Case: 25-1506    Document: 28     Page: 1   Filed: 11/05/2025




        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.


   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                  ANGELA HOWARD,
                      Petitioner

                             v.

             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
                      Respondent
                ______________________

                        2025-1506
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DC-1221-23-0349-W-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: November 5, 2025
                 ______________________

    ANGELA HOWARD, Fort Belvoir, VA, pro se.

     BRYAN MICHAEL BYRD, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH
 MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE.
                   ______________________

     Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
Case: 25-1506    Document: 28     Page: 2    Filed: 11/05/2025




 2                                       HOWARD v. DEFENSE




     Angela Howard was employed by the U.S. Department
 of Defense (agency) as a Clinical Laboratory Scientist at an
 agency hospital blood bank. While she was still in proba-
 tionary status, the agency terminated her employment,
 and she then sought corrective action from the Merit Sys-
 tems Protection Board, arguing that her termination vio-
 lated whistleblower-protection provisions of 

 because it was in retaliation for protected disclo-
 sures—particularly, that the agency was impairing her
 ability to take time for meal breaks during her work shifts.
 The agency responded, as relevant here, that it terminated
 Ms. Howard’s employment because of her conduct and per-
 formance, not because she made complaints. The Board
 denied relief. While concluding that Ms. Howard had ex-
 hausted her administrative remedies and had made pro-
 tected disclosures that were a contributory factor in the
 termination, the Board determined that the agency had
 proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
 terminated her employment even in the absence of the pro-
 tected disclosures. See Howard v. Department of Defense,
 No. DC-1221-23-0349-W-1, 

 (M.S.P.B.
 Nov. 13, 2023) (2023 Decision); Howard v. Department of
 Defense, No. DC-1221-23-0349-W-1, 

 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 3, 2025) (2025 Decision). On Ms. Howard’s
 appeal, we affirm.
                              I
     Ms. Howard started working as a Clinical Laboratory
 Scientist at Fort Belvoir Community Hospital in June of
 2020. Agency’s Supplemental Appendix (S. Appx.) 156.
 Her appointment to the position was subject to a two-year
 probationary period. 

 After her initial supervisor left
 the agency in April 2021, Ms. Howard reported to the same
 interim supervisor until her removal on August 6, 2021.
 S. Appx. 183, 125.
     In May 2021, Ms. Howard emailed her interim super-
 visor, expressing concerns that she was not being allowed
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 HOWARD v. DEFENSE                                          3



 to take meal breaks during her shifts. S. Appx. 185. The
 interim supervisor replied to her email with assurances
 that he would contact Ms. Howard’s union representative
 and work with the hospital’s leadership to address the is-
 sue. 

 During the next few weeks, Ms. Howard contacted
 her union representative, as well as the Chief of Labor
 Management and Employee Relations, among other offi-
 cials, to further complain about the alleged denial of meal
 breaks. S. Appx. 193–200. The agency investigated work-
 loads in the blood bank and found that employees in Ms.
 Howard’s position had not informed management of any in-
 ability to take meal breaks. S. Appx. 166–68.
      As the back-and-forth between Ms. Howard and the
 agency regarding meal breaks continued, her interim su-
 pervisor learned of or witnessed workplace conflict prob-
 lems, resistance to feedback, and performance deficiencies.
 S. Appx. 127–133, 177–78. In a July 2021 memorandum,
 Ms. Howard’s interim supervisor identified five examples
 of her deficient performance, including her failure to:
 (1) summarize and review training slides regarding a new
 internal agency system, 2023 Decision, at 38; 1 (2) complete
 or respond to requests for status updates regarding a Vali-
 dation Script, which put the blood bank at risk of missing
 a deadline, 2023 Decision, at 30–32; S. Appx. 187; (3) listen
 to her interim supervisor’s instructions to limit contacts of
 subject-matter experts to certain categories of questions, S.
 Appx. 201–03; (4) complete the corrective action of a Qual-
 ity Indicator Performance Report after she observed that a
 patient had been misregistered under the wrong medical
 number, creating a patient safety risk, 2023 Decision, at
 32–35; S. Appx.137–41, 152–53; and (5) take a timely




     1 For the 2023 Decision, we cite the page numbers on

 the administrative judge’s opinion in the Supplemental Ap-
 pendix. See S. Appx. 16–79.
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 4                                        HOWARD v. DEFENSE




 corrective action upon discovering a mistake in a special
 blood order, S. Appx. 154–55, 191–92. See S. Appx. 177–
 78.
     In August 2021, after receiving her interim supervi-
 sor’s memorandum, a Human Resources Specialist recom-
 mended Ms. Howard’s termination from her position,
 noting that her performance was unlikely to improve once
 her probationary period ended. 2023 Decision, at 53–56; S.
 Appx. 150–51. Concluding that Ms. Howard’s conduct ad-
 versely affected workplace efficiency and raised issues of
 patient safety, her interim supervisor signed her termina-
 tion letter. 2023 Decision, at 52; S. Appx. 147–49. Ms.
 Howard then exhausted her administrative remedies with
 the Office of Special Counsel and filed an Individual Right
 of Action (IRA) appeal with the Board. 2023 Decision, at
 12–13; see 

(a)(3), 1221(a).
      The Board-assigned administrative judge issued an in-
 itial decision after conducting a multi-day hearing, at
 which ten witnesses testified. 2023 Decision, at 1–64. In
 the initial decision, the administrative judge found that
 while Ms. Howard’s complaints about the alleged lack of
 meal breaks amounted to protected disclosures, and those
 protected disclosure were a contributing factor in Ms. How-
 ard’s termination, the agency proved by clear and convinc-
 ing evidence that it would have terminated her
 employment even in the absence of the protected disclo-
 sure. 2023 Decision, at 24–25, 63. Ms. Howard petitioned
 for full Board review of the administrative judge’s findings.
 S. Appx. 94. The Board considered the agency’s evidence
 and affirmed the administrative judge’s findings, which be-
 came the Board’s final decision. 2025 Decision, at *1–3.
    Ms. Howard timely petitioned for review by this court.
 We have jurisdiction under 

(a)(9).
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 HOWARD v. DEFENSE                                            5



                               II
     Under the statute defining the scope of our review of
 the Board decision, we may set aside the Board’s decision
 here only if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
 cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) ob-
 tained without procedures required by law, rule, or
 regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
 substantial evidence.” 

(c). We review the
 Board’s factual findings for substantial-evidence support.
 Knox v. Department of Justice, 

, 1064 (Fed.
 Cir. 2025). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence
 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
 a conclusion,” Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
 Relations Board, 

 (1938), even if an oppo-
 site conclusion might also be supportable, Consolo v. Fed-
 eral Maritime Commission, 

, 619–20 (1966).
     A petitioner in an IRA appeal seeking corrective action
 for alleged whistleblower reprisal must demonstrate that
 she made a protected disclosure under 

(b)(8) and that the protected disclosure was a con-
 tributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel
 action, such as removal from employment, as defined by 

(a)(2)(A). See 

(e)(1); Cahill v.
 Merit Systems Protection Board, 

 (Fed.
 Cir. 2016). If the petitioner makes that showing, relief may
 nevertheless be denied if the agency proves by clear and
 convincing evidence that it would have taken the same per-
 sonnel action even in the absence of the protected disclo-
 sure. See 

(e)(2); Miller v. Department of
 Justice, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Analysis at
 that stage is to include, but not necessarily be limited to,
 consideration of the following factors: “the strength of the
 agency’s evidence in support of its personnel action; the ex-
 istence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part
 of the agency officials who were involved in the decision;
 and any evidence that the agency takes similar actions
 against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are
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 6                                       HOWARD v. DEFENSE




 otherwise similarly situated.” Carr v. Social Security Ad-
 ministration, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Mil-
 ler, 

.
     We discern no reversible error in the Board’s decision
 in this matter.
                              A
     Ms. Howard argues that the Board committed reversi-
 ble errors regarding the protected disclosures related to
 meal breaks, the knowledge-and-timing test for the con-
 tributory-factor element of her claim, and the Carr factors.
 See Petitioner’s Br. at 7–12, 23. We are unpersuaded by
 these arguments.
     The Board explicitly adopted, and neither party chal-
 lenged before the full Board, the administrative judge’s af-
 firmative determination that Ms. Howard’s complaints
 about meal breaks amounted to protected disclosures un-
 der 

(b)(8). See 2025 Decision, at *1. Like-
 wise, the administrative judge affirmatively determined—
 after expressly considering the knowledge-and-timing test
 consistent with 

(e)(1)—that these disclo-
 sures were a contributing factor in the decision to termi-
 nate Ms. Howard. 2023 Decision, at 24–25; see Kewley v.
 Department of Health and Human Services, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that, under § 1221(e),
 “circumstantial evidence of knowledge of the protected dis-
 closure and a reasonable relationship between the time of
 the protected disclosure and the time of the personnel ac-
 tion will establish, prima facie, that the disclosure was a
 contributing factor to the personnel action” (internal cita-
 tion and quotation marks omitted)). The administrative
 judge found that Ms. Howard satisfied the knowledge-and-
 timing test, and the Board adopted all factual findings of
 the administrative judge. 2023 Decision, at 24–25; 2025
 Decision, at *1.
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 HOWARD v. DEFENSE                                          7



     Regarding the issue decided adversely to her—whether
 the agency would have terminated her employment even in
 the absence of the protected disclosures—Ms. Howard crit-
 icizes the Board’s evaluation of the Carr factors. Peti-
 tioner’s Br. at 13, 17, 22–24. She has not, however, shown
 reversible error on the Board’s determination on this issue.
      The Board weighed the Carr factors and found that the
 agency successfully rebutted Ms. Howard’s prima facie
 case of retaliation. 2023 Decision, at 26–63. For the first
 factor, regarding the strength of the agency’s evidence in
 support of its personnel action, the Board found that the
 agency’s reasoning for Ms. Howard’s termination was sup-
 ported by strong evidence demonstrating insubordination,
 deficient performance, and conduct that risked patient
 safety. 2023 Decision, at 52–53; see S. Appx. 177–78. For
 the second factor, regarding any motive for agency officials
 to retaliate, the Board found that the agency “had a limited
 motive to retaliate” but it “was not strong,” given “the lack
 of consequences or belief that the disclosure had merit or
 would result in the need for change.” 2023 Decision, at 60–
 61. That finding—made by the administrative judge, not
 challenged by Ms. Howard before the full Board, see 2025
 Decision, at *1; S. Appx. 94–115—has substantial-evidence
 support in, for example, the action of relevant agency offi-
 cials attempting to address the issue raised by her com-
 plaints, 2023 Decision, at 60–61; S. Appx. 193–200. For the
 third factor, regarding whether the agency took similar ac-
 tions against similarly situated, non-whistleblower em-
 ployees, the Board considered whether other employees,
 identified by Ms. Howard, were similarly situated but had
 been treated differently. 2023 Decision, at 62–63. It gave
 this factor little weight because the other employees iden-
 tified by Ms. Howard were not probationary or otherwise
 were not adequate comparators. Id.
     On this record, the Board committed no error in giving
 the first Carr factor the greatest weight and finding that
 the agency has proved by clear and convincing evidence
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 8                                        HOWARD v. DEFENSE




 that it would have terminated Ms. Howard’s employment
 even in the absence of her protected disclosures.
                              B
     Ms. Howard argues that the Board failed to consider
 certain evidence revealing negligence in supervision by an
 individual who she claims was “in material fact [her] offi-
 cial supervisor” at the time of her termination, as well as
 evidence that her interim supervisor did not have the au-
 thority to terminate her. Petitioner’s Br. at 4–8. But an
 IRA appeal is narrow in scope—it is “limited to the merits
 of allegations of violations of the Whistleblower Protection
 Act.” Young v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 

, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The present arguments
 might be relevant as affirmative defenses or charges of
 harmful procedural in different contexts, but Ms. Howard
 has not shown how these arguments are relevant to the
 IRA appeal. See id.; 

(c) (denying an ap-
 pellant the opportunity to raise affirmative defenses in an
 IRA appeal). Nor, in any event, has she established how
 this evidence could alter the findings on the whistleblower
 issue that the Board resolved against her.
                              C
     In her remaining arguments, Ms. Howard contends
 that the Board was “complicit[ ] in the agency’s bad-faith
 tactics” by denying her affirmative defense, limiting cer-
 tain testimony, and acquiescing in the agency’s “deliberate
 concealment” of evidence. Petitioner’s Br. 24. Ms. How-
 ard’s arguments regarding the Board’s bias amount to as-
 sertions that the Board abused its discretion in its decision
 to uphold her termination. The Board “abuses its discre-
 tion when ‘the decision is based on an erroneous interpre-
 tation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported
 by substantial evidence, or represents an unreasonable
 judgment in weighing relevant factors.’” Tartaglia v. De-
 partment of Veterans Affairs, 

, 1407–08 (Fed.
 Cir. 2017) (quoting Gose v. United States Postal Service,
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 HOWARD v. DEFENSE                                          9



 

 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Ms. Howard has not
 shown any such abuse of discretion.
      Ms. Howard’s accusations are not substantiated by rec-
 ord evidence. Instead, the administrative judge properly
 examined the evidence relevant to Ms. Howard’s IRA ap-
 peal, while excluding evidence as required by 

(c). To demonstrate that either the administrative
 judge or the Board acted with bias, Ms. Howard would have
 needed to make a showing of “a deep-seated favoritism or
 antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
 Bieber v. Department of the Army, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 

 (1994)). Ms. Howard has not provided evidence of
 bias that would meet that high burden, and nothing in the
 initial or final decision reveals such bias.
                             III
      We have considered Ms. Howard’s other arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm the Board’s final decision.
    The parties shall bear their own costs.
                         AFFIRMED