Case: 23-1501    Document: 66     Page: 1   Filed: 01/27/2025




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                      APPLE INC.,
                       Appellant

  LG ELECTRONICS INC., LG ELECTRONICS USA,
             INC., GOOGLE LLC,
                   Appellees

                             v.

     GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC,
                 Cross-Appellant
             ______________________

                   2023-1501, 2023-1554
                  ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2021-
 00921, IPR2022-00092, IPR2022-00362.
                  ______________________

                Decided: January 27, 2025
                 ______________________

     ROBERT MANHAS, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP,
 Washington, DC, argued for appellant, appellees. Appel-
 lant also represented by MELANIE L. BOSTWICK; CLIFFORD
 T. BRAZEN, ADAM PRESCOTT SEITZ, Erise IP, P.A., Overland
 Park, KS; PAUL R. HART, Denver, CO.

    STANLEY JOSEPH PANIKOWSKI, III, DLA Piper LLP
 (US), San Diego, CA, for appellees LG Electronics Inc., LG
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 2          APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC




 Electronics USA, Inc. Also represented by MATTHEW D.
 SATCHWELL, Chicago, IL.

     ERIKA ARNER, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett
 & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, for appellee Google LLC.
 Also represented by DANIEL COOLEY, Reston, VA.

     JOHN WITTENZELLNER, Williams Simons & Landis
 PLLC, Philadelphia, PA, argued for cross-appellant. Also
 represented by ERIC CARR, MARK JOHN EDWARD
 MCCARTHY, FRED WILLIAMS, Austin, TX.
                ______________________

     Before LOURIE, DYK, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 DYK, Circuit Judge.
     In this inter partes review proceeding (“IPR”), the Pa-
 tent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) determined that
 claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–17 of 

 (the “’949 patent”) were unpatentable, but it determined
 that claims 4, 11, and 18 were not shown to be unpatenta-
 ble. Patent owner Gesture Technology Partners, LLC
 (“Gesture”) cross-appeals the Board’s unpatentability find-
 ings as to claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–17, 1 and IPR petitioner
 Apple Inc. (“Apple”) appeals the Board’s findings as to
 claims 4, 11, and 18. We limit our discussion to claims 1–
 7 because we have separately affirmed the Board’s decision
 holding claims 8–18 unpatentable in its ex parte reexami-
 nation decision In re Gesture Tech. Partners,
 No. 2023-001857, Reexamination No. 90/014,903 (P.T.A.B.
 Aug. 8, 2023). See In re Gesture Tech. Partners, LLC, No.
 24-1038, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (nonprecedential).



     1  LG Electronics Inc., LG Electronics USA, Inc., and
 Google LLC are appellees in Gesture’s cross-appeal, as
 well. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4 n.1.
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 APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC               3



 We affirm the Board’s determination that claims 1–3 and
 5–7 are unpatentable and reverse the Board’s determina-
 tion that claim 4 is not unpatentable. We also reject Ges-
 ture’s suggestion that the Board lacks jurisdiction in IPRs
 over patents after their expiration.
                         BACKGROUND
     Gesture owns the ’949 patent, entitled “Camera Based
 Interaction and Instruction,” which is directed to image
 capture technology. ’949 patent describes a portable device
 that uses an electro-optical sensor to scan the field of vision
 and detect a user command, i.e., a gesture. When the de-
 vice detects a gesture, its processing unit controls a digital
 camera to capture a digital image. Claim 1 is exemplary
 as to the claims in Gesture’s cross-appeal and recites:
         A portable device comprising:
         a device housing including a forward facing
         portion, the forward facing portion of the device
         housing encompassing an electro-optical sen-
         sor having a field of view and including a digi-
         tal camera separate from the electrooptical
         sensor; and
         a processing unit within the device housing and
         operatively coupled to an output of the electro-
         optical sensor, wherein the processing unit is
         adapted to:
             determine a gesture has been performed in
             the electro-optical sensor field of view
             based on the electro-optical sensor output,
             and
             control the digital camera in response to
             the gesture performed in the electro-optical
             sensor field of view, wherein the gesture
             corresponds to an image capture command,
             and wherein the image capture command
             causes the digital camera to store an image
             to memory.
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 4           APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC




 ’949 patent, col. 15, ll. 21–38.   Claim 4 depends from
 claim 1 and requires the electro-optical sensor to be “fixed”
 in relation to the digital camera:

         The portable device of claim 1 wherein the elec-
         tro-optical sensor is fixed in relation to the dig-
         ital camera.
 ’949 patent, col. 15, ll. 43–44.
     In June 2021, Apple filed an IPR petition for the then-
 expired ’949 patent, asserting that each of its claims was
 unpatentable as obvious over 

 (“Numazaki”) and Japanese Patent Application No. H4-
 73631 (“Nonaka”). Numazaki discloses an “information in-
 put generation apparatus” that detects subjects using a
 “reflected light extraction unit” and “visible light photo-de-
 tection array,” J.A. 959, and Nonaka discloses a camera
 that captures images when an equipped remote release de-
 vice detects a user command.
     Apple argued that Nonaka suggested combining three
 of Numazaki’s embodiments to arrive at a portable device
 that captures video images in response to detecting prede-
 termined gestures. Apple further argued that Numazaki’s
 light extraction unit is fixed in relation to its photo-detec-
 tion array. The Board concluded that Apple had demon-
 strated that claims 1–3 and 5–7 are unpatentable as
 obvious but not claim 4, finding that Numazaki does not
 disclose the “fixed” limitation. Apple appeals, and Gesture
 cross-appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

(a)(4)(A).
                          DISCUSSION
     “Obviousness is a mixed question of fact and law.” No-
 vartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We review the Board’s legal conclusion of
 obviousness de novo and its factual findings for substantial
 evidence. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 

, 1354
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 APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC                 5



 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We interpret claim terms by looking to
 their ordinary meaning in light of the specification and
 prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 

,
 1315–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Vasudevan Software,
 Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir.
 2015).
                                I
      Gesture argues that the Board could not exercise juris-
 diction over this IPR because the ’949 patent expired in
 May 2020, before Apple filed its petition in June 2021. Ac-
 cording to Gesture, this is because the Supreme Court’s de-
 cision in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy
 Group, LLC, 

 (2018), explained that the “deci-
 sion to grant a patent is . . . the grant of a public franchise,”
 Cross-Appellant’s Br. 42 (quoting Oil States, 584 U.S. at
 334–35), and once a patent expires “the public franchise
 ceases to exist and the patent owner no longer has the right
 to exclude others,” id. at 43. Since the patentee’s right be-
 comes limited to collecting damages that formerly existed
 through an infringement action in an Article III court, Ges-
 ture argues, jurisdiction over the expired patent becomes
 limited to the Article III courts.
     To date, our prior cases have not squarely addressed
 whether the Board may institute IPRs for patents after
 they have expired; however, we have previously reviewed
 IPR decisions involving expired patents, implicitly assum-
 ing that the Board had jurisdiction in such cases. See, e.g.,
 Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 

,
 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (acknowledging cases where the chal-
 lenged patents “had expired before the Board’s decision”);
 Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 

, 1382 n.8
 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (discussing claim construction in “IPR pro-
 ceedings concerning expired and soon-to-be-expired pa-
 tents”). We confirm here that the Board has jurisdiction
 over IPRs concerning expired patents.
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 6          APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC




      The public-rights doctrine recognizes that Congress
 may assign some matters either to the Article III judiciary
 or to a non-Article III forum. Matters “involving public
 rights . . . may be presented in such form that the judicial
 power is capable of acting on them, . . . but which congress
 may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
 of the United States, as it may deem proper.” Murray’s
 Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 

 (1855). The Supreme Court has thus
 long held that Congress has the authority to assign to non-
 Article III forums those matters “arising between the gov-
 ernment and others, which from their nature do not require
 judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.” Crow-
 ell v. Benson, 

 (1932) (quoting Ex parte Ba-
 kelite Corp., 

 (1929)).
     In Oil States, the Supreme Court held that the Board’s
 jurisdiction over IPRs does not run afoul of Article III un-
 der the public-rights doctrine. 584 U.S. at 334–35. The
 Court first recognized that the grant of a patent inherently
 involves public rights, since “by issuing . . . patents, the
 PTO take[s] from the public rights of immense value and
 bestow[s] them upon the patentee.” Id. at 335 (alterations
 in original) (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.,
 

 (1888)). The Court then explained that,
 because an IPR is “a second look at an earlier administra-
 tive grant of a patent,” it involves the public’s same “inter-
 est in seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their
 legitimate scope.” 

 at 336–37 (quoting Cuozzo Speed
 Techs., LLC v. Lee, 

, 279–80 (2016)). Recog-
 nizing that a public franchise can be qualified by an
 agency’s authority to cancel it outside of an Article III
 court, the Court concluded that IPRs fall within the public-
 rights doctrine and do not violate Article III. 

.
     Gesture’s argument that the “public franchise ceases to
 exist” after a patent expires, Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 43, is
 incompatible with the Court’s logic in Oil States. There,
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 APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC              7



 the Court’s conclusion that an IPR falls under the public-
 rights doctrine was based on the fact that the procedure
 involves a “second look” at the earlier determination of
 granting a public right in the first place. 

 (quoting Cuozzo, 597 U.S. at 279). The review of an earlier
 grant of a patent thus inherently involves the adjudication
 of a public right, and it is irrelevant whether the patent has
 expired, since the patent itself continues to confer a limited
 set of rights to the patentee. See id. at 337.
     As we have explained, although a “patentee has fewer
 rights . . . when [its] patent has expired,” Keranos, LLC
 v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2015), it nevertheless maintains some rights,
 such as bringing an action for past damages, see Genetics
 Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc.,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The existence of
 those rights creates a live case or controversy, which can
 be adjudicated by an IPR and in proceedings before this
 court on appeal. See Sony Corp. v. Iancu, 

,
 1238 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Gesture fails to explain why an
 IPR, which “would have a consequence on any infringe-
 ment that occurred during the life,” 

 of the patent, falls
 outside the scope of the public-rights doctrine solely be-
 cause the patentee’s prospective right to exclude others has
 terminated. We accordingly reject Gesture’s challenge to
 the Board’s jurisdiction.
                               II
      We next address the Board’s decision holding obvious
 claims 1–3 and 5–7. Numazaki discloses several configu-
 rations for detecting, capturing, and processing visual in-
 formation.     Numazaki’s fifth embodiment relates to
 videoconferencing functionality and is directed to the ex-
 traction of useful image information. See J.A. 959 (col. 39,
 ll. 6–14). The embodiment’s light extraction unit extracts
 feature data of a target (e.g., the speaker), while the photo-
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 8          APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC




 detection array captures the entire field of view. Numazaki
 teaches transmitting only essential information by super-
 imposing the output of the photo-detection array and light
 extraction unit and capturing only the overlap as a video
 image. Numazaki’s third embodiment relates to gesture
 recognition and discloses the execution of a user command
 when a gesture camera detects a predetermined gesture.
 Numazaki’s eighth embodiment discloses a laptop that can
 incorporate functionalities described in previous embodi-
 ments.
     The Board found that a person of ordinary skill in the
 art would apply Nonaka’s teachings about the benefits of
 remote release functionality to insert Numazaki’s third
 embodiment’s gesture recognition and fifth embodiment’s
 video capture into the eighth embodiment’s laptop. The
 Board found that Numazaki’s light extraction unit corre-
 sponded to the ’949 patent’s electro-optical sensor and that
 Numazaki’s photo-detection array corresponded to the
 ’949 patent’s digital camera. Accordingly, the Board deter-
 mined that the combination of Numazaki and Nonaka dis-
 closed a device that controls a digital camera to capture
 video images in response to an electro-optical sensor’s de-
 tection of predetermined gestures, rendering claims 1–3
 and 5–7 obvious. The Board thus determined that Apple
 had sufficiently demonstrated a motivation to combine No-
 naka and Numazaki.
     On the cross-appeal, Gesture argues that the Board’s
 finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be
 motivated by Nonaka to combine Numazaki’s third, fifth,
 and eighth embodiments to render obvious claims 1–3 and
 5–7 was not supported by substantial evidence.
                              A
     First, Gesture argues that the Board erred in conclud-
 ing that Numazaki’s light extraction unit mapped onto the
 ’949 patent’s electro-optical sensor. Gesture points to a
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 APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC              9



 portion of its expert’s conclusory declaration in which he
 asserted that “[b]ecause of its ‘difference calculation
 unit . . .’ and its two separate [photo-detection units] hav-
 ing specific timing and lighting requirements, in [his] opin-
 ion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not have
 understood Numazaki’s ‘reflected light extraction unit . . .’
 as being the ‘electro-optical sensor’ of claim [1.]” J.A. 1987
 ¶ 45. But Gesture’s expert provided no explanation for why
 an electro-optical sensor cannot comprise two units with
 distinct timing requirements. The Board was accordingly
 not required to accept this conclusory assertion. See cxLoy-
 alty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The Board examined Numazaki’s disclo-
 sure and concluded that its reflected light unit “senses light
 and converts the sensed light into electronic signals,”
 which it found satisfies the “plain meaning of an ‘electro-
 optical sensor.’” J.A. 18 & n.7. We see no error in the
 Board’s weighing the plain import of Numazaki’s disclo-
 sure over Gesture’s expert’s cryptic, unsupported state-
 ment to the contrary. 2



     2   Relatedly, Gesture faults the Board for failing to
 explain “how the sensor and camera are included on the
 ‘forward facing portion’ of the device housing.” Cross-Ap-
 pellant’s Br. at 37. As a preliminary matter, Gesture did
 not make this argument before the Board, and we can
 hardly fault the Board for failing to precisely respond to an
 argument Gesture failed to raise before it. See Rembrandt
 Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc., 

, 1382–83
 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Putting forfeiture to the side, we can “rea-
 sonably discern[]” the Board’s path, Nucor Corp. v. United
 States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omit-
 ted), since it found that Numazaki’s sensor and camera
 were both forward facing and had overlapping fields of
 view, which would naturally require situating them on the
 same forward-facing “portion.” See J.A. 16–17, 21.
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 10         APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC




                              B
      Gesture also challenges the Board’s finding that a per-
 son of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to mod-
 ify Numazaki to teach a processing unit that “determine[d]
 a gesture has been performed in the electro-optical sensor
 field of view based on the electro-optical sensor output.”
 Cross-Appellant’s Br. at 38 (quoting ’949 patent, col. 15,
 ll. 26–32). Gesture’s argument appears to be that the
 Board’s analysis did not sufficiently explain why a person
 of ordinary skill in the art would understand how to com-
 bine Numazaki’s third, fifth, and eighth embodiments be-
 cause of their specialized processing units. But Apple was
 not required to identify embodiments with identical pro-
 cessing units, since the obviousness inquiry looks to the
 “combined teachings of the references” and “does not re-
 quire an actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re
 Mouttet, 

, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Moreo-
 ver, the Board did explain how a person of ordinary skill in
 the art would understand how to combine these embodi-
 ments, crediting Apple’s expert’s uncontroverted explana-
 tion that a person of ordinary skill would recognize how to
 “utilize the same output by two separate processing blocks”
 by “arranging multiple distinct processing units that sepa-
 rately process the same output of a single unit.” J.A. 24
 (quoting J.A. 1777 ¶ 9).
                              C
     Finally, Gesture argues that the Board improperly
 found that Nonaka suggested modifying Numazaki so as to
 “control the digital camera in response to the gesture per-
 formed in the electro-optical sensor field of view.” Cross-
 Appellant’s Br. at 40 (quoting ’949 patent, col. 15, ll. 33–
 38). Gesture argues that if Numazaki’s third and fifth em-
 bodiments were inserted into its eighth embodiment’s lap-
 top, there would be no reason to implement Nonaka’s
 remote-control functionality, since the user of a laptop
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 APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC              11



 usually sits directly adjacent to the device. But the Board
 expressly considered and rejected this argument based on
 its review of Numazaki and Nonaka, concluding that a per-
 son of ordinary skill in the art would still perceive benefits
 in implementing Nonaka’s teachings to Numazaki. Specif-
 ically, the Board found that “even if Numazaki does sug-
 gest that the user would need to be within reach to
 physically interact with the laptop, this does not mean that
 one of ordinary skill in the art would not have recognized
 the advantages of using remote gestures taught by No-
 naka,” J.A. 28, including a “higher degree of freedom, good
 portability, and cost benefits,” J.A. 29. Accordingly, we af-
 firm as to Gesture’s cross-appeal.
                               III
     The sole issue presented by Apple’s appeal is whether
 the Board properly determined claim 4’s “fixed” limitation
 was not obvious in light of Numazaki. Apple argues that
 the Board improperly ignored Apple’s expert’s testimony
 and that, with that testimony, the record indisputably
 showed agreement between the experts that a fixed rela-
 tionship between the components would have been desira-
 ble. This, in turn, would compel the conclusion that
 claim 4’s fixed limitation is obvious. We agree.
      We first consider the Board’s decision to ignore Apple’s
 expert’s testimony relating to the fixed limitation. In its
 IPR petition, Apple argued that Numazaki taught the fixed
 limitation because Numazaki’s fifth embodiment posi-
 tioned its photo-detection array and light extraction unit
 “side-by-side such that they have overlapping fields of
 view.” J.A. 156. Apple’s expert explained that “[g]iven . . .
 [that] the output of [the light extraction unit] is used to de-
 fine which portions the video captured by [the photo-detec-
 tion array] are retained, a [person of ordinary skill in the
 art] would have understood that both . . . have overlapping
 fields of view.” J.A. 778 ¶ 52. Apple expressly cited to this
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 12          APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC




 portion of the declaration with regard to claim 1, and then
 by incorporation with regard to claim 4. Compare J.A. 146
 (claim 1), with J.A. 156 (claim 4). In his supplemental dec-
 laration, Apple’s expert elaborated that the fact that the
 two components require overlapping fields of view was
 “key” to his conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the
 art would find fixing them in relation to one another to be
 desirable. J.A. 1782–84 ¶¶ 13–15.
      In its final written decision with respect to claim 4, the
 Board ignored Apple’s expert’s testimony, reasoning that
 Apple’s IPR petition “[did] not reference any such analysis
 in connection with the subject matter of claim[] 4.” J.A. 34.
 But under our precedent, Apple’s expert’s testimony was
 sufficiently confined to the argument made in Apple’s IPR
 petition to warrant consideration by the Board, since “a
 party is ‘not barred from elaborating on [its] arguments on
 issues previously raised.’” Masimo Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
 No. 2022-1631, 

, at *5 (Fed. Cir.
 Sept. 12, 2023) (nonprecedential) (alteration in original)
 (quoting Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc.,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); see also Apple Inc.
 v. Andrea Elecs. Corp., 

, 705–06 (Fed. Cir.
 2020). Here, Apple’s expert simply expanded upon the sig-
 nificance of Numazaki’s components retaining overlapping
 fields of vision to the fixed limitation, an argument that
 was expressly raised in Apple’s IPR petition. Accordingly,
 the Board erred in failing to consider this material evi-
 dence properly before it.
     The issue then becomes whether the record, properly
 including Apple’s expert’s testimony, provides substantial
 support for the Board’s conclusion that claim 4 was not ob-
 vious. We note that the term “fixed” is not defined any-
 where in the patent and thus consider its meaning in light
 of the specification, which is the “single best guide to the
 meaning of a disputed term.” Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City
 of New York v. Symantec Corp., 

, 1362
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 APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC               13



 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
 Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
      In the context of claim 4, “fixed” contemplates a rela-
 tionship between the portable device’s electro-optical sen-
 sor and digital camera. The ’949 patent’s specification
 explains that the goal of the invention is to cause a digital
 camera to capture an image of a subject when the device
 detects a gesture in the camera’s field of view. See ’949 pa-
 tent, col. 2, ll. 4–8. This is accomplished by processing the
 electro-optical sensor’s output and automatically capturing
 images when a gesture is detected. 

 at col. 5, ll. 24–38.
 It follows that, in the context of the ’949 patent, the electro-
 optical sensor and digital camera must have overlapping
 fields of vision while the digital image is captured. See
 J.A. 1782–84 (Apple’s expert); J.A. 1809 (Gesture’s expert).
 It would seem that in the context of the ’949 patent, the
 electro-optical sensor and digital camera are necessarily
 “fixed” in relation to one another when their spatial rela-
 tionship stays constant while an image is being captured,
 and Numazaki disclosed this limitation.
     But we need not reach this issue of claim construction,
 since even under the Board’s construction, which suggests
 that the components must remain fixed at all times, the
 undisputed evidence in the record clearly showed that a
 person of ordinary skill in the art would have been moti-
 vated to fix Numazaki’s photo-detection array and light ex-
 traction unit in relation to one another.

      Both experts agreed that to accomplish Numazaki’s
 fifth embodiment’s purpose, the photo-detection array and
 light extraction unit must retain overlapping fields of view.
 The Board itself found that Numazaki’s light extraction
 unit extracted only the “overlapping portion” of the two
 components’ fields of view. J.A. 13. Apple’s expert testified
 that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have un-
 derstood . . . [that] to perform the basic function of the fifth
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 14         APPLE INC. v. GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC




 embodiment, [the components] must have and maintain
 overlapping fields of view” and that “fixing them retains
 overlapping fields of view.” J.A. 1783–84 ¶¶ 14–15. Alt-
 hough Gesture’s expert testified that Numazaki’s “purpose
 could be satisfied with partial overlap potentially,”
 J.A. 1809, i.e., that a small degree of movement would be
 permissible, he did not explain how such movement could
 possibly serve the invention’s purpose of capturing images
 simultaneously and did not suggest that a person of ordi-
 nary skill in the art would find such movement to be desir-
 able. Instead, he agreed “that to accomplish its goal, the
 fifth embodiment in Numazaki requires [the light extrac-
 tion unit] and [photo-detection array] to retain overlapping
 fields of view” and that “fixing them ensures that . . . the
 fields of view, whatever they are, will be maintained,”
 J.A. 1810.

     There is accordingly “no reasonable dispute” that fixing
 the two components was desirable because doing so en-
 sured the necessary overlap, and that doing so was “readily
 achievable” and would “serve [Numazaki’s] undisputed
 goal.” Google LLC v. Koninklijke Philips N.V., 

, 844–46 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Because correcting the
 Board’s analysis results in only “only one permissible fac-
 tual finding,” reversal is appropriate. Corning v. Fast Felt
 Corp., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
                        CONCLUSION
      For the forgoing reasons, we hold that the Board had
 jurisdiction in this IPR. We affirm the Board’s determina-
 tion that claims 1–3 and 5–7 are unpatentable and reverse
 the Board’s determination that claim 4 is not unpatenta-
 ble.
   AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND REVERSED-IN-PART
                             COSTS
 Costs to appellant Apple.