Hooper v. Collins

Case: 26-1406 Document: 31 Page: 1 Filed: 09/14/2026

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

______________________ SETH HOOPER, Claimant-Appellant v.

DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF

VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee ______________________

2026-1406 ______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 25-7695, Judge Coral Wong Pi- etsch.

______________________ Decided: September 14, 2026 ______________________

SETH HOOPER, Ocean, NJ, pro se.

ERIC P. BRUSKIN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing- ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE.

______________________

2 HOOPER v. COLLINS

Before STOLL and STARK, Circuit Judges, and BARKER,

District Judge. 1

PER CURIAM.

Seth Hooper, proceeding pro se, appeals the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, dismissing Mr. Hooper’s appeal of a remand order of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. For the reasons explained be- low, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Hooper served on active duty with both the United States Navy and the United States Army at various times between 2000 and 2011. In August 2019, Mr. Hooper sub- mitted a claim for entitlement to service connection for a dental condition for treatment purposes only. In October 2019, the VA denied entitlement to service connection for a dental condition for compensation purposes. In July 2022, the Board remanded the claim of entitlement to service connection for a dental condition for compensation pur- poses back to the VA. It noted also “that a claim of entitle- ment to service connection for a dental condition raises both the issue of service connection for compensation pur- poses and service connection for treatment purposes,” and it accordingly referred the claim of entitlement to service connection for a dental condition for treatment purposes to the VA. Appx 10–11 (citation omitted). 2 In several deci- sions from January 2023 through January 2025, the VA continued to deny Mr. Hooper entitlement to service con- nection for a dental condition for compensation purposes HOOPER v. COLLINS 3 and to not address treatment, even though Mr. Hooper re- peatedly reiterated that “he was only claiming entitlement to service connection for a dental condition for treatment purposes.” Appx 11.

On September 16, 2025, the Board remanded the claim of entitlement to service connection for a dental condition for treatment purposes to the VA. 3 The Board determined that, “despite [Mr. Hooper’s] statements and the Board’s directive in the July 2022 decision, the [VA] ha[d] never referred [Mr. Hooper’s] treatment claim to [the Veterans Health Administration (VHA)] for consideration of service connection for a dental disability for purposes of VA outpa- tient treatment purposes which is required under 38 C.F.R. §[] 17.161.” Appx 12. The Board then remanded, “[r]efer[ring] the matter of entitlement to service connec- tion for dental disability for treatment purposes to VHA for adjudication of eligibility under 38 C.F.R. § 17.161.” Appx 13.

Mr. Hooper appealed the Board’s remand order to the Veterans Court. Before the Veterans Court, Mr. Hooper clarified that his appeal pertained to “only the part of the [Board’s] decision that remanded the matter of service con- nection for a dental disability for treatment purposes.” Appx 2 (citation omitted). The Veterans Court, in evaluat- ing its own jurisdiction, noted that “[a] Board remand is not a decision within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(d)(2) and 7252(a) because a remand does not grant or deny re- lief.” Appx 3 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Nicholson, 417 F.3d 1361, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). It further cited two of our recent decisions indicating that the Veterans Court could 4 HOOPER v. COLLINS not “vacate a Board remand order and in lieu of the vacated remand, order the VA to issue benefits.” Appx 3–4 (first citing Wright v. Collins, 157 F.4th 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2025); and then citing Ravin v. McDonough, 107 F.4th 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2024)). Accordingly, the Veterans Court determined it “lack[ed] jurisdiction over the Septem- ber 16, 2025[] Board remand” and dismissed the appeal. Appx 4.

Mr. Hooper appeals the Veterans Court’s dismissal. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).

DISCUSSION

On appeal from the Veterans Court, this court “shall decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). But, absent a constitutional challenge, we cannot review challenges to the Veterans Court’s factual determinations or the application of law to fact. Id. § 7292(d)(2). “[W]hether the Veterans Court properly dis- missed [an] appeal[] is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Perciavalle v. Collins, 171 F.4th 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (citing Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

The Veterans Court has “exclusive jurisdiction to re- view decisions of the Board.” 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). “A ‘de- cision’ of the Board, for purposes of the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction under section 7252, is the decision with respect to the benefit sought by the veteran: those benefits are ei- ther granted . . . , or they are denied.” Kirkpatrick, 417 F.3d at 1364 (omission in original) (quoting Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). If the Board has not rendered a decision on a claim, that claim is outside the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 1364–66; see also Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A remand from the Board that “contains no order granting or denying relief” is not a “decision” by the Board. Kirkpat- rick, 417 F.3d at 1364. Here, the only Board order HOOPER v. COLLINS 5 Mr. Hooper appealed to the Veterans Court was the Board’s remand of Mr. Hooper’s claim of entitlement to ser- vice connection for a dental condition for treatment pur- poses, which is not a “decision” that would place Mr. Hooper’s appeal within the Veterans Court’s appellate jurisdiction.

Mr. Hooper’s arguments to the contrary are unpersua- sive. He argues that “the record demonstrates that [the] VA has not complied” with its procedural obligations under 38 C.F.R. § 3.103, and he points to the VA’s failure to com- ply with the Board’s “multiple remand directives.” Appel- lant’s Inf. Br. 5. Even if we agreed the record reflected such noncompliance by the VA with its regulatory obligations, there has not been, as Mr. Hooper concedes, a “decision”— i.e., a grant or denial of benefits—by the Board here. See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 8 (“[T]he record demonstrates that the claimant has been unable to obtain any valid merits deter- mination within the framework established by regula- tion.”). Mr. Hooper also attempts to distinguish Kirkpatrick, arguing “[i]t did not address a circumstance where the adjudicatory process itself becomes incapable of producing the predicate agency action required for lawful merits adjudication.” Appellant’s Inf. Reply Br. 10. Mr. Hooper’s presented distinction is unavailing, as it does not change “[o]ur case law and section 7104(d)(2) [that] de- fine a Board decision as including an order granting appro- priate relief or denying relief.” Kirkpatrick, 417 F.3d at 1364.

Further, Mr. Hooper presents a constitutional chal- lenge, arguing that the “absence of any functioning path- way” to obtain a decision on the merits of his claim is a violation of the Due Process clause. Appellant’s Inf. Br. 8– 9. 4 While we recognize “that a veteran alleging a service-

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Hooper’s remaining argu- ments, including those in his citations of supplemental au- thority, see ECF Nos. 17, 19, 23–24, but find them unpersuasive. 5 For the foregoing reasons, we determine the Veterans Court correctly concluded that it lacked juris- diction over Mr. Hooper’s appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the Veterans Court’s dismissal.

AFFIRMED COSTS

No costs. are not the same constitutional arguments Mr. Hooper raised before the Veterans Court,” he has waived these ar- guments. Appellee’s Inf. Br. 10. We exercise our discretion to address the constitutional issue as presented by Mr. Hooper before us. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primar- ily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”).