Britt v. United States

Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 1 Filed: 01/23/2026

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ JAMES EDWARD BRITT, II, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________ 2025-1851 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:24-cv-01519-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling.

----------------------------------------------- JAMES EDWARD BRITT, II, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, UNKNOWN AGENTS OF THE FDIC, Defendants-Appellees ______________________ 2026-1371 ______________________ Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 2 Filed: 01/23/2026

2 BRITT v. US

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in No. 1:22-cv-03488-CKK, Judge Col- leen Kollar-Kotelly. ______________________ Decided: January 23, 2026 ______________________ JAMES EDWARD BRITT, II, Knoxville, TN, pro se.

AUGUSTUS GOLDEN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE. ______________________ Before MOORE, Chief Judge, DYK and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

James Edward Britt II appeals two orders, one from the District Court for the District of Columbia and one from the Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”), each dis- missing claims related to his former employment at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). For the claims appealed from the Claims Court, we affirm. Be- cause we lack jurisdiction to consider the claims raised in Mr. Britt’s appeal from the district court, we transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”).

BACKGROUND Mr. Britt was an employee of the FDIC. The facts of his employment history at the FDIC are undisputed. From 2014 to 2018, Mr. Britt worked in a position classified un- der the FDIC Corporate Grade (“CG”) system at CG-12. On Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 3 Filed: 01/23/2026

BRITT v. US 3

June 4, 2018, he voluntarily accepted an appointment as a Risk Management or Compliance Examiner (Mid-Career) at a CG-11 level. With the appointment to a lower grade, Mr. Britt signed a document titled “Voluntary Change to Lower Grade Statement.” S. App’x 37.1 In this document, Mr. Britt acknowledged that his acceptance of the CG-11 position would subject him to the FDIC’s re-promotion pol- icy. The re-promotion policy in effect at that time limited Mr. Britt to the higher of his then-current base salary or his highest previous salary earned during his FDIC ap- pointment if he were to be promoted again to a CG-12 po- sition within the next 24 months. Mr. Britt alleges that this created a contract—one controlling the government’s pay policy as to re-promotions even after 24 months.

After Mr. Britt accepted the CG-11 position, the FDIC increased the duration of the re-promotion policy to 48 months and made the change retroactive. In 2021, after about 38 months of service at the CG-11 level, the FDIC re- promoted Mr. Britt to a CG-12 position. Under the revised 48-month policy, Mr. Britt did not receive a pay increase with the repromotion.

Mr. Britt then filed a complaint at the District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States, the FDIC, and unknown agents of the FDIC. Mr. Britt as- serted twenty-five claims, including breach of contract, breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, in- tentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, violation of constitutional rights, and other various claims. Mr. Britt sought $13,574,336 in

No. 7.

Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 4 Filed: 01/23/2026

On March 18, 2024, the district court issued an opinion dismissing several claims for lack of subject-matter juris- diction and for failure to state a claim. The district court held that the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”) was the exclusive remedy for Mr. Britt’s work- related injury claims, making inapplicable the Federal Tort Claims Act, which Mr. Britt relied on to bring his tort claims. The court also held that FECA provided an alter- native remedial scheme that precluded Mr. Britt’s consti- tutional-tort claim, and that the civil conspiracy claim failed for lack of an underlying tort. The district court con- cluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the contract claims and transferred those claims to the Claims Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. S. App’x 12–13.

On October 23, 2024, Mr. Britt filed a “transfer com- plaint” against the United States in the Claims Court, al- leging breach of contract and seeking $4,703,103 in damages. The government moved to dismiss. After finding that Mr. Britt’s employment with the FDIC was by ap- pointment and concluding that no contract existed between Mr. Britt and the United States, the Claims Court dis- missed the breach-of-contract claim for lack of subject-mat- ter jurisdiction.2 Mr. Britt now appeals both district court and Claims Court dismissals. With respect to the appeal from the

On appeal, Mr. Britt does not contest these determina- tions.

Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 5 Filed: 01/23/2026

BRITT v. US 5

Claims Court, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3), and Mr. Britt’s appeal is timely. With respect to the appeal from the district court, we conclude that transfer of the appeal to the D.C. Circuit is appropriate.

DISCUSSION I We first consider Mr. Britt’s appeal relating to the breach-of-contract claims in the Claims Court. Where no contract exists with the government, the Claims Court should dismiss a contractual claim for lack of subject mat- ter jurisdiction. See Collier v. United States, 379 F.3d 1330, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We review de novo the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion. Biltmore Forest Broadcasting FM, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The existence of a contract is a mixed question of law and fact. Cal. Fed. Bank v. United States, 245 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Employees appointed to positions in the federal govern- ment do not generally have enforceable contract rights. See Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 738–41 (1982) (finding no contractual rights created by ci- vilian employment in the military); Chu v. United States, 773 F.2d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting the “well-es- tablished principle that, absent specific legislation, federal employees derive the benefits and emoluments of their po- sitions from appointment rather than from any contractual or quasi-contractual relationship with the government”); Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264, 268 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (noting that a “contract between government and one of its employees is possible, but it must be specifically spelled out as a contract”).

Mr. Britt attempts to distinguish his case because he claims the FDIC placed him in a “one of a kind” situation, as the documents from which the district court determined Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 6 Filed: 01/23/2026

These circumstances do not support the conclusion that a contract exists. The FDIC’s statutory powers are not rel- evant to the question whether the relationship between the FDIC and Mr. Britt was specifically spelled out as a con- tract. See Kania, 650 F.2d at 268. Mr. Britt relies on two documents he signed at the time of his acceptance of the CG-11 position as evidence of a contract. One document is an “agreement” requiring Mr. Britt to agree to obtain a Risk Management or Compliance commission within two years but makes no mention of the re-promotion policy. S.

App’x 36. The other document is titled “Voluntary Change to Lower Grade Statement” but reflects only Mr. Britt’s ac- knowledgment that he would be subject to the re-promo- tion policy, which the document explains had certain effects on payment following a re-promotion during the next 24 months. S. App’x 37. Even if we accept Mr. Britt’s contention that these documents were drawn uniquely for him, they do not meet the high standard for establishing a contractual relationship governing the government’s con- duct as employer. In particular, the Voluntary Change doc- ument, in simply explaining the re-promotion policy, cannot reasonably be construed as an employment con- tract—still less as one imposing on the FDIC an obligation restricting the agency’s policy choices regarding re-promo- tions past the 24-month mark. Notably, Mr. Britt’s em- ployment documents confirm that his employment was by appointment. S. App’x 33 (“Appointment Affidavit” signed Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 7 Filed: 01/23/2026

BRITT v. US 7 by Mr. Britt); S. App’x 36 (“Agreement Relating to the Ap- pointment as an Examiner” signed by Mr. Britt).

The undisputed facts establish that no pertinent con- tract existed between Mr. Britt and the government, and the Claims Court properly dismissed Mr. Britt’s breach-of- contract claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3 II We finally consider Mr. Britt’s appeal relating to non- contract claims presented to the district court. Mr. Britt argues that, because the district court transferred part of his case to the Claims Court, he could not appeal the dis- trict court merits order until the Claims Court entered fi- nal judgment for its portion of the case. He further argues that, as an interlocutory order, the district court dismissal merged with the final judgment of the Claims Court and may be appealed to this court.

We read the district court to have transferred only the portion of the case pertaining to contract claims and re- tained jurisdiction as to the dismissed tort and constitu- tional tort claims. S. App’x 13 (“[T]he Court shall transfer this case to the Court of Federal Claims with respect to Plaintiff’s contract claims.” (emphasis added)). We have held that 28 U.S.C. § 1631 permits district courts to trans- fer matters to the Claims Court on a claim-by-claim basis.

United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The D.C. Circuit has interpreted such

Case: 25-1851 Document: 18 Page: 8 Filed: 01/23/2026

We have jurisdiction over appeals from district courts only in actions involving specific subject matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)–(2). The untransferred claims dis- missed by the district court here do not fall within our ju- risdiction. We therefore lack jurisdiction to hear this direct appeal from the district court.

The government moves to “transfer Mr. Britt’s appeal as it pertains to the decisions of the [district court] to the D.C. Circuit.” Response Br. at 9. Mr. Britt also consents to such transfer if we conclude, as we have, that we lack jurisdiction. Where we lack jurisdiction over an appeal, we have authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to “transfer such ac- tion or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the ac- tion or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.” We transfer to the D.C. Circuit Mr. Britt’s appeal from the district court.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND TRANSFERRED-IN- PART COSTS No costs.