Trulson v. Collins

Case: 25-1915 Document: 45 Page: 1 Filed: 04/29/2026

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ FREDERICK TRULSON, Claimant-Appellant v. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee ______________________ 2025-1915 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 24-4063, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr. ______________________ Decided: April 29, 2026 ______________________ FREDERICK TRULSON, pro se.

NATALEE A. ALLENBAUGH, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus- tice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also repre- sented by WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE; MATTHEW ALBANESE, Y. KEN LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

Case: 25-1915 Document: 45 Page: 2 Filed: 04/29/2026

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______________________ Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Frederick Trulson appeals a decision from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirming the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) denial of entitle- ment to special monthly compensation above the rate pro- vided under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(l). Appx. 1–2. 1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND Mr. Trulson, a Navy veteran, received a 100% disabil- ity rating for service-connected schizophrenia. Appx. 30.

The Department of Veterans Affairs awarded Mr. Trulson special monthly compensation 2 at the § 1114(l) rate effec- tive May 2022. Appx 30–32. Mr. Trulson appealed to the Board, asserting he was entitled to a higher special monthly compensation rate under § 1114(r). Appx. 19; Appx. 21; see 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r). The Board denied Mr. Trulson’s appeal, finding he did not qualify. Appx. 19.

Thus, the Board found Mr. Trulson ineligible for a special monthly compensation rate higher than the § 1114(l) rate.

Appx. 18–20.

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On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Trulson argued the Board erred in denying him the § 1114(r) rate because his schizophrenia made living alone unsafe and required him to live in a full-time medical facility unless he had a care provider. See Appx. 3, 5–6. The Veterans Court noted the Board’s finding that, regardless of Mr. Trulson’s re- quired level of care, schizophrenia does not qualify as the anatomical loss, blindness, or deafness necessary for spe- cial monthly compensation under § 1114(r). Appx. 6; see Appx. 19. Because Mr. Trulson did not “engage with [the Board’s] findings,” the Veterans Court affirmed the Board and entered judgment. Appx. 6, 8; Appx. 9. Mr. Trulson appeals. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292.

DISCUSSION Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 7292. We “have exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpreta- tion thereof [by the Veterans Court] . . . and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent pre- sented and necessary to a decision.” Id. § 7292(c). Absent a constitutional challenge, we may not “review (A) a chal- lenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.”

Id. § 7292(d)(2). We review the Veterans Court’s legal de- terminations de novo. Wright v. Collins, 145 F.4th 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2025).

On appeal, Mr. Trulson argues the Veterans Court le- gally erred when it “misread[] the integrated scheme of § 1114” and its implementing regulations. Appellant’s Br. 8. 3 Under Mr. Trulson’s construction of the statute, the Veterans Court would have concluded that he qualified for

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As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether we have jurisdiction. See Appellant’s Br. 4; Appellee’s Br. 9–11. We have jurisdiction in cases where a veteran raises a question of statutory interpretation “that was re- lied upon by the [Veterans Court].” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).

Mr. Trulson raised such an issue regarding § 1114(r) before the Veterans Court. Appellant’s Br. 3, Trulson v. Collins, No. 24-4063 (Vet. App. Dec. 22, 2024) (raising the § 1114(r) rate issue generally); Appellant’s Reply Br. 5, No. 24-4063 (Vet. App. Apr. 11, 2025) (arguing Mr. Trulson’s required level of care “qualifies him for the . . . (R) rat[e]s”); see Ap- pellant’s Br. 8. Had the Veterans Court adopted Mr. Trul- son’s construction that the need for a higher level of care independently suffices to qualify a veteran for the § 1114(r)(2) rate, the Veterans Court, according to Mr. Trulson, would not have been able to deny him special monthly compensation at that rate. Appx. 6.

Special monthly compensation rates under § 1114(r) are awarded as follows: [I]f any veteran, otherwise entitled to compensation authorized under subsection (o) of this section, at the maximum rate authorized under subsection (p) of this section, or at the intermediate rate author- ized between the rates authorized under subsec- tions (n) and (o) of this section and at the rate authorized under subsection (k) of this section, is in need of regular aid and attendance, then, in ad- dition to such compensation— (1) the veteran shall be paid a monthly aid and attendance allowance at the rate of $2,002; or Case: 25-1915 Document: 45 Page: 5 Filed: 04/29/2026

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(2) if the veteran, in addition to such need for regular aid and attendance, is in need of a higher level of care, such veteran shall be paid a monthly aid and attendance al- lowance at the rate of $2,983 in lieu of the allowance authorized in clause (1) of this subsection, if the Secretary finds that the veteran, in the absence of the provision of such care, would require hospitalization, nursing home care, or other residential in- stitutional care. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r) (emphases added).

The statute’s plain language establishes that a veteran qualifies for the § 1114(r)(2) rate only if he first qualifies for a predicate special monthly compensation rate, regard- less of his necessary level of care. The statute’s reference to predicate special monthly compensation rates at the be- ginning of § 1114(r) indicates that Congress intended for those rates to serve as preconditions to the § 1114(r)(2) rate. Mr. Trulson does not dispute that he fails to qualify for the predicate special monthly compensation rates. See Appellant’s Br. 8; Appx. 6; Appx. 18–19. Thus, under the proper construction of § 1114(r), he does not qualify for a higher special monthly compensation.

Mr. Trulson also raises arguments he failed to present to the Veterans Court, for example, that he is entitled to an earlier special monthly compensation effective date based on 38 U.S.C. § 5110 and equitable tolling, Appellant’s Br. 9, and that his caregiver is entitled to a retroactive sti- pend under the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers, id. at 9–10. We lack jurisdiction over issues not raised before the Veterans Court. Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

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CONCLUSION We have considered Mr. Trulson’s remaining argu- ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we af- firm.

AFFIRMED COSTS No costs.