Case: 24-1770    Document: 40    Page: 1   Filed: 07/16/2025




        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.


   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                GARLAND WILLIAMSON,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                            v.

       DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
             VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2024-1770
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 23-526, Judge Amanda L. Mere-
 dith.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: July 16, 2025
                 ______________________

    GARLAND O. WILLIAMSON, Baltimore, MD, pro se.

     JOSHUA MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ERIC P. BRUSKIN, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; MATTHEW ALBANESE, DEREK SCADDEN, Office
 of General Counsel, United States Department of Veter-
 ans Affairs, Washington, DC.
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 2                                    WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS




                  ______________________

     Before PROST, CLEVENGER, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
                         Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
      Garland O. Williamson challenges the decision of the
 United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
 (“CAVC”), which upheld the Board of Veteran’s Appeals’
 (“Board”) dismissal of his claim to equitable relief under
 

 for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Williamson
 contends that the dismissal is in error and submits that
 he is entitled to equitable relief under the plain language
 of the statute, as well as for clear and unmistakable error
 (“CUE”) committed by the Department of Veteran’s Af-
 fairs (“VA”) Regional Office (“RO”) and the Board. For the
 following reasons, we affirm the CAVC’s decision.
                        BACKGROUND
     Mr. Williamson honorably served in active duty in the
 Navy from November 13, 1963 to March 11, 1966. 1972,
 Mr. Williamson submitted a claim for service-connected
 disability. The RO denied his claim and mailed its rating
 decision and subsequent confirmation of denial to the
 incorrect address.
     In 2007, Mr. Williamson filed a petition to reopen his
 1972 claim. In May of 2021, nearly 50 years after filing
 his original claim, the Board granted Mr. Williamson a
 100% service connection disability rating, effective from
 March 30, 1972. Mr. Williamson received retroactive
 payment of his benefits. In June and September of 2021,
 Mr. Williamson filed for equitable relief under
 

 seeking approximately $1.7 million to
 compensate him for the costs of real estate losses and
 dependent health care during the long period when he
 was not in receipt of the benefits to which he was entitled.
 Mr. Williamson stated that he had relied, to his detri-
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 WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS                                      3



 ment, on the denial of his 1972 claim, which he alleges
 was erroneous due to CUE in the RO’s denial.
                  The Secretary’s Decision
     The Executive Director of the VA’s Compensation
 Service,     on    behalf    of   the     Secretary,   denied
 Mr. Williamson’s request for equitable relief on Septem-
 ber 30, 2021.            The Secretary explained that
 

 grants the Secretary discretion to dis-
 pense equitable relief where the veteran has (a) been
 deprived of his rightful benefits due to administrative
 error, or (b) suffered a loss due to reliance on an erroneous
 decision by the VA. The Secretary found that neither
 § 503(a) nor § 503(b) is applicable to Mr. Williamson’s
 case. For § 503(a), the Secretary stated that recompense
 for disadvantageous financial decisions is not a benefit to
 which Mr. Williamson is entitled under the law. For
 § 503(b), the Secretary explained that though the Board
 eventually reached a different decision than the RO on
 Mr. Williamson’s 1972 claim, there was no CUE in the
 RO’s earlier decisions. The Secretary ended by “noting
 equitable relief decisions are not appealable,” citing
 CAVC authority. Appx. 37. 1 The RO reaffirmed this
 denial in a December 2021 notice letter to
 Mr. Williamson.
                    The Board’s Decision
     Mr. Williamson filed a notice of disagreement with
 the Secretary’s denial and appealed to the Board for
 review.     In October of 2022, the Board notified
 Mr. Williamson that it “did not have jurisdiction to review
 [the Secretary’s] decision,” but afforded time for
 “[Mr. Williamson] to submit additional evidence and


     1   “Appx.” refers to the Appellant’s Corrected Ap-
 pendix, ECF No. 11.
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 4                                    WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS




 argument on the jurisdiction question or to request a
 hearing on that question.” See Appx. 17. Mr. Williamson
 declined a hearing but submitted additional written
 argument. Mr. Williamson stated that “he assumed, for
 purposes of his appeal, that the Board does not have
 authority to review the Secretary’s decisions under
 

.” 

 The Board found Mr. Williamson’s
 argument lacked merit and that CAVC precedent held
 that “38 U.S.C. § 503 does not provide the Board jurisdic-
 tion to review the Secretary’s decisions on equitable relief
 claims.” Appx. 18–19.
                    The CAVC’s Decision
     Mr. Williamson appealed to the CAVC. The CAVC
 noted that in his appeal, Mr. Williamson did not dispute
 the Board’s lack of reviewing authority over the Secre-
 tary’s equitable decisions, but instead “raised a number of
 challenges to the factual and legal bases for the Secre-
 tary’s 2021 [denial]” of equitable relief. Appx. 14. In
 dismissing his appeal, the CAVC found that
 Mr. Williamson’s arguments ignored controlling case law,
 and so failed to meet his burden to establish jurisdiction.
 Mr. Williamson filed a motion for reconsideration, or in
 the alternative, a panel decision. The CAVC denied
 reconsideration but granted a panel decision, which
 upheld the CAVC’s dismissal. Mr. Williamson timely
 appealed to this court.
                        DISCUSSION
     The CAVC has long held that the Secretary’s discre-
 tion to provide equitable relief under 

 is
 beyond the review authority of the Board and the CAVC.
 See Darrow v. Derwinski, 

 (1992);
 Zimick v. West, 

, 50–51 (1998). This court
 agrees with the CAVC’s precedent. See Burris v. Wilkie,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Burkhart v. Wilkie,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Andrews
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 WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS                                    5



 v. McDonough, No. 2022-1979, 

, at *1–2
 (Fed. Cir. May 3, 2023).
     This body of law holds that Congress, in enacting
 

, unambiguously specified that decisions
 by the Secretary under § 503 are not judicially reviewable
 by the Board, and consequently the CAVC and this court
 do not have the authority to provide the requested relief.
 See, e.g., Burris, 888 F.3d at 1357–62; Andrews, 

 at *1–2. Mr. Williamson recognized this body of
 law when he stated to the Board that he knew the Board
 lacked authority to review the Secretary’s § 503 decisions.
 Appx. 17.
     Before this court, Mr. Williamson does not challenge
 what the case law holds, but instead boldly challenges the
 correctness of that body of law, asserting that denial of
 judicial review of the Secretary’s § 503 decisions deprives
 him of fundamental due process and violates, in addition,
 the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
 He also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper
 Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 

 (2024),
 supports his case, see ECF Nos. 20, 32, 34, 37, 38, and
 that the RO and Board committed CUE in denying his
 1972 claim. However, Mr. Williamson’s attempt to avoid
 application of settled law is unsuccessful.
     Mr. Williamson has not been deprived of due process.
 The Secretary’s grant or denial of equitable relief is
 undeniably discretionary. 

. As such,
 Mr. Williamson cannot show he is entitled by right to any
 of the equitable relief he seeks. See Town of Castle Rock,
 Colo. v. Gonzalez, 

 (2005) (“[T]he Due
 Process Clause does not protect everything that might be
 described as a ‘benefit.’” Instead, the claimant must
 “have a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit
 sought],” which cannot be so “if government officials may
 grant or deny it in their discretion.”) (internal citation
 omitted). Also, “[d]ue process of law has been interpreted
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 6                                    WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS




 to include notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.”
 Cushman v. Shinseki, 

 (Fed. Cir.
 2009). Should the Board detect a jurisdictional defect, it
 must notify the veteran and grant the veteran time to
 submit additional written argument or evidence that may
 remedy such defect, as well as the opportunity for a
 hearing. 

(c). The record shows the
 Board informed Mr. Williamson of the jurisdictional
 defect and offered him the opportunity to present addi-
 tional written and oral argument.            Appx. 17.
 Mr. Williamson declined a hearing but submitted addi-
 tional written arguments on his entitlement to equitable
 relief, which the Board found unavailing. Appx. 17–18.
 Mr. Williamson was granted due process to plead his case
 for equitable relief. That he does not agree with the
 outcome does not deprive him of the due process he was
 fully afforded.
     Mr. Williamson also cannot show that § 511, the stat-
 ute denying him judicial review of the Secretary’s adverse
 decision on his request for relief under § 503, violates the
 APA. Section 702 of the APA provides for judicial review
 of a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
 but at the same time, leaves unaffected “other limitations
 on    judicial    review,”   such     as    

.
 

. By its unambiguous terms, § 702 bars
 APA review of the Secretary’s decisions under § 503,
 which are denied judicial review by § 511.
     Mr. Williamson’s reliance on Loper Bright is mis-
 placed. Loper Bright held that courts may not defer to
 agency interpretation of laws in the manner previously
 permitted under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
 sources Defense Council, Inc., 

 (1984). Loper
 Bright, 

.          The body of law that
 Mr. Williamson attacks, cited above, did not arise from
 judicial deference to agency interpretation under Chevron,
 but instead resulted from the application of traditional
 statutory construction cannons unaffected by Chevron.
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 WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS                                     7



 “[B]ased on a plain reading of the Veteran’s Court’s
 jurisdictional statute, in conjunction with § 503 and the
 other [traditional statutory construction cannons] recited
 above, we conclude that the Veterans Court lacks jurisdic-
 tion to grant the equitable relief that Appellants seek.”
 Burris, 

. Therefore, Loper Bright is not
 relevant to this appeal.
     Lastly, Mr. Williamson has failed to show the pres-
 ence of any CUE. CUE claims apply to Board decisions.
 

. A CUE is an error that “had it not been
 made, would have manifestly changed the outcome.”
 

(c). The Board’s earlier denials of
 benefits based on Mr. Williamson’s 1972 claim were not
 erroneous simply because, by way of the appeals process,
 the Board ultimately concluded in 2021 that
 Mr. Williamson was entitled to benefits for service-
 connected disability, retroactive to 1972.
                         CONCLUSION
    While we are sympathetic to Mr. Williamson’s cir-
 cumstances, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the
 CAVC’s decision.
                         AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.