Jacki Easlick, LLC v. Cj Emerald

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

______________________

JACKI EASLICK, LLC, JE CORPORATE LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants v. ACCENCYC US Defendant-Appellee

CJ EMERALD, ET AL.

Defendants ______________________ 2024-1538, 2024-1826 ______________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in No. 2:23-cv-02000- WSS, Judge William S. Stickman, IV.

______________________ Decided: August 14, 2026 ______________________

STANLEY DONALD FERENCE, III, Ference & Associates LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by BRIAN SAMUEL MALKIN, Rosenbaum & Segall, PC, Long Beach, NY.

TIMOTHY A. DUFFY, Law Office Of Timothy A. Duffy, PC, Lake Forest, IL, argued for defendant-appellee. 2 JACKI EASLICK, LLC v. CJ EMERALD

______________________

Before DYK, SCHALL, and PROST, Circuit Judges. PROST, Circuit Judge.

Jacki Easlick, LLC and JE Corporate LLC (collectively, “Jacki Easlick”) appeal two decisions of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying their motions for a preliminary injunction and re- consideration of the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction. For the reasons below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

This appeal concerns Jacki Easlick’s TOTE HANGER® brand handbag hanger hook (“Tote Hanger”), associated with U.S. Design Patent No. D 695,526 (“the D’526 pa- tent”). The D’526 patent is a design patent for a hook for hanging handbags on closet rods. Jacki Easlick, LLC v. CJ Emerald, No. 2:23-cv-2000, 2024 WL 310125, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2024) (“Jacki Easlick I”).

On November 20, 2023, Jacki Easlick filed suit against 67 online sellers in the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the sellers infringed the D’526 patent by sell- ing hooks for hanging handbags. Id. AccEncyc US (“Ac- cEncyc”), a Chinese company that sold a handbag hanger hook on Amazon (among many other products), was one of those online sellers.

In its complaint and in an ex parte motion, Jacki Ea- slick requested “(1) a temporary restraining order; (2) an order restraining assets and merchant storefronts; (3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and (4) an order authorizing expedited discov- ery.” Id. That same day, the district court granted Jacki Easlick’s motion for an ex parte temporary restraining or- der against all defendants. Id.; Amicus Br. 2 (explaining that “[t]his case is a typical ‘Schedule A’ case, where a plaintiff joins together a large number of unrelated online merchants in a single infringement complaint.” and, as is also “typical” of “Schedule A plaintiffs,” Jacki Easlick ob- tained an ex parte temporary restraining order “before Ap- pellee had notice or could contest Appellants’ allegations”).1

Jacki Easlick subsequently moved for a preliminary in- junction. The district court denied the motion as to AccEn- cyc, finding that Jacki Easlick had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. Jacki Easlick I, 2024 WL 310125, at *7, 9. The remaining defendants either entered a consent order or faced default judgment. J.A. 20–21. Jacki Easlick then filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s denial of the pre- liminary-injunction motion. See Jacki Easlick, LLC v. CJ Emerald, No. 2:23-cv-2000, 2024 WL 1657843 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2024) (“Jacki Easlick II”). The district court de- nied that motion. Id. at *6.

Jacki Easlick timely appealed both denials to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (c)(1).

DISCUSSION

“The court considers the following four factors in eval- uating a motion for a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the moving party has shown a reasonable likelihood of suc- cess on the merits; (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunc- tion; (3) whether the balance of hardships tips in the mov- ing party’s favor; and (4) the impact of a preliminary injunction on the public interest.” DexCom, Inc. v. Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc., 89 F.4th 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). “We review the grant or denial of a 4 JACKI EASLICK, LLC v. CJ EMERALD preliminary injunction under the law of the regional cir- cuit, here the Third Circuit.” FMC Corp. v. Sharda USA, LLC, 145 F.4th 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2025).

The Federal Circuit has, however, “itself built a body of precedent applying the general preliminary injunction con- siderations to a large number of factually variant patent cases, and gives dominant effect to Federal Circuit prece- dent insofar as it reflects considerations specific to patent issues.” Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics Lab’ys., Inc., 106 F.4th 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). “Both the Third Circuit and the Federal Circuit review the dis- trict court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunc- tion for an abuse of discretion.” FMC, 145 F.4th at 1330 (citing Natera, 106 F.4th at 1375, and Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014)). “An abuse of discretion may arise when the district court made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors, exercised its discretion based upon an error of law, or exercised its discretion based upon clearly erroneous fac- tual findings.” Id. at 1330 (citing Natera, 106 F.4th at 1375).

Separately, “[a]pplying Third Circuit law, we review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for reconsidera- tion for an abuse of discretion.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Jacki Easlick argues that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong standard when evaluat- ing the likelihood of success on the merits and by incor- rectly concluding that Jacki Easlick had not shown irreparable harm. We address each of those arguments in turn and conclude by addressing the motion for reconsider- ation.

I

Jacki Easlick’s position that the district court erred in finding no likelihood of success on the merits rests on two arguments: that the district court (1) improperly focused on individual design details in assessing design-patent in- fringement and (2) failed to consider the prior art. Appel- lants’ Br. 14–23.

To determine “whether a design patent has been in- fringed . . . the court first construes the claim to determine its meaning and scope” and “the fact finder then compares the properly construed claim to the accused design.” Range of Motion Prods., LLC v. Armaid Co., 166 F.4th 981, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2026). “Design patent infringement is a question of fact, which a patentee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., 942 F.3d 1119, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “A design patent only protects the novel, ornamen- tal features of the patented design.” OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Courts employ the “ordinary observer” test to compare the patented and accused designs. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). The “ordinary observer” test provides that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.

Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871). If “the claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar, res- olution of the question whether the ordinary observer would consider the two designs to be substantially the same will benefit from a comparison of the claimed and ac- cused designs with the prior art.” Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678. And “[w]here, as here, the claimed design includes several elements, the fact finder must apply the ordinary observer test by comparing similarities in overall designs, not similarities of ornamental features in 6 JACKI EASLICK, LLC v. CJ EMERALD isolation.” Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Crocs, Inc. v. ITC, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303–04 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

A.

Jacki Easlick argues that the district court improperly focused on individual design details in conducting its de- sign patent infringement analysis. Appellants’ Br. 15. We disagree.

“Where a design contains both functional and non-func- tional elements, the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent.” OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1405. That is precisely how the district court began its analysis. Below is a reproduction of a side-by-side comparison of the pa- tented design of the Tote Hanger (on the left) and the ac- cused product (on the right) from the district court’s preliminary injunction opinion.

Jacki Easlick I, 2024 WL 310125, at *7

The district court determined that the Tote Hanger’s two attached hooks and vertical configuration are func- tional elements that must be “excluded from the scope of the claimed design.” Id. at *5. The district court further determined that the design patent protects the Tote Hanger’s ornamental features, including “among other non-functional features, the shape of the hooks, the flare out of the top hook’s tip, the 90-degree offset2 at the top and bottom hooks, and the spheres on the end of each hook.” Id.

Having separated the Tote Hanger’s functional and or- namental elements, the district court proceeded to its in- fringement analysis. It concluded that the “side-by-side comparisons of the claimed and accused designs do not sug- gest to the [c]ourt that an ordinary observer would be de- ceived into believing the accused design is the same as the one claimed by” Jacki Easlick. Id. at *7. The district court noted that the “most obvious difference lies with the center of each handbag hook,” contrasting the “corkscrew-like cen- ter of the Tote Hanger against the laterally bent center of the [a]ccused [p]roduct.” Id. It also identified the shape of the bottom hooks and the hooks’ finished ends as additional dissimilarities between the parties’ products. Id. The dis- trict court thus properly “recited the significant differences between the ornamental features of the two designs” and “in determining infringement, it mainly focused on whether an ordinary observer would be deceived into 8 JACKI EASLICK, LLC v. CJ EMERALD thinking that any of the [AccEncyc] designs were the same as [Jacki Easlick’s] patented design.” Richardson v. Stan- ley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Jacki Easlick contends that “the district court in this case was led astray” by AccEncyc’s “exclusive[]” focus on the Tote Hanger’s “‘corkscrew’ twist” and “different shapes on the end of the hooks in the two products, ignoring alto- gether the ‘overall impression’ of the two products.” Appel- lants’ Br. 18–19. But the district court explicitly stated that it was “comparing the overall visual effect of the two products.” Jacki Easlick I, 2024 WL 310125, at *7. This is not—as Jacki Easlick argues—a situation where the dis- trict court’s “concentration on small differences in isolation distracted from the overall impression of the claimed orna- mental features.” Crocs, 598 F.3d at 1303–04. Instead, the district court correctly considered “the ornamental features and analyze[d] how they impact the overall design.” Lanard Toys Ltd. v. DolgenCorp LLC, 958 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1335–37. Indeed, the district court noted that “[e]ven if the pictures of the Tote Hanger and the [a]ccused [p]roduct were mixed ran- domly, an ordinary observer could quickly restore them to their original order upon viewing the center of the parties’ handbag hooks.” Jacki Easlick I, 2024 WL 310125, at *7. Considering distinguishing features—as the district court did here—is not legal error. And it is hard to imagine how a court could reasonably conduct this analysis without pointing such features out. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The mandated overall comparison is a comparison taking into account significant differences between the two de- signs . . . .”).

B.

Jacki Easlick next argues that the district court im- properly failed to consider the prior art. Appellants’ Br. 23. But “[c]omparing the claimed and accused designs with the prior art is beneficial only when the claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar.” Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1337. Regardless, as the district court explained in de- ciding Jacki Easlick’s motion for reconsideration, a prior art analysis would not have changed the outcome of the district court’s preliminary injunction ruling. Jacki Ea- slick II, 2024 WL 1657843, at *5. We agree with the district court’s assessment that the prior art submitted by Jacki Easlick differs from the claimed design in several respects. Thus, as the district court correctly concluded, “[w]ith the attention of the hypothetical ordinary observer still drawn to these significant differences . . . re-application of the or- dinary observer test would not have changed the overall visual effect of the two designs.” Id. at *6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Jacki Easlick failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its design patent infringement claim.

II

The district court also determined that Jacki Easlick failed to show irreparable harm. Jacki Easlick I, 2024 WL 310125, at *9. Jacki Easlick urges us to reach the opposite conclusion. We cannot do so.

Jacki Easlick must establish “that absent an injunc- tion, it will suffer irreparable harm,” and “that a suffi- ciently strong causal nexus relates the alleged harm to the alleged infringement.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “[C]onclusory state- ments and theoretical arguments” are insufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung El- ecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Jacki Easlick makes three primary arguments to sup- port its position that it will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. First, it argues that the district court should have remained consistent with its temporary re- straining order ruling. Appellants’ Br. 25. Second, it im- plies that AccEncyc’s failure to brief the irreparable harm 10 JACKI EASLICK, LLC v. CJ EMERALD issue bears significance. Appellants’ Br. 25. Third, and alternatively, Jacki Easlick contends that the evidence it submitted was sufficient to establish irreparable harm. Appellants’ Br. 26. Each argument fails.

Jacki Easlick’s first argument rests on the notion that the district court should have found the offered irrepara- ble-harm evidence sufficient because it had already done so in issuing the temporary restraining order. And its second argument appears to be that the district court should have considered AccEncyc’s decision to not contest irreparable harm in its responsive preliminary injunction brief. See Appellants’ Br. 25. Jacki Easlick cites no law supporting these positions. Indeed, it cannot, because—regardless of whether AccEncyc responded on the issue—Jacki Easlick bears the burden of demonstrating irreparable harm. See Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009). And “[t]he grant or denial of a preliminary injunction . . . is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Abbott Lab’ys. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The decision to grant an ex parte temporary restraining order against 67 defend- ants does not restrain the district court’s separate analysis of a motion for a preliminary injunction.

In any case, the district court properly concluded that Jacki Easlick failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The district court assessed the evidence Jacki Easlick submit- ted (declarations made by Ms. Jacklyn Easlick and Mr. Stanley Ference as to each type of harm, and an overview of how foreign counterfeiting companies operate, respec- tively). See Jacki Easlick I, 2024 WL 310125, at *8–9. It determined that the allegations of harm to “profits, con- sumer relationships, brand value, goodwill, and quality reputation are nothing more than conclusory and theoreti- cal.” Id. at *8. The district court further assessed Jacki Easlick’s arguments regarding customer confusion, market loss, competition, and price erosion, and again emphasized that Jacki Easlick offered no evidence as to each. Id. at 8– 9. We agree. Mere citations to case law recognizing the existence of each type of alleged harm accompanied by con- clusory statements that those harms are occurring are in- adequate to meet the requisite burden. The district court did not abuse its discretion in carrying out its irreparable- harm analysis.

III

Having affirmed the district court’s denial of Jacki Ea- slick’s motion for a preliminary injunction, we turn to the denial of Jacki Easlick’s motion for reconsideration. “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct mani- fest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered ev- idence.” Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Courts do, however, avoid granting motions for reconsideration ab- sent “extraordinary circumstances,” such as preventing a “clearly erroneous” prior decision from resulting in a “man- ifest injustice,” assessing newly available evidence, or ac- counting for “supervening new law.” In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The district court correctly determined that none of those extraordinary circumstances are present here.

Jacki Easlick sought the district court’s consideration of “new” evidence in the form of the physical hooks at issue and Ms. Easlick’s testimony regarding irreparable harm. As the district court stated, there appears to be “no reason why [Jacki Easlick] could not provide the physical evidence or testimony” either before filing its preliminary injunction motion or before the preliminary injunction hearing. Jacki Easlick II, 2024 WL 1657843, at *3; see also id. at *1 (citing Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[N]ew evidence, for reconsideration purposes, does not refer to ev- idence that a party . . . submits to the court after an ad- verse ruling. Rather, new evidence in this context means 12 JACKI EASLICK, LLC v. CJ EMERALD evidence that a party could not earlier submit to the court because that evidence was not previously available.”)).

Jacki Easlick’s motion for reconsideration also argued that the district court erred in application of the ordinary observer test. Jacki Easlick II, 2024 WL 1657843, at *4. For the reasons set forth above, we disagree. We thus find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Jacki Easlick’s remaining argu- ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea- sons, we affirm the district court’s denials of Jacki Easlick’s motion for a preliminary injunction and motion for recon- sideration.

AFFIRMED