Case: 23-1674    Document: 68     Page: 1    Filed: 06/16/2025




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

           ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
                    Appellant

                             v.

   ROKU, INC., VIZIO, INC., NINTENDO CO., LTD.,
          NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC.,
                      Appellees
               ______________________

                   2023-1674, 2023-1701
                  ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2021-
 01338, IPR2021-01406.
                  ______________________

                  Decided: June 16, 2025
                  ______________________

    STEVEN M. SEIGEL, Susman Godfrey LLP, Seattle, WA,
 argued for appellant. Also represented by ANDRES HEALY;
 ALEXANDRA GISELLE WHITE, Houston, TX.

    ANDREW DUFRESNE, Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, WI,
 argued for all appellees. Appellees Nintendo Co., Ltd., Nin-
 tendo of America Inc. also represented by KYLE R.
 CANAVERA, San Diego, CA.

    RICHARD CRUDO, Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox
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 2                   ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 PLLC, Washington, DC, for appellees Roku, Inc., VIZIO,
 Inc. Also represented by LESTIN L. KENTON, JR.
                  ______________________

     Before LOURIE, REYNA, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
      Ancora Technologies, Inc. appeals two final written de-
 cisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concluding
 that various claims of 

 are un-
 patentable as obvious. Because the Board erred in apply-
 ing our precedent on nexus to the license evidence offered
 as objective indicia of nonobviousness, we vacate and re-
 mand.
                        BACKGROUND
                               I.
     Ancora Technologies, Inc. (“Ancora”) owns 

 (“’941 patent”). The ’941 patent generally re-
 lates to the restriction of unauthorized use of licensed soft-
 ware programs on computers. ’941 patent, Abstract.
 Specifically, the ’941 patent relates to software based prod-
 ucts that prevent hackers from copying a software program
 that was licensed for use on a computer. 

 at 1:21–35.
 The patent aims to avoid reliance on a computer’s “volatile
 memory media,” which are subject to “physical instabili-
 ties.” 

 at 1:24–26. The patent describes a method of re-
 stricting use of a licensed software program on a computer
 that has at least two “non-volatile memory areas” and one
 volatile area. 

 at 2:62–3:3. In a “non-limiting, preferred
 embodiment,” the non-volatile areas are inside a “Basic In-
 put / Output System” (“BIOS”) module. 

 at 4:49–54. A
 BIOS is built into a computer and allows it to start up, in
 contrast to an operating system (“OS”), see J.A. 1075,
 which runs software once the computer is started.
    The method described in claim 1 of the patent includes
 two features related to making a licensed program secure
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                    3



 using the non-volatile area of a BIOS. First, a “key” is the
 computer’s unique identification code embedded during
 manufacture in the “read-only memory” (“ROM”) section of
 the BIOS and stored in a non-volatile part of the BIOS
 where it cannot be erased or modified. 

 at 1:42–52. Sec-
 ond, a “verification structure” indicates that a program is
 licensed to run on the computer and is located in a second
 non-volatile area of the BIOS where, unlike in the first area
 where the key is stored, data can be erased or modified
 (such as in the computer’s “electrically erasable program-
 mable read-only memory,” or “EEPROM,” section). 

 at 1:59–2:9. The verification structure includes a “license
 record,” which is created as part of the process of creating
 the verification structure. 

 at 6:18–27, 5:13–16. The li-
 cense record is an encrypted code stored in the second non-
 volatile section of the BIOS (such as the EEPROM), so that
 the encrypted code can be erased or modified. 

 at 1:53–58.
     The method described in claim 1 has four key steps.
 First, the method selects a program in the computer’s vol-
 atile memory area (such as the internal “random access
 memory” or “RAM”). 

 at 2:66–67, 5:15–16. Second, the
 method sets up a verification structure in the non-volatile
 memory areas. 

 at 2:67–3:1. At this second step, the
 method uses an “agent” to set up the verification structure
 in an erasable, non-volatile memory area (such as the
 EEPROM). 

 at claim 1. Third, the method uses that
 structure to verify the program. 

 at 3:1–2. Fourth,
 based on the verification, the method acts on the program.
 

 at 3:2–3.
     At issue are claims 1–3, 6–14, and 16 of the ’941 patent.
 Claim 1 is an independent claim; the remaining claims di-
 rectly or indirectly depend from claim 1. Claim 1 reads:
     1. A method of restricting software operation
     within a license for use with a computer including
     an erasable, non-volatile memory area of a BIOS of
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 4                   ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




     the computer, and a volatile memory area; the
     method comprising the steps of:
     selecting a program residing in the volatile
     memory,
     using an agent to set up a verification structure in
     the erasable, non-volatile memory of the BIOS, the
     verification structure accommodating data that in-
     cludes at least one license record,
     verifying the program using at least the verifica-
     tion structure from the erasable non-volatile
     memory of the BIOS, and
     acting on the program according to the verification.
 ’941 patent, claim 1 (emphasis added).
                              II.
                  A. PROSECUTION HISTORY
     During prosecution, the examiner rejected an earlier
 version of claim 1 for lack of adequate written description
 and lack of enablement under 

, because the
 application did not teach either the device needed to edit
 an EEPROM or how the system would handle the complex
 processing required to write and erase data. J.A. 2934–35.
 The examiner also rejected claims 2–19 because they de-
 pend from claim 1. J.A. 2935. In response, Ancora
 amended claim 1 to add an “agent” that sets up the “verifi-
 cation structure in the erasable, non-volatile memory of the
 BIOS” (e.g., an EEPROM). J.A. 12953, 2956. As amended,
 the limitation reads: “using an agent to set up a verification
 structure in the erasable, non-volatile memory of the BIOS,
 the verification structure accommodating data that in-
 cludes at least one license record” (“‘agent’ limitation”).
 J.A. 2956 (emphasis added). The examiner then rejected
 all pending claims for obviousness based on certain prior
 art references. J.A. 2968–71. Ancora replied, arguing that
 these references “do not teach or suggest, among other
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                       5



 things, storing a verification structure, such as software li-
 cense information, in the BIOS of a computer.” J.A. 2977.
     The examiner later allowed Ancora’s amended claims,
 explaining, in part, that the prior art does “not teach li-
 censed programs running at the OS level,” where those pro-
 grams “interact[] with a program verification structure
 stored in the BIOS” for the purpose of “verify[ing] the pro-
 gram using the verification structure.” J.A. 2988. The ex-
 aminer also explained that the invention “overcomes” the
 fact that a BIOS is “not setup [sic] to manage a software
 license verification structure.” J.A. 2988. According to the
 examiner, the invention overcomes this problem in a BIOS
 by “using an agent to set up a verification structure in the
 erasable, non-volatile memory of the BIOS.” J.A. 2988
 (emphasis added).
                   B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      In 2021, Nintendo Co., Ltd. and Nintendo of America,
 Inc. (collectively, “Nintendo”) and Roku, Inc. and VIZIO,
 Inc. (collectively, “Roku”) filed petitions for inter partes re-
 view (“IPR”) of the ’941 patent.           See J.A. 163–240,
 4575–654. In 2023, the Board issued two final written de-
 cisions determining that claims 1–3, 6–14, and 16 are un-
 patentable as obvious over Hellman, 1 Chou, 2 and a third
 prior art reference that is not at issue on appeal. Nintendo
 Co., Ltd. v. Ancora Techs., Inc., No. IPR2021-01338
 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2023) (“Nintendo Decision”), J.A. 1–54;
 Roku, Inc. v. Ancora Techs., Inc., No. IPR2021-01406
 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2023) (“Roku Decision”), J.A. 55–111.
     Hellman discloses a method and apparatus for author-
 izing a “base unit” to use a “software package” a “specific
 number of times.” Hellman, 4:37–40. Relevant to this ap-
 peal, the base unit has a component called a “one-way hash


     1   

 (“Hellman”).
     2   

 (“Chou”).
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 6                   ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 function generator.” 

 at 6:31–61. Generally, a hash
 function converts input data into a string of numbers with
 a fixed length, a “hash value.” Here, the hash function gen-
 erator receives a signal from outside the base unit that rep-
 resents the software package, then converts that signal
 into “hash value H.” 

 The generator next sends a signal
 representing hash value H to another component in the
 base unit, the “update unit.” 

 at 9:64–10:1. The update
 unit uses the value H as an “address” to a third unit, the
 “non-volatile memory.” 

 at 10:1–14, 10:39–44.
      The update unit sends the signal representing value H
 to the non-volatile memory, which uses value H to calculate
 “M,” the number of available uses of the software package.
 

 at 10:40–43. The non-volatile memory then sends back
 to the update unit a signal representing M. 

 If M is
 greater than 0, the update unit sends a control signal to a
 fourth unit, the “switch,” which sends a signal to activate a
 fifth unit, the “software player,” to allow the player to use
 the package. 

 at 10:44–49. The update unit also sends
 a signal to the non-volatile memory to reduce M by 1. 

 If M is 0, the update unit does not send any signals, either
 to the non-volatile memory to reduce M, or to the switch to
 activate the software player—thus preventing the user
 from using the software package. 

 at 10:50–54. In both
 IPRs, petitioners acknowledged that Hellman does not di-
 rectly disclose the use of memory in a BIOS. J.A. 200,
 4610.
     Chou discloses an apparatus and method to “discour-
 age” computer theft. Chou, Abstract. Relevant to this ap-
 peal, Chou discloses a security routine stored in a BIOS.
 

 The routine verifies a password entered by a user or a
 number read from an externally connected memory device.
 

 at 2:16–32.
     In each decision, the Board construed the claim term
 “agent” in the “agent” limitation as “a software program or
 routine.” Nintendo Decision, J.A. 7–19; Roku Decision,
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                   7



 J.A. 62–75. Based on this construction, the Board deter-
 mined that the challenged claims are unpatentable as ob-
 vious. Nintendo Decision, J.A. 25–52; Roku Decision,
 J.A. 81–109.
     Ancora appeals both decisions, which are now consoli-
 dated.      We have jurisdiction under 

(a)(4)(A) and 

(c).
                        DISCUSSION
     Ancora raises three issues on appeal. First, Ancora ar-
 gues that the Board erred in construing the claim term
 “agent.” Second, Ancora argues that, even if the Board cor-
 rectly construed “agent,” the Board nonetheless erred in
 determining obviousness under 

 based on a
 combination of Hellman and Chou. Third, Ancora argues
 that the Board erred in its analysis of secondary consider-
 ations of nonobviousness.
     We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo
 and its factual determinations for substantial evidence. In
 re NuVasive, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a rea-
 sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
 clusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

 (1938).
     Claim construction is a question of law with underlying
 questions of fact. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys.,
 Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We review de
 novo the Board’s ultimate claim construction and its sup-
 porting determinations that are based on intrinsic evi-
 dence. Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
     Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying
 findings of fact, such as the scope and content of the prior
 art, whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated
 to combine the prior art to achieve the claimed invention,
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 8                    ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 and the presence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. In
 re NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1381–82.
                               I.
     Ancora argues that the Board erred in construing
 “agent” as “a software program or routine,” with no further
 limitations. Appellant Br. 16–37. According to Ancora, the
 proper construction is “a software program or routine” lim-
 ited to use at the OS-level and that excludes hardware (i.e.,
 limited to use in software). 

 at 19–33. We disagree with
 Ancora’s argument.
     The Board first determined that intrinsic evidence pro-
 vides no definition of or disavowal of “agent” as limited to
 use at the OS-level or in software only. Nintendo Decision,
 J.A. 11–19; Roku Decision, J.A. 67–75. Absent lexicogra-
 phy or disavowal, the Board relied on extrinsic evidence to
 determine that the plain and ordinary meaning of “agent”
 is “a software program or routine” without either limita-
 tion. Nintendo Decision, J.A. 10–11 (citing Thorner v. Sony
 Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); Roku Decision, J.A. 65–67 (same). We
 address Ancora’s challenges on each limitation in turn.
     Ancora argues that intrinsic evidence requires constru-
 ing “agent” as limited to use in software only. Appellant
 Br. 29–33. However, neither the patent nor prosecution
 history provide a “clear and unmistakable disclaimer” that
 “agent” must be limited to exclude hardware. Mass. Inst.
 of Tech. v. Shire Pharms., Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted); see Nintendo Deci-
 sion, J.A. 11; Roku Decision, J.A. 67. The patent does not
 define “agent.” See Nintendo Decision, J.A. 11–12; Roku
 Decision, J.A. 67. We recognize that, at several points, the
 specification addresses hardware. For example, the speci-
 fication states that hardware-based products that “access[]
 a dongle that is coupled e.g. to the parallel port of” the per-
 sonal computer are “expensive, inconvenient, and not par-
 ticularly suitable for software that may be sold by
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                    9



 downloading (e.g. over the internet).” ’941 patent, 1:19–32.
 Statements like these merely assert problems in both soft-
 ware- and hardware-based products; they do not provide
 that, to overcome these problems, an “agent” must be soft-
 ware only. See Nintendo Decision, J.A. 17–18; Roku Deci-
 sion, J.A. 73.
     Likewise, the prosecution history does not limit “agent”
 to software only. See Nintendo Decision, J.A. 16–19; Roku
 Decision, J.A. 71–75. Ancora argues disclaimer based on
 statements about hardware in the prosecution history. Ap-
 pellant Br. 30–33 (citing J.A. 2920–22, 2934–35). How-
 ever, these statements, like those in the specification
 addressed above, simply describe problems in both soft-
 ware- and hardware-based products; the statements do not
 provide that, to overcome these problems, an “agent” must
 be software only.
      Ancora further argues that the Board’s determination
 that the computer industry understood the plain meaning
 of “agent” as “a software program or routine” without being
 limited to software only is unsupported by substantial evi-
 dence. 

 at 33–35 (citing Nintendo Decision, J.A. 10).
 The Board, however, cited extensive evidence in support of
 its determination that the plain meaning of “agent” is not
 limited to software only. The Board relied on Ancora’s
 “acknowledg[ments]” that a prior district court decision on
 the ’941 patent held that “the plain and ordinary meaning
 [of] ‘agent’ is ‘a software program or routine,’” without be-
 ing limited to software only. Nintendo Decision, J.A. 10
 (quoting J.A. 505); Roku Decision, J.A. 73–74 (quoting
 J.A. 4860). The Board also relied on the Oxford Dictionary
 of Computing’s definition of “agent,” which states that an
 agent “may be software, hardware, or both.” Nintendo De-
 cision, J.A. 18–19 (quoting J.A. 1691) (Board’s emphasis);
 Roku Decision, J.A. 73–74 (same). Similarly, the Board re-
 lied on Ancora’s expert’s testimony that “a mixed soft-
 ware/hardware entity does have a software component.”
 Nintendo Decision, J.A. 18–19 (quoting J.A. 1600)
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 10                  ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 (quotations omitted); Roku Decision, J.A. 74 (same).
 Lastly, the Board relied on a declaration from another of
 Ancora’s experts that “‘agent’ is not limited to a pure soft-
 ware implementation” and “is generally understood in the
 art to encompass both software and hardware.” Roku De-
 cision, J.A. 73–75 (citing J.A. 1484); see also Nintendo De-
 cision, J.A. 10 (citing, inter alia, J.A. 2727). Ancora’s
 acknowledgements, the dictionary definition, the expert
 testimony, and the expert declaration all provide substan-
 tial evidence supporting the Board’s finding that its con-
 struction is consistent with the computer industry’s
 understanding at the time.
     Ancora also argues that intrinsic evidence requires
 construing “agent” as limited to use at the OS-level. Ap-
 pellant Br. 19–29. However, neither the patent nor prose-
 cution history provide a “clear and unmistakable
 disclaimer” that “agent” must be limited to use at the OS-
 level. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 

 (quotations
 omitted); see Nintendo Decision, J.A. 11; Roku Decision,
 J.A. 67. As addressed above, the patent does not define
 “agent.” See Nintendo Decision, J.A. 11–12; Roku Decision,
 J.A. 67. Moreover, the prosecution history does not show
 that Ancora limited “agent” to use at the OS-level. See Nin-
 tendo Decision, J.A. 8–16; Roku Decision, J.A. 62–71. An-
 cora highlights the examiner’s statement in the Notice of
 Allowance that “‘licensed programs’ interacting with the
 verification structure are ‘running at the OS level.’”
 J.A. 15; see Appellant Br. 23–24 (excerpting this quote).
 Yet this statement does not indicate that the agent, when
 setting up the verification structure, must also run at the
 OS-level. Similarly, Ancora repeatedly excerpts a sentence
 from its remarks in an important amendment to show that
 it defined “agent” as operating at the OS-level. Appellant
 Br. 20–24 (citing J.A. 2979). However, the full sentence
 from those remarks is: “Software license management ap-
 plications, such as the one of the present invention, are op-
 erating system (OS) level programs.” J.A. 2979. Here,
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                    11



 those software license management applications are not
 necessarily agents. Rather, they are the applications
 whose licenses an agent has helped secure using the
 method described in the claims. Again, simply because an
 application runs at the OS-level does not mean that the
 agent also runs at the OS-level. 3
      Ancora further argues that the Board’s finding that the
 computer industry understood the plain meaning of
 “agent” as “a software program or routine” without being
 limited to use at the OS-level is unsupported by substantial
 evidence. Appellant Br. 33–35 (citing Nintendo Decision,
 J.A. 10). The Board, however, cited evidence in support of
 its determination that the plain meaning of “agent” is not
 limited to use at the OS-level. The Board relied on Ancora’s
 “acknowledg[ments]” that a prior district court decision on
 the ’941 patent held that “the plain and ordinary meaning
 [of] ‘agent’ is ‘a software program or routine,’” without fur-
 ther limiting “agent” to use at the OS-level. Nintendo Deci-
 sion, J.A. 10 (quoting J.A. 505); Roku Decision, J.A. 65–66
 (quoting J.A. 4860). Ancora’s acknowledgements are sub-
 stantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that
 the computer industry understood “agent” as not limited to
 use at the OS-level.
     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Board
 correctly construed “agent” as “a software program or


     3   Ancora argues that the prosecution history may
 “not rise to the level of unmistakable disavowal” but none-
 theless “inform[s] the claim construction” due to “repeated
 and consistent remarks during prosecution.” Appellant
 Br. 19–20 (quoting Personalized Media Comm’cns,
 

 (citation omitted)) (quotations omitted).
 Yet, for the reasons provided above, the statements that
 Ancora argues are “repeated and consistent remarks” do
 not establish that, during prosecution, Ancora limited
 “agent” to use at the OS-level.
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 12                  ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 routine,” without limiting it to use at the OS-level or in
 software.
                             II.
     Ancora argues that, even under the Board’s construc-
 tion of “agent,” the Board erred in determining that the
 “agent” limitation was obvious based on a combination of
 Hellman and Chou. Appellant Br. 38–63. Ancora asserts
 three errors in the Board’s analysis of prima facie obvious-
 ness. We address each in turn.
     First, Ancora argues that the Board erred in determin-
 ing claim 1 is obvious in light of the Hellman/Chou combi-
 nation because this combination is inoperable. Appellant
 Br. 43–44. According to Ancora, this combination is inop-
 erable because it uses Hellman’s non-volatile memory (for
 storing M values) to store Chou’s BIOS, thus “creat[ing] the
 very risk” that the ’941 patent aims to prevent: By using
 memory in a BIOS to store non-BIOS data, the combination
 risks “inadvertently” changing data in the BIOS—data
 needed to operate a computer. 

 However, Ancora never
 raised this argument in its response to either petition. See
 J.A. 463–546, 4818–4955. Thus, we conclude that Ancora
 waived its inoperability argument. See Parus Holdings,
 Inc. v. Google LLC, 

, 1371–72
 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
     Second, Ancora argues that the Board’s determination
 of obviousness based on the Hellman/Chou combination
 was erroneous because a person of ordinary skill in the art
 would not be motivated to combine their teachings, as they
 are redundant. Appellant Br. 44–46. Specifically, Ancora
 argues that it is redundant for Chou to contribute a BIOS
 to Hellman’s computer, because Hellman’s computer al-
 ready contains a BIOS. 

 However, Ancora misreads the
 Board’s analysis: The Board found that Chou’s contribution
 to the combination was not merely to add a BIOS to Hell-
 man’s computer, but, more specifically, to motivate a per-
 son of ordinary skill in the art “to store Hellman’s license
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                   13



 information in the BIOS EEPROM, in order to discourage
 users from tampering with the license information and to
 provide extra protection to the sensitive information.” Nin-
 tendo Decision, J.A. 29 (quoting expert testimony) (quota-
 tions omitted); see also Roku Decision, J.A. 84. To reach
 this conclusion, the Board relied on expert testimony. 

 The Board’s finding was thus supported by substantial ev-
 idence.
     Third, Ancora argues that the Board’s determination of
 obviousness based on the Hellman/Chou combination was
 erroneous because Hellman’s memory address H is not a
 “verification structure.” Appellant Br. 46–49. According to
 Ancora, Hellman’s address H “merely identifies a location”
 and “is not a structure,” and Hellman’s alleged “agent,” the
 update unit, never sets up the address, as is required of the
 claimed “agent.” 

 (emphasis in original). Ancora again
 misreads the Board’s decision: The Board did not identify
 Hellman’s address H as the verification structure. Rather,
 the Board agreed with petitioners that testimony showed
 that the claimed verification structure corresponded to
 Hellman’s method of storing M values at address H. Nin-
 tendo Decision, J.A. 35, 37; Roku Decision, J.A. 93–94.
 This testimony was substantial evidence supporting the
 Board’s finding that Hellman taught the claimed verifica-
 tion structure.
     For the foregoing reasons, we agree with what is in ef-
 fect a prima facie determination of obviousness based on
 the Hellman/Chou combination.
                             III.
     The Board further found that Ancora failed to establish
 a sufficient nexus between the claimed invention and evi-
 dence of two objective indicia of nonobviousness: industry
 praise and licensing. Nintendo Decision, J.A. 41–51; Roku
 Decision, J.A. 99–108. Ancora argues that the Board’s
 findings that Ancora failed to show nexus on both indicia
 constituted legal error or were otherwise unsupported by
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 14                   ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 substantial evidence. Appellant Br. 52–63. For the follow-
 ing reasons, we disagree that the Board erred regarding in-
 dustry praise, but we agree that the Board erred regarding
 licensing.
     “[T]o be accorded substantial weight in the obviousness
 analysis, the evidence of secondary considerations must
 have a ‘nexus’ to the claims, i.e., there must be a legally and
 factually sufficient connection between the evidence and
 the patented invention.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster
 LLC, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations and
 quotations omitted). The burden is on the patent owner to
 establish a nexus. 

 The patent owner is entitled to a
 rebuttable presumption of nexus “[i]f the asserted objective
 evidence is tied to a specific product and that product em-
 bodies the claimed features, and is co-extensive with
 them.” 

 at 1332–33 (citations and quotations omitted).
 There is no presumption of nexus if “the patented invention
 is only a small component of the product tied to the objec-
 tive evidence.” 

.
     Concerning industry praise, the Board considered An-
 cora’s evidence of a “joint press release” from American
 Megatrends Inc. (“AMI”) and Ancora that directly named
 the ’941 patent, and an agreement in which AMI would of-
 fer products using the patent.          Nintendo Decision,
 J.A. 43–46    (citing J.A. 4120–35); Roku Decision,
 J.A. 101–03 (same). The Board found that the praise in the
 press release and agreement was directed “more broadly to
 the ’941 patent itself,” not specifically to “the challenged
 claims.” Nintendo Decision, J.A. 44 (Board’s emphasis);
 Roku Decision, J.A. 102 (same). 4



      4   The press release and agreement only refer to An-
 cora “technology” defined broadly as the ’941 patent. See,
 e.g., J.A. 4120 (the press release addressing “technology (as
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                   15



     Ancora argues that the Board erred in finding that An-
 cora failed to show that the press release and agreement
 with AMI had a nexus to the challenged claims. Appellant
 Br. 52 (citing Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We disagree. The AMI press
 release and agreement were directed to commercialization
 plans for “BIOS-based security products,” Nintendo Deci-
 sion, J.A. 44 (emphasis added), and the Board did not
 clearly err in finding that Ancora did not link up those
 products to the challenged claims. It was not error for the
 Board to require that the AMI press release and agreement
 have a nexus to the challenged claims as opposed to the
 patent as a whole.
      Concerning licensing, the Board found that Ancora
 failed to show a nexus between the challenged claims and
 two licenses that Ancora entered into with other parties 5
 during settlements in other cases. Nintendo Decision,
 J.A. 46–51; Roku Decision, J.A. 104–08. Specifically, the
 Board found Ancora “d[id] not establish whether these li-
 censes resulted directly from the unique characteristics of
 the claimed subject matter of the ’941 patent.” Nintendo
 Decision, J.A. 48. The Board also declined to consider a
 third license, which Ancora entered into with another party



 described in US Patent 6,411,941)”), 4125–26 (the agree-
 ment addressing “Ancora Technology,” defined as “Tech-
 nology described in U.S. Patent 6,411,941”).
     5   We are precluded from fully reciting all the facts in
 the record concerning who took licenses under the ’941 pa-
 tent and how much was paid in royalties under those li-
 censes. That material is labelled confidential, and we are
 bound to respect that confidentiality as long as what is so
 labelled relates to genuine business information of interest
 to competitors. That is so here. Suffice it to say that the
 licensees are very substantial companies and the royalties
 they paid were also very substantial.
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 16                  ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 during settlement, because Ancora failed to include it in its
 response. Nintendo Decision, J.A. 48 n.4; Roku Decision,
 J.A. 106 n.4. Still, the Board found that it would have
 treated the third license “similarly” to the second license.
 

      Ancora argues that the Board’s finding that Ancora
 failed to show that any of the licenses had a nexus to the
 claimed invention rested on legal error and was unsup-
 ported by substantial evidence. Appellant Br. 55–59. Ac-
 cording to Ancora, the record evidence was sufficient to
 show a nexus between the identified licenses and the
 claimed invention because the evidence reflected that the
 licenses were directed to the ’941 patent, were all entered
 into near the end of litigation involving the same claims
 and prior art as at issue in this case, and were for “pay-
 ments [that] far exceeded the cost of litigation.” Id. at 56.
 We agree that the Board erred in its nexus analysis of the
 license evidence.
     The Board applied a more exacting nexus standard
 than our case law requires for license evidence. Unlike
 products, which may incorporate numerous features be-
 yond those claimed or described in a patent and therefore
 may require careful parsing to establish a nexus, actual li-
 censes to the subject patent do not demand the same, as
 they are, by their nature, directly tied to the patented tech-
 nology. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Actual licenses to the pa-
 tented technology are highly probative . . . because such ac-
 tual licenses most clearly reflect the economic value of the
 patented technology in the marketplace.”).
     Licenses to the challenged patent then, unlike products
 or other forms of objective evidence of nonobviousness, do
 not require a nexus with respect to the specific claims at
 issue, nor does our nexus law require that a particular pa-
 tent be the only patent being licensed or the sole motivation
 for entering into a license. See Institut Pasteur &
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                     17



 Universite Pierre Et Marie Curie v. Focarino, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that requiring a show-
 ing that “third parties specifically licensed the patent fam-
 ily to gain access to the subject matter claimed in [a
 specific] patent, rather than other technology described in
 the [specific] patent but not claimed or claimed in related
 patents” is more than is required for the nexus analysis,
 because “that theoretical possibility does not undermine
 the strong probative value of the licensing of the [specific]
 patent”). In Institut, we reversed the Board’s obviousness
 determination at least in part because “the Board too finely
 parsed [the patent owner’s] licensing activities.” Id.; see
 also Impax Lab’ys Inc. v. Lannett Holdings Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court’s
 finding that although a “2012 agreement . . . related to the
 various formulation patents . . . a portion of the $130 mil-
 lion had to be based on expected profits from [two specific
 patents]”).
     Similarly, here, the Board too finely parsed the patent
 owner’s licensing activities. Regarding the first license,
 the ’941 patent was the only patent identified by patent
 number in the license agreement, J.A. 4181, but the Board
 reasoned that because “large portions of the license are re-
 dacted,” including all of Exhibit B, “it is impossible for [the
 Board] to discern what was licensed and on what terms pre-
 cisely.”   Nintendo Decision, J.A. 48–49 (emphasis
 added). That is too strict a requirement. Clearly, the ’941
 patent was the subject of the license. See J.A. 4181–82
 (“Ancora . . . grants . . . [a] license under the Ancora Pa-
 tents” and the “Ancora Patents” are defined in a manner
 that only recites the ’941 patent by patent number). The
 same can be said for the Board’s treatment of the second
 and third licenses, which also only specifically identify
 the ’941 patent by U.S. patent number on the face of the
 agreements. See J.A. 4141, 2070.
    Furthermore, the settlements resulting in licenses
 were reached, in the respective cases, after four years of
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 18                  ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 litigation, within a month of trial, and one day before trial.
 Appellant Br. 56. The license payments also far exceeded
 the cost of litigation, and the defendants were fully aware
 of the relevant prior art. 

 at 56–59. And while our case
 law does not require a parsing of specific claims for li-
 censes, Ancora correctly notes that “licensing the ’941 pa-
 tent necessarily conveys a right to all of the challenged
 claims, including claim 1, whose limitations are incorpo-
 rated into every claim of the patent.” Id. at 60. That evi-
 dence supports a nexus finding.
      Nonetheless, the Board found various deficiencies in
 the evidence provided to show a nexus between the subject
 matter of the licensed patent and the amounts paid in roy-
 alties. The Board stated, “it is difficult to assess whether
 the license[s] represented a business decision based on
 magnitude of the potential risk or an acquiescence to the
 strength of the ’941 patent.” Nintendo Decision, J.A. 49.
 We fail to see the difference. They amount to the same
 thing, a considered reluctance to run the risk of larger fi-
 nancial consequences from infringement. Moreover, while
 it is true that it is the claims that define what a patent co-
 vers, that which is disclosed could be the subject of a sepa-
 rate patent, such that a licensee might consider it prudent
 to take a license under both patents. The reverse is not
 true in the context of nexus findings; that is, the fact that
 a license concerns rights to more than one patent does not
 detract from the fact that each patent is a subject of the
 license.
     Insofar as the Board sought information about “what
 the potential exposure was,” i.e., a showing of damages,
 that confuses damages for litigation costs as the appropri-
 ate comparator for evaluating the significance of the mag-
 nitude of licensing payments. Nintendo Decision, J.A. 49.
 Aside from the fact that “how much [the patent owner] was
 demanding in damages” would be pre-trial speculation on
 behalf of one party to that litigation, damages figures are a
 function of an infringer’s usage, not a patent’s strength.
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                   19



 See 

 (providing that “the court shall award
 the claimant damages . . . in no event less than a reasona-
 ble royalty for the use made of the invention by the in-
 fringer” (emphases added)). A comparison of a license
 figure to a prospective damage award is therefore an inap-
 propriate determinant of patent strength.
     Nexus is indeed important in evaluating secondary
 considerations to ensure that factors that are advanced to
 show that an invention would not have been considered ob-
 vious at the relevant time period truly related to what is
 claimed. But, when it comes to licenses, clear evidence that
 substantial license fees were paid for licenses to a specific
 patent late in a litigation should be given the significance
 that their magnitude deserves. And while “it is often
 cheaper to take licenses than to defend infringement suits,”
 Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted), that is certainly
 not the case here.
     Additionally, not only did the Board apply an improp-
 erly heightened nexus standard, but it also failed to evalu-
 ate the nexus issue by misreading the first license. The
 Board stated that “Exhibit B . . . lists what patents and pa-
 tent applications were licensed.”         Nintendo Decision,
 J.A. 48 (emphasis added). That is not accurate. Rather,
 the license explains what was licensed: the ’941 patent and
 other Ancora controlled patents. J.A. 4181–82. The license
 also explains what was not licensed: the “Jobaline Pa-
 tents . . . listed in Exhibit B,” because those patents “are
 not considered Ancora patents under this Agreement.” 

 Exhibit B therefore contains patents that are not licensed
 under this agreement, contrary to the Board’s statement.
 The Board’s misreading, then, cannot serve as substantial
 evidence supporting its finding that there was no way to
 determine what was licensed. Again, the ’941 patent was
 the subject of the license. See J.A. 4181–82. That other
 patents may have also been part of the license does not de-
 tract from the nexus inquiry. These licenses, taken by
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 20                   ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.




 substantial parties paying substantial royalties to secure
 the right to practice the ’941 patent, should have been
 given more, if not controlling, weight in the Board’s obvi-
 ousness determination. On remand, the Board should
 evaluate the nexus issue regarding these licenses and then
 weigh such evidence against what was in effect its prima
 facie case of obviousness.
      The Board further noted, but did not evaluate, petition-
 ers’ arguments citing Ancora’s settlements with other com-
 panies in which Ancora licensed the ’941 patent for much
 less than anticipated litigation costs. See Nintendo Deci-
 sion, J.A. 47–48, 105. While Ancora tries to argue that
 such low-value licenses are “‘of little significance’ in the ob-
 viousness analysis,” Appellant Br. 61 (citing Iron Grip,
 

), Roku properly notes that the Iron Grip
 panel declined to credit low-value licenses not because of
 their value, but because of the failure of the patentee to
 provide adequate evidence that the licenses had a nexus to
 the patents at issue. Appellee Br. 62–63 (citing 

). On remand, the Board should also consider the
 nexus issue and the probative value of these licenses and
 weigh that against the licenses produced by Ancora in sup-
 port of its argument of commercial success as objective in-
 dicia of nonobviousness.
     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Board’s
 findings regarding the license evidence offered as objective
 indicia of nonobviousness constitute legal error and were
 not supported by substantial evidence.
                          CONCLUSION
     The Board did not err in its claim construction analysis
 and substantial evidence supports its prima facie case of
 obviousness. However, because the Board erred in its sec-
 ondary consideration analysis, we vacate and remand for
 the Board to reconsider the nexus issue as it pertains to the
 licenses offered as objective indicia of nonobviousness.
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 ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ROKU, INC.                21



                VACATED AND REMANDED
                           COSTS
 No costs.