties form trade relief to U.S. domestic
 industries injured by the subsidized imports. E.g., Al
 Ghurair Iron & Steel LLC v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2023). If Commerce determines that a
 countervailable subsidy exists and the U.S. International
 Trade Commission (“ITC”) determines that a domestic in-
 dustry is materially injured or is threatened with material
 injury by virtue of the subsidized imports, Commerce may
 impose countervailing duties on the subject imports equal
 to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy. See 

(a).
      The trade statute provides that a countervailable sub-
 sidy exists if: (1) a foreign government provides a “financial
 contribution;” (2) a “benefit” is thereby conferred upon a re-
 cipient in connection with the manufacture or export of the
 subject merchandise; and (3) the subsidy is “specific” to a
 foreign enterprise or industry, or a group of such enter-
 prises or industries. See 

 §§ 1677(5), (5A). To calculate
 a subsidy rate, Commerce divides “the amount of the ben-
 efit allocated to the period of investigation” by the “sales
 value” of the subject merchandise during the same period,
 the latter referred to as the sales denominator. 

(a). The larger the sales denominator, the lower
 the subsidy rate.
     This case involves (1) Commerce’s final determination
 that the Government of Canada and the Government of
 Québec provided countervailable subsidies to producers
Case: 22-1807         Document: 106     Page: 4   Filed: 06/21/2024




 4                                    GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




 and exporters of utility scale wind towers 1 imported from
 Canada to the United States, and (2) Commerce’s calcula-
 tion of the subsidy rate of 1.18% ad valorem. 2 Generally, a
 subsidy rate of less than 1% is considered de minimis,
 which Commerce will disregard, and no countervailing du-
 ties are assessed. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(4). Appellants ar-
 gue that Commerce erred in its assessment of three of the
 investigated programs and its computation of the sales de-
 nominator used to calculate the subsidy rate. According to
 Appellants, the subsidy rate should have been de minimis.
     I.       The Investigation and Commerce’s Determination
     In July 2019, Appellee Wind Tower Trade Coalition
 (“WTTC”) petitioned Commerce to initiate a countervailing
 duty investigation of certain imports of utility scale wind
 towers from Canada. See Utility Scale Wind Towers from
 Canada, Indonesia, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
 Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 

, 38216 (Aug. 6, 2019). WTTC contended that
 imports of the subject merchandise, the merchandise under
 investigation, received countervailable subsidies from the
 Government of Québec and the Government of Canada
 through various government programs. See 

     Commerce initiated a countervailing duty investiga-
 tion, the period of investigation covering January 1, 2018–
 December 31, 2018. 

. Commerce selected, as



          Generally, wind towers are steel towers with wind
          1

 turbines that are used to convert the kinetic energy from
 wind to electrical power. See Gov’t of Québec v. United
 States, 

, 1277 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2022).
     2    The 1.18% rate represents the aggregate subsidy
 rate calculated based on eight of the investigated programs
 that Commerce found countervailable. As noted infra, this
 rate was subsequently reduced to 1.13% to account for min-
 isterial errors not at issue here.
Case: 22-1807   Document: 106     Page: 5    Filed: 06/21/2024




 GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                               5



 mandatory respondents, 3 Marmen Inc. and Marmen Éner-
 gie Inc. (collectively, “Marmen”), the two largest and
 cross-owned Canadian exporters of the subject merchan-
 dise during the period of investigation. During the inves-
 tigation, Commerce issued initial countervailing duty
 questionnaires and supplemental questionnaires, to which
 Marmen, the Government of Québec, and the Government
 of Canada submitted responses. See J.A. 8387.
      In December 2019, Commerce reached a preliminary
 affirmative determination that countervailable subsidies
 were being provided to Canadian producers of wind towers
 through eight of the investigated programs. Utility Scale
 Wind Towers from Canada: Preliminary Affirmative Coun-
 tervailing Duty Determination, and Alignment of Final De-
 termination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination,
 

, 68126 (Dec. 13, 2019) (“Preliminary Af-
 firmative Determination”); J.A. 8386–8408 (decision mem-
 orandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination).



     3   In countervailing duty investigations, if a large
 number of exporters or producers are involved, Commerce
 may select, and limit the investigation to, a small number
 of mandatory respondents. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(e)(2). Man-
 datory respondents are compelled to participate in the in-
 vestigation. Other exporters or producers of the subject
 merchandise may volunteer to participate in the investiga-
 tion, and Commerce may accept voluntary respondents at
 its discretion. Id. § 1677m(a); 

(d).
 Mandatory respondents’ failure to properly cooperate in
 the investigation may adversely affect the countervailing
 duty rates assessed for them. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b).
 The calculated subsidy rates for the mandatory respond-
 ents may determine the countervailing duty rates applica-
 ble to other exporters and producers that are not
 individually investigated during the investigation.
 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(5), 1677f-1(e)(2).
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106     Page: 6    Filed: 06/21/2024




 6                               GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




 For the eight countervailable programs, Commerce calcu-
 lated a total countervailable subsidy rate of 1.09% ad val-
 orem. Preliminary Affirmative Determination, 84 Fed.
 Reg. at 68127. In calculating the subsidy rate, Commerce
 used the 2018 “Applicable Sales Value” Marmen reported
 as the sales denominator. See J.A. 8428; J.A. 2907.
     After Commerce issued the Preliminary Affirmative
 Determination, Marmen submitted a “ministerial error”
 comment, 4 alleging that Commerce erred in not adjusting
 the sales denominator to include a year-end “exchange rate
 adjustment” that Marmen’s auditor made. J.A. 8434–35;
 J.A. 8436 (citing line item “Year-end auditor adjustment to
 General Ledger (revenue) for exchange rate gain(loss)”).
 According to Marmen, this adjustment was to translate all
 foreign-currency sales recorded in its general ledger to Ca-
 nadian dollars (“CAD”). J.A. 8434–35. Using the “cor-
 rect[ed] sales denominator” that includes this adjustment,
 according to Marmen, would change the preliminarily cal-
 culated subsidy rate from above de minimis (1.09%) to be-
 low de minimis (0.95%). J.A. 8436. Commerce declined to
 amend its Preliminary Affirmative Determination based on
 Marmen’s allegation because the record information did
 not support that the alleged error was “ministerial” as de-
 fined in the regulations.        J.A. 8453; see 

(f).



     4    Generally, after Commerce discloses its calcula-
 tions in its preliminary determinations, a party to the pro-
 ceeding may submit comments concerning “ministerial
 errors” contained in Commerce’s calculations. 

(c). Commerce will analyze such comments and
 make corrections where appropriate. 

 § 351.224(e). Ac-
 cording to the regulations, a “ministerial error means an
 error in addition, subtraction, or other arithmetic function,
 clerical error resulting from inaccurate copying, duplica-
 tion, or the like.” Id. § 351.224(f).
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106     Page: 7   Filed: 06/21/2024




 GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                7



     In February 2020, Commerce conducted a verification
 of the information Marmen submitted during the investi-
 gation. See Verification of Questionnaire Responses of Mar-
 men Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., and Gestion Marmen,
 J.A. 8654–8708 (“Verification Report”). Verification refers
 to the process by which Commerce “verif[ies] the accuracy
 and completeness” of factual information submitted by in-
 terested parties, before Commerce makes a final counter-
 vailing duty determination. 19 C.F.R § 351.307(d). If the
 submitted information “cannot be verified,” Commerce
 may make determinations based on “the facts otherwise
 available” on the record. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(D); 

(a).
     At verification, relevant to the auditor’s adjustment,
 Commerce discussed with Marmen the U.S. dollars
 (“USD”) sales Marmen identified as needing to be con-
 verted to CAD and reviewed the underlying sales records.
 J.A. 8679–80. This process revealed several discrepancies
 in the requested adjustment. Specifically, Commerce
 found that the adjustment included sales classified as USD
 sales but recorded in European currency, the EURO, in
 Marmen’s general ledger. 

 Upon reviewing the under-
 lying records, Commerce discovered that two of the EURO-
 coded sales in the general ledger were shown in the original
 sales documentation as transacted in CAD. 

 These sales
 were thus inappropriately included in the USD-CAD con-
 version as part of the auditor’s adjustment.
     In June 2020, Commerce reached a final affirmative
 countervailing duty determination. Utility Scale Wind
 Towers from Canada: Final Affirmative Countervailing
 Duty Determination and Final Negative Determination of
 Critical Circumstances, 

, 40245 (July 6,
 2020) (“Final Affirmative Determination”). In the Final Af-
 firmative Determination, Commerce maintained its deter-
 mination that eight of the investigated programs were
 countervailable. Issues and Decision Memorandum for the
 Final Determination of the Countervailing Duty
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 8    Filed: 06/21/2024




 8                               GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




 Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers from Canada,
 J.A. 74–130.
     Based on the eight countervailable programs, Com-
 merce calculated an aggregate countervailable subsidy
 rate of 1.18% ad valorem for Marmen and assigned the
 same rate for all other producers. Final Affirmative Deter-
 mination, 85 Fed. Reg. at 40246. In calculating the subsidy
 rate, Commerce again did not include Marmen’s auditor’s
 adjustment in the sales denominator. J.A. 116. Because
 “Commerce found multiple improperly identified and im-
 properly converted [sales] values in the calculation of the
 auditor’s adjustment at verification,” Commerce deter-
 mined the adjustment to be “unverified and unreliable.”
 Id. Commerce explained that it lacked the ability to check
 each sale, and instead, the checks it performed at verifica-
 tion were to “test the broader reliability of reported infor-
 mation.” Id. Commerce thus relied on Marmen’s reported
 sales information excluding the unverified auditor’s adjust-
 ment. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(D).
      Along with five other programs, Commerce determined
 that the following three programs provided countervailable
 subsidies, each contributing to the ultimately assessed ag-
 gregate subsidy rate of 1.18%. See J.A. 78–80. We provide
 an overview of each of the three programs below. As noted
 above, to be countervailable, a subsidy must satisfy three
 criteria: (1) a program provides a financial contribution;
 (2) a benefit is thereby conferred on a recipient; and (3) the
 subsidy is specific to a foreign enterprise or industry, or a
 group thereof. By finding the three programs at issue
 countervailable, Commerce found they each satisfy all
 three criteria. For each program, Appellants challenge
 Commerce’s assessment of one or two criteria. Conse-
 quently, in the overview below, we focus on the criteria that
 the parties dispute in this appeal.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106     Page: 9    Filed: 06/21/2024




 GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                 9



    i.   Additional Depreciation for Certain Class 1 Assets
     The Canadian tax regulations provide property depre-
 ciation deductions from taxable income, called the Capital
 Cost Allowance (“CCA”). J.A. 8037–38; J.A. 2513. Under
 the CCA program, assets are divided into different classes,
 each assigned a respective deduction rate. For Class 1 as-
 sets, a generally applicable CCA rate is 4%, but taxpayers
 can claim a higher rate for certain subsets of Class 1 assets
 acquired after March 2007. As relevant here, taxpayers
 can claim an additional 6% (for a total of 10%) if at least
 90% of an eligible building’s floor space is used for manu-
 facturing. J.A. 2514. Similarly, an additional 2% (for a to-
 tal of 6%) may be claimed for other non-residential
 buildings. Id. The additional allowances are intended to
 reflect the shorter useful life of buildings used for manu-
 facturing or other non-residential purposes. Id.; see
 J.A. 2522–82 (“Economic Depreciation and Retirement of
 Canadian Assets: A Comprehensive Empirical Study”)
 (“StatCan Study”).
     To be eligible for the additional allowances, “a building
 will be required to be placed into a separate class.”
 J.A. 2514. “If the taxpayer forgoes the separate class,” the
 standard 4% rate applies. Id.; J.A. 8037. Marmen, for cer-
 tain buildings, elected to claim the 10% depreciation deduc-
 tion, which reduced its taxable income during the period of
 investigation.
     Commerce determined that the additional allowance
 provided a countervailable subsidy and calculated a sub-
 sidy rate of 0.07% ad valorem. J.A. 79. As relevant here,
 Commerce determined that the additional allowance pro-
 vided a financial contribution and that it conferred a bene-
 fit equal to the resulting tax savings.          J.A. 97–98.
 Commerce reasoned that absent the additional allowance,
 Marmen would have paid more taxes under the 4% stand-
 ard rate. J.A. 98. The appropriate benefit, Commerce con-
 cluded, was the “tax savings of the difference between the
Case: 22-1807       Document: 106     Page: 10   Filed: 06/21/2024




  10                                GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




  deduction calculated using the basic rate” and the deduc-
  tion “using the total depreciation rate” that Marmen
  claimed. J.A. 98–99.
                     ii.   GASPÉTC Tax Credit
       The GASPÉTC program provides a tax credit to pro-
  mote employment in certain regions in Gaspésie and cer-
  tain maritime regions of Québec. J.A. 2182. This program
  allows employers to claim a 15% tax credit for total wages
  paid to eligible employees. Id. An employer can claim the
  credit when filing tax returns for the previous year. At the
  same time, the previous year’s credit is considered taxable
  income, which the employer must then pay taxes on in the
  following year. In 2018, Marmen claimed the GASPÉTC
  tax credit on its year-2017 tax return and paid taxes for the
  GASPÉTC credit it received for year-2016. J.A. 2871.
      Commerce determined that the GASPÉTC credit pro-
  vided a countervailable subsidy and calculated a subsidy
  rate of 0.78% ad valorem. J.A. 80. As relevant here, in
  quantifying the benefit conferred under this program,
  Commerce used the amount of credit Marmen received for
  2017. J.A. 126–27. Commerce declined to reduce that
  amount by the taxes Marmen paid for the credit it received
  for 2016. Id. In doing so, Commerce cited the regulatory
  directive under 

(e): “[i]n calculating the
  amount of a benefit, [Commerce] will not consider the tax
  consequences of the benefit.” J.A. 126. Commerce also ex-
  plained that its calculation here was consistent with its
  past “treatment of other tax credits which ha[d] similar
  consequences.” 

             iii.    On-the-Job Training Tax Credit
      The on-the-job training program encourages busi-
  nesses to hire trainees, such as students or apprentices.
  J.A. 1970. The program allows businesses to claim a tax
  credit for 24% of wages paid to trainees, and a higher per-
  centage if the trainee is a person with a disability or is an
Case: 22-1807     Document: 106      Page: 11    Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                  11



  immigrant. 

 To be eligible for this credit, an employer
  must satisfy several criteria, including, among others, en-
  gaging in a qualified business and having received the re-
  quired certification. J.A. 1976–77.
       Commerce determined that the on-the-job training
  credit provided a countervailable subsidy and calculated a
  subsidy rate of 0.01% ad valorem. J.A. 79–80. As relevant
  here, Commerce found that this program provided a sub-
  sidy that is de facto (as a matter of fact) specific. J.A. 129.
  Commerce determined that, during the period of investiga-
  tion, the actual number of recipients that benefited from
  this program was “limited in number on an enterprise ba-
  sis.” 

 In reaching this determination, Commerce com-
  pared “the actual number of companies that received the
  tax credit in 2018 to the total number of tax filers, inclusive
  of corporations and individuals in business, within Québec
  for 2018.” 

       After Commerce issued the Final Affirmative Determi-
  nation, the ITC reached a final affirmative determination
  that a domestic industry was materially injured by the sub-
  sidized wind towers imported from Canada. Utility Scale
  Wind Towers from Canada, Indonesia, Korea, and Vi-
  etnam, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-627-629, 731-TA-1458–1461
  USITC Pub. 5101 (Aug. 2020) (Final). Based on these two
  affirmative determinations, Commerce issued a counter-
  vailing duty order imposing countervailing duties on the
  imports of wind towers from Canada. Utility Scale Wind
  Towers from Canada, Indonesia, and the Socialist Republic
  of Vietnam: Amended Final Affirmative Countervailing
  Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Orders, 

, 52543 (Aug. 26, 2020). The 1.18% subsidy
  rate assessed in the Final Affirmative Determination was
  subsequently reduced to 1.13%, to account for ministerial
  errors not at issue here. See 

.
Case: 22-1807     Document: 106     Page: 12    Filed: 06/21/2024




  12                              GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




       II. Appeal to the U.S. Court of International Trade
      In September 2020, the Government of Québec filed
  suit in the U.S. Court of International Trade, challenging
  various aspects of Commerce’s Final Affirmative Determi-
  nation. Gov’t of Québec v. United States, 

, 1280 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2022) (“CIT Decision”). The
  Government of Canada joined as plaintiff-intervenor and
  WTTC joined as defendant-intervenor. 

 Marmen and
  WTTC subsequently filed separate appeals. 

 The ap-
  peals were consolidated. 

 The Government of Québec,
  the Government of Canada, Marmen, and WTTC each
  moved for judgment on the agency record. 

       The Court of International Trade sustained Com-
  merce’s Final Affirmative Determination, finding that the
  Final Affirmative Determination was in accordance with
  law and supported by substantial evidence. Relevant here
  are the court’s affirmances of (1) Commerce’s computation
  of the sales denominator used to calculate the subsidy rate,
  and (2) Commerce’s assessment concerning the additional
  depreciation allowance, GASPÉTC tax credit, and the on-
  the-job training credit.
       Regarding the sales denominator, the Court of Interna-
  tional Trade concluded that Commerce properly excluded
  Marmen’s requested auditor adjustment as unreliable af-
  ter identifying multiple errors at verification. 

.
  In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected Marmen’s
  contention requiring Commerce to identify compelling evi-
  dence before rejecting the auditor’s report, finding such a
  contention lacked support in law. 

 The errors identified
  through verification, the court reasoned, undermined the
  broader reliability of the requested adjustment and sup-
  ported Commerce’s determination to exclude the adjust-
  ment as unreliable. 

.
      As to the assessment of the three subsidy programs at
  issue here, the Court of International Trade affirmed Com-
  merce’s determination in all challenged aspects. We
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 13     Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                 13



  provide below an overview of the Court of International
  Trade’s decision, focusing on the challenged aspects at is-
  sue here.
    i.    Additional Depreciation for Certain Class 1 Assets
       As to the additional depreciation for certain Class 1
  manufacturing buildings, the Court of International Trade
  affirmed Commerce’s determination that the additional 6%
  allowance provided a financial contribution conferring a
  benefit. 

. The court rejected the Canadian par-
  ties’ argument that the additional allowance reflected the
  actual shorter useful life of manufacturing buildings so it
  constituted neither a “financial contribution” or “benefit.”
  

 at 1294–95. The court concluded that Commerce’s de-
  termination was in accordance with the statutory defini-
  tion of “financial contribution” 5 and the pertinent
  regulations on “Direct Taxes” benefits. 6 

 The Court of
  International Trade also rejected the argument that Com-
  merce erred by declining to directly engage with the
  StatCan Study, an empirical analysis on building depreci-
  ation the Canadian parties relied on. 

 at 1295–96. Ac-
  cording to the court, “where a taxpayer can opt-in to more
  favorable treatment, it is reasonable for Commerce to con-
  fine its analysis to the comparisons provided for by law,


      5    Under 

(5)(D), “financial contribu-
  tion” includes “(i) the direct transfer of funds, such as
  grants, loans, and equity infusions,” and as relevant here,
  “(ii) foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise
  due, such as granting tax credits or deductions from taxa-
  ble income.”
       6   Regarding benefits provided through direct taxes,
  

(a)(1) (“Exemption or remission of
  taxes”) provides that “a benefit exists to the extent that the
  tax paid by a firm as a result of the program is less than
  the tax the firm would have paid in the absence of the pro-
  gram.”
Case: 22-1807       Document: 106     Page: 14   Filed: 06/21/2024




  14                                GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




  even if the more favorable treatment better reflects eco-
  nomic reality.” 

.
                     ii.   GASPÉTC Tax Credit
       Regarding the GASPÉTC tax credit, the Court of Inter-
  national Trade affirmed Commerce’s determination to ex-
  clude increased tax liabilities in calculating the benefit
  Marmen received under the program. 

 at 1292–93. The
  court found unpersuasive the Government of Québec and
  Marmen’s assertion that 

(a)(1) directed
  Commerce to consider and exclude the previous year’s tax
  liabilities from the benefit calculation. Id.; see also 

(a)(1) (“[A] benefit exists to the extent that
  the tax paid by a firm as a result of the program is less than
  the tax the firm would have paid in the absence of the pro-
  gram.”). The regulations, the court reasoned, did not re-
  quire treating “tax liabilities from a previous year’s use of
  the program [as] a component” of the “result of the pro-
  gram.” CIT Decision, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 1293. The court
  added that Commerce’s determination was consistent with
  its uniform past practice of disregarding tax consequences
  when assessing benefits provided through direct taxes. Id.
             iii.    On-the-Job Training Tax Credit
      The Court of International Trade also sustained Com-
  merce’s determination that the on-the-job training tax
  credit provided a de facto subsidy. Id. at 1291. The Gov-
  ernment of Québec and the Government of Canada argued
  that Commerce’s specificity determination violated the
  statutory requirements and that its comparison was
  “methodologically unsound.” See id. at 1290. The court
  disagreed. First, the court explained Commerce’s approach
  assessed both whether “the actual recipients of the sub-
  sidy”     were     “limited   in   number,”   

(5A)(D)(iii)(I), and whether the subsidy is
  “truly . . . broadly available and widely used throughout
  [the] economy.” 

. The court concluded that Com-
  merce’s approach was in accordance with the statute and
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106     Page: 15    Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                               15



  the aims of the specificity test as set out in the Statement
  of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay
  Round Agreements Act (“SAA”). 7 

 (citing SAA, H.R. Doc.
  No. 103-316, at 929 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
  4040). Second, the court determined that Commerce did
  not err in using all corporate tax filers as the comparator
  group in assessing specificity. 

 The court explained that
  it was “reasonable to think that [such] a comparison” would
  be “instructive” in assessing whether the subsidy was
  widely used. 

      Accordingly, the Court of International Trade sus-
  tained in full Commerce’s Final Affirmative Determination.
  Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy Co.,
  the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada
  appeal to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
  

(a)(5).
                     STANDARD OF REVIEW
      We review de novo the Court of International Trade’s
  decisions involving Commerce’s countervailing duty deter-
  minations, reapplying the same substantial evidence re-
  view standard applied by the Court of International Trade.
  Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Istihsal Endustrisi A.S. v.
  United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2021). We
  uphold Commerce’s determination unless it is unsupported
  by substantial evidence or is otherwise not in accordance
  with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Substantial evi-
  dence means such relevant evidence that a reasonable
  mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.



      7   The SAA “shall be regarded as an authoritative ex-
  pression by the United States concerning the interpreta-
  tion and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements
  and [the Uruguay Round Agreement Act] in any judicial
  proceeding in which a question arises concerning such in-
  terpretation or application.” 

(d).
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 16    Filed: 06/21/2024




  16                             GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




  Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 

 (1938).
  In conducting our review, we “will not ignore the informed
  opinion of the Court of International Trade,” which often
  serves as a starting point of our analysis. Suramerica de
  Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Nippon Steel Corp. v. United
  States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
                          DISCUSSION
       Appellants raise two categories of challenges to Com-
  merce’s Final Affirmative Determination. First, as to the
  subsidy rate calculation, Appellants challenge Commerce’s
  exclusion of Marmen’s auditor’s adjustment from the sales
  denominator. Second, Appellants challenge Commerce’s
  assessment concerning the three programs at issue, specif-
  ically: (1) Commerce’s finding that the additional deprecia-
  tion deduction for certain Class 1 assets constituted a
  financial contribution conferring a benefit; (2) Commerce’s
  determination to exclude increased tax liabilities when cal-
  culating the benefit conferred under the GASPÉTC pro-
  gram; and (3) Commerce’s finding that the on-the-job
  training tax credit provided a de facto specific subsidy. Be-
  cause Commerce’s determinations are supported by sub-
  stantial evidence and in accordance with law, we affirm.
                  I.     The Sales Denominator
      We first address Commerce’s determination not to
  adopt Marmen’s auditor’s adjustment in computing the
  sales denominator. Appellants argue that Commerce “un-
  reasonabl[y]” determined that the auditor’s adjustment
  was “unverified and unreliable.” Appellants Br. 25. Appel-
  lants further argue that Commerce’s determination contra-
  venes its past practice and its obligation to accurately
  calculate subsidy rates. 

 We disagree.
      Based on errors identified through verification, Com-
  merce reasonably determined that Marmen’s auditor’s ad-
  justment was unreliable. Marmen claimed that the
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106     Page: 17   Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                              17



  adjustment was to convert USD sales recorded in its gen-
  eral ledger to CAD, and the auditor used a single annual
  average USD-CAD exchange rate. J.A. 8676–77. Com-
  merce’s verification revealed that the auditor’s adjustment
  erroneously included sales denominated in a non-USD for-
  eign currency (the EURO) in the general ledger, and two of
  these sales were transacted in CAD and thus erroneously
  coded. J.A. 8679–80. Based on these “improperly identi-
  fied and improperly converted” sales, it was reasonable for
  Commerce to determine that “the auditor’s adjustment was
  not accurate or reliable.” J.A. 116.
      Appellants take issue with Commerce’s statement that
  Commerce “discovered” the five EURO-coded sales through
  “spot-checking.” Appellants Br. 32. Appellants contend
  that Marmen self-identified these sales to Commerce be-
  cause, in the USD-sales listings Marmen prepared, these
  EURO-coded sales were listed as such and were thus
  flagged for Commerce. 8 E.g., id. at 33. These errors, Ap-
  pellants claim, account for less than 0.2% of the total re-
  quested adjustment and Commerce’s spot-checking beyond
  these errors did not reveal additional “EURO-coded sales.”
  Id. at 34, 36. According to Appellants, because Commerce
  found no additional errors and concluded the verification
  early, it was “unreasonable for Commerce to infer that ad-
  ditional errors were likely.” Id. at 34–35.




      8   Countering Appellants’ argument, the United
  States contends that Marmen never alerted Commerce to
  the “second type of error—sales included as USD in the ad-
  justment and recorded in Marmen’s ledger as Euro that
  were actually in CAD.” United States Br. 24. According to
  Appellees, it was Commerce that identified this “second
  type of error” when “it spot-checked documentation for the
  Euro-coded sales.” Id.; WTTC Br. 25; see Verification Re-
  port, J.A. 8579–80.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 18     Filed: 06/21/2024




  18                              GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




       Regardless of whether Commerce completely inde-
  pendently discovered those problematic sales or used Mar-
  men’s submitted listings as a clue, these errors undeniably
  exist and undermine the reliability of the adjustment.
  When Commerce inquired about the errors relating to the
  EURO-coded sales, Marmen attributed them to its account-
  ing firm’s “sales classification” or its “internal coding mis-
  take.” J.A. 8680. The fact that Commerce’s verification did
  not reveal additional EURO-coded sales does not compel a
  conclusion that the auditor’s adjustment contains no other
  errors. Marmen’s explanation for the identified errors does
  not support that all errors are fully accounted for by the
  identified EURO-coded sales, whether attributed to “sales
  classification,” “coding mistake[s],” or other causes. This
  evidence supports Commerce’s reasonable inference that
  the auditor’s adjustment may contain other errors. See
  CIT Decision, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 1286 n.11. As Commerce
  explained, it lacked the ability to verify each sale and ex-
  haustively examine all underlying sales documentation.
  J.A. 116. Here, the verification demonstrated that the re-
  quested adjustment contained errors, which undermined
  “[its] broader reliability.” Id. We agree with the Court of
  International Trade that “[w]hile the impact of the discov-
  ered errors, taken alone, on the proposed foreign currency
  adjustment may be small, Commerce could reasonably in-
  fer that there may remain other errors.” CIT Decision, 567
  F. Supp. 3d at 1286.
      We also find unpersuasive Appellants’ assertion that
  Commerce’s action here contradicts its past practice or its
  legal obligations. See Appellants Br. 37. Appellants con-
  tend that, by conducting verification of “an independent
  auditor’s” analysis, Commerce took an erroneous “extraor-
  dinary” action departing from its past practice and the law.
  Id. at 39–40.
      Verifying the parties’ submission and rejecting inaccu-
  rate and unverifiable information is consistent with, and
  required by, Commerce’s statutory obligation to calculate
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 19     Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                 19



  subsidy rates “as accurately as possible.” See id. at 41; see
  also 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(i). Marmen requested the auditor’s
  adjustment in a ministerial error allegation after Com-
  merce reached the Preliminary Affirmative Determination
  based on the sales value Marmen itself reported. J.A. 114.
  To support its allegation, Marmen pointed to a line item
  “Year End auditor adjustment in [General Ledger] 40000
  for Gain(loss) exchange rate,” which had little accompany-
  ing explanation. See id.; J.A. 8436; J.A. 8092; J.A. 8118.
  Given the timing and nature of Marmen’s request and the
  lack of corroborating explanation in the record, it was rea-
  sonable for Commerce to decide to investigate the accuracy
  of the requested adjustment.
      Lastly, we reject Appellants’ argument that Commerce
  should have, but failed to, “cite compelling evidence” to dis-
  regard the auditor’s adjustment. Appellants Br. 40. To
  support its proposition, Appellants cite SeAH, a decision by
  the Court of International Trade in an unrelated proceed-
  ing, and certain statements in a previous administrative
  proceeding referenced in SeAH. Id. at 39 (citing SeAH Steel
  VINA Corp. v. United States, 

  (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017)); see also 

 (citing statements from
  memo accompanying Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld
  Pipe Fittings from Taiwan, 

 (Nov. 20,
  2006)). Appellants’ arguments lack merit.
      SeAH involves Commerce’s evaluation and selection of
  one set of surrogate financial statements over the other,
  where Commerce “had reason to trust the reliability” of the
  one it selected and explained its “basis for rejecting” the
  other. SeAH, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1351–52. One of the rea-
  sons supporting Commerce’s selection was that the se-
  lected set contained an auditor’s opinion and registration
  information, while the other did not. 

 In that context,
  the Court of International Trade observed that Commerce
  can “accept the independent auditor’s report as reliable un-
  less ‘compelling evidence’ exists that the auditor is not in
  ‘good standing.’” 

. This observation does not
Case: 22-1807      Document: 106     Page: 20   Filed: 06/21/2024




  20                               GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




  stand for Appellants’ proposed rule requiring Commerce to
  provide “compelling evidence to set aside information pro-
  vided by an auditor.” See CIT Decision, 567 F. Supp. 3d at
  1285. Further, as the Court of International Trade noted,
  the facts here are readily distinguishable from those in
  SeAH. See id. In SeAH, no evidence “contradicted the in-
  dependent auditor’s conclusions” accompanying the se-
  lected surrogate statements; here, in contrast, Marmen’s
  own auditor’s adjustment was “shown to be at least par-
  tially in error.” Id. Appellants’ reliance on the out-of-con-
  text statements from the Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings
  proceeding fails for similar reasons. See id. (explaining the
  differences between the determination involved in Butt-
  Weld Pipe Fittings and Commerce’s evaluation here).
     Accordingly, we agree with the Court of International
  Trade that Commerce’s exclusion of Marmen’s requested
  auditor adjustment was supported by substantial evidence
  and in accordance with law.
                     II.    Program Assessment
       i.   Additional Depreciation for Certain Class 1 Assets
      Appellants challenge Commerce’s determination that
  the additional 6% depreciation Marmen claimed for certain
  Class 1 assets provided a countervailable subsidy. Appel-
  lants contend that the additional depreciation does not pro-
  vide a “benefit” nor result in a “financial contribution” in
  the form of foregone revenue. Appellants Br. 42, 49. Ac-
  cording to Appellants, the additional depreciation merely
  reflects the actual shorter useful life of manufacturing
  buildings and the normal rate at which they depreciate.
  E.g., id. at 42–43, 53–54. We are unpersuaded.
       To find a countervailable subsidy, there must be a gov-
  ernmental “financial contribution” that conferred a “bene-
  fit.” See 

(5). As relevant here, financial
  contribution includes “foregoing or not collecting revenue
  that is otherwise due, such as granting tax credits or
Case: 22-1807     Document: 106      Page: 21    Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                  21



  deductions from taxable income.”                 

(5)(D)(ii). And in cases involving direct taxes, “a ben-
  efit exists to the extent that the tax paid by a firm as a
  result of the program is less than the tax the firm would
  have paid in the absence of the program.” 

(a) (emphasis added).
       In accordance with the governing statute and regula-
  tions, Commerce reached a determination that is sup-
  ported by substantial evidence in the record, including the
  Canadian tax regulations themselves. Before the Cana-
  dian tax regulations implemented additional allowances
  for certain subsets of Class 1 assets, a single standard or
  default 4% rate applied for all Class 1 assets. J.A. 2514.
  Around 2007, the Canadian tax regulations added addi-
  tional allowances for two subsets of Class 1 assets, includ-
  ing as relevant here, “an additional allowance of 6% (total
  10%)” for certain eligible buildings acquired after March
  2007 and used for manufacturing. 

 To be eligible for
  this additional allowance, “a building will be required to be
  placed into a separate class,” and “elections have to be
  filed.” Id.; J.A. 9539; see also J.A. 9548 (“If you do not file
  an election to put it in a separate class, the 4% rate will
  apply.”). Marmen filed its election to claim this additional
  allowance (of 6%) and thereby further reduced its taxable
  income during the 2018 period of investigation.
      Absent the additional allowance, the generally applica-
  ble 4% standard rate would have applied. Marmen would
  have paid more taxes and the Canadian governments
  would have collected more revenue. The additional 6% al-
  lowance claimed and received by Marmen thus represents
  revenue that the Canadian governments could have col-
  lected but forewent, which constitutes a “financial contri-
  bution.” 

(5)(D)(ii); see J.A. 99. And
  because of this additional 6% allowance, “a benefit exists”
  as “the tax paid by [Marmen] as a result of the program is
  less than the tax [Marmen] would have paid in the absence
  of the program.” 

(a)(1); see J.A. 97–99.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 22    Filed: 06/21/2024




  22                             GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




       We find unpersuasive Appellants’ contention that
  Commerce committed a “fundamental error” by failing to
  consider that “the depreciation rate is based on the average
  useful life of a particular asset.” Appellants Br. 47, 49.
  Commerce based its determination on how the Canadian
  tax regulations explicitly structured the additional depre-
  ciation allowance, applying the explicit definitions of “ben-
  efit” and “financial contribution” provided in the governing
  statute and regulations. See J.A. 97–99. The governing
  statutory and regulatory provisions do not require Com-
  merce to base its determination on whether a program at
  issue accurately aligns with the economic reality of build-
  ing depreciation. 

(5)(D)(ii); 

(a)(1); see CIT Decision, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 1295.
  We thus agree with the Court of International Trade that
  Commerce’s determinations are in accordance with law
  and supported by the tax regulations themselves. See CIT
  Decision, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 1294–96.
      Relatedly, we reject Appellants’ contention that Com-
  merce ignored or failed to adequately address the StatCan
  Study. See Appellants Br. 47, 49. Appellants relied on the
  StatCan Study to support their characterization that the
  additional depreciation allowance reflected the economic
  reality. See J.A. 93–94. As discussed above, Commerce
  based its assessment on a comparison of the different de-
  preciation deduction rates provided in the Canadian tax
  regulations. See CIT Decision, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 1296. In
  doing so, Commerce rejected Appellants’ contrary conten-
  tion that would require Commerce to compare the deduc-
  tion rate(s) to what would be justified by the economic
  reality. See J.A. 98. By rejecting that overarching conten-
  tion, Commerce adequately engaged with the StatCan
  Study evidence Appellants cited to support their underly-
  ing characterization of the depreciation allowance.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 23     Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                 23



                   ii.   GASPÉTC Tax Credit
       Appellants next challenge Commerce’s benefit assess-
  ment under the GASPÉTC tax credit program. In calculat-
  ing the benefit Marmen received under this program in
  2018, Commerce used the tax credit Marmen claimed for
  2017 without offsetting it by the income tax Marmen paid
  for the credit it received in 2016. Appellants contend that
  the regulations require Commerce to consider the “total tax
  effect of the program” that, in Appellants’ view, requires a
  reduction by the tax Marmen paid for the prior year’s
  credit. Appellants Br. 57. We are not persuaded.
       Under 

(a)(1), in cases involving
  “[e]xemption or remission of taxes,” “a benefit exists to the
  extent that the tax paid by a firm as a result of the program
  is less than the tax the firm would have paid in the absence
  of the program.” In excluding the tax Marmen paid as a
  result of the prior year’s credit from its benefit assessment,
  Commerce followed the directive under 

(e). Section 351.503 is the “Benefit” section under
  “Subpart E—Identification and Measurement of Counter-
  vailable Subsidies,” and it contains various subsections on
  benefit assessment. Subsection (e) instructs that “[i]n cal-
  culating the amount of a benefit, [Commerce] will not con-
  sider the tax consequences of the benefit.” 

(e) (emphasis added).
      Appellants argue that 

(e) is inappli-
  cable because, in their view, it provides a general rule
  whose application would contravene the “specific rule” pro-
  vided in 

(a)(1). See Appellants Br. 60–
  61. We discern no contravention. Section 351.509(a)(1) di-
  rects Commerce to calculate the benefit received under a
  program in the year at issue, here the 2018 period of inves-
  tigation. The regulatory language does not address taxes
  resulting from prior year(s)’ credit, let alone instruct that
  such resulting taxes be subtracted from the benefit
Case: 22-1807       Document: 106     Page: 24   Filed: 06/21/2024




  24                                GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




  received in the year at issue. This section thus does not
  contradict the instruction contained in 

(e).
       Additionally, further supporting Commerce’s determi-
  nation are the statutory limitations on the circumstances
  where offsets are applied. See 

(6). Specif-
  ically, section 1677(6) explicitly lists a narrow range of sce-
  narios where Commerce may apply offsets in calculating
  countervailable subsidies. 

 These include, among other
  scenarios, cases involving fees paid to receive a subsidy and
  “loss in the value” of the subsidy due to delayed receipt. 

  The enumerated scenarios do not include, as relevant here,
  tax consequences from prior year’s benefit. Id.; see Kajaria
  Iron Castings Pvt. Ltd. v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing permissible offsets under
  § 1677(6)).
      Accordingly, we agree with the Court of International
  Trade that Commerce acted in accordance with law when
  it excluded taxes incurred from the previous year’s credit
  in computing the benefit Marmen received under the
  GASPÉTC program.
             iii.    On-the-Job-Training Tax Credit
       Lastly, Appellants challenge Commerce’s determina-
  tion that the Québec on-the-job training tax credit was de
  facto specific under 

(5A)(D)(iii). Appel-
  lants Br. 62. As noted supra, to be countervailable, a sub-
  sidy must be “specific” to a foreign enterprise or industry,
  or a group of foreign enterprises or industries. 

(5)(A). Specificity can be de jure (as a matter of law),
  or de facto. 

 § 1677(5A)(D). As relevant here, a subsidy
  is de facto specific if Commerce finds “one or more of the
  following factors”:
       (I) The actual recipients of the subsidy, whether
       considered on an enterprise or industry basis, are
       limited in number.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 25    Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                                  25



      (II) An enterprise or industry is a predominant
      user of the subsidy.
      (III) An enterprise or industry receives a dispropor-
      tionately large amount of the subsidy.
      (IV) The manner in which the authority providing
      the subsidy has exercised discretion in the decision
      to grant the subsidy indicates that an enterprise or
      industry is favored over others.
  Id. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii). In assessing de facto specificity,
  Commerce examines the factors enumerated in 

(5A)(D)(iii) sequentially. 

. “If a
  single factor warrants a finding of specificity, [Commerce]
  will not undertake further analysis.” 

 § 351.502(a).
  Here, Commerce found the on-the-job training tax credit to
  be de facto specific based on factor (I), namely the actual
  number of recipients was “limited in number” on an enter-
  prise basis. J.A. 129.
      Appellants raise two primary challenges to Com-
  merce’s specificity determination. Appellants first contend
  that Commerce erred in not conducting a de jure specificity
  analysis, which Appellants argue should inform the de
  facto analysis. Appellants Br. 64. Appellants also argue
  that Commerce’s comparison approach in its “limited in
  number” analysis was methodologically unsound and con-
  travened the SAA’s directive regarding the purpose of the
  specificity determination. Id. at 71–78. We disagree.
      First, contrary to Appellants’ contention, the statute
  does not make a de jure analysis a prerequisite inquiry for
  a de facto analysis. Rather, the statutory language is clear
  that specificity can be either de jure or de facto. 

(5A)(D)(ii)–(iii). The de jure specificity inquiry is
  separate from the de facto inquiry and the two are based
  on different factors. 

 Commerce thus did not err in find-
  ing specificity based on its de facto analysis without a sep-
  arate de jure analysis.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106      Page: 26    Filed: 06/21/2024




  26                             GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




      Second, Commerce did not err in using the total corpo-
  rate tax filers as a comparator in assessing whether the
  credit recipients are limited in number. The governing
  statute and the implementing regulations do not prescribe
  any mandatory method that Commerce must employ in as-
  sessing de facto specificity or analyzing the listed factors.
  See 

(5A)(D)(iii); 

. Ra-
  ther, it is a fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry, where
  the factors involved and the weight accorded to them vary
  from case to case. Royal Thai Gov’t v. United States, 

, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see SAA, H.R. Doc. No.
  103-316, at 929. In conducting this inquiry, Commerce ex-
  ercises the necessary latitude afforded it in choosing the
  appropriate approach.
      We agree with the Court of International Trade that
  Commerce did not exceed that latitude here. In assessing
  specificity, Commerce considered that the on-the-job train-
  ing program is to encourage businesses to take on trainees.
  J.A. 8400. Both corporations and individuals engaging in
  business activities can avail themselves of this program
  and claim the tax credit. 

 The Government of Québec
  reported that during the 2018 period of investigation, 4,930
  of 387,949 corporate entities, roughly 1.27%, 9 received the
  on-the-job training credit. J.A. 1982; J.A. 2173. Commerce
  thus concluded that the credit recipients were “limited in
  number” on an “enterprise” basis. J.A. 129. As the Court
  of International Trade pointed out, Commerce has taken
  similar comparison approaches to assess specificity of tax
  credit programs in past investigations. CIT Decision, 567



       9   This percentage is based on a comparison of the
  number of credit recipients to the number of corporate tax
  filers, J.A. 1982, excluding individual tax filers engaging
  in business. The United States contends that this percent-
  age would be even smaller if such individual tax filers were
  included. United States Br. 60–61, 61 n.7.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106     Page: 27    Filed: 06/21/2024




  GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US                               27



  F. Supp. 3d at 1291–92; see also United States Br. 76–77.
  While the facts in other cases may call for different ap-
  proaches or considerations, the nature of the program and
  the small percentage of recipients here support Com-
  merce’s “limited in number” assessment. 10 See CIT Deci-
  sion, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 1292.
      Contrary to Appellants’ assertion, Commerce’s ap-
  proach does not conflict with the SAA’s directive regarding
  the purpose of the specificity determination. See, e.g., Ap-
  pellants Br. 72, 74. As stated in the SAA, the specificity
  determination serves to “winnow out only those foreign
  subsidies which truly are broadly available and widely
  used throughout an economy.” SAA, H.R. Doc. No.
  103-316, at 929. It ensures that countervailing duties are
  not improperly levied against subsidies that are generally
  available and widely used across the economy, such as cer-
  tain public infrastructure-related programs. Id. at 929–30.
  Commerce’s comparison of the on-the-job training credit re-
  cipients to corporate tax filers aligns with this intended
  purpose of the specificity determination. As the Court of
  International Trade noted, Commerce’s comparison is “in-
  structive in determining whether the subsidy is widely
  spread throughout the economy.” CIT Decision, 567 F.
  Supp. 3d at 1291. Given the nature of the program, the



      10   For similar reasons, we find unpersuasive Appel-
  lants’ reliance on Mosaic Co. v. United States, 

 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2023), which Appellants submitted
  as a supplemental authority. In Mosaic, the Court of In-
  ternational Trade rejected Commerce’s de facto specificity
  analysis concerning a different and unrelated penalty relief
  program. Mosaic, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 1314. As the Court
  of International Trade itself explained in Mosaic, the pro-
  gram at issue there was “distinguishable” from the on-the-
  job training program we are evaluating in this case. Id. at
  1315 n.10.
Case: 22-1807    Document: 106        Page: 28   Filed: 06/21/2024




  28                             GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US




  limited number of recipients (about 1.27% of corporate en-
  tities) demonstrates that the on-the-job credit is not one of
  widespread availability and use throughout the economy.
       Accordingly, we agree with the Court of International
  Trade that Commerce’s de facto specificity determination
  of the on-the-job training credit is supported by substantial
  evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law.
                         CONCLUSION
      We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments
  and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth
  above, we conclude that Commerce’s Final Affirmative De-
  termination is supported by substantial evidence and in ac-
  cordance with law. Accordingly, the Court of International
  Trade’s decision sustaining Commerce’s Final Affirmative
  Determination is affirmed.
                          AFFIRMED
                              COSTS
  Costs against Appellants.