Case: 25-1812    Document: 159            Page: 1       Filed: 08/29/2025




    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

    V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES
     AND PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE,
       MICROKITS, LLC, FISHUSA INC., TERRY
             PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
                 Plaintiffs-Appellees

                                   v.

  DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
      AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
      EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
        UNITED STATES, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
  COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
    AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL
   CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED
   STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
   JAMIESON GREER, IN HISOFFICIAL CAPACITY
   AS UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
      OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
   REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK, IN HIS
      OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
    COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
             BORDER PROTECTION,
               Defendants -Appellants

            -------------------------------------------------

  STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE
     OF COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
    STATE OF DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS,
  STATE OF MAINE, STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE
Case: 25-1812    Document: 159      Page: 2    Filed: 08/29/2025




 2                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  OF NEVADA, STATE OF NEW MEXICO, STATE OF
        NEW YORK, STATE OF VERMONT,
               Plaintiffs-Appellees

                              v.

  PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES
      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
     KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
     SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
       SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
      HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES
  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY
  S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES
   CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS
   OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER FOR
     U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
                 UNITED STATES,
                Defendants-Appellants
               ______________________

                    2025-1812, 2025-1813
                   ______________________

    Appeals from the United States Court of International
 Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-TMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-
 00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior Judge Jane A. Restani,
 Judge Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Timothy M. Reif.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: August 29, 2025
                  ______________________

     NEAL KUMAR KATYAL, Milbank LLP, Washington, DC,
 argued for plaintiffs-appellees V.O.S. Selections, Inc., Plas-
 tic Services and Products, LLC, MicroKits, LLC, FishUSA
 Inc., Terry Precision Cycling LLC. Also represented by
 SAMANTHA KINSELLA ILAGAN, COLLEEN ROH SINZDAK; PAUL
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 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          3



 HAROLD, STEFFEN NATHANAEL JOHNSON, Wilson, Sonsini,
 Goodrich & Rosati, PC, Washington, DC; MICHAEL W.
 MCCONNELL, Palo Alto, CA; JAMES J. MCQUAID, Liberty
 Justice Center, Arlington Heights, IL; JEFFREY MICHAEL
 SCHWAB, REILLY STEPHENS, Austin, TX.

     BENJAMIN N. GUTMAN, Oregon Department of Justice,
 Salem, OR, argued for plaintiff-appellee State of Oregon.
 Also represented by CHRISTOPHER PERDUE, LEIGH SALMON;
 DUSTIN BUEHLER, Portland, OR.

    BRETT SHUMATE, Civil Division, United States Depart-
 ment of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-
 appellants. Also represented by BRADLEY HINSHELWOOD,
 MICHAEL S. RAAB, SOPHIA SHAMS, DANIEL WINIK.

     ILYA SOMIN, Law School, George Mason University, Ar-
 lington, VA, for plaintiff-appellee V.O.S. Selections, Inc.

     JOSHUA BENDOR, Office of Arizona Attorney General,
 Phoenix, AZ, for plaintiff-appellee State of Arizona. Also
 represented by SYREETA TYRELL.

    SARAH HUNTER WEISS, Colorado Department of Law,
 Denver, CO, for plaintiff-appellee State of Colorado.

     MICHAEL SKOLD, Office of the Attorney General, Hart-
 ford, CT, for plaintiff-appellee State of Connecticut.

     IAN LISTON, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilming-
 ton, DE, for plaintiff-appellee State of Delaware. Also rep-
 resented by VANESSA L. KASSAB.

    SARAH A. HUNGER, Office of Illinois Attorney General,
 Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellee State of Illinois.

   VIVIAN MIKHAIL, Office of the Maine Attorney General,
 Augusta, ME, for plaintiff-appellee State of Maine.
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 4                             V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




     PETER FARRELL, Office of the Minnesota Attorney Gen-
 eral, St. Paul, MN, for plaintiff-appellee State of Minne-
 sota.

    HEIDI PARRY STERN, Office of the Nevada Attorney
 General, Las Vegas, NV, for plaintiff-appellee State of Ne-
 vada.

     AMY SENIER, New Mexico Department of Justice, Santa
 Fe, NM, for plaintiff-appellee State of New Mexico.

     ESTER MURDUKHAYEVA, Office of the New York State
 Attorney General, New York, NY, for plaintiff-appellee
 State of New York. Also represented by RABIA MUQADDAM.

    RYAN P. KANE, Vermont Office of the Attorney General,
 Montpelier, VT, for plaintiff-appellee State of Vermont.
                   ______________________

  Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, DYK, PROST, REYNA,
    TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and
                 STARK, Circuit Judges. 1
     Opinion for the court joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE,
     DYK, REYNA, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK.
     Additional views filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM,
     joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE, REYNA, and STARK.
   Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge TARANTO, in
  which Chief Judge MOORE, and Circuit Judges PROST and
                        CHEN, join.
 PER CURIAM.




       1   Circuit Judge Newman did not participate.
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 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           5



     The Government appeals a decision of the Court of In-
 ternational Trade setting aside five Executive Orders that
 imposed tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods
 from nearly every country in the world, holding that the
 tariffs were not authorized by the International Emergency
 Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 

 et seq. Be-
 cause we agree that IEEPA’s grant of presidential author-
 ity to “regulate” imports does not authorize the tariffs
 imposed by the Executive Orders, we affirm.
                               I
                               A
      This case involves the extent of the President’s author-
 ity under IEEPA to “regulate” importation in response to a
 national emergency declared by the President. For many
 years, Congress has carefully constructed tariff schedules
 which provide for, in great detail, the tariffs to be imposed
 on particular goods. Since taking office, President Donald
 J. Trump has declared several national emergencies. In re-
 sponse to these declared emergencies, the President has
 departed from the established tariff schedules and imposed
 varying tariffs of unlimited duration on imports of nearly
 all goods from nearly every country with which the United
 States conducts trade. This appeal concerns Five Executive
 Orders imposing duties on foreign trading partners to ad-
 dress these emergencies: Executive Orders Nos. 14193,
 14194, 14195, 14257, and 14266 (hereinafter collectively
 referred to as the Challenged Executive Orders). We sum-
 marize the history of the Challenged Executive Orders by
 first discussing the national emergencies in response to
 which they were issued and then addressing the nature of
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 6                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




 the measures directed by the Challenged Executive Or-
 ders. 2
      On January 20, 2025, the President declared the exist-
 ence of a national emergency at the United States’ south-
 ern border with Mexico under sections 201 and 301 of the
 National Emergencies Act (NEA), 

 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
 §§ 1601–1651). See Proclamation No. 10886, Declaring a
 National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United
 States, 

, 8,327 (Jan. 20, 2025). In the
 Proclamation, he identified the presence of “cartels, crimi-
 nal gangs, known terrorists, human traffickers, smugglers,
 unvetted military-age males from foreign adversaries, and
 illicit narcotics that harm Americans” at and around the
 southern border as threats to the country’s territorial sov-
 ereignty. 

 Shortly thereafter, the President faulted Mex-
 ico for “afford[ing] safe havens for the cartels to engage in
 the manufacturing and transportation of illicit drugs” to
 the United States. Executive Order No. 14194, Imposing
 Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern Border,
 

, 9,117 (Feb. 1. 2025).
     The President also expanded the scope of the national
 emergency declared in Proclamation 10886 to include
 threats originating from Canada and the People’s Republic
 of China. On February 1, 2025, he declared that “the sus-
 tained influx of illicit opioids and other drugs has profound
 consequences on our Nation” and stated that “Canada has
 played a central role in these challenges, including by fail-
 ing to devote sufficient attention and resources . . . to


     2    The President has continued to impose various tar-
 iffs targeting imports from dozens of U.S. trading partners
 during the pendency of this appeal. Because this appeal
 pertains only to the Challenged Executive Orders, we do
 not delve into the details of these later Executive Orders
 here.
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 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           7



 effectively stem the tide of illicit drugs.” Executive Order
 No. 14193, Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit
 Drugs Across Our Northern Border, 

,
 9,113 (Feb. 1, 2025). He similarly stated that this emer-
 gency had been exacerbated by China’s failure “to arrest,
 seize, detain, or otherwise intercept chemical precursor
 suppliers, money launderers, other [transnational criminal
 organizations], criminals at large, and drugs.” Executive
 Order No. 14195, Imposing Duties to Address the Syn-
 thetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of
 China, 

, 9,122 (Feb. 1, 2025).
     In response to the declared national emergency of the
 trafficking of opioids into the country and the ostensible
 failure of Mexico, Canada, and China to meaningfully ad-
 dress this threat, the President imposed what this opinion
 refers to as the “Trafficking Tariffs”: 25 percent ad valorem
 duties on “[a]ll articles that are products of Canada,” Exec-
 utive Order No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 3 25 percent
 ad valorem duties on “[a]ll articles that are products of
 Mexico,” Executive Order No. 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,118
 (Feb. 1, 2025), 4 and 10 percent ad valorem duties on “[a]ll
 articles that are products of China,” Executive Order
 No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,122. In each of these



     3    Canadian energy and energy resources were sub-
 jected to a lower ad valorem rate of 10 percent. 90 Fed. Reg.
 at 9,114. Enforcement of the tariffs on Canadian products
 was subsequently delayed from the planned start date of
 February 4, 2025, to March 4, 2025. Executive Order
 No. 14197, Progress on the Situation at Our Northern Bor-
 der, 

, 9,183 (Feb. 3, 2025).
     4    Enforcement of the tariffs on Mexican products was
 subsequently delayed from the planned start date of Feb-
 ruary 4, 2025, to March 4, 2025. Executive Order
 No. 14198, Progress on the Situation at Our Southern Bor-
 der, 

, 9,185 (Feb. 3, 2025).
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 8                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




 Executive Orders, the President stated that the circum-
 stances “constitute[d] an unusual and extraordinary
 threat, which ha[d] its source in substantial part outside
 the United States, to the national security, foreign policy,
 and economy of the United States.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114,
 9,118, 9,122. In imposing these tariffs, he claimed to be act-
 ing under the authority of section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA
 and “specifically [found] that action under other authority
 to impose tariffs [was] inadequate to address this unusual
 and extraordinary threat.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 9,118,
 9,122. Each of the Executive Orders providing for the Traf-
 ficking Tariffs directed the Secretary of Homeland Security
 to alter the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
 States (HTSUS) to effectuate the new, higher Trafficking
 Tariffs. 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,115, 9,118, 9,123.
      The President subsequently modified the Trafficking
 Tariffs. First, after determining that China “ha[d] not
 taken adequate steps to alleviate the illicit drug crisis
 through cooperative enforcement actions, and that the cri-
 sis described in Executive Order 14195 ha[d] not abated,”
 he increased ad valorem duties on Chinese products from
 10 percent to 20 percent. Executive Order No. 14228, Fur-
 ther Amendment to Duties Addressing the Opioid Supply
 Chain in the People’s Republic of China, 

, 11,463 (Mar. 3, 2025). The President further imple-
 mented duty-free de minimis treatment 5 for otherwise cov-
 ered articles from Canada and Mexico. See Executive Order
 No. 14231, Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of
 Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border, 

, 11,785 (Mar. 6, 2025); Executive Order No. 14232,
 Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs



     5   Under Section 321(a)(2)(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
 duty-free de minimis treatment allows goods valued at
 $800 or less to enter the country without customs duties.
 

(a)(2)(C).
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 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           9



 Across Our Southern Border, 

, 11,787
 (Mar. 6, 2025). 6
     On April 2, 2025, the President imposed what this
 opinion refers to as the “Reciprocal Tariffs”: baseline
 10 percent ad valorem duties on imports from nearly every
 country with which the United States has any significant
 trade relationship with additional ad valorem duties rang-
 ing from 11 percent to as high as 50 percent to be imposed
 “shortly thereafter” on a per-country basis. Executive Or-
 der No. 14257, Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff
 To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and
 Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits,
 

, 15,045, 15,049–50 (Apr. 2, 2025). Like
 the Trafficking Tariffs, these Reciprocal Tariffs were to be
 implemented by modifying the HTSUS. 

.
     In imposing the Reciprocal Tariffs, the President again
 invoked his claimed authority under IEEPA; the NEA; sec-
 tion 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified as amended at
 

); and 

. 7 

. He


     6    The President also originally implemented such
 duty-free de minimis treatment for otherwise eligible arti-
 cles from China, Executive Order No. 14200, Amendment
 to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in
 the People’s Republic of China, 

, 9,277
 (Feb. 5, 2025), but he later rescinded this de minimis treat-
 ment for Chinese products, Executive Order No. 14256,
 Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic
 Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China as
 Applied to Low-Value Imports, 

, 14,899
 (Apr. 2, 2025).
     7    The Government does not contend that any of the
 statutes besides IEEPA grant the President the substan-
 tive authority to impose these tariffs. The NEA governs
 procedures for declaring and ending national emergencies;
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  10                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  explained that the Reciprocal Tariffs addressed “an unu-
  sual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
  economy of the United States” posed by “underlying condi-
  tions, including a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade
  relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers,
  and U.S. trading partners’ economic policies that suppress
  domestic wages and consumption.” 

 On April 9, 2025,
  the President suspended the imposition of the additional
  country-specific ad valorem duties for all countries except
  China until July 9, 2025. Executive Order No. 14266, Mod-
  ifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Trading Partner
  Retaliation and Alignment, 90 Fed. Reg 15,625, 15,626
  (Apr. 9, 2025).
       The President repeatedly amended the China-specific
  Reciprocal Tariff rate in response to China’s adjustments
  of its own tariff rates on U.S. goods: he first increased the
  China-specific rate from 34 to 84 percent effective April 8,
  2025, Executive Order No. 14259, Amendment to Recipro-
  cal Tariffs and Updated Duties as Applied to Low-Value
  Imports From the People’s Republic of China, 

, 15,509 (Apr. 8, 2025), and then from 84 to 125 per-
  cent effective April 10, 2025, Executive Order No. 14266,
  90 Fed. Reg. at 15,626. These new rates were to be effectu-
  ated by modifying the HTSUS to reflect the higher rates.
  Executive Order No. 14259, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,509; Execu-
  tive Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,626. Following
  discussions with Chinese officials, the President lowered
  the China-specific Reciprocal Tariff rate to 10 percent, ef-
  fective until August 12, 2025, observing that these discus-
  sions were “a significant step by [China] toward remedying



  section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 requires the President
  to update the HTSUS to reflect import duties but does not
  provide the substantive authority to impose such duties;
  and 

 simply allows the President to delegate
  powers within the Executive Branch.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            11



  non-reciprocal trade arrangements and addressing the con-
  cerns of the United States relating to economic and na-
  tional security matters.” Executive Order No. 14298,
  Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Discussions
  With the People’s Republic of China, 

,
  21,831–32 (May 12, 2025).
      On July 7, 2025, the President paused enforcement of
  all Reciprocal Tariffs until August 1, 2025. Executive Or-
  der No. 14316, Extending the Modification of the Recipro-
  cal Tariff Rates, 

, 30,823 (July 7, 2025).
  On July 31, 2025, the President again paused enforcement
  of the Reciprocal Tariffs for seven days. Executive Order
  No. 14326, Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates,
  

, 37,963–64 (July 31, 2025). The Recip-
  rocal Tariffs (other than for China 8) took effect on Au-
  gust 7, 2025.
                                B
       On April 14, 2025, five small businesses—V.O.S. Selec-
  tions, Inc.; Plastic Services and Products, LLC, dba Genova
  Pipe; MicroKits, LLC; FishUSA, Inc.; and Terry Precision
  Cycling, LLC (collectively, the “Private Plaintiffs”)—
  brought suit before the Court of International Trade (CIT)
  against the United States and various Government offi-
  cials in their official capacities, challenging the President’s
  imposition of the Reciprocal Tariffs. On April 23, 2025, Or-
  egon and eleven other states (collectively, the “State Plain-
  tiffs”) brought suit before the CIT against the United



      8   On August 11, 2025, the President issued a new
  Executive Order extending the suspension of the Recipro-
  cal Tariffs against China from the prior deadline of Au-
  gust 12, 2025 to November 10, 2025. Executive Order
  No. 14334, Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates
  To Reflect Ongoing Discussions With the People’s Republic
  of China, 

, 39,305–06 (Aug. 11, 2025).
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  12                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  States and various Government officials in their official ca-
  pacities, challenging the President’s imposition of both the
  Reciprocal Tariffs and the Trafficking Tariffs.
      On May 28, 2025, a three-judge panel of the CIT
  granted summary judgment to the Private Plaintiffs and
  State Plaintiffs in a consolidated order, holding that both
  the Reciprocal Tariffs and the Trafficking Tariffs exceeded
  the President’s authority under IEEPA and permanently
  enjoining the Government from imposing these tariffs.
  V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, 

, 1383 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2025). The Government ap-
  pealed both cases the same day and moved to stay the in-
  junction pending appeal. We consolidated the appeals,
  granted the Government’s motion to stay pending their res-
  olution, and expedited briefing and oral argument. V.O.S.
  Selections, Inc. v. Trump, No. 2025-1812, 

, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2025). We also sua
  sponte decided to assign the case to the court en banc. ECF
  No. 51 at 3 (“[T]he court also concludes that these cases
  present issues of exceptional importance warranting expe-
  dited en banc consideration of the merits in the first in-
  stance.”).
                               C
      Before we reach the merits of this case, we briefly dis-
  cuss the history and legal authority concerning the imposi-
  tion of tariffs as relevant to this appeal.
       The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay
  and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and to “reg-
  ulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” U.S. Const. art. I,
  § 8, cl. 1, 3. Tariffs are a tax, and the Framers of the Con-
  stitution expressly contemplated the exclusive grant of tax-
  ing power to the legislative branch; when Patrick Henry
  expressed concern that the President “may easily become
  king,” 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions 58 (Jona-
  than Elliot ed., 1836), James Madison replied that this
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                               13



  would not occur because “[t]he purse is in the hands of the
  representatives of the people,” id. at 393.
       At the time of the Founding, and for most of the early
  history of the United States, tariffs were the primary
  source of revenue for the federal government. See Goldwa-
  ter Inst. Br. 12 n.5 (citing Federalist No. 12 at 75 (J. Cooke,
  ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (“[W]e must a long time
  depend for the means of revenue, chiefly on such duties.”)).
  Setting tariff policy was thus considered a core Congres-
  sional function. See Michael W. McConnell, The President
  Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power Under the Con-
  stitution 101 (2020); cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (limiting
  direct taxation by tying it to a census for proper apportion-
  ing). In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified,
  granting Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes on
  incomes, from whatever source derived.” U.S. Const.
  amend. XVI. This ability of Congress to impose a domestic
  income tax reduced the importance of tariffs as a source of
  revenue for the federal government.
      For much of this early history, Congress set tariffs
  without authorizing the President to adjust tariff rates by
  entering into international agreements. In the late nine-
  teenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress began to
  delegate to the Executive limited authority to “activate or
  suspend” tariff rates through international agreements.
  Cato Inst. Amicus Br. 6–7 (citing Tariff Act of 1883,
  

; Tariff Act of 1890, 

). Nonetheless,
  Congress continued to enact legislation establishing the
  basic tariff schedules. For example, in the Tariff Act of
  1930, Congress set forth tariff rates in “ninety-five pages of
  schedules.” ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade
  Comm’n, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
      Through the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, Congress
  adopted the Tariff Schedules of the United States. 

 Stat. 72, 72–75 (1962). In 1988, the HTSUS was
  enacted by Congress. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
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  14                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  Act of 1988, 

 Stat. 1107, 1148–50. The
  HTSUS sets the United States’ current tariff schedules.
  During this entire period, Congress authorized the Presi-
  dent to enter into agreements reducing tariff rates, or, in
  some cases, increasing tariff rates. That presidential au-
  thority to increase rates was cabined in various respects,
  including limitations on the President’s authority to in-
  crease rates by more than a certain percentage of the es-
  tablished statutory rate. See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade
  Agreements Act of 1934, 

ch. 474, § 1,
  

, 943–45 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
  §§ 1351–54 (2018)); Trade Act of 1974, 

 101–02, 151, 

, 1982–84 (1975) (codified
  at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111–12). The HTSUS rates reflect appli-
  cable governing tariffs that have been set over time in part
  through international negotiations and multilateral and
  bilateral trade agreements like the United States-Mexico-
  Canada Agreement. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
  United States Revision 20 (Aug. 27, 2025), General Notes
  at 28; see generally 

(b)(2) (directing the
  President to “take such action as the President considers
  necessary to bring trade agreements to which the United
  States is a party into conformity with the Harmonized Tar-
  iff Schedule”).
      In 1916, Congress passed legislation that created the
  United States Tariff Commission, which was later re-
  named the United States International Trade Commission
  (ITC). Revenue Act of 1916, 

 700–09,
  

, 795–98; 

(a). Later legislation
  provided that one of the ITC’s responsibilities is to provide
  recommendations to the President in making adjustments
  to the tariff schedule. 

. The framework for
  tariff schedules is set forth in the HTSUS. “The [HTSUS]
  is the United States’ implementation of the 1983 Interna-
  tional Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Descrip-
  tion and Coding (‘the Convention’), which created a single
  international system of nomenclature to classify goods for
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           15



  customs purposes.” Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United
  States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “As periodic
  changes are made to the international harmonized tariff
  system, the HTSUS is correspondingly modified pursuant
  to a statutory scheme established by the Omnibus Trade
  and Competitiveness Act of 1988.” 

 The HTSUS itself “is
  indeed a statute but is not published physically in the
  United States Code.” Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Congress’s enactment of the
  HTSUS provided that its terms, including “[e]ach modifi-
  cation or change made to the [HTSUS] by the President
  under authority of law,” “shall be considered to be statutory
  provisions of law for all purposes.” 

(c)(1).
                                D
       In 1917, Congress enacted the Trading with the Enemy
  Act (TWEA), 

 1–19, 

,
  411–26 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95a;
  50 U.S.C. §§ 4305–41), to address threats to the U.S. econ-
  omy resulting from our entry into World War I. Section 5(b)
  of TWEA empowered the President to “investigate, regu-
  late, or prohibit[] any transactions in foreign exchange”
  during wartime. 

(b)(1)(A). In 1933, Con-
  gress expanded TWEA by authorizing the President to de-
  ploy the power to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit” foreign
  transactions during other national emergencies besides
  war. Emergency Banking Relief Act, 

,
  

, 1 (1933). In 1941, just one week after the Pearl
  Harbor attack, Congress further broadened presidential
  authority under TWEA by adding the phrase “importation
  or exportation” to the list of transactions involving foreign
  property that the President may “investigate, regulate,
  or . . . prohibit.” First War Powers Act of 1941, 

, 

, 839.
      After World War II, presidents used TWEA to impose
  economic sanctions on foreign adversaries, regulate foreign
  exchange, and control exports based on several
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  16                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  declarations of national emergencies. See, e.g., Proclama-
  tion 2914, Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emer-
  gency, 

, 9,029 (Dec. 16, 1950)
  (President Truman invoking TWEA to declare a national
  emergency because of the outbreak of the Korean war and
  the threat of “communist imperialism”); Foreign Assets
  Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 500, 

,
  reserved by Foreign Assets Control Regulations; Transac-
  tion Control Regulations (Regulations Prohibiting Trans-
  actions Involving the Shipment of Certain Merchandise
  Between Foreign Countries), 

, 35,739
  (Department of the Treasury forbidding any financial
  transactions involving, or on behalf of, North Korea in re-
  sponse to Proclamation 2914); Executive Order No. 11387,
  Governing Certain Capital Transfers Abroad, 

, 47 (Jan. 1, 1968) (President Johnson placing controls
  on capital exports). In 1971, to address a balance of pay-
  ments deficit, 9 President Nixon asserted the authority to
  temporarily suspend existing tariff agreements that re-
  duced the statutory rates so as to impose a temporary ad-
  ditional ten percent ad valorem duty, which was not to
  exceed the amounts set in the Congressionally-approved
  existing Tariff Schedules of the United States, on all duti-
  able articles imported into the United States. Proclama-
  tion 4074, Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of
  Payments Purposes, 

, 926 (Aug. 15, 1971). This
  surcharge lasted less than five months. Proclamation 4098,


       9  A country’s balance of payments is the difference
  between all money flowing into the country and the amount
  of money flowing out of the country to the rest of the world
  during a particular time period. A severe and sudden dis-
  ruption in a country’s ability to finance its international
  transactions, often due to an inability to cover essential im-
  ports or external debt repayments, is known as a balance-
  of-payments crisis. See V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d
  at 1375.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          17



  Termination of Additional Duty for Balance of Payments
  Purposes, 

, 1,592 (Dec. 20, 1971). Yoshida In-
  ternational, a zipper importer subject to the surcharge,
  filed a lawsuit challenging the legality of the temporary
  tariff surcharge imposed by President Nixon’s Proclama-
  tion and sought a refund of taxes paid. The United States
  Customs Court ruled in favor of Yoshida, holding that the
  President had exceeded his statutory authority as dele-
  gated by the Tariff Act of 1930, the Trade Expansion Act
  of 1962, and section 5(b) of TWEA in assessing the sur-
  charge; it accordingly concluded that President Nixon’s im-
  position of a temporary surcharge was not authorized.
  Yoshida Int’l v. United States, 

, 1175–76
  (Cust. Ct. 1974) (Yoshida I), rev’d, 

 (CCPA
  1975) (Yoshida II).
       While Yoshida I was pending appeal, Congress enacted
  the Trade Act of 1974 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
  §§ 2101–2497b). Section 122 of the Trade Act gave the
  President the authority to impose, for up to 150 days, im-
  port quotas and/or a temporary import surcharge of up to
  15 percent “to deal with large and serious United States
  balance-of-payments deficits,” “to prevent an imminent
  and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign ex-
  change markets,” or “to cooperate with other countries in
  correcting an international balance-of-payments disequi-
  librium.” 

(a).
      The next year, our predecessor court, the Court of Cus-
  toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA), reversed the Customs
  Court’s decision and upheld President Nixon’s ten percent
  surcharge, determining that its imposition fell within the
  authority delegated to the President by section 5(b) of
  TWEA. Yoshida II, at 566. The court also noted that a “sur-
  charge imposed after Jan. 3, 1975[,] must, of course, com-
  ply with [section 122 of the Trade Act].” 

 at 582 n.33. As
  described in greater detail below, the decision does not hold
  that TWEA created unlimited authority in the President to
  revise the tariff schedule, but only the limited temporary
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  18                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  authority to impose tariffs that would not exceed the Con-
  gressionally-approved tariff rates.
      In 1976, Congress pared back the scope of TWEA and
  enacted the National Emergencies Act (NEA). 

 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at
  

, 1621–22, 1631, 1641, 1651). The NEA
  limited presidential power and placed restrictions on the
  use of authorities granted by TWEA. As relevant to this
  appeal, the NEA ended within two years “[a]ll powers and
  authorities possessed by the President . . . as a result of the
  existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect
  on September 14, 1976,” 

(a), and placed
  new restrictions on the declaration and termination of fu-
  ture national emergencies. 

 §§ 1621–22.
       The NEA did not explicitly address section 5(b) of
  TWEA; however, the NEA’s legislative history indicates
  Congress’s intent “to study section 5(b) [of TWEA] and pro-
  pose such revisions as might be found necessary” to limit
  the President’s exercise of authority granted in section 5(b)
  during peacetime. S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 2 (1977). IEEPA
  is the result of this legislative effort and is consistent with
  Congress’s stated goal “to revise and delimit the Presi-
  dent’s authority to regulate international economic trans-
  actions during wars or national emergencies.” Id. In
  drafting IEEPA, Congress adopted the same list of author-
  ities as in TWEA—including the power to “regulate . . . im-
  portation”—but Congress explicitly limited the President’s
  authority under IEEPA by substituting authorities “which
  [we]re both more limited in scope than those of [TWEA]
  section 5(b) and subject to various procedural limitations.”
  H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 2, 19 (1977). The House Report
  also mentioned the Yoshida II decision in its background
  section, stating:
        [S]ection 5(b) came into play when, on Au-
        gust 15, 1971, President Nixon declared a na-
        tional emergency with respect to the balance-
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           19



        of-payments crisis and under that emergency
        imposed a surcharge on imports. In that case,
        section 5(b) was not among the statutes cited
        in the President’s proclamation as authority
        for the surcharge[] but was so cited later by
        the Government in response to a suit brought
        in Customs Court by Yoshida International
        challenging the surcharge. The court’s deci-
        sion then rested on whether section 5(b) au-
        thorized imposition of duties. Although the
        lower court held that it did not, the Appeals
        Court reversed on the grounds that the exist-
        ence of the national emergency made sec-
        tion 5(b) available for purposes which would
        not be contemplated in normal times.
  Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
      IEEPA provides that, after declaring a national emer-
  gency pursuant to the NEA, the President may “investi-
  gate, block during the pendency of an investigation,
  regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
  hibit, any . . . importation or exportation of . . . any prop-
  erty in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
  any interest.” 

(a)(1)(B). Notably, IEEPA
  does not use the words “tariffs” or “duties,” nor any similar
  terms like “customs,” “taxes,” or “imposts.” IEEPA also
  does not have a residual clause granting the President pow-
  ers beyond those which are explicitly listed.
                                  E
      In addition to the President’s authority to adjust tariffs
  by international agreement and the limited authority con-
  ferred by Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified at
  

), Congress has passed numerous other
  statutes that authorize the President and the executive
  branch to impose or modify tariffs on imports in certain cir-
  cumstances. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-
  361, § 338, 

, 704 (codified at 

);
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  20                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 

 Stat.
  872 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1991); Trade Act
  of 1974, 

 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified
  as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2497b). Notably, every
  Congressional delegation to the President of the core legis-
  lative power to impose tariffs includes well-defined proce-
  dural and substantive limitations. For example,
  Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes
  the President to adjust the importation of certain articles
  if the Secretary of Commerce finds that they pose a threat
  to national security. 

(c)(1)(A). The statute
  provides the President must, within ninety days, deter-
  mine whether he concurs with the Secretary’s report, and
  if he does concur, “determine the nature and duration of
  the action that . . . must be taken . . . so that such imports
  will not threaten to impair the national security.” 

  § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii). The President must take any such ac-
  tion within fifteen days of his determination. Id.
  § 1862(c)(1)(B). In all instances, section 232 requires the
  President to “submit to the Congress a written statement
  of the reasons why the President has decided to take action,
  or refused to take action.” Id. § 1862(c)(2).
       Provisions of the Trade Act similarly authorize the ex-
  ecutive branch to impose tariffs on imports, but only once
  certain conditions set forth by statute have been met. Sec-
  tion 201 allows the President to “take all appropriate and
  feasible action within his power,” including imposing tar-
  iffs (often called “safeguard” tariffs) if the ITC finds that
  imports are causing or threatening “serious injury” to a do-
  mestic industry. 

(a). Under Section 301 of
  the Trade Act, the President may specifically direct the
  United States Trade Representative (USTR) to respond to
  unfair trade practices which violate trade agreements, or
  burden or restrict United States commerce, including by
  “impos[ing] duties or other import restrictions” on foreign
  countries responsible for the harmful conduct. 

(a), (c)(1)(B). While the USTR may take any action
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           21



  “within the power of the President with respect to trade in
  any goods or services, or with respect to any other area of
  pertinent relations with the foreign country,” 

 § 2411(a),
  the USTR must complete various steps before taking such
  action. For example, before imposing duties pursuant to
  section 301, the USTR must initiate an investigation, id.
  § 2412; consult with the foreign country regarding the
  practices being investigated, id. § 2413; determine whether
  the requisite conditions for action are met, and if so, pub-
  lish its proposed action and the factual findings on which
  it is based, id. § 2414; and allow for public comment regard-
  ing both the proposed investigation and the final action, id.
  § 2412(a)(4). As interpreted by the Government, IEEPA,
  unlike these other statutes, would impose no such limita-
  tions on the President’s authority.
                                II
      “We review a grant of summary judgment by the [CIT]
  de novo.” Aspects Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. United States,
  

, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “We review the
  [CIT]’s grant of an injunction for abuse of discretion,”
  which “may be established by showing that the [CIT] ‘made
  a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors
  or exercised its discretion based on an error of law or
  clearly erroneous fact findings.’” Oman Fasteners, LLC
  v. United States, 

, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (in-
  ternal citation omitted) (quoting Wind Tower Trade Coal.
  v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2014)) “To the
  extent the [CIT]’s decision to grant or deny an injunction
  ‘hinges on questions of law,’ this court reviews those deter-
  minations without deference.” 

                               III
      We first consider whether this case falls within our
  court’s subject matter jurisdiction. “The objection that a
  federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be
  raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any
  stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of
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  22                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 

  (2006) (internal citation omitted). “If the court determines
  at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
  court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Alt-
  hough no party here questions our jurisdiction, we are ob-
  ligated to confirm whether we have it.
       We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 

(a)(5). We review de novo whether the CIT had sub-
  ject-matter jurisdiction. Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United
  States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If the CIT
  lacked jurisdiction, we similarly lack jurisdiction to reach
  the merits of this appeal. Glasstech, Inc. v. AB Kyro OY,
  

 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[A]n appellate court
  has no jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case if the
  court from which the appeal was taken was without juris-
  diction.”).
       Article III of the Constitution provides that “[t]he judi-
  cial Power of the United States, shall be vested . . . in such
  inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time or-
  dain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Accordingly,
  the “[j]urisdiction of the lower federal courts is . . . limited
  to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of
  jurisdiction.” Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux-
  ites de Guinee, 

 (1982).
      The statute conferring jurisdiction on the CIT provides,
  in relevant part, that “the [CIT] shall have exclusive juris-
  diction of any civil action commenced against the United
  States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any
  law of the United States providing for . . . tariffs, duties,
  fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for
  reasons other than the raising of revenue.” 28 U.S.C.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            23



  § 1581(i)(1)(B). 10 By granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
  CIT, “[s]ection 1581(i) removes specific actions from the
  general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts
  (under 

) and places them in the jurisdic-
  tion of the [CIT].” Orleans Int’l, Inc. v. United States,
  

 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The question here is
  whether the action before us arose from a law providing for
  tariffs such that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction in the
  first instance, and we may properly maintain appellate ju-
  risdiction.
      A claim “arises out of” a tariff law “for reasons other
  than the raising of revenue,” 

(i)(1)(B), if
  the law in question is invoked as the authority to impose a
  tariff for such a non-revenue raising purpose. To determine
  jurisdiction pursuant to an “arising out of” provision, we do
  not have to decide whether the statute does in fact confer
  such authority. That question goes to the merits of the
  claim. “Jurisdiction is [the court’s] authority to decide the
  case either way.” The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.,
  

 (1913). It does not depend on the claim’s
  success. See id.; see also Bell v. Hood, 

, 682–83
  (1946).



      10   While the President is a named party in this ap-
  peal, the CIT noted that section 1581(i), which permits ac-
  tions “against the United States, its agencies, or its
  officers,” does not cover an action naming the President.
  V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 1366–67. The CIT
  therefore held that while the President “must be dismissed
  from the two cases before the court,” it “retain[ed] ‘jurisdic-
  tion to consider challenges to the President’s actions in
  suits against subordinate officials who are charged with
  implementing the presidential directives.” 

 at 1367
  (quoting USP Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 

, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). The parties before us have not
  challenged those rulings.
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  24                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




      The CIT found it had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the
  present case in part because the Challenged Executive Or-
  ders purport to “effect changes to the [HTSUS]” to reflect
  the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariff rates. J.A. 64. The
  statute establishing the HTSUS specifies that “[t]he provi-
  sions of the [HTSUS] . . . enacted by” Congress, as well as
  “[e]ach modification or change made to the [HTSUS] by the
  President under authority of law,” “shall be considered to
  be statutory provisions of law for all purposes.” 

(c)(1)(A), (C). The Challenged Executive Orders pur-
  port to modify the HTSUS—for example, by “inserting . . .
  new headings” providing for specific tariff rates applicable
  to goods from each country, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,088, 15,090,
  by allegedly “modifying the HTSUS to temporarily sus-
  pend” certain tariffs, id. at 15,626, or by directing the Sec-
  retary of Homeland Security to alter the HTSUS to
  effectuate the orders, id. at 9,115, 9,118, 9,123. While exec-
  utive orders are not ordinarily “law within the meaning of
  the Constitution,” Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
  

, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal citation and
  quotation marks omitted), the Challenged Executive Or-
  ders, if authorized, would modify the HTSUS. These modi-
  fications to HTSUS are thus purported laws of the United
  States, and a lawsuit challenging tariffs effectuated by
  such a modification “arises out of [a] law of the United
  States providing for . . . tariffs.” See California v. Trump,
  No. 25-cv-03372-JSC, 

, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
  June 2, 2025) (quoting 

(i)).
      Finding that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over the
  present cases is consistent with the reason why Congress
  established this exclusive jurisdiction in the first place, as
  noted by three district court courts considering challenges
  to the same tariffs now before us. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
  Inc., 

 (1988) (“Congress intended, first
  and foremost, to remedy the confusion over the division of
  jurisdiction between the Customs Court (now the Court of
  International Trade) and the district courts and to ensure
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           25



  uniformity in the judicial decisionmaking process.” (inter-
  nal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Webber v. U.S.
  Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CV-25-26-GF-DLC, 

, at *7 (D. Mont. Apr. 25, 2025) (“Consolidating
  tariff matters with the [CIT] ensures a necessary ‘degree of
  uniformity and consistency’ throughout the United States.”
  (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Bd.,
  

, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); California v. Trump,
  

, at *5–6. 11 The CIT had subject matter
  jurisdiction over this case in the first instance, and we ac-
  cordingly have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.




      11   One decision from the District Court for the Dis-
  trict of the District of Columbia has held otherwise. See
  Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1248 (RC),
  

 (D.D.C. May 29, 2025), appeal pending,
  No. 25-5202 (D.C. Cir.), cert. before judgment denied,
  No. 24-1287, 

 (June 20, 2025). The dis-
  trict court in that case held that its jurisdiction was not
  precluded by § 1581’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
  CIT because IEEPA does not delegate to the President any
  authority to impose tariffs. See id. at *8 (holding that
  IEEPA’s authorization of the President to “regulate . . . im-
  portation or exportation” does not encompass the power to
  tariff, because “[t]o regulate is to establish rules governing
  conduct; to tariff is to raise revenue through taxes on im-
  ports or exports.”). This decision appears to erroneously
  conflate the merits question of whether IEEPA authorizes
  tariffs with the jurisdictional issue. Regardless, we do not
  agree with the jurisdictional analysis in Learning Re-
  sources because, whether or not IEEPA itself is a “law
  providing for tariffs,” the Challenged Executive Orders,
  which direct modifications to the HTSUS, are such laws,
  for the reasons explained above.
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  26                             V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




                                 IV
      We are not addressing whether the President’s actions
  should have been taken as a matter of policy. Nor are we
  deciding whether IEEPA authorizes any tariffs at all. Ra-
  ther, the only issue we resolve on appeal is whether the
  Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the
  Challenged Executive Orders are authorized by IEEPA.
  We conclude they are not.
                                 A
      We first consider the statutory text, including any rel-
  evant canons of interpretation. See U.S. ex rel. Schutte
  v. SuperValu Inc., 

 (2023) (“We start, as
  always, with the text.”). IEEPA authorizes the President to
  take certain actions in response to a declared national
  emergency arising from an “unusual and extraordinary
  threat[] . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or econ-
  omy of the United States.” 

(a). Upon the
  declaration of such an emergency, IEEPA authorizes the
  President to:
       investigate, block during the pendency of an inves-
       tigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
       prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, with-
       holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
       importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or ex-
       ercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
       to, or transactions involving, any property in which
       any foreign country or a national thereof has any
       interest by any person, or with respect to any prop-
       erty, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
       States.
  

(a)(1)(B) (emphases added).
      The statute bestows significant authority on the Presi-
  dent to undertake a number of actions in response to a de-
  clared national emergency, but none of these actions
  explicitly include the power to impose tariffs, duties, or the
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            27



  like, or the power to tax. The Government locates that au-
  thority within the term “regulate . . . importation,” but it is
  far from plain that “regulate . . . importation,” in this con-
  text, includes the power to impose the tariffs at issue in
  this case.
      Notably, when drafting IEEPA, Congress did not use
  the term “tariff” or any of its synonyms, like “duty” or “tax.”
  There are numerous statutes that do delegate to the Pres-
  ident the power to impose tariffs; in each of these statutes
  that we have identified, Congress has used clear and pre-
  cise terms to delegate tariff power, reciting the term “du-
  ties” or one of its synonyms. In contrast, none of these
  statutes uses the broad term “regulate” without also sepa-
  rately and explicitly granting the President the authority
  to impose tariffs. The absence of any such tariff language
  in IEEPA contrasts with statutes where Congress has af-
  firmatively granted such power and included clear limits
  on that power.
       For example, section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 per-
  mits the President to “specify and declare new or additional
  duties.” 

(a) (emphasis added). Section 122
  of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to pro-
  claim “a temporary import surcharge . . . in the form of du-
  ties.” 

(a)(A) (emphasis added). Section 201
  of the Trade Act authorizes the President to “proclaim an
  increase in, or the imposition of, any duty on the imported
  article” or to “proclaim a tariff-rate quota.” 

(a)(3)(A)–(B) (emphases added). And section 301 of
  the Trade Act allows the President to “impose duties or
  other import restrictions.” 

(c)(1)(B) (em-
  phasis added). 12



      12 See also 

(a) (“[T]here shall be im-
  posed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in
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  28                             V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




      The only statute the Government identifies that might
  reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with this analysis is
  section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Sec-
  tion 232 provides that:
       [I]f the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an “ar-
       ticle is being imported into the United States in
       such quantities or under such circumstances as to
       threaten to impair the national security,” the Pres-
       ident is authorized to “take such action, and for
       such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the im-
       ports of (the) article and its derivatives so that . . .
       imports (of the article) will not threaten to impair
       the national security.”
  Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 

 (1976) (quoting 

(b) (1970 ed., Supp.
  IV) (emphasis added)).
      In Algonquin, the Supreme Court interpreted the
  phrase “adjust the imports” in section 232 to permit the
  President to “control such imports of petroleum and petro-
  leum products . . . by imposing on them a system of mone-
  tary exactions in the form of license fees.” 

 at 551–52,
  571. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the



  addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of
  the net countervailable subsidy.”); 

 § 1673 (“[T]here shall
  be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty,
  in addition to any other duty imposed.”); id. § 2465 (“No
  duty-free treatment provided under this subchapter shall
  remain in effect after December 31, 2020.”); id.
  § 2252(d)(2)(D) (“Such relief shall take the form of an in-
  crease in, or the imposition of, a duty on imports.”); id.
  § 2411(c)(1)(B) (“[T]he Trade Representative is authorized
  to . . . impose duties or other import restrictions on the
  goods of . . . foreign countr[ies] for such time as the Trade
  Representative determines appropriate.”).
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                             29



  authorization to “‘adjust’ imports should be read to encom-
  pass only quantitative methods [i.e.], quotas as opposed to
  monetary methods [i.e.]., license fees of effecting such ad-
  justments,” based on the statute’s explicit statement that
  the circumstances that threaten to impair national secu-
  rity are not related to quantity of imports but rather “their
  use, their availability, [and] their character.” Id. at 561
  (quoting 104 Cong. Rec. 10542-10543 (1958) (remarks of
  Rep. Mills)).
       Even section 232 does not undermine our conclusion
  regarding IEEPA’s use of “regulate . . . importation.” This
  is first because the use of the term “adjust,” which the Gov-
  ernment argues is synonymous with “regulate,” in sec-
  tion 232 is in the context of a provision dealing with the
  imports and duties, making it far more plausible that the
  adjustment referenced in subsection (b) includes an adjust-
  ment to tariff rates. See 

(a) (explicitly re-
  ferring to “the duty . . . on any article”). Also, in construing
  the meaning of “adjust” in Algonquin, the Supreme Court
  also relied heavily on the statutory history of the Trade Ex-
  pansion Act. Multiple members of the House and Senate
  had explicitly referenced the President’s authority to “in-
  crease . . . duties” or “impose . . . fees” as contemplated by
  proposed amendments that were “strikingly similar” to the
  enacted law. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 563–66. In contrast,
  here, neither the term “duties” nor any of its synonyms ap-
  pear anywhere in the text of IEEPA, and the history of the
  enactment of IEEPA lacks any similar legislative lodestar.
  Moreover, section 232 is within title 19 of the U.S. Code,
  which is entitled “Customs Duties.” See INS v. Nat’l Ctr.
  for Immigrants’ Rts., Inc., 

 (1991) (“[W]e
  have stated that the title of a statute or section can aid in
  resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text.”). In con-
  trast, IEEPA’s provisions are located within title 50, which
  is entitled “War and National Defense.” And in enacting
  IEEPA, Congress explicitly set out to cabin the President’s
  authority, providing for authorities “which [we]re both
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  30                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  more limited in scope than those of [TWEA] and subject to
  various procedural limitations.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-459,
  at 2. 13 Thus, even if Algonquin is viewed as supporting the
  proposition that “adjust the imports” includes the power to
  impose tariffs (as opposed to standing for the narrower
  proposition that, in section 232, which appears in title 19,
  “adjust” simply is not limited to non-monetary actions), it
  does not follow that IEEPA’s use of “regulate . . . importa-
  tion” also includes tariffs.
       Further, as we previously discussed, see supra Sec-
  tion I.E., in each statute delegating tariff power to the
  President, Congress has provided specific substantive lim-
  itations and procedural guidelines to be followed in impos-
  ing any such tariffs. It seems unlikely that Congress
  intended, in enacting IEEPA, to depart from its past prac-
  tice and grant the President unlimited authority to impose
  tariffs. The statute neither mentions tariffs (or any of its
  synonyms) nor has procedural safeguards that contain
  clear limits on the President’s power to impose tariffs.
       Taken together, these other statutes indicate that
  whenever Congress intends to delegate to the President the
  authority to impose tariffs, it does so explicitly, either by
  using unequivocal terms like tariff and duty, or via an over-
  all structure which makes clear that Congress is referring
  to tariffs. This is no surprise, as the core Congressional
  power to impose taxes such as tariffs is vested exclusively
  in the legislative branch by the Constitution; when Con-
  gress delegates this power in the first instance, it does so
  clearly and unambiguously. See Nat’l Cable Television
  Ass’n, v. United States, 

, 340–41 (1974) (“Tax-
  ation is a legislative function, and Congress . . . is the sole


       13 To be clear, we cite legislative history as additional
  support for the conclusion we reach based on the statutory
  text alone. Even without this legislative history, we would
  reach the same conclusion.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                              31



  organ for levying taxes . . . . It would be . . . a sharp break
  with our traditions to conclude that Congress had bestowed
  on [the executive branch] the taxing power.”).
      Contrary to the Government’s assertion, the mere au-
  thorization to “regulate” does not in and of itself imply the
  authority to impose tariffs. The power to “regulate” has
  long been understood to be distinct from the power to “tax.”
  In fact, the Constitution vests these authorities in Con-
  gress separately. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 1, 3; see also Gib-
  bons v. Ogden, 

 (1824) (“It is, that all duties,
  imposts, and excises, shall be uniform. In a separate clause
  of the enumeration, the power to regulate commerce is
  given, as being entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes
  and imposts, and as being a new power, not before con-
  ferred. The constitution, then, considers these powers as
  substantive, and distinct from each other.”); Nat’l Fed’n. of
  Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 

 (2012) (hold-
  ing that the individual mandate provision of the Patient
  Protection and Affordable Care Act was a permissible ex-
  ercise of Congress’s taxing power but exceeded Congress’s
  power to regulate commerce). While Congress may use its
  taxing power in a manner that has a regulatory effect, see
  Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus., 

, the power to
  tax is not always incident to the power to regulate.
       Indeed, there are important examples where Congress
  has granted the power to regulate to the executive branch
  without delegating the power to impose tariffs. See, e.g.,
  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

  Stat. 881 (codified as amended by 

  Stat. 1409, 1409 at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(h)(1)) (directing the Se-
  curities and Exchange Commission “to regulate the trading
  of [tradeable assets]”); Communications Act of 1934, § 303,
  

 Stat. 1082, 1082 (codified as
  

(e)) (directing the Federal Communications
  Commission to “[r]egulate the kind of apparatus to be used
  with respect to its external effects and the purity and
  sharpness of the emissions from each [radio] station and
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  32                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  from the apparatus therein”). The Government’s sugges-
  tion would mean, for example, that Congress delegated to
  the SEC power to tax substantial swaths of the American
  economy by granting the SEC the authority to regulate var-
  ious activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(h)(1) (“[T]he Commis-
  sion shall have the authority to regulate the trading of any
  put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, cer-
  tificate of deposit, or group or index of securities.”); id.
  § 78i(h)(2) (“[T]he Commission shall have the authority to
  regulate the trading of any security futures product to the
  extent provided in the securities laws.”).
       Even in the context of international trade, apart from
  the decision in Yoshida II, the Government has not pointed
  to any statute or judicial decision that has construed the
  power to regulate as including the authority to impose tar-
  iffs without the statute also including a specific provision
  in the statute authorizing tariffs. That was notably the
  case in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, where
  the statute authorized the President to act “to regulate the
  foreign commerce of the United States” and then specifi-
  cally authorized tariffs. 

 (1928) (quoting
  Tariff Act, ch. 356 § 315, 

, 941–42 (1922)
  (granting President authority to proclaim certain “in-
  creases or decreases in any rate of duty provided in th[e]
  act.”)).
      Upon declaring an emergency under IEEPA, a Presi-
  dent may, in relevant part, “investigate, block during the
  pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel,
  nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” the “importation or ex-
  portation of . . . any property in which any foreign country
  or a national thereof has any interest.”. 

(a)(1)(B). “Regulate” must be read in the context of
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            33



  these other verbs, 14 none of which involve monetary actions
  or suggest the power to tax or impose tariffs. 15
      The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA as provid-
  ing the President power to impose unlimited tariffs also
  runs afoul of the major questions doctrine. See, e.g., Oral



      14   Instead, the other verbs implicate the common law
  doctrine that trade with enemy nations or hostile actors is
  illegal. See, e.g., The Julia, 

 (1814) (“[I]n
  war all intercourse between the subjects and citizens of the
  belligerent countries is illegal, unless sanctioned by the au-
  thority of the government.”); Hanger v. Abbott, 

,
  535–36 (1867) (“All foreign writers on international law
  concur in the opinion that the immediate and necessary
  consequence of a declaration of war is to interdict all inter-
  course or dealings between the subjects of the belligerent
  states.”); Coppell v. Hall, 

 (1868) (“When
  international wars exist all commerce between the coun-
  tries of the belligerents, unless permitted, is contrary to
  public policy, and all contracts growing out of such com-
  merce are illegal. Such wars are regarded not as wars of
  the governments only, but of all the inhabitants of their re-
  spective countries.”). Congress has long enacted statutes
  on this backdrop. See, e.g., Section 5 of the Act of July 13,
  1861, 

, 257.
       15  An import of goods may trigger a host of other cus-
  toms-related procedures, such as acquisition of a Certifi-
  cate of Origin under the North American Free Trade
  Agreement (NAFTA) rules of origin, see Xerox Corp. v.
  United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2005), li-
  censes, see Algonquin, 

 (1976), and creation
  and management of foreign trade zones, see Nissan Motor
  Mfg. Corp., U.S.A. v. United States, 

  (Fed. Cir. 1989). These measures are more readily under-
  stood to fall under the authorization to “regulate . . . impor-
  tation” granted to the President by IEEPA.
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  34                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  Arg. 16 at 19:28–19:39 (the Government stating “there is no
  limit on the cap of the tariff in IEEPA itself”). The Supreme
  Court has explained that the doctrine applies in “cases in
  which the ‘history and the breadth of the authority . . . as-
  serted’” by the Government entails vast “economic and po-
  litical significance.” West Virginia v. EPA, 

,
  721 (2022) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 

 (2000)). In such cases, there may be a “‘reason to
  hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer
  such authority.” 

 (quoting Brown & Williamson,
  529 U.S. at 159–60). When the major questions doctrine is
  implicated, the Government must point to “clear congres-
  sional authorization” for that asserted power. 

 at 732
  (quoting Util. Air. Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 

, 324
  (2014)).
       The tariffs at issue in this case implicate the concerns
  animating the major questions doctrine as they are both
  “unheralded” and “transformative.” 

; see also
  

 (“[J]ust as established practice may shed light on
  the extent of power conveyed by general statutory lan-
  guage, so the want of assertion of power by those who pre-
  sumably would be alert to exercise it, is equally significant
  in determining whether such power was actually con-
  ferred.” (quoting FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 

 (1941)). 17 The Supreme Court has explained that



       16 Available at https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.
  gov/default.aspx?fl=25-1812_07312025.mp3.
      17  The Government argues as a threshold matter that
  the major questions doctrine does not apply to the Presi-
  dent because of the President’s democratic and political ac-
  countability. See Government’s Opening Br. 43–44. The
  Government fails to articulate why it makes any difference
  whether the challenged action is the result of presidential
  or agency action, since agency heads themselves are
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          35



  where the Government has “never previously claimed pow-
  ers of this magnitude,” the major questions doctrine may
  be implicated. Biden v. Nebraska, 

, 501–03
  (2023).
      Since IEEPA was promulgated almost fifty years ago,
  past presidents have invoked IEEPA frequently. But not
  once before has a President asserted his authority under
  IEEPA to impose tariffs on imports or adjust the rates
  thereof. Rather, presidents have typically invoked IEEPA
  to restrict financial transactions with specific countries or
  entities that the President has determined pose an acute
  threat to the country’s interests. For example, in the after-
  math of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Presi-
  dent George W. Bush invoked IEEPA to establish a process
  for designating terrorist organizations and affiliated indi-
  viduals to prevent the deployment of American resources
  for their advantage. Executive Order No. 13224, Blocking
  Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who
  Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism,
  

, 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). In almost all



  accountable to the President. See Trump v. Wilcox, 

, 1415 (2025). We accordingly join our sister cir-
  cuits in concluding that delegations to the President are
  treated the same as delegations to executive agencies un-
  der the major questions doctrine. See, e.g., Louisiana
  v. Biden, 

, 1031 n.40 (5th Cir. 2022); Georgia
  v. President of the U.S., 

, 1295–96 (11th Cir.
  2022); Kentucky v. Biden, 

, 606–08 (6th Cir.
  2022). The only circuit court decision to hold otherwise was
  vacated as moot, see Mayes v. Biden, 

, 933
  (9th Cir. 2023), vacated as moot, 

 (9th Cir.
  2023); see also Nebraska v. Su, 

, 9 n.2 (9th Cir.
  2024) (acknowledging that “Mayes is no longer binding
  law”); 

 (Nelson, J., concurring) (explaining why the
  major questions doctrine applies to presidential actions).
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  36                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  other instances where IEEPA has been invoked, presidents
  did so to freeze assets, block financial transfers, place em-
  bargoes, or impose targeted sanctions on hostile regimes
  and individuals. Even under IEEPA’s predecessor, TWEA,
  a President has invoked his authority to impose tariffs on
  only one occasion, and on that occasion, the tariffs were of
  limited scope and duration. See Yoshida II, 

. The invocation of IEEPA to impose tariffs on nearly
  every country in the world is undoubtedly a significant de-
  parture from these previous invocations. “‘This ‘lack of his-
  torical precedent,’ coupled with the breadth of authority
  that the [Government] now claims[] [may be] a ‘telling in-
  dication’” that the Government’s reading of a statute is in-
  correct. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab.,
  Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 

, 119–
  20 (2022) (per curiam) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
  Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 

, 505 (2010)); Dames
  & Moore v. Regan, 

, 669–74 (1981) (interpret-
  ing IEEPA in light of past presidential action).
      Additionally, as already discussed, tariffs are a core
  Congressional power. The “basic and consequential
  tradeoffs” that are inherent in the President’s decision to
  impose the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs “are ones
  that Congress would likely have intended for itself.” Ne-
  braska, 

 (quoting West Virginia, 597 U.S.
  at 730). Moreover, the United States imports more than
  $4 trillion of goods annually; these imports account for
  14 percent of the nation’s economy. J.A. 215. The Govern-
  ment itself has claimed that the Reciprocal Tariffs will
  “generate between $2.3 trillion and $3.3 trillion over the
  budget window.” The White House, Statement from the Off.
  of Commc’ns, FACT: One, Big, Beautiful Bill Cuts Spend-
  ing, Fuels Growth, https://www.whitehouse.gov/arti-
  cles/2025/05/fact-one-big-beautiful-bill-cuts-spending-
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                             37



  fuels-growth/ (May 28, 2025). 18 The Executive’s use of tar-
  iffs qualifies as a decision of vast economic and political sig-
  nificance, so the Government must “point to clear
  congressional authorization” for its interpretation of
  IEEPA. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723 (quoting Util. Air,
  573 U.S. at 324).
     For the reasons discussed above, we discern no clear
  congressional authorization by IEEPA for tariffs of the
  magnitude of the Reciprocal Tariffs and Trafficking Tariffs.
  Reading the phrase “regulate . . . importation” to include
  imposing these tariffs is “a wafer-thin reed on which to rest
  such sweeping power.” Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of
  Health & Hum. Servs., 

, 765 (2021)



      18   Indeed, the economic impact of the tariffs is pre-
  dicted to be many magnitudes greater than the two pro-
  grams that the Supreme Court has previously held to
  implicate major questions. In Alabama Association of Real-
  tors v. Department of Health & Human Services, the Court
  held that the power to impose “$50 billion in . . . economic
  impact” was “exactly the kind of power” “of vast economic
  and political significance” for which it “expect[s] Congress
  to speak clearly.” 

, 764 (2021) (per curiam) (in-
  ternal quotation marks omitted). In Nebraska, the Su-
  preme Court pointed to the “staggering” scope of impact of
  a program “between $469 billion and $519 billion,” which
  was “ten times the ‘economic impact’” in Alabama Associa-
  tion that it previously concluded “triggered analysis under
  the major questions doctrine.” 600 U.S. at 502–03. As
  noted, the Government’s estimates of the Reciprocal and
  Trafficking Tariff’s impact are at least five times larger.
  And given the President’s continued invocation of IEEPA
  to impose additional expansive tariffs during the pendency
  of this appeal, the overall economic impact of the tariffs im-
  posed under the Government’s reading of IEEPA is even
  larger still.
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  38                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  (per curiam). In this respect, the Government’s argument
  resembles the argument expressly rejected by the Supreme
  Court in Nebraska, where the Court concluded that Con-
  gress’s authorization to the Secretary of Education to
  “waive or modify” laws and regulations governing student
  debt did not encompass student debt relief. 600 U.S.
  at 494–96. The Court explained that “[h]owever broad the
  meaning of ‘waive or modify,’ that language cannot author-
  ize the kind of exhaustive rewriting of the statute that has
  taken place here.” 

. The same is true of the stat-
  utory language (“regulate . . . importation”) at issue in this
  case.
      We are unpersuaded by the Government’s argument
  that it is “particularly inappropriate to construe narrowly
  a delegation of power in the arena of foreign affairs and
  national security.” Government’s Opening Br. 45. While
  the President of course has independent constitutional au-
  thority in these spheres, the power of the purse (including
  the power to tax) belongs to Congress. See Zivotofsky ex rel.
  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 

, 21 (2015) (“[I]t is essential
  the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and
  respected. . . . The Executive is not free from the ordinary
  controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign af-
  fairs are at issue.”); Fuld v. Pal. Liberation Org., 

, 19 (2025) (“The Federal Government’s inherent foreign
  affairs power, like every other governmental power, must
  be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions
  of the Constitution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  Absent a valid delegation by Congress, the President has
  no authority to impose taxes.
      Given these considerations, we conclude Congress, in
  enacting IEEPA, did not give the President wide-ranging
  authority to impose tariffs of the nature of the Trafficking
  and Reciprocal Tariffs simply by the use of the term “regu-
  late . . . importation.”
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          39



                                B
      In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, the Gov-
  ernment relies heavily on Yoshida II, a decision of our pre-
  decessor court, the CCPA. In the Government’s view, we
  should discern that Congress intended to include in IEEPA
  the power to impose tariffs because it enacted IEEPA with
  knowledge of existing judicial precedent set by Yoshida II,
  which recognized the delegation of tariff authority to the
  President under TWEA, IEEPA’s predecessor statute, and
  contained the identical “regulate . . . importation” lan-
  guage. Thus, we consider whether, even if Congress rati-
  fied Yoshida II’s understanding of the term “regulate,” to
  what extent that ratification authorizes the Trafficking
  and Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Execu-
  tive Orders under IEEPA.
       Yoshida II concerned President Nixon’s issuance of
  Proclamation 4074 to address a balance-of-payments defi-
  cit. 

. The CCPA reversed the Customs
  Court’s determination that TWEA section 5(b) did not au-
  thorize President Nixon’s 10 percent import surcharge.
  

. Section 5(b) of TWEA also authorized the
  President to “regulate . . . importation.” 

;
  

(b)(1)(B). The CCPA held that TWEA
  “does in fact delegate to the President, for use during war
  or during national emergency only, the power to ‘regulate
  importation,’” and that power also included the authority
  to “impos[e] an import duty surcharge.” Yoshida II,
  

. 19 Without foreclosing the possibility


      19  We note that Yoshida II is not binding on the en
  banc court. See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp.,
  

 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Indeed, ‘[t]he prov-
  ince and obligation of the en banc court is to review the
  current validity of challenged prior decisions.’” (alteration
  in original) (quoting United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d
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  40                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  that TWEA delegated authority to the President to impose
  some tariffs, the CCPA also “agree[d] with the Customs
  Court that the delegation could not constitutionally have
  been of the full and all-inclusive power to regulate foreign
  commerce.” Id. at 574. Thus, it determined that “[a] ques-
  tion remain[ed] . . . as to how the President may regulate
  importation in a national emergency, i.e., what means of
  execution of the delegated powers are permissible.” Id.
  at 574.
      The CCPA ultimately concluded that President Nixon’s
  tariff was authorized given its “[l]imited [n]ature” in time,
  scope, and amount, since it was a temporary measure, “lim-
  ited to articles which had been the subject of prior tariff
  concessions, and, thus, to less than all United States im-
  ports,” and subject to a maximum rate that had been pre-
  scribed by Congress. Id. at 577–78. Thus, the CCPA held
  that “[f]ar from attempting . . . to tear down or supplant the
  entire tariff scheme of Congress, the President imposed a
  limited surcharge, as a temporary measure . . . calculated
  to help meet a particular national emergency, which is
  quite different from imposing whatever tariff rates he
  deems desirable.” Id. at 577–78 (internal quotation marks
  omitted).
      The Government argues that because Yoshida II was
  existing precedent at the time IEEPA was enacted, Con-
  gress intended to ratify Yoshida II’s understanding of the
  term “regulate . . . importation” as used in TWEA by using
  the same language in IEEPA. Even if we assume, as the


  1158, 1167 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev’d on other
  grounds, Evans v. United States, 

 (1992))). But
  because Yoshida II approved narrowly circumscribed tar-
  iffs that did not exceed Congressional caps, and the CCPA
  expressly declined to approve unbounded tariffs, today’s
  case does not require us to decide whether to overrule Yo-
  shida II.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            41



  Government urges, that Congress intended to ratify Yo-
  shida II when it enacted IEEPA, we still must consider
  what it is that Congress ratified. Yoshida II does not
  broadly conclude that “regulate . . . importation” must be
  read to include any type of tariff imposition. In fact, it held
  the opposite. The CCPA’s reasoning in Yoshida II was ex-
  pressly premised on the limits of President Nixon’s Procla-
  mation. The court noted that “[t]he Executive does not here
  seek, nor would it receive, judicial approval of a wholesale
  delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 583. And the CCPA
  agreed with the Customs Court that to sanction “the exer-
  cise of an unlimited power . . . would be to strike a blow to
  our Constitution.” Id. Thus, the CCPA explicitly contrasted
  presidential conduct it found permissible within the power
  granted by TWEA—“‘a temporary measure’ . . . calculated
  to help meet a particular national emergency” that is lim-
  ited in scope and amount—with conduct it found impermis-
  sible under TWEA—“imposing whatever tariff rates [the
  President] deems desirable.” Id. at 578.
      The Government would have us define “regulate . . .
  importation” to include only the portion of Yoshida II au-
  thorizing tariffs and ignore the rest of its holding. But if
  the ratification doctrine is to apply, and we are to presume
  that Congress intended for the holding of Yoshida II to ap-
  ply to the newly enacted IEEPA, then we must presume
  that it intended for the court’s entire holding to apply, not
  just the portion favorable to the Government. And because
  Yoshida II was explicit in its view that an unbounded tariff
  authority would not be permitted, that understanding
  must be attributed to Congress as well.
       Accepting the Government’s argument as correct—that
  Congress ratified Yoshida II’s conclusion that “regulate . . .
  importation” could include the power to impose tariffs—we
  still must conclude that the Challenged Executive Orders
  in this case exceed the authority provided by that interpre-
  tation of IEEPA. Both the Trafficking Tariffs and the Re-
  ciprocal Tariffs are unbounded in scope, amount, and
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  42                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  duration. These tariffs apply to nearly all articles imported
  into the United States (and, in the case of the Reciprocal
  Tariffs, apply to almost all countries), impose high rates
  which are ever-changing and exceed those set out in the
  HTSUS, and are not limited in duration. The Trafficking
  and Reciprocal Tariffs assert an expansive authority that
  is beyond the express limitations of Yoshida II’s holding
  and, thus, beyond the authority delegated to the President
  by IEEPA.
                              ***
                               V
      The final issue raised by this appeal is whether the CIT
  abused its discretion in vacating and permanently enjoin-
  ing the operation of the Challenged Executive Orders. For
  the reasons explained below, we vacate the CIT’s injunc-
  tion and remand.
       An injunction “does not follow from success on the mer-
  its as a matter of course.” Winter v. NRDC, 

  (2008). Under “well-established principles of equity, a
  plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a
  four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.” eBay
  Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 

 (2006). The
  four factors a plaintiff must establish to secure a perma-
  nent injunction are: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable
  injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as mone-
  tary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that in-
  jury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
  the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is war-
  ranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be dis-
  served by a permanent injunction.” 

 “The decision to
  grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equi-
  table discretion by the [trial] court, reviewable on appeal
  for abuse of discretion.” 

     After invalidating both the Trafficking Tariffs and the
  Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           43



  Orders as contrary to law, the CIT ordered the Government
  to issue the “necessary administrative orders to effectuate
  the permanent injunction” “within 10 calendar days.”
  V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d. at 1384. The CIT did
  not address the eBay factors in its original opinion. The fol-
  lowing week, in an order responding to the Government’s
  motions to stay the CIT’s enforcement of its judgment
  pending the Government’s appeal to this Court, the CIT ex-
  plained that “[t]he injunction issued on account of Plain-
  tiffs’ success on the merits and the unavailability under the
  Uniformity Clause of a complete legal remedy in the form
  of piecemeal duty refunds to specific plaintiffs,” and that
  “[i]ntrinsic to this exercise of equitable discretion was the
  compelling public interest in ‘ensuring that governmental
  bodies comply with the law’ . . . and the lack of any cogniza-
  ble hardship borne by the United States in the form of its
  non-enforcement of orders issued ultra vires.” J.A. 63
  (quoting Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
      We need not decide whether the CIT abused its discre-
  tion by only articulating its analysis of the eBay factors
  some days after it issued its original opinion on the merits,
  nor whether the Government has shown any prejudice
  from the delay. Nor need we evaluate the sufficiency of the
  CIT’s explanation. This is because vacatur of the universal
  injunction is warranted based on the Supreme Court’s in-
  tervening decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 

  (2025).
       In CASA, the Supreme Court considered the Govern-
  ment’s challenge to three universal injunctions issued by
  different district courts prohibiting enforcement of the
  President’s policy with respect to birthright citizenship. 

. While the Court held that the universal injunc-
  tions at issue “likely exceed the equitable authority Con-
  gress has granted to federal courts,” 

, it
  “decline[d] to take up . . . in the first instance” arguments
  as to the permissible scope of injunctive relief, 

.
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  44                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  Instead, it instructed “[t]he lower courts [to] move expedi-
  tiously to ensure that, with respect to each plaintiff, the
  injunctions comport with this rule and otherwise comply
  with principles of equity” as outlined in the opinion. 

; see also Doe v. Trump, 

, 112 (1st Cir.
  2025) (remanding “for the limited purpose of enabling the
  District Court to consider the bearing, if any, of that guid-
  ance in CASA on the scope of the preliminary injunc-
  tion . . . and to act accordingly”); United States v. Texas,
  No. 24-50149, 

, at *38 (5th Cir. July 3,
  2025) (“Like the Supreme Court in Trump v. CASA, we ‘de-
  cline to take up . . . in the first instance’ arguments as to
  the permissible scope of injunctive relief in the present
  case. ‘[W]e therefore leave it’ to the district court to con-
  sider any arguments the parties may present in this re-
  gard.” (alterations in original)).
      We will follow this same practice. 20 On remand, the
  CIT should consider in the first instance whether its grant
  of a universal injunction comports with the standards out-
  lined by the Supreme Court in CASA.
                               VI
      We affirm the CIT’s holding that the Trafficking and
  Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive
  Orders exceed the authority delegated to the President by
  IEEPA’s text. We also affirm the CIT’s grant of declaratory
  relief that the orders are “invalid as contrary to law.”
  V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 1383–84. We vacate
  the CIT’s grant of a permanent injunction universally



       20 We are neither affirming nor reversing the CIT’s
  holding that any relief short of a universal injunction
  would be unconstitutional as violative of the Uniformity
  Clause. On remand, the CIT will need to reconsider this
  holding in light of the guidance provided by the Supreme
  Court in CASA.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                         45



  enjoining the enforcement of the Trafficking and Recipro-
  cal Tariffs and remand for the CIT to reevaluate the pro-
  priety of granting injunctive relief and the proper scope of
  such relief, after considering all four eBay factors and the
  Supreme Court’s holding in CASA.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND
              REMANDED-IN-PART
                             COSTS
      No costs.
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    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                       ______________________

    V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES
     AND PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE,
       MICROKITS, LLC, FISHUSA INC., TERRY
             PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
                 Plaintiffs-Appellees

                                       v.

  DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
      AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
      EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
        UNITED STATES, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
  COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
    AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL
   CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED
   STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
   JAMIESON GREER, IN HISOFFICIAL CAPACITY
   AS UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
      OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
   REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK, IN HIS
      OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
    COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
             BORDER PROTECTION,
               Defendants -Appellants

                -------------------------------------------------

  STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE
     OF COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
    STATE OF DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS,
  STATE OF MAINE, STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE
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  2                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   OF NEVADA, STATE OF NEW MEXICO, STATE OF
         NEW YORK, STATE OF VERMONT,
                Plaintiffs-Appellees

                              v.

  PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES
      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
     KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
     SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
       SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
      HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES
  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY
  S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES
   CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS
   OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER FOR
     U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
                 UNITED STATES,
                Defendants-Appellants
               ______________________

                    2025-1812, 2025-1813
                   ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Court of International
  Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-TMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-
  00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior Judge Jane A. Restani,
  Judge Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Timothy M. Reif.
                  ______________________
  CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge, joined by Circuit Judges
  LOURIE, REYNA, and STARK, additional views.
       We join the majority opinion in full. While we agree
  with the majority that the International Emergency Eco-
  nomic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 

 et seq., does
  not grant the President authority to impose the type of tar-
  iffs imposed by the Executive Orders, Maj. Op. at 26–42,
  we write separately to state our view that IEEPA does not
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            3



  authorize the President to impose any tariffs. In particu-
  lar, we conclude that (1) the Government’s expansive inter-
  pretation of “regulate” is not supported by the plain text of
  IEEPA; (2) the Government’s reliance on the ratification of
  our predecessor court’s opinion in United States v. Yoshida
  Int’l, Inc., 

 (CCPA 1975) (“Yoshida II”) does
  not overcome this plain meaning; and (3) the Government’s
  understanding of the scope of authority granted by IEEPA
  would render it an unconstitutional delegation.
                               A.
      We start by addressing the statutory text of IEEPA.
  IEEPA allows the President to declare a national emer-
  gency to deal with “any unusual and extraordinary threat,
  which has its source in whole or substantial part outside
  the United States, to the national security, foreign policy,
  or economy of the United States.” 

(a).
  Once the President declares such an emergency, IEEPA
  grants the President the power to:
      investigate, block during the pendency of an inves-
      tigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
      prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, with-
      holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
      importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or ex-
      ercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
      to, or transactions involving, any property in which
      any foreign country or a national thereof has any
      interest by any person, or with respect to any prop-
      erty, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
      States[.]
  

(a)(1)(B). The Government locates the
  President’s purported tariff authority in the statute’s grant
  of power to “regulate . . . importation.” Appellants’ Br. 32.
      The plain meaning of “regulate” does not support the
  Government’s argument. “Regulate” means “[t]o fix, estab-
  lish or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established
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  4                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to govern-
  ing principles or laws.” Regulate, Black’s Law Dictionary
  (5th ed. 1979). “Regulate” also means “to govern or direct
  according to rule,” “to bring under the control of law or con-
  stituted authority,” or “make regulations for or concern-
  ing.”    Regulate, Webster’s Third New International
  Dictionary (1961). As the plain meaning of “regulate” does
  not include measures for raising revenue, the Government
  is forced to rely on a syllogism: it contends to “regulate”
  importation means to “adjust” or “control” the quantity of
  imports, and tariffs are ways to “adjust” or “control” the
  quantity of imports. Appellants’ Br. 32–33; Am. First Leg.
  Found. Br. 3–5; see Dissent at 29–33. The Government’s
  broad interpretation of “regulate” as encompassing every
  possible method and mode of adjustment of the quantity of
  importation, including taxation, faces three textual prob-
  lems in the specific context 1 of 

: (1) it is
  inconsistent with how “regulate” would be applied beyond
  its application to “importation;” (2) it renders the other
  listed powers in IEEPA surplusage; and (3) it violates the
  proposition that Congress must speak clearly when author-
  izing taxation.
     First, the Government’s interpretation of “regulate”
  would require “regulate” to have multiple meanings in the



      1   As the dissent notes, taxes can sometimes be a form
  of regulation. Dissent at 29–33. However, “[s]tatutory lan-
  guage has meaning only in context.” Graham Cnty. Soil &
  Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 

 (2005). The examples the dissent marshals all
  contain explicit grants of taxation authority and thus stand
  for the uncontroversial principle that taxation can some-
  times have a regulatory purpose; they do not support the
  broader proposition that “regulate,” in all contexts and
  most especially in the context of IEEPA, is interpreted to
  include the taxation power.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                             5



  very provision on which the Government relies. The Su-
  preme Court has “never engaged in such interpretive con-
  tortion” to conclude that Congress intended to “giv[e] the
  same word, in the same statutory provision, different
  meanings in different factual contexts.” United States
  v. Santos, 

 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
  IEEPA’s grant of the power to “regulate” applies not just to
  “importation,” but to
        any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
        transfer, withdrawal, transportation, impor-
        tation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exer-
        cising any right, power, or privilege with
        respect to, or transactions involving, any
        property in which any foreign country or a na-
        tional thereof has any interest.
  

(a)(1)(B) (emphases added). If the Govern-
  ment’s reading of “regulate” to include adjusting quantity
  through taxation is adopted, then the President would
  have the power to unilaterally tax bank withdrawals or to
  implement a wealth tax on any foreign property holdings.
  Similarly, under the Government’s interpretation, the
  President could “regulate . . . transportation” by taxing
  transportation to reduce it. Further, reading IEEPA’s
  grant of authority to “regulate . . . exportation” to include
  the ability to reduce exportation by taxing it would render
  the provision unconstitutional. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
  The Government’s suggestion that “it is natural to read the
  President’s power to ‘regulate . . . importation’ as encom-
  passing the power to impose tariffs, while reading the
  power to ‘regulate . . . exportation’ as excluding that
  power,” Appellants’ Reply Br. 9, effectively concedes that
  its argument requires reading “regulate” to have different
  meanings in different factual contexts of the same statu-
  tory provision. We reject the Government’s proposal that
  we adopt such a fluctuating construction of “regulate.”
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  6                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




      Second, the Government’s interpretation of “regulate”
  would make the President’s other authorities in IEEPA su-
  perfluous. It is a “‘cardinal principle of statutory construc-
  tion’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
  construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence,
  or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW
  Inc. v. Andrews, 

 (2001) (quoting Duncan
  v. Walker, 

 (2001)). If the Government’s
  expansive reading of “regulate” were correct, there would
  have been little need for Congress to separately list, for ex-
  ample, the powers to “direct and compel,” or “prevent or
  prohibit” in IEEPA. See 

(a)(1)(B). Nota-
  bly, the power to “prevent or prohibit” any particular act of
  importation (or acquisition, holding, or withdrawal) is sub-
  sumed in a definition of “regulate” that includes no limits
  on the scope of authorized restrictions. Thus, we also reject
  the Government’s interpretation for allowing the term
  “regulate” to render many of the remaining listed powers
  superfluous.
      Third, even if the Government’s reading were plausi-
  ble, any delegation is far from clear. “Congress must indi-
  cate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the
  discretionary authority to” impose “‘fees’ or ‘taxes.’” Skin-
  ner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 

 (1989)
  (quoting Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
  

, 559 n.10 (1976)); see National Cable Televi-
  sion Ass’n v. United States, 

 (1974) (“It
  would be such a sharp break with our traditions to conclude
  that Congress had bestowed on a federal agency the taxing
  power.”). We reject the dissent’s suggestion that because
  IEEPA involves foreign affairs, it must be interpreted so
  broadly as to include tariff authority. Dissent at 36. 2 We



      2  Indeed, the dissent’s key case for this proposition
  held that a statute should be read to incorporate “the
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            7



  are aware of no Supreme Court case applying that proposi-
  tion to read a broad delegation of taxing authority into am-
  biguous text. For a similar reason, we reject the dissent’s
  suggestion that “[t]axing through tariffs is just a less ex-
  treme, more flexible tool for pursuing the same objective of
  controlling the amount or price of imports that, after all,
  could be barred altogether.” Dissent at 32. The power of
  the purse 3 is “the most comple[te] and effectual weapon


  historical authority of the President in the fields of foreign
  commerce and of importation into the country,” which
  would not include taxation authority. B-West Imports, Inc.
  v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting
  S.P.R. Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 

 (Ct. Cl. 1964)); compare 

 (“Presidents acting un-
  der broad statutory grants of authority have ‘imposed and
  lifted embargoes, prohibited and allowed exports, sus-
  pended and resumed commercial intercourse with foreign
  countries.’” (quoting S.P.R. Sugar, 

)), with
  Maj. Op. at 33 n.14 (explaining the difference between the
  President’s historical authority to ban commerce with ene-
  mies and the tariff authority); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
  Co. v. Sawyer, 

, 643–44 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
  concurring) (“Congress alone controls the raising of reve-
  nues and their appropriation . . . . [T]he Constitution did
  not contemplate that the title Commander-in-Chief of the
  Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander-in-
  Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants.”).
       3   At the founding, the power to tariff and the power
  to tax were synonymous. “[N]early all” government reve-
  nue came from tariffs until 1862. Andrew Reamer, Chapter
  2: Before the U.S. Tariff Commission: Congressional Ef-
  forts to Obtain Statistics and Analysis for Tariff-setting,
  1789–1916, in A Centennial History of the United States In-
  ternational Trade Commission 33, 35–37 (2017); see Adv.
  Am. Freedom Br. 18 (noting that at the founding,
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  8                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  with which any constitution can arm the immediate repre-
  sentatives of the people,” The Federalist No. 58, at 394
  (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961), not a mere lesser au-
  thority to the traditional executive power that enables it to
  cut off trade with wartime enemies. See Maj. Op. at 33
  n.14.
      Instead, we read “regulate” in its statutory context.
  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 

  (2001) (referring to statutory context and recognizing that
  Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”). It is
  natural to read “regulate . . . importation” to include
  measures like supply chain validation, quarantines, and
  known importer rules. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13194,
  

, 7389–90 (Jan. 18, 2001) (authorizing
  “promulgation of rules and regulations” under IEEPA to
  stop “indirect importation” of rough diamonds from Sierra
  Leone); see also Maj. Op. at 33 n.15 (collecting examples).
  Thus, a proper construction of “regulate” would encompass
  measures enabling the President “to direct by rule or re-
  striction,” but would not strain the term to cover every pos-
  sible method or mode of restriction, such as taxation.
                               B.
      In urging a contrary result, the Government relies
  heavily on the supposed ratification of Yoshida II. See Ap-
  pellants’ Reply Br. 4–6. The ratification doctrine applies
  only when (1) Congress “simply reenact[s]” a statute “with-
  out change” and (2) there is a “judicial consensus so broad
  and unquestioned that we must presume Congress knew of




  “taxations levied on imports were not a special category of
  power that Congress shared with, or could share with, the
  President”).
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                             9



  and endorsed it.” JAMA v. ICE, 

 (2005). 4
  Neither requirement is met here.
      Congress did not reenact the Trading with the Enemy
  Act (“TWEA”) without change; rather, it withdrew some of
  the authority previously granted to the President, includ-
  ing the “authority to regulate purely domestic transac-
  tions.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 11 (1977). Tariffs may be
  less anomalous when domestic economic regulation is also
  contemplated. Moreover, key portions of Yoshida II’s rea-
  soning are no longer applicable. First, Yoshida II relied on
  the absence of “acts providing procedures prescribed by the
  Congress for the accomplishment of the very purpose
  sought to be obtained.” 

. Here, there are
  numerous other authorities that the President could have
  invoked. See J.A. 475 (“Peter Navarro: . . . There’s 122,
  there’s 301, there’s 232, there’s 338. There’s all sorts of
  things we can do well within the law.”). Second, as con-
  cerns the tariffs considered in Yoshida II, at least as a prac-
  tical matter, Congress had retroactively passed a measure
  providing President Nixon the authority to enact balance-
  of-payment tariffs. See S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 88 (1974)
  (providing “explicit statutory authority” for Nixon’s ac-
  tions, without commenting on whether TWEA was miscon-
  strued). No such implicit or explicit approval exists
  here: instead, when the President in 2019 asked Congress



      4   The substantive weakness of the Government’s po-
  sition also supports finding that Yoshida II was not rati-
  fied. It is inappropriate to rely on “language in a
  Committee Report” or “a few isolated statements” when the
  invocation of ratification “would result in a construction of
  the statute which not only is at odds with the language of
  the section in question and the pattern of the statute taken
  as a whole, but also is extremely far reaching in terms of
  the virtually untrammeled and unreviewable power it
  would vest.” SEC v. Sloan, 

 (1978).
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  10                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  to give him authority to impose reciprocal tariffs, Congress
  demurred. President Donald J. Trump, State of the Union
  (Feb. 5, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/brief-
  ings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-ad
  dress-2/ (“Tonight, I am also asking you to pass the United
  States Reciprocal Trade Act, so that if another country
  places an unfair tariff on an American product, we can
  charge them the exact same tariff on the same product that
  they sell to us.”); see United States Reciprocal Trade Act,
  H.R. 764, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing granting the Pres-
  ident a narrow power to impose reciprocal tariffs); see also
  United States Reciprocal Trade Act, H.R. 735, 119th Cong.
  (2025). Thus, the relevant portion of IEEPA was not effec-
  tively reenacted without change.
      Nor was there a broad and unquestioned judicial con-
  sensus from which we can presume that Congress endorsed
  Yoshida II. Congress heard testimony explicitly question-
  ing Yoshida II as a “thin” opinion that should not “define
  the scope of congressional delegation.” Emergency Controls
  on International Economic Transactions: Hearing on H.R.
  1560 and H.R. 2382 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ.
  Pol’y & Trade of the H. Comm. on Int’l Rels., 95th Cong.
  8–9, 18 (1977) (statement of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
  New York University Law School). 5 Indeed, Yoshida II



       5  The dissent cites this testimony for the proposition
  that Congress knew of Yoshida II, without analyzing
  whether Congress endorsed it. Dissent at 37. Congress
  recognized the importance of Professor Lowenfeld’s opin-
  ions and adopted numerous of his proposals, including
  modifying the statute to require “express renewal,” to re-
  quire “a new declaration of emergency” for new actions, and
  to raise the standard for what counts as an “emergency.”
  Emergency Controls on International Economic Transac-
  tions: Hearing on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382 Before the
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            11



  explicitly indicated that future tariffs “must, of course,
  comply with the statute now governing such action.”
  

 n.33. Moreover, by its terms, Yoshida II
  did not “approve in advance any future surcharge of a dif-
  ferent nature, or any surcharge differently applied or any
  surcharge not reasonably related to the emergency de-
  clared.” 

. Thus, Yoshida II hardly set out an un-
  questioned definition of the word “regulate.” At most, it
  left the door slightly open as to whether its holding would
  apply prospectively. The legislative history suggests that,
  while Congress knew about Yoshida II, it did not endorse
  it or convert its retroactive holding into a prospective
  one: the only mention of Yoshida II in the key committee
  report is in a summary of past uses, H.R. Rep. No. 95-459,
  at 5, which the same report also states were “something
  quite different from what was envisioned in 1917.” 

  at 8–9. Thus, there was no broad and unquestioned judi-
  cial consensus surrounding Yoshida II, and Yoshida II’s in-
  terpretation of “regulate” as encompassing tariffs was not
  ratified.
                                C.
       The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA would ren-
  der it an unconstitutional delegation. Because taxation au-
  thority constitutionally rests with Congress, any
  delegation of that authority to the President must at least
  set out an intelligible principle that includes “both ‘the gen-
  eral policy’” that the President “must pursue and ‘the
  boundaries of [its] delegated authority.’” FCC v. Consum-
  ers’ Rsch., 

, 2497 (2025) (alteration in origi-
  nal) (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 

 (1946)). Similarly, Congress must “provide[ ] sufficient


  Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y & Trade of the H. Comm. on
  Int’l Rels., 95th Cong. 10–11 (statement of Prof. Andreas
  F. Lowenfeld, New York University Law School); see 

; 

(d).
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  12                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  standards to enable both ‘the courts and the public [to] as-
  certain’” whether the President “has followed the law.” 

  (second alteration in original) (quoting OPP Cotton Mills,
  Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage & Hour Div., Dep’t of Lab., 

 (1941)). Because this is undoubtedly a case that
  “affect[s] the entire national economy,” the “‘guidance’
  needed is greater . . . than when [Congress] addresses a
  narrow, technical issue.” 

 (quoting Whitman v. Am.
  Trucking Ass’ns, 

 (2001)). For taxes, 6
  both “quantitative” and “qualitative limits on how much
  money” the President can raise are permissible, but it
  would “pose a constitutional problem” if the “statute gives
  the [executive branch] power, all on its own, to raise [a] hy-
  pothetical $5 trillion” with no “ceiling.” 

 at 2501–02.
      The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA would be a
  functionally limitless delegation of Congressional taxation
  authority. 7 Even if we assume that “to deal with any


       6   Justice Gorsuch has stated that tariffs “arguably
  raise[ ] distinct nondelegation questions from domestic
  taxes,” but did so in arguing that domestic taxes should be
  subject to an even stricter non-delegation standard; he did
  not suggest that tariffs are not subject to the intelligible
  principle standard. Consumers’ Rsch., 145 S. Ct. at 2533
  n.15 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
       7  Notably, the CCPA in Yoshida II relied on examin-
  ing the “actions . . . judged in the light of what the Presi-
  dent actually did, not in the light of what he could have
  done.” 

. Subsequently, however, the Su-
  preme Court has made clear that in assessing whether a
  Congressional grant of authority violates the non-delega-
  tion doctrine, courts cannot limit their analysis only to how
  that authority has actually been exercised. In Whitman,
  the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he very choice of
  which portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                         13



  unusual and extraordinary threat” satisfies the require-
  ment to set out the “general policy,” the “boundaries” the
  Government identifies, Appellants’ Br. 37–41, are no
  boundaries at all. The Government and the dissent con-
  tend that IEEPA has constitutionally satisfactory limits
  because of a requirement that the threat be “unusual and
  extraordinary,” and that it “has its source in whole or sub-
  stantial part outside the United States.” Appellants’ Br. 37
  (quoting 

(a)); see Dissent at 59–63 (reject-
  ing solely procedural or judicially unenforceable limits).
  Whether or not this limit provides an intelligible principle
  for the other authorities in IEEPA, it provides no limit on
  the supposed power to tax. As soon as the President sees
  an unusual and extraordinary threat, the Government’s in-
  terpretation of IEEPA would enable the President to set
  whatever tariff rates he wishes. 8 The Government’s



  prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted—
  would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative au-
  thority.” 

. Thus, Yoshida II’s analysis does
  not fully address how non-delegation issues are litigated
  today. Accordingly, to the extent the Government relies on
  ratification of Yoshida II without the limits in Yoshida II,
  its interpretation runs into substantial non-delegation
  problems.
      8    Indeed, at oral argument, the Government sug-
  gested that the only limit preventing it from using tariffs
  to address a budget deficit emergency is that the President
  must find that the emergency has its source in “substantial
  part outside the United States.” Oral Arg. 39:20–39:51,
  https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=25
  -1812_07312025.mp3; 

(a). Consider, how-
  ever, that under the Government’s view, the President
  could make such a factual finding by merely pointing to a
  lack of taxes paid on imports from outside the country. But
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  14                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  interpretation would leave neither quantitative nor quali-
  tative restrictions on how much money the executive
  branch could raise without Congressional authorization.
      The historical distinction between the quantitative
  limits implicated by the other listed powers in IEEPA and
  taxes, see Maj. Op. at 33 n.14, distinguishes the present cir-
  cumstances from the cases cited by the dissent for the prop-
  osition that the non-delegation doctrine is weakened in the
  area of foreign affairs. See Dissent at 60–61 (citing Curtis
  Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Foreign Affairs, Nondelegation,
  and the Major Questions Doctrine, 

  (2024)). The cases cited by the dissent either involved the
  traditionally executive embargo power or involved the sort
  of executive calculation and fact-finding that do not impli-
  cate the non-delegation doctrine. See Gundy v. United
  States, 

, 158–163 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissent-
  ing) (discussing Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States,
  

 (1813) and J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
  v. United States, 

 (1928), and explaining how,
  in those cases, “Congress had made all the relevant policy
  decisions,” leaving fact-finding for the executive). Indeed,
  “IEEPA [is] not [an] authorization[ ] that obviously con-
  nect[s] to independent presidential power.” Bradley &
  Goldsmith at 1796; see 

 at 1788–89 (noting that the nar-
  rower Section 232 is “close to the line of constitutionality”
  under a more modern non-delegation doctrine, and that the
  proposition that national security assessments can be “in-
  terlinked with Congress’s authority over trade” is “highly
  debatable and would entail a very relaxed approach to the
  independent powers idea.”). Moreover, the idea that tariff
  delegations are subject to a lower non-delegation standard
  is incompatible with J.W. Hampton, which addressed a



  if the President can declare an emergency to cut the deficit
  by raising taxes in whatever way he wishes, not much re-
  mains of Congressional authority over taxation.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            15



  tariff statute while creating the intelligible principle stand-
  ard. 

.
       Even the broadest tariff-related statute upheld by the
  Supreme Court imposed more meaningful limits than
  those imposed by IEEPA. The Supreme Court upheld the
  limits in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
  noting that there needed to be a factual finding “that an
  ‘article is being imported into the United States in such
  quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to
  impair the national security,’” that the President’s dele-
  gated taxation authority had a ceiling because he could “act
  only to the extent ‘he deems necessary to adjust the im-
  ports . . . so that such imports will not threaten to impair
  the national security,’” and that there were “specific factors
  to be considered by the President in exercising his author-
  ity under s 232(b).” Algonquin, 

. Thus, the
  Supreme Court understood Section 232 to contain a quali-
  tative limit similar to the limits at issue in Consumers’ Re-
  search. The Government identifies no such quantitative or
  qualitative limits here. Accordingly, even if we thought the
  Government’s reading of IEEPA were plausible, we would
  “shun an interpretation that raises serious constitutional
  doubts.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 

, 286 (2018).
                                D.
      Congress “alone has access to the pockets of the peo-
  ple.” The Federalist No. 48, at 334 (James Madison)
  (J. Cooke ed., 1961). Accordingly, we would also affirm be-
  cause Congress did not unambiguously delegate its taxing
  power to the President in IEEPA.
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    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                       ______________________

    V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES
     AND PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE,
       MICROKITS, LLC, FISHUSA INC., TERRY
             PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
                 Plaintiffs-Appellees

                                       v.

  DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
      AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
      EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
        UNITED STATES, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
  COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
    AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL
   CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED
   STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
   JAMIESON GREER, IN HISOFFICIAL CAPACITY
   AS UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
      OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
   REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK, IN HIS
      OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
    COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
             BORDER PROTECTION,
               Defendants -Appellants

                -------------------------------------------------

  STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE
     OF COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
    STATE OF DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS,
  STATE OF MAINE, STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE
  OF NEVADA, STATE OF NEW MEXICO, STATE OF
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  2                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




           NEW YORK, STATE OF VERMONT,
                 Plaintiffs-Appellees

                              v.

  PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES
      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
     KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
     SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
       SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
      HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES
  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY
  S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES
   CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS
   OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER FOR
     U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
                 UNITED STATES,
                Defendants-Appellants
               ______________________

                    2025-1812, 2025-1813
                   ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Court of International
  Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-TMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-
  00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior Judge Jane A. Restani,
  Judge Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Timothy M. Reif.
                  ______________________
  TARANTO, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Chief
  Judge MOORE and Circuit Judges PROST and CHEN join.
      Before us on appeal is the decision of the Court of In-
  ternational Trade (CIT) in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United
  States, 

 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2025) (CIT
  Op.) in a pair of cases—one brought by five private busi-
  nesses and the other brought by twelve States—in which
  all plaintiffs assert harm to their interests in imported
  goods. 

. The CIT ruled that it had
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                             3



  jurisdiction over the case and that at least one plaintiff in
  each group had constitutional standing. 

 at 1365–69.
  The CIT then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs,
  holding unlawful the asserted cause of the harm—namely,
  tariffs on imports of goods imposed by two groups of execu-
  tive orders issued by the President. 

. For au-
  thority to impose the tariffs in both the first group, which
  concerns what have been called the reciprocal tariffs, and
  the second group, which concerns what have been called
  the (drug-)trafficking tariffs, the President relied on the In-
  ternational Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
  

 201–207, 

, 1626–28
  (1977) (codified as slightly amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–
  1706). The CIT set aside the tariffs on the ground that they
  were not authorized by IEEPA, and it issued an injunction
  as a remedy. CIT Op. at 1370–84.
       This court today affirms the holdings on jurisdiction,
  standing, and unlawfulness, while vacating the CIT’s in-
  junction and remanding for reconsideration of the remedy.
  Maj. Op. at 24–25, 42–44. We agree with the majority’s
  decision on jurisdiction and standing and on the need for
  reconsideration of the remedy if the tariffs are unlawful.
  But we disagree with the majority’s conclusion on the issue
  of the tariffs’ legality. We conclude that plaintiffs have not
  justified summary judgment in their favor on either statu-
  tory or constitutional grounds.
       Regarding statutory authority: Plaintiffs have not
  shown on summary judgment that either group of tariffs
  fails to meet the preconditions IEEPA sets for the exercise
  of the presidential authorities that IEEPA grants—requir-
  ing that measures adopted be imposed to deal with an un-
  usual and extraordinary threat, having foreign sources, to
  the national security or foreign policy or economy of the
  United States, the threat declared as a national emergency
  (lasting one year unless renewed). The majority does not
  disagree. Rather, the majority concludes that the particu-
  lar tariffs at issue are not among the tools IEEPA makes
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  4                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  available through the authorization to “regulate . . . impor-
  tation” of goods, IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(B) [

(a)(1)(B)], even when all the required preconditions
  are met. Maj. Op. at 37–38. We think otherwise. IEEPA’s
  language, as confirmed by its history, authorizes tariffs to
  regulate importation—a conclusion that the majority does
  not squarely reject, but Judge Cunningham and those who
  join her opinion do. And IEEPA’s language does not con-
  tain the additional limits on which the majority opinion to-
  day relies as the sole basis for its illegality holding. Maj.
  Op. at 37–42. IEEPA embodies an eyes-open congressional
  grant of broad emergency authority in this foreign-affairs
  realm, which unsurprisingly extends beyond authorities
  available under non-emergency laws, and Congress con-
  firmed the understood breadth by tying IEEPA’s authority
  to particularly demanding procedural requirements for
  keeping Congress informed. And, contrary to the CIT’s rea-
  son for invalidating the reciprocal tariffs, such emergency
  authority is not displaced by another statute (section 122
  of the Trade Act of 1974, 

 Stat. 1978,
  1987–88, (1974) (codified at 

)); nor does
  IEEPA contain the exclusion of using IEEPA authorities as
  leverage that the CIT articulated as the sole basis for hold-
  ing the trafficking tariffs unlawful. Finally, the major
  questions doctrine does not call for a different statutory
  conclusion. Regarding constitutionality: We conclude that
  IEEPA’s authorization of presidential action in this realm
  is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative author-
  ity under the Supreme Court’s decisions, which have up-
  held broad grants of authority, including tariffing
  authority, in this foreign-affairs-related area.
      For those reasons, on the present state of governing
  law, we would reverse the CIT’s summary judgment and
  remand for further proceedings on any issues concerning
  unlawfulness that plaintiffs have preserved. We therefore
  respectfully dissent.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            5



                        I. BACKGROUND
                      A. Executive Orders
       One group of executive orders at issue began with Ex-
  ecutive Order 14257, 

 (April 2, 2025)
  (EO ’257), titled Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tar-
  iff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and
  Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits.
  That order announced a 10% tariff on imports from all trad-
  ing partners (subject to certain exceptions) effective April
  5, 2025, and country-specific higher tariffs for 57 named
  countries effective a few days later. 1 EO ’257, 90 Fed. Reg.
  at 15045 (§§ 2–3), 15049 (Annex I). That order was fol-
  lowed by several orders that largely paused the country-
  specific portions of the tariffs announced in EO ’257, while
  for a time increasing tariffs for the People’s Republic of
  China. See CIT Op. at 1363–64. EO ’257 calls the tariffs
  in this first group “reciprocal tariffs.” Both the private
  plaintiffs and State plaintiffs challenge these reciprocal
  tariffs.
      The second group of executive orders at issue began on
  February 1, 2025, with the issuance of executive orders
  that raised tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China based on
  the roles (such as deficient interdiction and cooperation
  with U.S. law enforcement) those countries assertedly play



      1 The private plaintiffs state how the “additional recip-
  rocal tariffs on specific countries” were calculated: They are
  “based on a simple ratio of the trade deficit in goods (ex-
  cluding services) as a percentage of total U.S. import from
  the given country.” Private Appellees’ Brief at 48. That is,
  for country X, the amount is based on the difference be-
  tween the value of U.S. goods entering X and the value of
  X goods entering the U.S., divided by the value of X goods
  entering the U.S. The government has not disputed that
  assertion about the basis for the country-specific tariffs.
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  6                             V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  in exacerbating opioid and related crime problems in the
  United States. Exec. Order No. 14193, 

  (Feb. 1, 2025) (EO ’193) (Canada); Exec. Order No. 14194,
  

 (Feb. 1, 2025) (EO ’194) (Mexico); Exec.
  Order No. 14195, 

 (Feb. 1, 2025) (EO ’195)
  (China). Several follow-on executive orders included
  pauses based on seemingly positive responses from the gov-
  ernments of Canada and Mexico, increases to the rates
  based on assertedly inadequate or negative responses from
  the government of China, and some alterations of the rates
  and definitions of the class of subject goods. See CIT Op.
  at 1362–63 (summarizing executive orders); Maj. Op. at 6–
  11. Following the CIT, we refer to this second group as in-
  volving trafficking tariffs. Only the State plaintiffs chal-
  lenge these tariffs.
       Both groups of executive orders rely on IEEPA for au-
  thority to impose the tariffs. The executive orders declare
  or cite declarations of national emergencies (a requirement
  for action under IEEPA), in accordance with the National
  Emergencies Act of 1976, 

 Stat. 1255,
  1255–57, §§ 101, 201–202, 301, 401 (1976) (codified as
  amended at 

, 1621–22, 1631, 1641)
  (NEA). EO ’257, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15041, 15044; EO ’193, 90
  Fed. Reg. at 9113–14; EO ’194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9117; EO
  ’195, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9121. The orders provide that the im-
  posed tariffs will be embodied in the Harmonized Tariff
  Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), citing § 604 of the
  Trade Act of 1974, 

 Stat. 1978, 2073
  (1974) (codified as amended at 

), which di-
  rects the President to “embody in the [HTSUS] . . . Acts af-
  fecting import treatment, and actions thereunder,
  including . . . modification . . . or imposition of any rate of
  duty or other import restriction.” (Emphases added.) Con-
  gress has declared that the HTSUS, including “[e]ach mod-
  ification or change made . . . by the President under
  authority of law (including section 604 of the Trade Act of
  1974 [

]),” “shall be considered to be
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            7



  statutory provisions of law for all purposes.” 

(c)(1). Finally, the executive orders cite 

, which provides for presidential delegation of author-
  ities granted to the President.
       The CIT in this case did not hold, and the parties have
  not argued to us, that different conclusions regarding law-
  fulness may apply to some executive orders but not others
  within each of the two groups of tariffs. In particular, all
  of the challenges to the tariffs presented to us by the plain-
  tiffs in support of the summary judgment granted in their
  favor, including the challenges deemed meritorious by the
  CIT, are put forth as invalidating the initial EO ’257 recip-
  rocal tariffs and the initial trafficking tariffs (EOs ’193,
  ’194, and ’195). Like the CIT, we therefore may and do
  evaluate the challenges now before us as they apply to
  those initial tariffs (though what occurred in the follow-on
  orders may have a bearing on that evaluation). If there are
  grounds for separately challenging any of the follow-on or-
  ders, such grounds are not currently presented to us.
                           B. IEEPA
      Emergency declarations and powers, having a long lin-
  eage, drew particular congressional attention in the early
  1970s. In 1972, the Senate created a Special Committee on
  the Termination of the National Emergency to study such
  national emergencies, associated legislative authorities,
  and the impact of their termination. S. Res. 9, 93d Cong.
  (1973); S. Res. 224, 93d Cong. (1973); S. Res., 94th Cong.
  (1975); see S. Rep. No. 94-922, at 1–4 (1976). In November
  1973, the Senate committee published a report cataloguing
  emergency powers statutes, S. Rep. No. 93-549 (1973), and
  in July 1974, the same Senate committee (with the same
  makeup but slightly renamed as the Special Committee on
  National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers
  to reflect an expanded mandate) published a 140-page re-
  port after a year-and-a-half-long study of national emer-
  gencies and delegated emergency powers since the
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  8                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  Founders’ era, Senate Special Committee on National
  Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief
  History of Emergency Powers in the United States, 93d
  Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1974) (1974 Emergency Pow-
  ers Report). See S. Rep. No. 94-922, at 4–5. In the Fore-
  word to the 1974 Emergency Powers Report, at v, Co-
  Chairs Senators Frank Church and Charles McC. Mathias,
  Jr. observed that “[t]he United States has been in a state
  of national emergency since March 9, 1933,” and that “es-
  pecially since the days of the 1933 economic emergency, it
  has been Congress’ habit to delegate extensive emergency
  authority—which continues even when the emergency has
  passed—and not to set a terminating date.” They added:
  “The United States thus has on the books at least 470 sig-
  nificant emergency powers statutes without time limita-
  tions delegating to the Executive extensive discretionary
  powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which af-
  fect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encom-
  passing ways.”        Id.; see United States v. Yoshida
  International, Inc., 

, 581 n.32 (C.C.P.A. 1975)
  (Yoshida CCPA) (reciting 470 figure and citing 1973 report,
  S. Rep. No. 93-549).
      Among the emergency-power statutes then in place
  was the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 

 Stat. 411 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
  §§ 4301–41), which initially applied only in times of war
  but was “expanded to deal with peacetime national emer-
  gencies in 1933.” Regan v. Wald, 

, 225–26 &
  n.2 (1984); see Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933, 

, 

, 1–2 (1933); War Powers Act of
  1941, 

, 

, 839–40 (1941)
  (providing TWEA authorities “[d]uring the time of war or
  during any other period of national emergency declared by
  the President”). Beginning in 1941, TWEA section 5(b)(1)
  acquired its present language and paragraph structure (as
  relevant here), authorizing the President, “by means of in-
  structions, licenses, or otherwise,” to take a variety of
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                             9



  related actions in two categories—one focused on money or
  its financial substitutes (subsection A) and the other on
  property (subsection B). War Powers Act of 1941, § 301, 55
  Stat. at 839–40 (amending section 5(b) of TWEA). Under
  TWEA, the President may
      (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transac-
      tions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or pay-
      ments between, by, through, or to any banking
      institution, and the importing, exporting, hoard-
      ing, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or
      bullion, currency or securities, and
      (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nul-
      lify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition hold-
      ing, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
      transportation, importation or exportation of, or
      dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privi-
      lege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
      property in which any foreign country or a national
      thereof has any interest . . . .
  TWEA § 5(b) [50 U.S.C.§ 4305(b)(1)]. That language has
  been part of TWEA ever since. See Regan v. Wald, 

 n.2, 227 n.7; 50 U.S.C.App. § 5(b) (1976 ed.); 

(b)(1) (current version).
      In 1976, Congress enacted the NEA. §§ 101, 201–202,
  301, 401, 501–02, 90 Stat. at 1255–59, now codified as
  amended at 

, 1621–22, 1631, 1641, 1651.
  The NEA, where applicable, generally terminated preexist-
  ing declarations of emergency, NEA § 101, 

, and established new constraints on new declara-
  tions, NEA §§ 201–202, 301, 401, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621–22,
  1631, 1641. One provision governing national emergencies
  declared under the NEA requires automatic termination of
  the declared emergency after one year unless renewed by
  the President. NEA § 202(d), 

(d). Another
  provision, as enacted, allowed both for presidential termi-
  nation by proclamation and for congressional termination
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  10                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  by concurrent resolution without presidential action or ap-
  proval, NEA § 202(a), 

(a); see also NEA
  § 202(b)–(c), 

(b)–(c); but in 1985, after the
  Supreme Court held legislative vetoes to be unconstitu-
  tional in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
  Chadha, 

 (1983), Congress changed the provi-
  sion to refer instead to a joint resolution, which is subject
  to a presidential veto, Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
  

, 

, 448 (1985) (amend-
  ing 

(a)–(c)). Significantly, the NEA ex-
  pressly exempted TWEA from its provisions, leaving
  congressional reconsideration of TWEA for another day.
  NEA § 502(a)(1), 90 Stat. at 1258 (current version at 

); see S. Rep. No. 94-1168, at 7 (1976) (ex-
  plaining that TWEA and a few other emergency laws, on
  which the government was relying, were exempted from
  the NEA to allow for “further investigation” and “careful
  consideration” and future “enactment of permanent law
  where appropriate”).
      At the end of 1977, Congress addressed TWEA, enact-
  ing 

 Stat. 1625, 1626–29 (1977).
  In Title I, Congress deleted TWEA’s general phrase cover-
  ing any “period of national emergency declared by the Pres-
  ident,” thus returning TWEA to its original more limited
  application—only to wartime situations. § 101, 91 Stat. at
  1625. In Title II, Congress enacted IEEPA to give the Pres-
  ident what the Supreme Court has since recognized to be
  “essentially the same” set of authorities for peacetime that
  remained in TWEA for wartime, Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S.
  at 227–28, using language “directly drawn” from TWEA,
  Dames & Moore v. Regan, 

 (1981). 91
  Stat. at 1626–29. We describe the current version of
  IEEPA, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–04, which is identical in all
  material respects to the version of IEEPA enacted in 1977.
       Congress in IEEPA first defined the “situations in
  which authorities may be exercised,” 91 Stat. at 1626 (cap-
  italization corrected), providing standards not found in
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          11



  TWEA. Section 202 states as follows (emphases added to
  the words chiefly at issue on appeal here):
      (a) Any authority granted to the President
      by section 203 [§ 1702] may be exercised to
      deal with any unusual and extraordinary
      threat, which has its source in whole or sub-
      stantial part outside the United States, to the
      national security, foreign policy, or economy
      of the United States, if the President declares
      a national emergency with respect to such
      threat.
      (b) The authorities granted to the President
      by section 203 [§ 1702] may only be exercised to
      deal with an unusual and extraordinary
      threat with respect to which a national emer-
      gency has been declared for purposes of this
      chapter and may not be exercised for any
      other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities
      to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new
      declaration of national emergency which must be
      with respect to such threat.
  IEEPA § 202, 91 Stat. at 1626 [

] (empha-
  ses added).
      Those provisions may be summarized as imposing four
  requirements. For the President to exercise the authorities
  set forth in the next section of IEEPA (§ 203, 

), (i) there must be an unusual and extraordinary
  threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy
  of the United States, § 202(a); (ii) the threat must wholly
  or substantially have a source outside the United States,
  § 202(a); (iii) the President must declare a national emer-
  gency with respect to that threat (an emergency that, un-
  der the NEA, expires after one year unless renewed and
  that also may be terminated by presidential proclamation
  or a congressional joint resolution), § 202(a)–(b); and
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  12                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  (iv) the authorities must be exercised to deal with that
  threat and not for any other purpose, § 202(b).
       Section 203, codified as slightly amended in 

, contains the “grant of authorities,” 91 Stat. at 1626,
  referred to in section 202. Using TWEA’s bifurcation be-
  tween (A) finance and (B) property and materially identi-
  cal language, section 203(a)(1) states as follows (emphases
  added to the words chiefly at issue on appeal here):
       (a)(1) At the times and to the extent specified
       in section 202 [§ 1701], the President may, under
       such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of
       instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
       (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
           (i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
           (ii) transfers of credit or payments be-
           tween, by, through, or to any banking insti-
           tution, to the extent that such transfers or
           payments involve any interest of any for-
           eign country or a national thereof,
           (iii) the importing or exporting of currency
           or securities, . . . ;
       (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an in-
       vestigation, 2 regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
       void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
       withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transporta-
       tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in,
       or exercising any right, power, or privilege with



       2The “block during the pendency of an investigation”
  phrase was added by the Uniting and Strengthening Amer-
  ica by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
  and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act),
  

, 

, 277–78 (2001).
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          13



      respect to, or transactions involving, any prop-
      erty in which any foreign country or a na-
      tional thereof has any interest . . . .
  IEEPA § 203, 91 Stat. at 1626 [

] (empha-
  ses added). 3 Thus, of most pertinence here, the President,
  by means of instructions, license, or otherwise, not only
  may prevent or prohibit but also may regulate any impor-
  tation of property of a foreign country or national.
  § 203(a)(1)(B) [§ 1702(a)(1)(B)].
       Finally, Congress wrote into IEEPA demanding re-
  quirements for keeping Congress well informed about the
  President’s exercise of IEEPA authority. § 204 [§ 1703].
  “[I]n every possible instance,” the President must consult
  with Congress before and during the exercise of granted
  authority. § 204(a) [§ 1703(a)]. Upon exercising an IEEPA
  authority, the President must “immediately” transmit a re-
  port to Congress “specifying”:
      (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exer-
      cise of authority;
      (2) why the President believes those circumstances
      constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat,
      which has its source in whole or substantial part




      3  Section 203 contains other provisions not specifically
  at issue here: e.g., granting authority to require record-
  keeping, § 203(a)(2) [§ 1702(a)(2)], and stating exceptions,
  including for personal communications and humanitarian
  donations, § 203(b) [§ 1702(b)]. Section 203 also contains a
  provision (subparagraph (a)(1)(C)) added by the USA Pa-
  triot Act in 2001 to provide confiscation authority when the
  United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been
  attacked. 

, 

, 277–78
  (2001).
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  14                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




       outside the United States, to the national security,
       foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
       (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions
       to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to
       deal with those circumstances;
       (4) why the President believes such actions are nec-
       essary to deal with those circumstances; and
       (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such
       actions are to be taken and why such actions are to
       be taken with respect to those countries.
  IEEPA § 204(b) [

(b)]. And the President
  must update such reports, detailing changes, every six
  months. § 204(c) [§ 1703(c)]. Those requirements are “sup-
  plemental to,” not a substitution for, the NEA’s congres-
  sional-information requirements found in section 401 of
  the NEA, 

. IEEPA § 204(d) [§ 1703(d)].
      The majority today (at pp. 18–19, 30) quotes the key
  congressional committee report explaining the bill enacted
  as 

The pertinent passage of the report
  states: “Title II of the bill, the [IEEPA], confers upon the
  President a new set of authorities for use in time of na-
  tional emergency which are both more limited in scope
  than those of section 5(b) [of TWEA] and subject to various
  procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA].”
  H. R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 2 (1977); see also 

 (refer-
  ring to excluding purely domestic problems). That state-
  ment does not refer to narrowing of the set of actions the
  President may take under IEEPA. Thus, the new limita-
  tion “in scope” (including the foreign-source requirement)
  refers at most to the set of substantive preconditions stated
  in IEEPA section 202, which had no counterpart in TWEA,
  and to the requirement of declaring a national emergency
  subject to NEA requirements, including the one-year expi-
  ration in the absence of renewal, which were not contained
  in TWEA. See IEEPA § 202 [

]; NEA
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           15



  §§ 201–202, 301, 401 [50 U.S.C. §§ 1621–22, 1631, 1641].
  The “procedural limitations” include the demanding new
  requirements for close involvement of Congress, IEEPA
  § 204 [

], not matched by any requirement
  or limitation found in TWEA. But the specified types of
  action that the President may take, set forth in section 203
  of IEEPA, as relevant here, are not more limited than those
  specified in TWEA: They are drawn from and essentially
  the same as those in TWEA, as the Supreme Court has
  twice noted. See Regan v. Wald, 

 (“The au-
  thorities granted to the President by § 203 of IEEPA are
  essentially the same as those in § 5(b) of TWEA, but the
  conditions and procedures for their exercise are different.”
  (footnote noting a few differences immaterial to the present
  case)); Dames & Moore, 

. In particular, they
  contain the identical authorization of the President to “reg-
  ulate . . . importation.” Importantly, it is only the scope of
  section 203’s grant of authorities that the majority relies
  on today. The House Report language quoted by the ma-
  jority thus has no significance for the only basis of the ma-
  jority’s ruling.
                        C. CIT Decision
       In the pair of cases now on appeal, the CIT had before
  it the private plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment of
  unlawfulness of the reciprocal tariffs along with what it
  construed as the State plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
  ment of unlawfulness of the reciprocal and trafficking tar-
  iffs. CIT Op. at 1364–65. The government did not itself
  file a motion for summary judgment; in opposing the grant
  of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the government
  merely asserted without elaboration in the conclusion of its
  response (and requested in its proposed court order) that
  judgment should be entered for it. Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to
  Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and Summ. J. at 45, V.O.S. Selections,
  Inc. v. United States (CIT No. 25-66), Dkt. No. 32 (Apr. 29,
  2025); Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. and
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  16                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  Prelim. Inj. at 45 (CIT No. 25-77), Dkt. No. 41 (May 16,
  2025). The CIT granted summary judgment to the plain-
  tiffs.
      Before reaching the merits, the CIT held that it had
  jurisdiction under 

(i), which provides for
  exclusive CIT jurisdiction over “any civil action commenced
  against the United States, its agencies or its officers, that
  arise out of any law of the United States providing for—
  (A) revenue from imports or tonnage; (B) tariffs, duties,
  fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for
  reasons other than the raising of revenue . . . .” CIT Op. at
  1365–66. The CIT explained that the executive orders
  “made amendments to the HTSUS,” which (as noted above)
  has the status of a statute. CIT Op. at 1366. 4 The CIT also
  held that at least one private plaintiff and at least one
  State plaintiff had constitutional standing, because,
  through declarations, they had sufficiently stated that they
  would be harmed by the challenged tariffs, whether by pay-
  ing the increased amounts as importers or, as purchasers
  of imported goods covered by the tariffs, by paying higher
  prices on or encountering difficulties in obtaining such
  goods. 

 at 1367–69.
      On the merits, the CIT first held that the reciprocal
  tariffs are unauthorized by IEEPA, ultimately concluding
  that the IEEPA authority relevant to this case had been
  displaced by another statute (section 122 of the Trade Act
  of 1974). 

 at 1370–76. The court began with an expla-
  nation that the constitutional nondelegation doctrine
  would not permit a congressional delegation of “unlimited”
  tariff authority to the President and that IEEPA’s


       4 As the majority opinion notes (at 23 n.10), the CIT,
  in a ruling not challenged on appeal, concluded that the
  President “must be dismissed from the two cases before the
  court,” but the executive orders are properly reviewed in
  this suit. CIT Op. at 1366–67 (citations omitted).
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            17



  language authorizing the President to “regulate . . . impor-
  tation,” § 203(a)(1)(B) [§ 1702(a)(1)(B)], does not authorize
  “unlimited tariffs.” CIT Op. at 1371–73. But the CIT did
  not deny, and could not have denied, that IEEPA by its
  terms, quoted and summarized above, contains limits—in-
  cluding not only a declaration of national emergency (ex-
  piring after a year, unless renewed, and subject to
  legislative override) and the procedural limitations of sec-
  tion 204 of IEEPA, but the substantive preconditions of
  section 202 of IEEPA, requiring that any authority is being
  exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary
  threat, from a foreign source, to the national security, for-
  eign policy, or economy of the United States. See supra at
  pp. 11–12. And the CIT did not hold that such limits were
  insufficient to pass muster under the nondelegation doc-
  trine and did not ultimately hold that reciprocal tariffs run
  afoul of these statutory limits.
       Thus, the CIT did not hold that the reciprocal tariffs
  fail to meet the conditions set in section 202 of IEEPA, in-
  cluding the requirements of a national-emergency declara-
  tion and the requirement that IEEPA authority be
  “exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary
  threat” to national security, foreign policy, or the economy
  emanating in whole or substantial part from abroad, and
  for no other purpose. § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)]. The CIT like-
  wise did not hold, as plaintiffs contended, that tariff-impo-
  sition authority is simply outside the power to “regulate . . .
  importation” granted by section 203 [§ 1702]. The CIT rec-
  ognized that this court’s predecessor, in Yoshida CCPA at
  573, reached the opposite conclusion in holding that
  TWEA’s “regulate . . . importation” language includes the
  power to impose tariffs and upholding under that language
  the specific tariffs at issue in Yoshida CCPA—the tariff
  surcharge imposed, on August 14, 1971, by Presidential
  Proclamation No. 4074, Imposition of Supplemental Duty
  for Balance of Payments, 

 (1971 Presidential
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  18                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  Proclamation). CIT Op. at 1372 (citing Yoshida CCPA at
  573, 576–78).
       Instead, the CIT looked outside IEEPA to identify a
  limit that the CIT concluded precluded the President’s im-
  position of the reciprocal tariffs under IEEPA. Specifically,
  the CIT held that section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 [

] concerning expressly specified balance-of-
  payments problems, is the exclusive presidential tariff au-
  thority for addressing the category of problems to which
  the reciprocal tariffs are directed, displacing any authority
  that would otherwise be found in IEEPA. CIT Op. at 1374–
  76; see also 

 (“Section 122 removes the Presi-
  dent’s power to impose remedies in response to balance-of-
  payments deficits, and specifically trade deficits, from the
  broader powers granted to a president during a national
  emergency under IEEPA by establishing an explicit non-
  emergency statute with greater limitations.” (footnote and
  citations omitted)). The CIT seems to have categorically
  concluded that IEEPA could not be used to impose any tar-
  iffs responding to “balance-of-payments deficits.” 

 (“Congress cabined the President’s authority to im-
  pose tariffs in response to balance-of-payments deficits to
  non-emergency legislation[.]” (section heading; capitaliza-
  tion generally deleted)). Although the CIT noted that sec-
  tion 122 sets caps of 15% and 150 days on certain
  surcharges, 

 caps that EO ’257 exceeds, the CIT held the
  reciprocal tariffs invalid in full, not just insofar as they ex-
  ceed 15% in amount or 150 days in duration, 

.
      The CIT next held that IEEPA does not authorize the
  trafficking tariffs. In contrast to what it concluded regard-
  ing the reciprocal tariffs, the CIT did not conclude that au-
  thority under IEEPA’s section 203 for the trafficking tariffs
  had been displaced by another statute, and it did not oth-
  erwise hold that the trafficking tariffs were outside section
  203’s grant of authority to “regulate . . . importation.”
  § 203 [§ 1702]. Rather, the CIT reasoned that the traffick-
  ing tariffs fall outside section 202’s requirement for
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           19



  presidential action (identified supra at p. 12 as require-
  ment (iv))—that the authority be “exercised to deal with”
  the stated unusual and extraordinary threat and not “for
  any other purpose,” § 202(b) [§ 1701(b)]. Id. at 1376–83.
  As an initial matter, the CIT held that the political ques-
  tion doctrine does not preclude judicial review for compli-
  ance with that condition, but the court recognized the
  principle requiring “‘considerable deference’” in trade pol-
  icy, as it is an aspect of foreign affairs. CIT Op. at 1377–
  80 (quoting Federal Mogul Corp. v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Here, the CIT then held, the
  trafficking tariffs fail to meet section 202’s “exercised to
  deal with” condition—not because the President failed to
  issue an on-point declaration of a national emergency (not
  in dispute here) or because the opioid and related crime
  problems are not properly deemed to be an unusual and
  extraordinary threat within IEEPA’s terms (also not in dis-
  pute or questioned by the majority), but because the tariffs
  do not “deal with” that threat. 

 at 1380–82. In the CIT’s
  view, the “deal with” language “connotes a direct link be-
  tween an act and the problem it purports to address.” Id.
  at 1381. The tariffs lack such a direct link, the CIT ruled,
  because (1) the tariffs are imposed on “all articles,” includ-
  ing many imported articles far removed from the opioid
  and crime problems that constitute the threat, and (2) ac-
  tions that simply exercise leverage over the foreign govern-
  ment to solve those problems cannot meet the CIT’s
  articulated direct-link requirement. Id. at 1381–82. The
  CIT therefore held the trafficking tariffs to be unlawful.
      The government timely appealed to bring the CIT’s
  judgment within our jurisdiction under 

(a)(5).
                         II. DISCUSSION
      Like the majority today, we take no issue with the
  CIT’s holdings that it had jurisdiction and that enough
  plaintiffs had constitutional standing in order for the
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  20                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  lawfulness of the reciprocal and trafficking tariffs to be ad-
  judicated. We also agree with the majority that, if the tar-
  iffs are unlawful, a remand is needed regarding remedy.
  But we disagree with the CIT’s holding, and the majority’s
  conclusion today, that plaintiffs are entitled to summary
  judgment that the tariffs are unlawful.
       The CIT reasoned that IEEPA does not and constitu-
  tionally could not grant “unlimited” tariff authority. CIT
  Op. at 1370–74; see also Maj. Op. at 6, 18, 30, 33, 41 (“un-
  limited”); 

 at 40–41 (“unbounded”). But that reasoning,
  by its terms, does not identify why these particular tariffs
  constitute an exercise of “unlimited” tariff authority or are
  otherwise unauthorized by IEEPA given its statutory lim-
  its. It bears repeating that IEEPA’s section 202 [§ 1701]
  requires that (i) there is an unusual and extraordinary
  threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy
  of the United States; (ii) the threat wholly or substantially
  has a source outside the United States; (iii) the President
  declares a national emergency with respect to that threat
  (a declaration that expires after one year unless renewed
  and is subject to legislative override); and (iv) the authori-
  ties granted in section 203 [§ 1702] are exercised to deal
  with that threat and not for any other purpose. See supra
  at pp. 11–12. The section 203 authority invoked here is the
  authority to regulate importation, by means of instruc-
  tions, licenses, or otherwise, authority that Yoshida CCPA
  held, when considering the identical language in TWEA,
  authorizes the imposition of tariffs. See supra at pp. 17–
  18. We are thus presented with statutory and constitu-
  tional questions: (1) whether the reciprocal and trafficking
  tariffs are unauthorized by sections 202 or 203, either be-
  cause they exceed limits set by those provisions or because
  those provisions have been displaced by another statute in
  a respect that governs the present tariffs, and (2) if the tar-
  iffs are authorized by IEEPA, whether sections 202 and
  203 are unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           21



       We follow the CIT in addressing the reciprocal tariffs
  first and then the trafficking tariffs. We discuss all the le-
  gal issues common to the groups of tariffs in discussing the
  reciprocal tariffs. Only one issue remains for separate dis-
  cussion—the “exercised to deal with” limitation of sec-
  tion 202 [§ 1701]—when we turn to the trafficking tariffs.
                      A. Reciprocal Tariffs
      For the invalidity of the reciprocal tariffs, the private
  and State plaintiffs mostly present statutory arguments.
  Regarding non-compliance with IEEPA’s section 202, they
  make only one argument: that the problem identified by
  EO ’257 is not unusual or extraordinary. They do not dis-
  pute that the reciprocal tariffs otherwise satisfy the other
  three requirements of section 202. Regarding section 203,
  plaintiffs argue that the “regulate . . . importation” author-
  ity does not encompass tariffs at all, an argument adopted
  by Judge Cunningham’s separate opinion but not adopted
  by today’s majority opinion. Plaintiffs may be suggesting—
  and in any event, today’s court majority concludes—that
  the “regulate” authority contains certain (undefined tem-
  poral and/or duty amount and/or scope) limits that pre-
  clude the tariffs here at issue. Turning away from IEEPA
  itself, plaintiffs argue, as the CIT ruled, that any IEEPA
  authority for the reciprocal tariffs is displaced by sec-
  tion 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 [

]. They
  also suggest that, even if ordinary statutory analysis does
  not render the reciprocal tariffs unlawful, the major ques-
  tions doctrine supports such a holding. Finally, plaintiffs
  argue that, if IEEPA authorizes the reciprocal tariffs and
  is not displaced here by section 122, then IEEPA is uncon-
  stitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.
     1. IEEPA § 202: Unusual and Extraordinary Threat
      We begin with IEEPA’s section 202 [§ 1701], about
  which plaintiffs make just one argument concerning the re-
  ciprocal tariffs—that there is no “unusual and extraordi-
  nary threat” to the national security, foreign policy, or
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  22                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  economy of the United States (and hence cannot be an
  “emergency,” which adds nothing to this argument). Pri-
  vate Appellees Brief at 39–42; State Appellees Brief at 25–
  29. They do not assert a failure to meet section 202’s other
  requirements: They do not deny that there is a qualifying
  foreign source of the threat or a qualifying declaration of
  national emergency or that the authorities are being exer-
  cised “to deal with” the threat without an extraneous pur-
  pose. The CIT did not adopt plaintiffs’ argument that the
  reciprocal tariffs were unauthorized because there is no
  “unusual and extraordinary threat”; nor does this court’s
  majority. We readily conclude that plaintiffs have not
  shown on summary judgment that the reciprocal tariffs are
  contrary to the “unusual and extraordinary threat” statu-
  tory limit.
                       a. Judicial Review
      As an initial matter, we note that the unusual-and-ex-
  traordinary-threat requirement on its face involves factual
  and policy judgments to which the courts are obliged to give
  considerable deference. The President is not subject to the
  Administrative Procedure Act, including its various pro-
  cess and explanation requirements for agency decision-
  making. See Dalton v. Spector, 

 (1994);
  Franklin v. Massachusetts, 

, 800–01 (1992); 

(b)(1), 704. And when presidential determi-
  nations are reviewable, the Supreme Court and our court
  have repeatedly stressed that judicial review of the Presi-
  dent’s decisions, at least in spheres of national security and
  foreign affairs, is very tightly limited. See, e.g., Trump
  v. Hawaii, 

, 686 (2018); Holder v. Humanitar-
  ian Law Project, 

, 34 (2010); Regan v. Wald, 

; Haig v. Agee, 

 (1981); Harisi-
  ades v. Shaughnessy, 

 (1950); United
  States v. George S. Bush & Co., 

, 379–80
  (1940); see also, e.g., USP Holdings, Inc. v. United States,
  

, 1365–66, 1366 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Motions
  Systems Corp. v. Bush, 

, 1359–62 (Fed. Cir.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          23



  2006) (en banc); Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United
  States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 5
      Like the CIT, we are not prepared to say that compli-
  ance with the unusual-and-extraordinary-threat require-
  ment is wholly unreviewable, as a political question or
  otherwise. See CIT Op. at 1377–80. The well-established
  deference standard just noted provides very strong protec-
  tion of presidential discretion. The principle that “[h]ow
  the President chooses to exercise the discretion Congress
  has granted him is not a matter for [judicial] review,” Dal-
  ton, 

, however, does not mean that there is
  no such thing as action identifiable as outside the statutory
  or other bounds on presidential discretion. Thus, we are
  not prepared to say that the strong protection of presiden-
  tial discretion wholly precludes a court from finding an
  abuse of discretion regarding the IEEPA substantive
  boundary. In this context, such judicial review would mean



      5  The court in Maple Leaf said that a court may “inter-
  pose” when there has been “a significant procedural viola-
  tion, or action outside delegated authority” and, also, when
  there has been “a clear misconstruction of the governing
  statute.” 

. The “clear misconstruction” for-
  mulation, to the extent it requires that any actionable mis-
  construction of the governing statute be “clear,” raises an
  issue of incompatibility with Loper Bright Enterprises
  v. Raimondo, 

 (2024). No such incompatibility
  exists if the Maple Leaf formulation is understood as
  simply stating an interpretive principle, favoring broad
  readings of statutes in the area, see infra at pp. 36–37, for
  the courts to apply in making their own determinations of
  the proper statutory interpretation. We do not rely on any
  deference-in-interpretation requirement, so need not ex-
  plore the Loper Bright question about the Maple Leaf for-
  mulation.
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  24                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  judicial identification of an action as crossing the statutory
  boundary, after scrupulous and humble recognition of all
  the predictive, evaluative, and other judgment-call-based
  elements that, though people may passionately hold con-
  trary views, are not subject to objective proof of error. See,
  e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’
  Research, 

, 

, 2515–16 (2025)
  (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To elaborate: Although the
  nondelegation doctrine’s intelligible principle test has his-
  torically not packed much punch in constricting Congress’s
  authority to delegate, the President generally must act
  within the confines set by Congress when he implements
  legislation. So the President’s actions when implementing
  legislation are constrained—namely, by the scope of Con-
  gress’s authorization and by any restrictions set forth in
  that statutory text. See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Rai-
  mondo, 

, 394–96, 404 (2024).”).
      But we need not and should not undertake to elaborate
  on how to identify such situations unless tackling that task
  is necessary, and it is not necessary in this case.
                   b. Executive Order 14257
      Plaintiffs argue that the reciprocal tariffs violate the
  unusual-and-extraordinary-threat requirement because
  the goods trade deficit is not “unusual” or “extraordinary.”
  In so arguing they necessarily presuppose that the require-
  ment embodies a principle that is intelligible, at least to
  the extent that a violation of that principle is ascertainable,
  and they do not ask that we depart from the undeniably
  strong respect for presidential discretion embodied in the
  case law. In the present matter, plaintiffs’ challenge to the
  President’s unusual-and-extraordinary-threat determina-
  tion can and should be rejected without further exploration
  of the scope of review. Plaintiffs’ argument suffers from a
  decisive defect that is independent of the deference issue:
  Their challenge is misfocused as it does not address the ac-
  tual bases provided in EO ’257 for the unusual-and-
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                               25



  extraordinary threat determination and, thus, the presi-
  dential action at issue.
      Plaintiffs assert only that trade deficits cannot be an
  “unusual and extraordinary threat” because they are old
  rather than unusual. Private Appellees Brief at 39–42;
  State Appellees Brief at 25–29. But that argument disre-
  gards the President’s finding in EO ’257 of a recent notable
  increase in aggregate goods trade deficits generally and for
  agricultural trade deficits in particular. See 90 Fed. Reg.
  at 15042 (stating that “the trading relationship between
  the United States and its trading partners has become
  highly unbalanced, particularly in recent years”); id. at
  15044 (stating that agricultural surplus as of January 2021
  “has vanished” and “been replaced by a projected $49 bil-
  lion annual agricultural trade deficit” and that the annual
  U.S. goods trade deficits “have grown by over 40 percent in
  the past 5 years alone”). And that is not the only mismatch
  between plaintiffs’ challenge and the actual premise of EO
  ’257.
      A group of economists, appearing as amici in support of
  plaintiffs, attempts to bolster the argument that large and
  persistent trade deficits are not unusual or extraordinary
  by making a fundamental point: “Both aggregate and bilat-
  eral trade deficits are generally harmless.” Amended Brief
  Amici Curiae of Economists in Support of Affirmance at 7;
  see also id. at 4 (noting global prevalence of persistent na-
  tional trade deficits). It is critical, therefore, to identify the
  particular kinds of harmful effects when asserting that a
  goods trade deficit is in fact harmful. EO ’257 does so. And
  plaintiffs’ argument does not address those effects.
      EO ’257 does not rest on a premise that such goods
  trade deficits (i.e., more imports than exports of goods, suit-
  ably measured), whether in the aggregate with all U.S.
  trading partners or bilaterally with specific countries, even
  when large and persistent, are inherently (i.e., always, per
  se, or necessarily) threatening to national security or the
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  26                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  economy. Instead, it targets the “unusual and extraordi-
  nary threat” of particular goods trade deficits (and foreign
  government’s policies that lead to goods trade deficits) that
  cause a number of specified negative effects (conse-
  quences), such as domestic manufacturing deficiencies,
  that EO ’257 asserts follow from the recent and current
  goods trade deficits, even if they would not follow from all
  goods trade deficits (or even all prolonged ones). EO ’257
  relies on those problems as making the “underlying condi-
  tions, including a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade
  relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers,
  and U.S. trading partners’ economic policies”—“as indi-
  cated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade def-
  icits”—into “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
  national security and economy of the United States.” 90
  Fed. Reg. at 15041. About that group of negative effects,
  the ones actually detailed in and relied on by EO ’257,
  plaintiffs make no case at all: They say nothing to indicate
  that those effects are usual or ordinary, much less to allow
  such a determination on their motions for summary judg-
  ment.
      The particular problems recited in EO ’257 to establish
  the statutorily required unusual-and-extraordinary threat
  are not focused on a “monetary crisis,” CIT Op. at 1374, of
  the sort that lay behind the 1971 Presidential Proclama-
  tion at issue in Yoshida CCPA and that gave rise to Con-
  gress’s enactment of section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974
  [

], see S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 87–89 (1974);
  H. R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 27–31 (1973). Rather, the prob-
  lems identified in EO ’257 that the present-day goods trade
  deficits “have led to” are focused on deficiencies in “domes-
  tic production” (including deficiencies in “the U.S. manu-
  facturing and defense-industrial base” and to the nation’s
  making of agricultural products) wholly or partly caused by
  the purchase of imported goods made abroad in place of do-
  mestically made goods, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15043. EO ’257
  early on states:
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           27



      Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade defi-
      cits have led to the hollowing out of our manufac-
      turing base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced
      domestic manufacturing capacity; undermined
      critical supply chains; and rendered our defense-in-
      dustrial base dependent on foreign adversaries.
  Id. at 15041. EO ’257 adds: “A nation’s ability to produce
  domestically is the bedrock of its national and economic se-
  curity.” Id. at 15043. And it elaborates further:
      Permitting [structural] asymmetries [between the
      United States and its trading partners] to continue
      is not sustainable in today’s economic and geopolit-
      ical environment because of the effect they have on
      U.S. domestic production. . . .
      Both my first Administration in 2017, and the
      Biden Administration in 2022, recognized that in-
      creasing domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S.
      national security. . . .
      U.S. production [particularly in certain advanced
      industrial sectors] could be permanently weak-
      ened. . . .
      [B]ecause the United States has supplied so much
      military equipment to other countries, U.S. stock-
      piles of military goods are too low to be compatible
      with U.S. national defense interests. . . .
      In recent years, the vulnerability of the U.S. econ-
      omy in this respect was exposed both during the
      COVID–19 pandemic, when Americans had diffi-
      culty accessing essential products, as well as when
      the Houthi rebels later began attacking cargo ships
      in the Middle East. . . .
      The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threat-
      ens the U.S. economy in other ways, including
      through the loss of manufacturing jobs. . . .
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  28                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




       Just as a nation that does not produce manufac-
       tured products cannot maintain the industrial base
       it needs for national security, neither can a nation
       long survive if it cannot produce its own food. . . .
       Such impact upon military readiness and our na-
       tional security posture is especially acute with the
       recent rise in armed conflicts abroad.
  Id. at 15043–44 (Preamble); id. at 15045 (§ 1).
      Plaintiffs do not assert that they are entitled to sum-
  mary judgment because EO ’257 is wrong in its findings
  about significant increases in the goods trade deficit in re-
  cent years, generally and, in particular, e.g., for agricul-
  tural products. Nor do they deny that long-standing trade-
  related conditions might, like conditions that lead to bank-
  ruptcy, build gradually, but then suddenly reach a crisis
  level. And they simply say nothing to show, much less to
  support summary judgment in their favor, that the litany
  of negative effects of present-day trade deficits enumerated
  in EO ’257 are usual or ordinary. Thus, they have made no
  case for entitlement to summary judgment that there is no
  unusual and extraordinary threat addressed by the recip-
  rocal tariffs or, accordingly, that the reciprocal tariffs are
  unauthorized by section 202.
                         2. IEEPA § 203
      Regarding IEEPA’s section 203 [

],
  plaintiffs argue that all the tariffs at issue (reciprocal and
  trafficking) fall outside the set of authorities granted to the
  President in that section. Private Appellees Brief at 19–
  26; see, e.g., State Appellees Brief at 11–17, 20, 32–51. We
  reject the several arguments they present for limiting the
  broad scope of section 203’s authorization to “regulate . . .
  importation.” The CIT did not rely on such arguments or
  so hold. Instead, the CIT held, for the reciprocal tariffs,
  that IEEPA is displaced by another statute (section 122 of
  the Trade Act of 1974 [

]), as discussed
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            29



  further infra in Section II.A.3. Today’s majority, however,
  holds that “regulate . . . importation” does not authorize
  the tariffs at issue here. The majority opinion does not
  deny that some tariffs might be authorized, while Judge
  Cunningham’s opinion does; the majority holds that section
  203 of IEEPA includes some temporal and/or duty amount
  and/or scope limits that, in turn, the present tariffs violate.
  We disagree with the no-tariffs and not-these-tariffs posi-
  tions concerning the scope of section 203 of IEEPA.
     a. Coverage of Tariffs by “Regulate . . . Importation”
      Plaintiffs argue that “regulat[ing] . . . importation”
  does not include imposing tariffs. Private Appellees Brief
  at 20–25; State Appellees Brief at 32–51. We disagree.
       Definitions of the term “regulate” provide broad under-
  standings of the term’s ordinary meaning: to “fix, establish
  or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode;
  to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing prin-
  ciples or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979);
  see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
  1913 (1976) (defining “regulate” as “to govern or direct ac-
  cording to rule” and “to bring under the control of law or
  constituted authority”). As the government states in its
  opening brief, “[i]mposing tariffs on imports is clearly a
  way of ‘control[ling]’ imports (Black’s); ‘govern[ing] or di-
  rect[ing]’ them ‘according to rule’ (Webster’s); ‘adjust[ing]’
  them ‘by rule, method, or established mode’ (Black’s); or,
  more generally ‘subject[ing]’ them ‘to governing principles
  or laws’ (Black’s).” Government’s Opening Brief at 32 (first
  alteration added).
      This straightforward result is supported by the
  longstanding judicial recognition that taxes are often a spe-
  cies of regulation—specifically aimed at altering conduct.
  See, e.g., CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service,
  

, 224 (2021) (a “regulatory tax” is a “tax de-
  signed mainly to influence private conduct”); National Fed-
  eration of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 

,
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  30                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  567 (2012) (NFIB) (explaining that “taxes that seek to in-
  fluence conduct are nothing new” and that “[s]ome of our
  earliest federal taxes sought to deter the purchase of im-
  ported manufactured goods in order to foster the growth of
  domestic industry”); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Ad-
  kins, 

 (1940) (explaining that a tax can in
  “purpose and effect” be “primarily a sanction to enforce . . .
  regulatory provisions” of a statute and that “[t]he power of
  taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be
  utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another power
  which is granted it”); Sonzinsky v. United States, 

 (1937) (explaining that “[e]very tax is in some
  measure regulatory”). With respect to imports particu-
  larly, the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden explained
  long ago that “duties may often be, and in fact often are,
  imposed on tonnage, with a view to the regulation of com-
  merce” and that, indeed, “[t]he right to regulate commerce,
  even by the imposition of duties, was not controverted” by
  the Framers. 

 (1824). 6 And our


       6   The Court made this observation in rejecting re-
  spondent Ogden’s argument that New York could ban com-
  peting interstate-waterway boat services even when
  offered by persons given a federal license under a federal
  statute. Ogden argued that the commerce power of Art. I,
  § 8, cl. 1, cl. 3, is not preemptive (to use modern language)
  because the separately stated power to impose duties, Art.
  I, § 8, cl. 1, was not generally preemptive. Gibbons, 22 U.S.
  (9 Wheat.) at 201–02. The premise as to import duties, the
  Court agreed, was supported by the fact that the Framers
  saw fit to include a separate provision barring States from
  imposing import duties. See id.; Art. I, § 10, cl. 2. But Og-
  den’s proposed conclusion did not follow, the Court held,
  because duties could be both regulatory and aimed to rais-
  ing revenue, and the Framers banned all such duties, as “a
  prudent precaution,” to avoid the need for sifting. Gibbons,
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            31



  predecessor court, in Yoshida CCPA, observed: “Though
  the power to tax and to lay duties upon imports and the
  power to regulate commerce are distinct, it is well estab-
  lished that the first power can be employed in the exercise
  of the second.” Yoshida CCPA, 

 n.20 (citing
  not only the above-quoted page of Gibbons, but also McGol-
  drick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 

 (1940); Board of
  Trustees v. United States, 

 (1933); and J.W.
  Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 

  (1928)).
      Context is always relevant to interpretation, and in the
  context of IEEPA’s section 203, the natural reading of “reg-
  ulate” in the phrase “regulate . . . importation” is one that



  

. The § 10, cl. 2 ban therefore did
  not imply that, for all regulatory measures, action by Con-
  gress under the Commerce Clause was not preemptive.
      It is the Court’s recognition of the common understand-
  ing that duties are often a form of “regulation” that is key
  for present purposes, not that Article I states both a taxing
  power and the commerce power. The Court held in NFIB
  that the imposition at issue, though plainly regulatory, was
  a valid exercise of the taxing power, 

, but
  was not a valid exercise of the commerce power only be-
  cause its subject was not commercial activity but inactivity,
  

 at 549–58. Relatedly, that one object of “regulation” is
  “exportation” in IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(B) [§ 1702(a)(1)(B)],
  and one type of regulation may be independently unconsti-
  tutional for exported articles, Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, does not in
  our view undermine the strong reasons that “regulate” in-
  cludes tariffs in IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(B) at least where no in-
  dependent constitutional bar exists. Cf. Department of
  Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service
  v. Kirtz, 

 (2024) (declining to “disregard the
  statute’s clear terms” just because there may be “a valid
  constitutional defense” to some applications).
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  32                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  embraces tariffs. The provision includes authorization for
  the extreme tools of “prohibit[ing]” and “prevent[ing]” im-
  portation (and a host of related tools). § 203(a)(1)(B) [

(a)(1)(B)]. Taxing through tariffs is just a less
  extreme, more flexible tool for pursuing the same objective
  of controlling the amount or price of imports that, after all,
  could be barred altogether. The context also includes
  IEEPA’s positive emphasis on breadth when it gives the
  President authority to act by “means of instructions, li-
  censes, or otherwise.” § 203(a)(1) [§ 1702(a)(1)] (emphasis
  added); see also Yoshida CCPA, 

 (“The
  words ‘or otherwise,’ if they mean anything, must mean
  that Congress authorized the use of means which, though
  not identified, were different from, and additional to, ‘in-
  structions’ and ‘licenses.’”).
      We know of no persuasive basis for thinking that Con-
  gress wanted to deny the President use of the tariffing tool,
  a common regulatory tool, to address the threats covered
  by IEEPA. Indeed, a contrary conclusion about the IEEPA
  language, “regulate . . . importation,” would seem to deny
  the President tariffing authority even in a time of war, be-
  cause the language of TWEA is identical. The Supreme
  Court has recognized “the broad authority of the Executive
  when acting under th[e] congressional grant of power” pro-
  vided in section 203. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 672.
  Given the surrounding terms and the evident goal, i.e.,
  given this linguistic and substantive context, there is every
  reason to understand “regulate” to include, not exclude,
  such an ordinary tool of import regulation as tariffing. 7
  Although a similar conclusion presumably would not be
  justified for some or many other uses of the word “regulate”



       7 IEEPA enumerates exceptions to the President’s au-
  thority under section 203. IEEPA § 203(b) [§ 1702(b)].
  Tariff authority is not included in the enumerated excep-
  tions.
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                             33



  in the United States Code, see Maj. Op. at 29–30, that fact
  does not weaken the conclusion that “regulate” as used in
  the IEEPA statute includes tariffs.
      Congressional usage elsewhere is consistent with this
  conclusion. For example, ever since 1934, when it added
  section 350 to the Tariff Act of 1930, Congress has ex-
  pressly recognized that import duties are a form of “regu-
  lation” of imports. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
  1934, 

, 

, 943–44 (1934)
  (defining “duties and other import restrictions” as includ-
  ing “(1) rate and form of import duties and classification of
  articles, and (2) limitations, prohibitions, charges, and ex-
  actions other than duties, imposed on importation or im-
  posed for regulation of imports”) (current version at 

(c)(1)(A)–(B)). Similarly, in section 122(a) of
  the Trade Act of 1974, Congress expressly used the phrase
  “restrict imports” to cover duties. 88 Stat. at 1978 (codified
  at 

(a)) (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
  S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 24 (referring to an “import sur-
  charge” as a type of “[i]mport restriction[]” and discussing
  “a temporary reduction in the rate of duty . . . or a tempo-
  rary suspension of other import restrictions”); 

 (dis-
  cussing “existing duties or other import restrictions”).
  These usages confirm the natural meaning of “regulate” as
  including tariffs when the object is to control imports.
       The majority notes that a variety of statutes use “tariff”
  or “duty” or the like when conveying presidential authority,
  whereas IEEPA does not. Maj. Op. at 27. But as the Su-
  preme Court recently reiterated, “Congress need not state
  its intent in any particular way, or use magic words,” even
  to waive sovereign immunity, explaining that (on the par-
  ticular issue presented) “even if Congress typically confers
  the authority to settle claims by use of the term ‘settle,’ that
  standard practice does not bind legislators to specific words
  or formulations.” Soto v. United States, 

, 371
  (2025) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Context
  can establish the authorization without a particular word.
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  34                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  

. Here, the usage in the other cited statutes is
  hardly surprising, because Congress in those statutes was
  overwhelmingly focused on tariff issues. In contrast, Con-
  gress in IEEPA (as in TWEA) was focused on the subject of
  emergencies and giving plainly broad emergency authority
  regarding foreign property. In this context, breadth is the
  proper lesson, without need for a listing of specific common
  tools for achieving the evident legislative objective.
       The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Energy Ad-
  ministration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. supports this inter-
  pretation. 

 (1976). The Court there held that
  the language “adjust imports” in section 232(b) of the
  Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 

 Stat.
  872, 877 (codified as amended at 

(b)–(c)),
  is not confined to “imposition of quotas” but includes “im-
  position of monetary exactions—i.e., license fees and du-
  ties.” Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 561–62. The Court readily
  deemed such exactions to be within the natural scope of the
  language as a means of “adjust[ing] imports,” 

,
  though section 232(b) makes no reference to “duties.” And
  it did so without any reliance on or even mention of the fact
  that section 232(a) [§ 1862(a)] refers to duties in preserving
  the effects of certain earlier laws. 8 The Court also




       8Nor did the Court rely on any heading or title. Sec-
  tion 232 as enacted and amended contains no heading ex-
  cept the section title “Safeguarding National Security.” See
  Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. at 877; Trade Act of
  1974, tit. 2, § 127, 88 Stat. at 1993; Crude Oil Windfall
  Profit Tax Act of 1980, 

, 

, 301 (1980); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
  of 1988, 

, 

, 1257–
  60 (1988). Congress, while recognizing that the codifiers
  placed section 232 in Title 19 of the United States Code,
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           35



  explained that “limiting the President to the use of quotas
  would effectively and artificially prohibit him from directly
  dealing with some of the very problems against which
  § 232(b) is directed.” 426 U.S. at 561–62. So too here: An
  exclusion of tariffs, a common tool of import regulation,
  would be an “artificial” prohibition not grounded in the nat-
  ural scope of the language of IEEPA’s section 203.
       Such a limitation would be especially out of place in an
  emergency statute like IEEPA, for which restricting “flexi-
  bility required to meet problems” is particularly unlikely.
  Yoshida CCPA, 

; 

 at 578 & n.28 (stating
  that “Congress necessarily intended a grant of power ade-
  quate to deal with national emergencies” and referring to
  “the flexibility imperative inherent in the delegation of
  emergency powers”). And it would be out of keeping with
  “the principle that statutes granting the President



  see, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, tit. 2, § 127, 88 Stat. at 1993,
  has not enacted Title 19 into positive law.
       The majority suggests that the Court in Algonquin
  found duties to be within “adjust imports” because it found
  that the statute’s concern with national security is related
  only to imports’ “use,” “availability,” and “character” and is
  “not related to quantity of imports.” Maj. Op. at 29 (citing
  526 U.S. at 561 (quoting 104 Cong. Rec. 10542–43 (1958)
  (remarks of Rep. Mills))). The cited passage notes “Con-
  gress’ judgment that ‘not only the quantity of imports . . .
  but also the circumstances under which they are coming in:
  their use, their availability, their character’ could endanger
  the national security.” Algonquin, 

 (quoting
  104 Cong. Rec. 10542–43 (remarks of Rep. Mills)) (empha-
  ses added). This statement of the breadth of congressional
  concern only reinforced the natural meaning of “adjust im-
  ports” and confirmed that denying duty coverage would
  “artificially prohibit” the President from dealing with the
  congressionally identified problem. 

.
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  36                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  authority to act in matters touching on foreign affairs are
  to be broadly construed,” B-West Imports, Inc. v. United
  States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1996), consistent with
  the history of, and recognized reasons for, broad delega-
  tions to the President involving such matters, see, e.g., Chi-
  cago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
  

, 109–10 (1948) (citing Norwegian Nitrogen
  Co. v. United States, 

 (1933), and George S.
  Bush & Co., 

); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
  Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936); Hamilton v. Dil-
  lin, 

 (1874).
       The background of IEEPA powerfully supports this
  straightforward conclusion from the text. The Supreme
  Court has explained that the “pertinent language of [sec-
  tion] 1702[, IEEPA’s section 203,]” was “directly drawn”
  from section 5(b) of TWEA. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at
  671; see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. at 228 (explaining that
  IEEPA granted the President authorities that “are essen-
  tially the same as those in [section] 5(b) of TWEA”). This
  is self-evident from a comparison of the language of IEEPA
  and TWEA, set forth supra at p. 9 (TWEA section 5(b)) and
  pp. 12–13 (IEEPA section 203). Importantly, in late 1975,
  our predecessor court, with generally exclusive appeals-
  court-level jurisdiction in the area, see North American Ce-
  ment Corp. v. Anderson, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
  held in Yoshida CCPA that the TWEA “regulate” language
  does embrace the authority to impose tariffs as a tool of
  regulation, 526 F.2d at 576 (concluding that “regulation
  importation” encompasses “imposing an import sur-
  charge”).
     The Yoshida CCPA decision was known to those in
  Congress who were working on the emergency-law issue
  and what to do about TWEA particularly. See, e.g., Emer-
  gency Controls on International Economic Transactions,
  Hearings on H. R. 1560 and H. R. 2382 and Markup of the
  Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation before the
  Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                           37



  of the House Committee on International Relations, 95th
  Cong., 1st Sess., at 9, 18, 223 n.6 (1977) (commenting on
  the Yoshida CCPA decision, and its holding that TWEA in-
  cludes the imposition of duties, in hearings covering the
  markup of TWEA reform legislation). In late 1977, Con-
  gress enacted IEEPA by borrowing the very language from
  TWEA that Yoshida CCPA had construed to include tariffs.
  Such an enactment after our predecessor court had so ruled
  is itself significant confirmation of the tariff-including in-
  terpretation of “regulate . . . importation,” which is the
  most natural meaning. Cf. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva
  Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 

, 131 (2019) (not-
  ing congressional reenactment of pertinent statutory lan-
  guage after Federal Circuit confirmed the meaning of the
  language suggested by Supreme Court authorities). Even
  more pointed confirmation comes from the fact that the key
  committee report explaining the legislation that enacted
  IEEPA discusses Yoshida CCPA and indicates no disagree-
  ment or disapproval, H. R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 5 (acknowl-
  edging that Yoshida CCPA concluded that TWEA
  “authorized imposition of duties”), and the Senate thereaf-
  ter neither made any relevant change in the language to
  preclude continued interpretation of “regulate . . . importa-
  tion” to include import duties nor registered any disagree-
  ment with that decision, S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 2, 5 (1977).
      In light of all the foregoing, we would hold, as our pre-
  decessor court did in Yoshida CCPA, that tariffing is within
  the language of “regulate . . . importation” in this broad
  grant of emergency authorities.
             b. Majority’s Narrowing Constraints
       The majority today holds that, even if imposing tariffs
  can be a form of “regulat[ing] . . . importation” under sec-
  tion 203 of IEEPA, the President must act within some set
  of limits that the majority sketches but does not define.
  The majority suggests that the President must announce
  any such tariffs as temporary, limit them to some subset of
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  38                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




  imported articles, and/or constrain them by some maxi-
  mum rate prescribed elsewhere by Congress. Maj. Op. at
  17, 37–41. The majority mentions three features of the
  1971 Presidential Proclamation at issue in Yoshida CCPA
  as a source for its suggestion: a statement in the proclama-
  tion that the surcharge imposed there was “temporary”; a
  provision capping the proclamation-imposed tariff sur-
  charge for all imports at rates elsewhere set by Congress
  for imports from just a small number of countries (so-called
  “column 2” rates); and the imposition of the surcharge only
  on non-duty-free imports and imports that were the subject
  of concessions in trade agreements. Maj. Op. at 39–40 (cit-
  ing Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 577–78). 9 The majority re-
  lies on such constraints in the 1971 Presidential
  Proclamation as invalidating the reciprocal tariffs—and
  the trafficking tariffs as well. But there is no textual sup-
  port in section 203 of IEEPA for these constraints or other
  sound basis for adopting such constraints. Nor do we read
  Yoshida CCPA’s interpretation of “regulate . . . importa-
  tion”—as authorizing the imposition of duties—to be con-
  fined to the facts of the 1971 proclamation.




       9For almost all countries, the 10% surcharge imposed
  by the 1971 proclamation was not capped by the rate (even
  the non-concession rate) Congress had otherwise pre-
  scribed for imports from the particular country, which for
  almost all countries was the rate specified in column 1. Ra-
  ther, the 10% surcharge was capped, for goods from all
  countries, only by the rate Congress had set for specifically
  identified “Communist Countries” for the same goods (in
  column 2), see U.S. Tariff Commission, Tariff Schedules of
  the United States Annotated at 3–4 (1971). 85 Stat. at
  927–28. Today, HTSUS General Note 3(b) states that the
  column 2 rates apply to Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, and
  the Russian Federation. General Note 3(b), HTSUS (2025).
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  V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            39



                                 i
      Regarding the temporal constraint, we first note that
  the majority does not say that the presidential announce-
  ment must set a specified end point. The 1971 Presidential
  Proclamation did not set an end point. All it did was use
  the word “temporary” in the heading (“Temporary Modifi-
  cations for Balance of Payments Purposes”), 85 Stat. at
  927—while also stating in the actual prescribing language
  that the surcharges “shall continue in effect until modified
  or terminated by the President or by the Secretary of the
  Treasury,” 

 (subpart C, paragraph 2) (emphasis added),
  and declaring that the Secretary may, among other things,
  “reimpose the rate of additional duty herein . . . if he deter-
  mines that such action is consistent with safeguarding the
  balance of payments position of the United States,” id. at
  928 (subpart C, paragraph 4) (emphasis added).
       But if mirroring the 1971 Presidential Proclamation is
  what the majority means to require, what must count is
  substance, not the mere use or non-use of the word “tempo-
  rary.” And in substance, there is no material difference be-
  tween the 1971 Presidential Proclamation and the tariffs
  at issue here. For one thing, the executive orders here have
  a presumptive expiration date on the tariffs: Under the
  NEA, the underlying emergency expires after a year unless
  renewed. They could be renewed, of course, but the 1971
  Presidential Proclamation itself, which contains no pre-
  sumptive expiration date, is express that the surcharge im-
  posed there might be reimposed, and the President could
  in any event have issued a new proclamation. Likewise,
  the executive orders here indicate that the measures im-
  posed will last until changed or removed, and they contem-
  plate downward change if the problem being addressed is
  sufficiently resolved. See EO ’257, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15047
  (§ 4) (reciprocal tariffs); EO ’193, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9115 (§ 3)
  (Canada trafficking tariff); EO ’194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9119
  (§ 3) (Mexico trafficking tariff); EO ’195, 90 Fed. Reg. at
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   40                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   9123 (§ 3) (China trafficking tariff). 10 So, too, the 1971
   proclamation states that the surcharge lasts until changed.
   The majority thus cannot find in a comparison to the 1971
   proclamation upheld in Yoshida CCPA, as recognized in
   the lead-up to the enactment of IEEPA, a basis for finding
   a crucial temporal limitation that is missing from the tar-
   iffs at issue here.
       IEEPA itself supplies no basis for whatever affirmative
   requirement of temporariness the majority has in mind as
   a ground for invalidating the tariffs at issue. Section 203
   of IEEPA [

], in reciting the litany of presi-
   dential authorities, does not impose a requirement that
   they be “temporary.” Nor does section 202 of IEEPA
   [§ 1701]. Section 202 does contain two kinds of time limits.
   First, it ties the exercise of authority to a declaration of
   emergency, and that emergency, under the NEA, expires in
   a year unless renewed. IEEPA § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)]. Sec-
   ond, it says that the President is limited to exercising the
   section 203 authorities to deal with an unusual and ex-
   traordinary threat (to specified U.S. interests, from foreign
   sources, and upon a declared national emergency). IEEPA
   § 202(b) [§ 1701(b)]. But IEEPA does not prescribe a tem-
   poral limit on how long the threat (or underlying national
   emergency) lasts—which Congress cannot be understood to
   have assumed was predictable at the time of presidential
   action. In fact, IEEPA has been used frequently by Presi-
   dents since 1977, and “[o]n average, emergencies invoking
   IEEPA last more than nine years,” with “the length of
   emergencies invoking IEEPA . . . increas[ing] each decade.”
   Congressional Research Service, C. Casey, D. Rennack, &



        10 For Canada and Mexico, the President quickly
   paused the imposition of tariffs when it looked like those
   countries were taking helpful steps.         Exec. Order
   No. 14197, 

 (Feb. 3, 2025); Exec. Order
   No. 14198, 

 (Feb. 3, 2025).
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   V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            41



   J. Elsea, The International Emergency Economic Power
   Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use at 17 (Jan. 30, 2024) (CRS
   IEEPA Study); 

 at 58–63 tbl. A-1 (listing emergencies);
   

 at 66–86 tbl. A-3 (listing IEEPA-related executive or-
   ders); see id. at 25 (“IEEPA has served as an integral part
   of the postwar international sanctions regime”); id. at 55
   (“IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanction re-
   gime.”). Thus, textually and as implemented for almost 50
   years, the statute imposes no “temporariness” constraint
   that supplements what is inherent in section 202 of IEEPA
   and in the present tariffs—the status of the emergency dec-
   laration and the continuation of the unusual and extraor-
   dinary threat. Here, the CIT did not hold, the majority
   does not conclude, and plaintiffs have not argued that the
   actual identified threat has come to an end or that the
   courts can so determine and order termination of the tar-
   iffs. Cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 

, 166–73 (1948)
   (explaining that the termination of war is a political act left
   to treaty, legislation, or presidential proclamation).
       The suggested constraints of some kind of cap in duty
   amount and some limitation of what products may be cov-
   ered fare no better. As to the former: The executive orders
   do state specific duty amounts. They indicate that an in-
   crease might turn out to be warranted because of the
   threat, but such an increase would itself be embodied in a
   specification of duty amounts. And the duty amounts must
   reflect the requirement that section 203’s authorities be ex-
   ercised only to deal with the threat and for no other pur-
   pose. But nothing in IEEPA’s text further restricts the
   rates of imposed tariffs.
       Similarly, nothing in IEEPA’s text requires mirroring
   the 1971 proclamation’s limitation of the surcharge to im-
   ports that previously had been the subject of duties and
   concessions on trade agreements. That limitation was a
   choice the President made in 1971 to suit the overall mix
   of circumstances then faced, requiring judgment calls
   about the best way to proceed. Whatever constraints
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   42                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   affected the President’s choice in 1971, nothing in IEEPA
   suggests the necessity of such a scope-of-imports limita-
   tion. And if there were such a limitation, there is no ap-
   parent reason it would not equally apply to all the non-
   tariff measures authorized by section 203, such as “pro-
   hibit[ion].” Since IEEPA’s enactment in 1977, Presidents
   have regularly prohibited importation of any articles from
   specified countries, and the majority has not explained how
   its proposed scope-limiting approach could be squared with
   that historical practice. See CRS IEEPA Study at 66–86
   tbl. A-3 (listing IEEPA-related executive orders that, e.g.,
   order that the “import” or “importation” of “any goods or
   services” or “any products” of Iraqi, Iranian, Sudanese, or
   Nicaraguan origin is “prohibited” (Exec. Order No. 12722,
   

 (1990) (Iraq); Exec. Order No. 13059,
   

 (1997) (Iran); Exec. Order No. 13067,
   

 (1997) (Sudan) Exec. Order No. 14088,
   

 (2022) (Nicaragua))).
       In short, the majority’s efforts at narrowing the sec-
   tion 203 tariff authorization (beyond the limits prescribed
   by section 202), besides being insufficiently defined, have
   no proper foundation in the statute.
                                ii
       We see no sound rationale for adopting the non-text-
   based limitations suggested by the majority. In particular,
   the suggested limitations do not follow from the fact that
   Congress adopted the “regulate . . . importation” language
   soon after, and with expressed awareness of, the decision
   in Yoshida CCPA. That adoption does not play the role of
   a ratification that overrides an otherwise-clear contrary
   meaning. It merely confirms that Congress must have un-
   derstood the meaning of the text that is already clear from
   ordinary textual analysis. Moreover, the three features of
   the 1971 Presidential Proclamation on which the majority
   focuses were merely among the sufficient conditions the
   CCPA cited for holding the 1971 tariffs to be authorized by
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   V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          43



   TWEA. Our predecessor court in Yoshida CCPA did not
   say that those facts were necessary or otherwise set an
   outer boundary of TWEA’s authorization. Indeed, the
   CCPA stressed that TWEA provided a “broad and express”
   delegation to the President and that “presidential actions
   must be judged in the light of what the President actually
   did, not in light of what he could have done” or “what he
   might do.” 526 F.2d at 573, 577, 583–84 (emphases added)
   (citation omitted). There was, in short, no ruling in Yo-
   shida CCPA about conditions necessary under TWEA that
   Congress could have ratified.
       Nor can the majority’s suggestions be supported on a
   rationale that section 203 of IEEPA must be given a nar-
   row enough scope—even in a non-textual way—to avoid
   finding presidential authorization to impose tariffs beyond
   the authorization provided by tariff laws generally. The
   CIT rightly refrained from any such conclusion.
        It is the obvious role of emergency laws to confer au-
   thority that Congress has not conferred in non-emergency
   laws. Otherwise, the President would hardly need to rely
   on emergency laws, yet the President has repeatedly done
   so during our history. Congress understood this practical
   reality in the lead-up to its passage in 1977 of IEEPA. See,
   e.g., 1974 Emergency Powers Report, at 1 (explaining in the
   second sentence of the report that John Locke “argued that
   occasions may arise when the Executive must exert a broad
   discretion in meeting special exigencies or ‘emergencies’ for
   which the legislative power has no relief and/or existing
   law will not grant necessary remedy”); see generally id.
   And Congress has long enacted broad emergency laws to
   play that role. See C. BRADLEY, HISTORICAL GLOSS AND
   FOREIGN AFFAIRS 174–78 (2024) (BRADLEY); Dames &
   Moore, 453 U.S. at 677–78 (noting, in an IEEPA case, that
   Congress has elsewhere shown its “acceptance of a broad
   scope for executive action in circumstances such as those
   presented” there and that IEEPA “delegates broad
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   44                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   authority to the President to act in times of national emer-
   gency with respect to property of a foreign country”).
       Logically, we see no sound basis for insisting that lim-
   its in non-emergency tariff authorizations be read into
   emergency authorizations. Such an insistence would run
   counter to the governing approach to interpreting “statutes
   touching on the same topic.” Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 63. Courts
   are to apply a “strong presumption” that such statutes “co-
   exist harmoniously” so as to preserve both. Id. at 63–64
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That pre-
   sumption is overcome only if there is an “actual incon-
   sistency,” see id. at 64, or a party otherwise carries the
   “heavy burden” of showing a “clear and manifest” expres-
   sion of congressional intent that one statute displaces the
   other, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 

, 510
   (2018) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations
   omitted); see Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 63–64. See also J.E.M. Ag
   Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 

 (2001) (explaining that “this Court has not
   hesitated to give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long
   as each reaches some distinct cases” (citing Connecticut
   National Bank v. Germain, 

 (1992))).
       To diminish the scope that IEEPA would otherwise
   have, the inquiry required would be a focused considera-
   tion of a particular non-IEEPA statute and a showing that
   the identified statute clearly contradicts IEEPA or other-
   wise expresses a clear intent to limit IEEPA. The CIT rec-
   ognized as much by choosing to rely only on section 122 of
   the Trade Act of 1974 [

] instead of tariff
   laws collectively. See CIT Op. at 1374–76. We address the
   specific section 122 issue next, and we disagree with the
   CIT’s conclusion. But methodologically, the CIT was right
   not to narrow IEEPA based on a more general view that
   Congress has not conferred in its tariff laws collectively a
   general authority as broad as the “emergency economic
   powers” conferred by IEEPA.
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   V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          45



       Precedent confirms the correctness of the CIT’s avoid-
   ance of such a rationale. That rationale would be much the
   same as the analysis rejected by the Supreme Court in Al-
   gonquin. The Supreme Court in that case was reviewing a
   holding of the D.C. Circuit that gave a limited reading to
   section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which
   grants (and then granted) the President special authority
   to “adjust the imports” of goods whose importation
   “threaten[s] to impair the national security.” Trade Expan-
   sion Act of 1962 § 232(b) [

(b)–(c)]; see Al-
   gonquin, 426 U.S. at 550, 557–58 (citations omitted). The
   D.C. Circuit held that the statute did not authorize the im-
   position of monetary duties on oil imports in the form of
   per-barrel license fees. See Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 557 (ci-
   tations omitted). The D.C. Circuit reasoned that “reading
   the statute to authorize” such duties “‘would be an anoma-
   lous departure’ from ‘the consistently explicit, well-defined
   manner in which Congress has delegated control over for-
   eign trade and tariffs.’” Id. (quoting Algonquin SNG, Inc.
   v. Federal Energy Administration, 

   (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The Supreme Court reversed. It insisted
   on resolving the question simply by analyzing the terms of
   section 232(b), which it readily found broad enough to em-
   brace the duties, 426 U.S. at 561–62, and confirming that
   the legislative history was not to the contrary, 

 at 562–
   71. There was no specific statute contradicting the fair in-
   terpretation of section 232(b), and the Court gave no
   weight to the more general idea of anomaly on which the
   D.C. Circuit had relied.
       Our predecessor court, in Yoshida CCPA, similarly re-
   jected a gestalt-anomaly approach. It said that the Cus-
   toms Court, in the decision under review, had treated an
   assortment of tariff statutes—“[t]he Tariff Act of 1930[,]
   and its amendments, the Trade Agreements Act of 1934,
   and its amendments, and the Trade Expansion Act of
   1962[,] all providing tariff-making authority to the Presi-
   dent, albeit with various limitations”—“as indicating a
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   46                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   congressional intent that such limitations should apply to
   any delegation of its tariff making authority.” 526 F.2d at
   578. The CCPA rejected that approach, stressing that
   “[t]he existence of limited authority under certain trade
   acts does not preclude the execution of other, broader au-
   thority under a national emergency powers act.” Id.
       In short, we find in IEEPA what must be considered an
   eyes-open choice of a broad standard. Such breadth is evi-
   dent in the language and history of IEEPA. And it is con-
   firmed by the fact that Congress took pains to impose
   exacting requirements for the President to involve Con-
   gress in the exercise of IEEPA authorities, from consulta-
   tion at the outset to regular reporting afterward. IEEPA
   § 204 [

]; see supra at pp. 13–14. Those de-
   mands are a strong indication that Congress knew it was
   giving broad powers to the President.
            3. Displacement by 1974 Trade Act § 122
       The CIT, not finding a limit within IEEPA that the re-
   ciprocal tariffs violated, ultimately held the tariffs unlaw-
   ful on the ground that, even if IEEPA itself would support
   the reciprocal tariffs, section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974
   [

] “removes” any presidential authority
   under IEEPA for these tariffs. CIT Op. at 1375 (“Section
   122 removes the President’s power to impose remedies in
   response to balance-of-payments deficits, and specifically
   trade deficits, from the broader powers granted to a presi-
   dent during a national emergency under IEEPA by estab-
   lishing an explicit non-emergency statute with greater
   limitations.” (footnote omitted)). The CIT seems to have
   categorically concluded that section 122 displaces all
   “emergency”-action authority responding to a particular
   problem. Id. at 1374 (reasoning that Congress “cabined”
   the President’s tariff authority to respond to the specified
   problem to the exercise of authority under “to non-emer-
   gency legislation”). The majority does not adopt this con-
   clusion. And we conclude that this is not the proper
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   V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                          47



   understanding of the relationship between IEEPA and sec-
   tion 122, at least as applied to the reciprocal tariffs here.
       We have already recited the very demanding standard
   that must be met before a court, faced with two statutes
   that overlap in subject matter, may declare one to displace
   the other rather than give full effect to both as complemen-
   tary. A contradiction or expressions of Congress’s clear,
   manifest intent to displace that statute is required. See
   supra at p. 44. The plaintiffs do not present arguments
   consistent with this demanding standard. See, e.g., Private
   Appellees Brief at 25–37; State Appellees Brief at 11–23.
   Applying that standard, we conclude that section 122 does
   not displace IEEPA authority as relevant here.
       As already noted, section 122 was part of the Trade Act
   of 1974 and grew out of the 1971 Presidential Proclamation
   that responded to a “monetary crisis.” CIT Op. at 1374.
   Section 122(a) states:
       Whenever fundamental international payments
       problems require special import measures to re-
       strict imports—
           (1) to deal with large and serious United
           States balance-of-payments deficits,
           (2) to prevent an imminent and significant
           depreciation of the dollar in foreign ex-
           change markets, or
           (3) to cooperate with other countries in cor-
           recting an international balance-of-pay-
           ments disequilibrium,
       the President shall proclaim, for a period not ex-
       ceeding 150 days (unless such period is extended by
       Act of Congress)—
           (A) a temporary import surcharge, not to
           exceed 15 percent ad valorem, in the form
           of duties (in addition to those already
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   48                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




          imposed, if any) on articles imported into
          the United States;
          (B) temporary limitations through the use
          of quotas on the importation of articles into
          the United States; or
          (C) both a temporary import surcharge de-
          scribed in subparagraph (A) and temporary
          limitations described in subparagraph (B).
   Trade Act of 1974 § 122, 88 Stat. at 1987–88 [

(a)]. Under this language, the necessary threshold
   condition for application of this provision is the existence
   of “fundamental international payments problems.” 

   (emphasis added). When there are such payments prob-
   lems, and those problems in turn require special measures
   “to restrict imports” for any of the three enumerated pur-
   poses (e.g., to reduce the need for foreign currency by re-
   ducing imports), the President must take certain actions
   (presumptively, as the President may decline to impose
   “import restrictions” if such impositions are contrary “to
   the national interest,” Trade Act of 1974 § 122(b), 88 Stat.
   at 1988 [§ 2132(b]). Among the presumptively mandatory
   actions are tariff surcharges of up to 15% for up to 150
   days.
        Neither section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 nor IEEPA
   completely overlaps the other: For example, IEEPA applies
   to national security and foreign policy threats well outside
   section 122, and section 122 applies even where the rele-
   vant circumstances do not rise to the level of a national
   emergency. In any event, (1) the two statutes are not con-
   tradictory for the problem addressed by the reciprocal tar-
   iffs and (2) there is no clear and manifest intent that this
   problem is to be addressed by, and only by, the measures
   specified in section 122.
       First, section 122 and IEEPA do not contradict each
   other regarding the circumstances presented by the
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   V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP                            49



   reciprocal tariffs. Of course, for certain goods trade defi-
   cits, both statutes might apply—but a goods trade deficit
   alone is not enough for application of either IEEPA or sec-
   tion 122. As already discussed, see supra at pp. 25–28,
   problems may or may not arise from goods trade deficits at
   all, and different kinds of problems may arise separately
   and at different times. Here, the problems addressed by
   the reciprocal tariffs (imposed under IEEPA) are not the
   problems addressed by the terms of section 122, and that
   is reason enough to conclude that section 122 does not dis-
   place IEEPA’s coverage to the reciprocal tariffs.
       More specifically, the reciprocal tariffs rest on the find-
   ing that a goods trade deficit has given rise to a variety of
   domestic problems centered on manufacturing deficiencies.
   See supra at pp. 26–28. It is those problems which underlie
   the national emergency declared with respect to the unu-
   sual and extraordinary threat, thus triggering application
   of IEEPA. EO ’257 contains no finding that there even is
   an overall balance-of-payments deficit, which considers not
   just transactions in goods but also services, capital invest-
   ments, and other international transactions. 11 Moreover,



       11  A textbook from the time explains balance-of-pay-
   ments accounting. P. KENEN & R. LUBITZ, INTERNATIONAL
   ECONOMICS at 52–78 (3d ed. 1971). It breaks down the
   ledger of this “double-entry bookkeeping” system into a
   “current” account showing “flows of goods and services” and
   a “capital” account showing “lending and investment” on
   one side and a “cash” account showing “how cash balances
   and short-term claims have changed in response to current
   and capital transactions” on the other, the two sides having
   to balance because “[a]ll current and capital account trans-
   actions must have cash or credit counterparts.” Id. at 53–
   55; see also CIT Op. at 1375. Trade in goods is therefore
   just one part of the set of transactions covered by the
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   50                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   and sufficient for our conclusion that the statutes do not
   contradict each other as relevant here, the reciprocal tariffs
   do not in any way focus on “fundamental international pay-
   ments problems.” Trade Act of 1974 § 122(a) [§ 2132] (em-
   phasis added); see generally EO ’257. Such problems
   concern the payments (financial, cash) side of the account-
   ing statement, which involves the reserves of currencies (or
   their substitutes like gold) and the operation of foreign-ex-
   change markets that determine the ability of persons from
   one country to acquire another country’s currency needed
   to make the foreign purchases or investments reflected in
   the current and capital accounts. 12 That is the nature of


   overall balance of payments, which also includes services
   and capital investments (on the transactions side of the
   ledger) and payments (on the payments side). Compare
   § 122(a) (referring to “balance-of-payments”) with § 122(c)
   (referring to “balance-of-trade”); see S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at
   87–89 (explaining change of terminology); H. R. Rep.
   No. 93-1644, at 27 (1974) (acknowledging and receding to
   Senate’s change of terminology).
        12 See KENEN & LUBITZ at 57–58 (noting that a “gap

   between gross payments from the United States and gross
   payments to the United States” (the “gross payments defi-
   cit”) “is not necessarily a ‘bad thing,’” but can become “dan-
   gerous” by “cut[ting] so deeply into cash holdings that a
   country can no longer cope with unplanned deficits arising
   from cyclical and other disturbances”); id. at 58 (noting va-
   riety of “chain[s] of events” needed to “decrease the Ameri-
   can demand for foreign currencies and increase the foreign
   demand for U.S. dollars” so as to “reduce the gross pay-
   ments deficit and restore equilibrium in the foreign-ex-
   change market by forestalling further changes in the
   banks’ working balances,” depending on “the extent to
   which exchange rates are free to fluctuate” and “the way
   each country’s money supply is connected to its gold and
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   the problem underlying the 1971 Presidential Proclama-
   tion on which section 122 was based, see CIT Op. at 1374;
   Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 567 & n.3, 580, and section 122
   is limited to some subset of such “fundamental interna-
   tional payments problems,” Trade Act of 1974 § 122(a)
   [§ 2132] (emphasis added). 13
        Thus, section 122 does not apply to the problems un-
   derlying the reciprocal tariffs, which are not the payments
   problems that are the precondition to section 122’s applica-
   tion. Even if section 122 is the exclusive authority for pres-
   idential action to address some problems, it is not exclusive
   for the problem at issue here—and certainly not clearly
   so. 14 For this reason alone, applying IEEPA here does not



   foreign-exchange holdings”); id. (identifying “excess de-
   mand for foreign currency (an excess supply of dollars) in
   the foreign-exchange market,” which is the “net payments
   deficit,” as “the best available measure of payments dise-
   quilibrium because . . . it corresponds to the actual excess
   supply of dollars in the foreign exchange market” that
   “must be either eliminated or financed”).
       13 The original Administration proposal for what be-

   came section 122 did not contain that language. See H. R.
   6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 10, 1973) (§ 401). The
   House Committee on Ways and Means added the language,
   after hearings, when it introduced and soon reported out
   the bill that became law, H. R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
   (Oct. 3, 1973). See H. R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 27–28, 97–98,
   199–200.
       14 The Yoshida CCPA court stated, in dictum, that fu-

   ture presidential actions “must . . . comply” with sec-
   tion 122. 526 F.2d at 582 n.33. That point must be
   understood as limited to the particular “balance of pay-
   ments problems” actually covered by section 122, namely,
   a subset of “fundamental international payments
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   contradict section 122, and section 122, which is readily
   read as not prescribing anything for the problem addressed
   in the reciprocal tariffs, does not express a clear, manifest
   intent to displace the emergency authority of IEEPA.
        Second, even aside from the foregoing, there is no clear,
   manifest intent to displace emergency authority, which re-
   sided in TWEA at the time of section 122’s enactment and
   would come to reside in IEEPA in 1977. Section 122 does
   not contain any “notwithstanding any other provision of
   law,” displacement-of-other-authority, or exclusivity lan-
   guage at all. The statutory language provides no indication
   that Congress intended section 122 to be the exclusive au-
   thority for the President to impose tariffs to address all bal-
   ance-of-payments problems, let alone all possible effects of
   trade deficits. All it says is that whenever there is the iden-
   tified precondition, there is a presumptive mandate for
   presidential action, and all the language does is set a per-
   cent and time limit on that presumptively mandatory
   measure. It says nothing to negate otherwise-available
   presidential authority.
       Third, and independently sufficient, the CIT recog-
   nized that section 122 addresses “non-emergency” situa-
   tions. CIT Op. at 1374 (emphasis added). It is implausible
   to suggest that Congress, in acting to supply special presi-
   dential authority (indeed, presumptive duties) for certain
   surcharges even when the given problem was not an emer-
   gency, was implicitly denying the President otherwise-
   available authority to address the given problem when it
   rose to the level of an emergency. It is far more plausible
   that Congress was leaving any emergency authority unim-
   paired but adding non-emergency authority.




   problems”—which do not include the problems identified in
   the reciprocal tariffs.
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       Legislative history indicates that this is just what the
   key Senate committee understood. That committee recog-
   nized that other statutes, including TWEA, might well pro-
   vide overlapping authority in the balance-of-payments
   context. In its November 1974 report, the committee men-
   tioned the Customs Court’s July 8, 1974 decision in Yo-
   shida International, Inc. v. United States, 

, 1168–76 (Cust. Ct. 1974), which held that TWEA did
   not authorize import-duty surcharges (such as the sur-
   charge imposed by the 1971 Presidential Proclamation,
   based on a payments crisis). S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 88.
   The Committee referred to the decision and recognized that
   it might be reversed on appeal:
       The importance of providing such authority [under
       section 122] is manifest in the light of the recent
       decision by the United States Customs Court which
       held that the 10 percent import surcharge imposed
       temporarily in August of 1971 was without ad-
       vance authority. If that position is upheld on ap-
       peal it could involve a substantial loss of revenue
       to the U.S. Treasury and windfall gains to those
       importers who passed on the import surcharge to
       consumers. While the Committee does not wish to
       take a position one way or the other on the validity
       of the 1971 surcharge, it does feel the Executive
       ought to have explicit statutory authority to impose
       certain restrictions on imports for balance of pay-
       ments reasons.
   

 Despite recognizing that TWEA might authorize im-
   port-duty surcharges to address balance-of-payments prob-
   lems, and despite making other changes in the House bill
   that had come to it, the Senate committee did not include
   any “notwithstanding any other authority,” displacement-
   of-other-authority, or exclusivity language. The commit-
   tee, instead, simply added an express authority applicable
   even when there was no emergency, indeed made the
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   President’s exercise of that authority presumptively man-
   datory, and set limits on that authority.
       Finally, when Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977—after
   section 122 was enacted—it did not adopt any language
   narrowing presidential authority wherever it would touch
   on topics addressed in section 122. And the key committee
   report does not indicate any (unenacted) intent to do so.
   See generally S. Rep. No. 95-466. The relationship between
   IEEPA and section 122 is therefore subject to the general
   principle governing judicial handling of overlapping stat-
   utes. Under that principle, section 122 does not displace
   IEEPA, at least for purposes of the reciprocal tariffs.
                  4. Major Questions Doctrine
       Moving past ordinary statutory analysis, plaintiffs
   (and the majority) invoke the “major questions doctrine” (or
   canon) to argue that we should reach a statutory result con-
   trary to the conclusions we have drawn about IEEPA (in-
   cluding that it is not displaced by section 122 of the Trade
   Act of 1974). Private Appellees Brief at 46–54; State Ap-
   pellees Brief at 12–18. Under that doctrine (or canon), in
   “certain extraordinary cases,” circumstances give “reason
   to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to con-
   fer” the authority needed to uphold a challenged govern-
   ment action. West Virginia v. Environmental Protection
   Agency, 

, 723, 721 (2022) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). The doctrine has supported
   rejection of the statutory claim when, in light of several
   contextual features such as narrowness of the statutory
   words at issue, “common sense as to the manner in which
   Congress would have been likely to delegate such power . . .
   made it very unlikely that Congress had actually done so.”
   

 at 722–23 (cleaned up) (internal quotation mark and ci-
   tation omitted); see id. at 724 (determination is whether
   authority claimed is “beyond what Congress could reason-
   ably be understood to have granted”); see Biden v. Ne-
   braska, 

, 518–19 (2023) (Barrett, J.,
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   concurring) (explaining that it is relevant whether the as-
   serted power is within the delegatee’s “wheelhouse”). We
   see no convincing basis in that doctrine for altering the
   statutory conclusion we have reached.
        The language of IEEPA is undeniably broad on its face.
   It lists a host of powers—some (such as prohibition and pre-
   vention) even more restrictive than tariffing. There is no
   suggestion that the IEEPA-specified authority must be ex-
   ercised only for specified types of products or only for a nar-
   row set of countries. See supra at pp. 41–42. The facially
   evident intent is to provide flexibility in the tools available
   to the President to address the unusual and extraordinary
   threats specified in a declared national emergency. This is
   not an “ancillary,” “little used backwater” provision, West
   Virginia, 597 U.S. at 710, 730, or a delegation outside the
   recipient’s wheelhouse.
        The breadth is anything but surprising in the context
   here. As Justice Kavanaugh recently reiterated in explain-
   ing why the canon has not been applied “in the national
   security or foreign policy contexts,” “the canon does not re-
   flect ordinary congressional intent” in these contexts be-
   cause “the usual understanding is that Congress intends to
   give the President substantial authority and flexibility to
   protect America and the American people.” Consumers’ Re-
   search, 145 S Ct. at 2516 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see
   id. (describing major questions doctrine as having been ap-
   plied “in the domestic sphere,” and citing authorities, none
   of which involve foreign affairs). There is simply no “com-
   mon sense” expectation in the present context, involving
   emergencies touching foreign affairs, that Congress was
   unlikely to be granting the authority at issue. The facial
   breadth in an emergency context makes the straightfor-
   ward application of the statute’s words hardly “‘unher-
   alded,’” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 722 (quoting Utility Air
   Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, 

, 324 (2014)), and if a more specific herald is
   needed, see Biden, 

 (requiring “clear
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   56                           V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   congressional authorization” for certain agency actions), it
   is present in the 1971 proclamation, Yoshida CCPA, and
   subsequent congressional adoption of the relevant lan-
   guage in 1977.
       For those reasons, we conclude that the essential prem-
   ise for using the major questions doctrine to reject the
   claimed authority for the challenged action is missing here.
   Congress very clearly made a broad delegation here, as in
   other emergency-authority delegations. Whether to pro-
   vide such delegations is certainly open to policy debate, as
   it carries obvious risks, see Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at
   583–84, and such debate has occurred over the decades, but
   the policy debate is not for us to resolve. We do not see
   IEEPA as anything but an eyes-open congressional choice
   to confer on the President “broad authority” to choose tools
   to restrict importation when the IEEPA section 202 stand-
   ards are met. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677. We there-
   fore see no reason to pull back from the statutory
   conclusions we have reached above.
           5. Constitutional Nondelegation Doctrine
       Plaintiffs argue that IEEPA is an unconstitutional del-
   egation of legislative authority to the President, i.e., vio-
   lates the nondelegation doctrine. Private Appellees Brief
   at 54–62; State Appellees Brief at 18–20. The Supreme
   Court has not ruled on the issue, though it has upheld ac-
   tion under the statute. E.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at
   672, 677–78. All the courts of appeals to have considered
   the question have rejected such challenges. United States
   v. Shih, 

, 1092 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,
   

 (2024); United States v. Amirnazmi, 

 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Dhafir, 

, 215–17 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Arch
   Trading Co., 

, 1092–94 (4th Cir. 1993); see
   also United States v. Mirza, 

, 255–56 (5th
   Cir. 2011) (non-precedential).      On the state of the
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   longstanding case law on the subject, we too reject the non-
   delegation-doctrine challenge.
       The general standard for determining whether Con-
   gress had unconstitutionally delegated the legislative
   power assigned to it by Article I of the Constitution re-
   quires two elements to be supplied by Congress—an under-
   standable statement of “the general policy that the agency
   must pursue” and understandable “boundaries,” i.e., “suffi-
   cient standards to enable both the courts and the public [to]
   ascertain whether the agency has followed the law.” Con-
   sumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2497 (cleaned up) (quoting
   American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 

   (1946); OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage
   and Hour Division, Department of Labor, 

   (1941)); id. at 2501, 2504, 2507, 2511. That standard, not
   a different one, the Supreme Court held a few months ago,
   applies to statutes that authorize monetary impositions
   such as taxes. Id. at 2497–501. And, as applied to such
   impositions, the Court specifically rejected the argument
   that “Congress must set a ‘definite’ or ‘objective limit’ on
   how much money an agency can collect—a numeric cap, a
   fixed rate, or the equivalent.” Id. at 2497. What applies,
   the Court held, is the “usual nondelegation standard,” and
   that standard is “trained on intelligible principles, not on
   numeric caps and ‘mathematical formula[s].’” Id. at 2498
   (quoting United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 

 (1939)); see also 

 at 2498 n.3 (rejecting dis-
   sent’s “rate-or-cap test”).
        The government suggests that the Consumers’ Re-
   search standard is inapplicable when the delegation is to
   the President rather than to a non-elected executive offi-
   cial. Government’s Reply Brief at 18–20. The government
   has not persuasively justified that suggestion. No question
   is presented here about whether a tougher standard than
   the one confirmed in Consumers’ Research might apply to
   a delegation to a board protected against discretionary re-
   moval by the President (i.e., “an independent agency”).
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   Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2517 (Kavanaugh, J.,
   concurring). The government’s suggestion is that a laxer
   standard than the Consumers’ Research standard should
   apply whenever the delegatee is the President. That con-
   tention presents two difficulties.
        First, the nondelegation doctrine polices what Con-
   gress has delegated to another branch, not to whom it has
   delegated the authority. See Gundy v. United States, 

, 132 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“The nondelega-
   tion doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legisla-
   tive power to another branch of Government.”). Indeed,
   “[t]o distinguish between the permissible and the imper-
   missible in this sphere,” the Supreme Court has “long
   asked whether Congress has set out an ‘intelligible princi-
   ple’ to guide what it has given the agency to do.” Consum-
   ers Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr.
   & Co. v. United States, 

 (1928)). Whether
   Congress has provided an intelligible principle depends on
   the text of the statute Congress created, not on the charac-
   ter of the receiving party.
        Second, the Supreme Court has observed that, when-
   ever an executive officer is exercising executive power, the
   officer is exercising power that belongs to the President.
   Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
   

, 203 (2020) (“Under our Constitution, the ‘ex-
   ecutive power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President’ . . . .”).
   Although we need not draw a definitive conclusion on the
   matter, it is not apparent to us why the Consumers’ Re-
   search standard should be categorically lowered for delega-
   tions to the President. See Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct.
   at 2512 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citation omitted)
   (stating his view that delegations to “executive officers or
   agencies . . . are not analytically distinct for present pur-
   poses from delegations to the President because the Presi-
   dent controls, supervises, and directs those executive
   officers and agencies”).
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        Relatedly, we are not prepared to rely on the merely
   procedural requirements, such as declaring a national
   emergency and complying with the requirements of keep-
   ing Congress informed, as themselves sufficient to meet the
   understandable-boundaries element of that standard even
   if the substantive requirements were not sufficient. The
   Supreme Court suggested that procedural requirements
   could not suffice in that way when it stated in Rock Royal
   that “procedural safeguards cannot validate an unconstitu-
   tional delegation” while noting that such safeguards “do
   furnish protection against an arbitrary use of properly del-
   egated authority.” 

 (citing with “cf.” signal
   and A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 

 (1935)). Application of the nondelegation
   doctrine must at least focus on, perhaps even be limited to,
   substantive constraints on the exercise of the delegated
   power. Regarding the national emergency, the NEA pro-
   vides no substantive standards for what may be declared a
   national emergency, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621–1641, and con-
   sistent with that absence of standards, such a declaration
   itself is likely unreviewable, see Haig, 453 U.S. at 292;
   Chang v. United States, 

, 896 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
   1988); Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 581 n.32; cf. Shih, 73
   F.4th at 1092. The focus therefore must be on the substan-
   tive requirement that the presidential action be exercised,
   upon declaration of a national emergency, to deal with an
   unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
   foreign policy, or economy of the United States, emanating
   in relevant part from abroad, and for no other reason. See,
   e.g., supra at pp. 11–12.
        One feature of the present case that clearly is relevant
   to how demanding the nondelegation doctrine is here is the
   fact, not meaningfully disputed by plaintiffs, that the tar-
   iffs involve the President’s role and responsibilities in for-
   eign affairs (including national security), which has
   constitutional foundations (in Article II) and which Con-
   gress may help the President more effectively perform by
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   furnishing the President with tools, such as criminal pro-
   hibitions or tariff impositions, that can be created only by
   Congress exercising its Article I powers. See Trump
   v. United States, 

, 2327 (2024) (explaining
   that the President “has important foreign relations respon-
   sibilities: making treaties, appointing ambassadors, recog-
   nizing foreign governments, meeting foreign leaders,
   overseeing international diplomacy and intelligence gath-
   ering, and managing matters related to terrorism, trade,
   and immigration”); C. Bradley & J. Goldsmith, Foreign Af-
   fairs, Nondelegation, and the Major Questions Doctrine,
   

 (2024); BRADLEY at 168–90. The
   tariffs involve goods crossing into the United States from
   foreign countries, foreign governments’ policies respecting
   both those goods and U.S. exports for entry into those gov-
   ernments’ countries, and the possibility of presidential ne-
   gotiation of agreements with foreign governments. The
   Supreme Court has recognized that the congressional
   grant to the President of tariffing and other import-control
   authority dates back to the founding era and has treated
   such actions as involving foreign affairs. See, e.g., J.W.
   Hampton, 

; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 

 (1904); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 

, 695–97 (1892); Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United
   States, 

, 387–89 (1813); see Bradley
   & Goldsmith at 1757 (explaining that “Congress in the
   early post-Founding period authorized the President to
   make broad discretionary policy determinations” and
   “many of the broadest delegations came in contexts related
   to foreign affairs,” noting specifically a 1794 authorization
   to the President, while Congress was in session, to “impose
   a shipping embargo ‘whenever, in his opinion, the public
   safety shall so require’”); BRADLEY at 168–73. Opinions by
   and from within the Court suggest that Congress has espe-
   cially great leeway to delegate authority to the President
   in foreign-affairs matters, based on the view that realities
   in that area frequently support “paint[ing] with a brush
   broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas,”
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   Zemel v. Rusk, 

 (1965), and the notion that
   “the same limitations on delegation do not apply ‘where the
   entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses
   independent authority over the subject matter,” Loving
   v. United States, 

, 772–73 (1996) (quoting
   United States v. Mazurie, 

, 556–57 (1975)).
   See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 

, 540–41 (1950); Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
   at 312–22; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
   yer, 

, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
   (reading Curtiss-Wright to hold that “the strict limitation
   upon congressional delegations of power to the President
   over internal affairs does not apply with respect to delega-
   tions of power in external affairs”). Several Justices have
   in recent years noted the distinctive character of foreign-
   affairs matters under the nondelegation doctrine. See Con-
   sumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2516 (Kavanaugh, J., con-
   curring) (raising question); id. at 2539 n.20 (Gorsuch, J.,
   dissenting) (same); Department of Transportation v. Asso-
   ciation of American Railroads, 

, 79–80 & n.5
   (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
       The Court’s formulation requiring the ability of courts
   to ascertain whether substantive boundaries have been
   crossed suggests at least a presumption of judicial enforce-
   ability of those boundaries—at least the boundaries with-
   out which the policy leeway would be too great. Cf. Yakus
   v. United States, 

 (1944) (asking if legis-
   lation makes it possible for courts to ascertain compliance);
   Gundy, 588 U.S. at 158 n.39 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In
   the present context, the strong principles of deference in
   the foreign-affairs area (including the emergency authority
   at issue here) and broad interpretation and permissible
   greater leeway of delegation all have constitutional foun-
   dations. Over statutory matters, Congress has abilities to
   adjust grants of authority (over the long term anyway) and
   to exercise powers over matters for which the President
   needs congressional action (in the shorter term). We do not
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   see how it would make sense to say that broad delegations,
   subject to particularly deferential review, both of which are
   permitted for constitutional reasons, together lead to a con-
   clusion of unconstitutionality.
        The IEEPA standard might well pass constitutional
   muster even under ordinary delegation standards, i.e., out-
   side the foreign-affairs and related contexts where espe-
   cially great leeway is allowed, even recognizing that “[t]he
   degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies accord-
   ing to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.”
   Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 

 (2001); see Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at
   2497 (repeating Whitman point). The Court recently ex-
   plained that it has found a violation in only two cases (the
   same year): Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 

 (1935), where Congress established “no cr[i]terion” and
   declared “no policy”; and Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at
   521–22; 541–42, where Congress authorized creation of
   codes of “fair competition” nationwide with “no standards”
   except to “rehabilitat[e], correct[], and expan[d]” the econ-
   omy. Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2502–03. The
   Court explained:
        At the same time, we have found intelligible prin-
        ciples in a host of statutes giving agencies signifi-
        cant discretion. So, for example, we upheld a
        provision enabling an agency to set air quality
        standards at levels “requisite to protect the public
        health.” We sustained a delegation to an agency to
        ensure that corporate structures did not “unfairly
        or inequitably distribute voting power” among se-
        curity holders. And we affirmed authorizations to
        regulate in the “public interest” and to set “just and
        reasonable” rates, because we thought the discre-
        tion given was not unbridled.
   

 at 2503 (quoting Whitman, 

; then Amer-
   ican Power & Light, 

; citing National
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   Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 

, 225–226
   (1943); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 

   (1944)); see also New York Central Securities Corp.
   v. United States, 

 (1932); Federal Commu-
   nications Commission v. Radio Corporation of America
   Communications, 

 (1953); Federal Radio
   Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 

 (1933).
       The leeway allowed by those precedents makes it chal-
   lenging to distinguish the substantive requirements that
   we have focused on here—namely, that there is a qualify-
   ing “unusual and extraordinary threat,” see supra at
   pp. 22–28, and that the President must be exercising the
   IEEPA-specified authorities “to deal with” that threat and
   for no other purpose, see infra at pp. 64–67. Those stand-
   ards are on their face intelligible, as even plaintiffs have
   presupposed in arguing that they are violated. But we
   need not decide whether IEEPA would pass muster under
   standards other than those which apply in the context of
   this case, involving emergency authority addressing for-
   eign-source conduct threatening the national security, for-
   eign policy, or economy of the United States. Under the
   applicable standards, we see no basis for finding a consti-
   tutional violation under current doctrine.
        The Court’s decision in Algonquin is significant for the
   present case. There, the Court held that section 232(b) of
   the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 

, “easily
   fulfills” the “intelligible principle” test articulated in the
   J.W. Hampton case. 426 U.S. at 559. The Court explained
   that the statute authorizes presidential action (which the
   Court held included imposition of duties) to the extent the
   President deems necessary where imports “threaten to im-
   pair the national security,” based on consideration of, e.g.,
   what goods are needed, domestic industry’s ability to sup-
   ply them, and other obviously pertinent facts. § 232(b), (c)
   [§ 1862(b), (c)]; see 426 U.S. at 559. The Court held that
   the statute presented not even a “looming problem of
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   64                            V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP




   improper delegation” that would call for a narrowing stat-
   utory construction to avoid the problem. 426 U.S. at 560.
   We note that, while section 232 requires that the President
   receive certain findings of threatened impairment of the
   national security from the Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
   ment of Commerce, we have held that those findings are no
   more reviewable than if they were the President’s own find-
   ings, as they are part of a single process. USP Holdings,
   36 F.4th at 1369–70 (relying on George S. Bush & Co., 310
   U.S. at 379–80). The Supreme Court readily upheld sec-
   tion 232(b)—with what this court’s majority today calls the
   provision’s “well-defined procedural and substantive limi-
   tations,” Maj. Op. at 20—against a nondelegation chal-
   lenge. Although some features of IEEPA differ from the
   features of section 232, we do not see a basis for a different
   result in this case under current nondelegation law.
                       B. Trafficking Tariffs
        We finally turn to the trafficking tariffs (applicable to
   Canada, Mexico, and China), which are challenged only by
   the State plaintiffs (not the private plaintiffs), for which
   only one issue not already discussed—a statutory issue—
   remains for consideration. The essential characteristics
   that frame the issue raised are simply described. The ma-
   jority does not doubt, and the State plaintiffs do not dis-
   pute, that the problem the trafficking tariffs target—
   introduction of opioids or precursors and other criminal ac-
   tivity—rises to the level of an “unusual and extraordinary
   threat” to the national security, foreign policy, or economy
   of the United States (and has been properly declared to be
   a national emergency). IEEPA § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)]. Nor is
   there any contention that the President’s actions have an-
   other purpose than addressing that threat.             IEEPA
   § 202(b) [§ 1701(b)]. Instead, the challenge focuses on the
   fact that the tariff measures adopted (then paused and
   modified) apply to a large variety of imports that them-
   selves are not the source of the problem, i.e., are not illegal
   drugs or precursors and do not involve criminal activity.
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   The CIT held that fact to place the trafficking tariffs out-
   side the power of the President to exercise the section 203-
   specified authorities “to deal with” the threat, IEEPA
   § 202(a), (b) [§ 1701(a), (b)], even though, as the CIT did not
   dispute, the trafficking tariffs seek indirectly to induce the
   foreign governments’ action in alleviating that threat. CIT
   Op. at 1381–82. That holding, we conclude, is contrary to
   the statute.
       IEEPA does not say that the imports covered by sec-
   tion 203 authorities must be the source of the “threat” re-
   quired by section 202. The section 203 authorities may be
   “exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary
   threat” meeting the specified conditions (the threat must
   be to our national security, foreign policy, or economy, it
   must be declared to be a national emergency, and, under
   section 202(b) [§ 1701(b)], the authorities must be exer-
   cised to deal with that threat and for no other reason).
   IEEPA § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)] (emphasis added). Nor does
   IEEPA use the language of “direct link” (or the word “di-
   rect”) at all, much less in a sense that precludes a measure
   reasonably designed to work as leverage. CIT Op. at 1381–
   82.
       IEEPA says only that the President’s exercise of au-
   thority must be “to deal with” the identified threat, and not
   “for any other purpose.” IEEPA § 202(b) [§ 1701(b)] (em-
   phasis added). That language addresses the intended effect
   of the measures on the threat, not the content of the meas-
   ure adopted. The measure must aim to achieve that effect
   and not be so overbroad that it can reliably be inferred to
   be really for a different purpose.          IEEPA § 202(b)
   [§ 1701(b)]. But that does not require that the imports
   taxed themselves be responsible for the threat. A measure
   that reaches imports, property, or other interests of foreign
   actors can be an obvious and effective tool for dealing with
   the threat by inducing the foreign country to take action to
   redress the harm identified as a threat.
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       We see no persuasive basis for a contrary reading in
   light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dames & Moore.
   There, the Court held that IEEPA authorized the President
   to take action involving Iranian assets as leverage to solve
   a problem based on Iran’s holding of American hostages,
   not to solve a problem with the specific assets frozen. The
   Supreme Court blessed the measure as a “‘bargaining chip’
   to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile
   country.” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673.
        Similarly, here, the tariffs are to be a “bargaining chip”
   to get Canada, Mexico, and China to take more action re-
   garding the criminal trafficking identified in the executive
   orders. The President found that Canada and Mexico had
   “played a central role” in the challenge posed by “[g]ang
   members, smugglers, human traffickers, and illicit drugs
   of all kinds” that “have poured across our borders and into
   our communities,” including by “failing to devote sufficient
   attention and resources or meaningfully coordinate with
   the United States law enforcement partners to effectively
   stem the tide of,” for Canada, “illicit drugs,” and, for Mex-
   ico, “unlawful migration and illicit drugs.” EO ’193, 90 Fed.
   Reg. at 9113; EO ’194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9117. Similarly, he
   found that China had “subsidized and otherwise incentiv-
   ized PRC chemical companies to export fentanyl and re-
   lated precursor chemicals that are used to produce
   synthetic opioids sold illicitly in the United States,” and
   “plays a central role” in the challenge posed by “[t]he influx
   of these drugs,” “not merely by failing to stem the ultimate
   source of many illicit drugs distributed in the United
   States, but by actively sustaining and expanding the busi-
   ness of poisoning our citizens.” EO ’195, 90 Fed. Reg. at
   9121.
        The trafficking tariffs make clear that the President
   contemplated eliminating or lowering the tariffs if the
   country subject to the tariff took adequate steps concerning
   the specific identified threat. And the actions immediately
   following issuance of the tariffs confirm the proper focus of
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   the tariffs on the underlying drug/crime problem (thus, no
   “other purpose,” IEEPA § 202 [§ 1701]) and the utility of
   tariffs as a bargaining chip. Both Canada and Mexico’s
   “immediate steps designed to alleviate the illegal migra-
   tion and illicit drug crisis through cooperative action” (re-
   sulting in the President pausing the tariffs on goods from
   Canada and Mexico), and China’s failure to take such steps
   (resulting in the President increasing tariffs), evince their
   utility as such a bargaining chip. Exec. Order No. 14197,
   

 (Feb. 3, 2025); Exec Order No. 14198, 

 (Feb. 3, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14228, 

 (Mar. 3, 2025). The States make no real
   argument to the contrary.
                               ***
       For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully dissent from
   the majority’s affirmance of the CIT’s summary judgment
   that the reciprocal and trafficking tariffs are unlawful.