Mott v. United States

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant and Edward Padelford were joint and equal owners of 1,293 bales of cotton, stored in the city of Savannah, Georgia, in December, 1864, when that place was surrendered to the army, of General Sherman. This property, in common with all the cotton found in the city, was taken possession of by the government of the United States, shipped to New York, where it was sold, and the net proceeds, after deducting expenses, have been paid into the treasury of the United States. This action is.brought under the 3d section of the act of March 12, 1863, to recover those proceeds.

By leave of the court the.claimants have so amended their petition as to sever in their prayer for relief, by which they ask for separate *219■awards. The evidence that these persons bought this cotton during the years 186], 1862, and 1863, and had it stored in the city of Savannah when that place surrendered to Sherman’s army in December, 1864, is full and satisfactory. This cotton, with nearly forty thousand bales belonging to other parties, was seized by the military authorities, turned over to a treasury agent, shipped to New York. There it was sold, and after deducting charges and expenses of transportation, sale, &c., the balance of the proceeds were paid into the treasury of the United States. ’

The following exhibit, made out by the clerk of Colonel Ransom, the quartermaster at Savannah, who seized and shipped the cotton, shows its shipment:

Exhibit A.

Invoice — i£. L. Molt.

Estimated weight.

Schr. M. A. Berry. 359 to 423. 32,825 lbs.. 65

Schr. W. B. Thomas . . - 304 to 328. 12,625 lbs.. 125

Ship May Flower. 1 to 157, and 267 to 352.122,735 lbs.. 243

Schr. H. J. Raymond .. 306 to 331. 13,130 lbs:. 26

Ship Sandusky. 335 to 408....... 37,370 lbs.. 74

Schr: W. C. Merschon.. 195 to 251, and 258 to 266. 33,330 lbs.. 66

Ship Lawrence. 2,082 to2,094, and 2,134 to 2,200 .. 40,400 lbs.. 80

Steamer Geres. 1 to 77. 38,885lbs-. 80

Bark Atlanta. 645 to S75.116,655 lbs.. 231

Steamer Constitution ... 61 to 206. 73,730 lbs-- 146

Ship L. L. Sturgis-j 1,053 to 1,097 ^ 1,160 to 1,255 > ..131,300 lbs.. 260 1,276 to 1,394 3 -

Bales.. .1,293

The cotton was delivered at New York to Mr. Simeon Draper, who was the agent of the treasury there for receiving and selling captured and abandoned property. The evidence shows that 38,787 bales were received by Mr. Draper, atNew York, and all of it was sold. The average net proceeds amounted to $190 47 per bale, amounting in the whole to $246,277 71. The one-half this-sum, amounting to $123,138 85, is claimed by Mott in this case. We think he proves in a satisfactory manner his ownership to the property, its seizure and sale by the government, and that its proceeds are, now in the United States treasury. His right'to these proceeds depends upon the remaining question to be examined, which is, whether the claimant has proved to our satisfaction “ that he never gave any aid or comfort to the rebellion.”

*220Upon this subject tbe following witnesses testify on belialf of the plaintiff. An epitome or digest of their testimony is here presented.

Thomas M. Hogan, '(Claimant’s Evidence, p. 78,) postmaster at Columbus, Georgia :

Has known Mr. Mott well for the past six years ; has had frequent interviews, and ev'ery opportunity to know his real views ; has heard him say, during the war, that he would prefer to give up all his slaves rather than that the Union should be dissolved; in consequence of his known opinions there was a strong prejudice against him in the community ; said during the war that there were four acres in Columbus that had never seceded, meaning his residence, and this saying was the talk of the town. He was a mail contractor for the United States at the outbreak of the rebellion, hut refused to continue to carry mails for the confederacy. He did all he could to prevent secession. Witness has never known him to give any aid or comfort to the rebels.

John L. Mustran. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 82:)

Has known Mr. Mott well for the past six years. If he had given aid or comfort to the rebellion witness would have known it; has never known him to do so, or heard that he had done so.

J. E. Webster, United States assessor. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 84:)

Witness’s opportunities of knowing Mr. Mott for the past six years have been of the very best kind. Union men were regarded as enemies of the south from the fact that they adhered to the government of the United States. Mr. Mott ranked and was classed among the Union men, open in the expression of his opinions at all times, and no man of either party doubted to which party he belonged. He upheld' the Union party as far as a prudent man could. As far as a prudent man could be, he was open in the expression of his opinions. Mr. Mott has never given aid or comfort to the rebellion. Witness would have known it if he had. There were only about 30 Union men in Columbus.

Richard W. Jacques, United States deputy collector. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 87 :)

Met Mr. Mott daily during the war ; knew his opinions ; they were against the confederate cause. His opinions were frequently spoken of in the community, and threats made against him. He was classed as a Union man; never gave aid or comfort to the rebellion to witness’s knowledge ; would have heard of it if he had done so.

David L. Bocker. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 89 :)

Was in almost daily intercourse with Mr. Mott during last half of the *221war. He frequented witness’s store. Mr. Mott never sympathized with the confederate cause, but regretted .the defeat of the Union arms; expressed himself sanguine of the final success of the federal cause; said he had never seceded, and there was and is a small spot in Georgia not out of the Union — meaning the grounds attached to his dwelling— and would tell witness, when walking there, that he was on a spot that had never seceded. He was considered disloyal to the confederacy by every man and woman in the place. He spoke against the officers of the confederacy in harsh terms; so boldly as to incur danger to himself and associates. He said he would, rather lose his slaves than that the confederacy should succeed.

Benjamin F. Coleman. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 93 :)

Knew Mr. Mott well during the war. Union men were regarded as traitors to their country. Witness would always, if he could, have closed the war in favor of the Union, and Mr. Mott was as loyal as he, and more outspoken. He could have aided the confederate cause greatly by his influence, but always exercised it against the confederacy. His freedom from molestation, on account of his Union sentiments, was due to his high social position in the community, and the forbearance of the better part, &c.

Joseph A. L. Lee. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 95 :)

Has had frequent and friendly intercourse with Mr. Mott during the past six years. ■ Witness was the collector under the confederacy. Mr. Mott protested against paying taxes to that government; said that it was not his government; his government was the United States; in fact never did pay, but his son-in-law would come forward and pay. He had a fixed political status in the community; that of loyalty to the United States. His influence was always exercised against the confederacy. The secessionists entertained bitter feelings towards him, induced by his open expressions against the confederate cause and government. When the emancipation proclamation was issued, he said if every negro he had was freed he would cling to the Union. He adhered to the Union party and never left it.

A. M. Allen, late commissary and major, Confederate States army. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 98 :)

Had charge of that district during the war; was familiar with Mott’s sentiments and conduct. He spoke in favor of the United States and against the confederate government. Witness respected him for the consistency of his conduct. He made many remarks to witness, that if repeated would have instantly caused his arrest by the vigilance committee. His general course of conduct and conversation were *222always against the confederate government, and always favorable to the United States.

William A. Bedell. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 101:)

Witness was an original secessionist; never knew Mr. Mott to be regarded as other than a Union man, and regarded him as loyal to the United States as President Lincoln himself. His political position was well understood. Witness has heard it spoken of and denounced bitterly. There were some ten or fifteen belonging to the Union clique as open and avowed as Mr. Mott.

James Johnson. (Claimant’s Evidence, p. 331:)

Has known Mr. Mott 25 years; was intimately acquainted with his sentiments previous to and during the war. He was decidedly and openly opposed to the secession of Georgia and to the war, which he considered madness and folly. He was recognized by every one as a Union man, and was denounced by those in favor of the war. He was a strong Union man during the war, and rejoiced at the conclusion of it. He did no act which could be construed as in aid of the rebellion, except in supplying the wants of his son who was in the rebel service, but without his father’s consent. P. 62: Mr. Mott’s faith in the ultimate triumph of the United States was unfaltering.

General James H. Wilson. (Claimant’s evidence, p. 105 :)

Commanded the cavalry corps of the military division of the Mississippi in April, 1865, and captured Columbus; before coming to-Columbus, heard of Mr. Mott, from both loyal and disloyal parties, as a Union man. These impressions were confirmed on acquaintance with him, and exempted his property from destruction when witness burned Columbus. Witness was in command in Georgia six or ten months after the surrender. Never heard anything to qualify his opinion ; all he has heard confirmed it; gave him a safeguard, such as he never gave except when well assured of the loyalty of the party. Mr. Mott was considered by all the Union men as one of the most loyal men of the country. When the rebellion commenced Mr. Mott had procured a United States flag, intending to hoist it over his house, but the rebels either destroyed it or compelled him to destroy it.

John L. Mustian. (Claimant’s evidence, p. 81:)

Mr. Mott had two sons, one of whom engaged in the confederate service as a lieutenant; the other went to Europe. The elder son, who was of age, entered the service from a sense of duty, having been educated at a military school in Georgia. Mr. Mott was opposed to his entering the service; used every effort to prevent it; was over severe in his opposition ; even unnaturally so. His younger son was *223a member of some military company before the war, and his father-sent him to Furope, where he remained during the war.

Against this mass of testimony on the part of the claimant, we have not a particle of countervailing evidence on the part of the United States. Nothing whatever to contradict or rebut the unbroken chain in his favor. If such evidence could have been procured it would have doubtless been furnished by the vigilance of those representing the government. The case has been pending for a long time, and was laid over last term to enable the solicitors to re-examine into the case more fully. That they have performed their duty fully we have-no reason to doubt.

With this testimony before us we cannot allow ourselves to entertain a doubt of Mr. Mott’s thorough, genuine loyalty and patriotism-at all times and under all circumstances. In this we all concur, that he has satisfactorily proved “that he never gave any aid or comfort to-the rebellion.”

Having thus clearly proved both his ownership and his loyalty, he has entitled himself to an award for the net proceeds of his property* amounting to the sum of $123,138 85, and this sum we award him.

concurring :

In this case two claimants, having several interests in a common property, have united in one petition. As the petition was first drawn the demand was joint, but since the trial the claimants have been permitted to sever, and now" each asks a separate judgment. As to one of these claimants, we are all agreed that he has made out his case and is entitled to judgment; as to the other, we are equally divided in opinion. The question now is, whether this several judgment for the one claimant can be rendered without prejudice to the rights of' the other.

If it were not for the doubts expressed by my brother Peck, I confess that none would have occurred to my own mind. The court is-here sitting as a special tribunal, bound by no restrictions of form, and for the mere purpose of determining three questions of fact, which* when determined, will entitle the claimant to a specific fund held for his benefit by the defendants. The case, therefore, is not an action at. law, nor analogous to an action at law,-but is a special statutory proceeding, and in principle as in substance an ordinary suit in equity.

Now, if a suitor were seeking an undivided share of a specific fund in equity, it would be not merely his right but his duty to make the *224other parties in interest parties in the proceeding. In an ordinary court of equity this would be done by making them co-defendants with the stakeholder; but under the statute that course could hardly be pursued, and the only remaining course, therefore, would be to make them co-claimants. This course has actually been pursued by the court in Turner’s case, at the present term, where an adverse party ■applying and claiming to be the true owner of the fund was allowed to interplead. In an ordinary proceeding at equity he would have been .joined as a co-defendant; under the statute he'was admitted as a co-claimant.

In equity there would be no principle that I am aware of which would forbid a court from directing a receiver to pay over to one party his share of the fund in court when his rights were determined, reserving all questions appertaining to the remainder of the fund for further decision, and'an order to be entered at the foot of the decree; espe-’ cially might this be done where all of the parties to the proceeding con•sent. Such I understand to be the case here. The defendants are •only interested in having the statutory grounds of the- claimants’ rights established, and they do not object; the co-claimant Padelford comes into court by his counsel and expressly consents. It is only therefore, a question of regularity on the part of the court.

This question of regularity, I think, cannot affect the rights of any party, and will be fbund wholly immaterial if analyzed. For in any ■event the court will have to render two judgments in effect, and to issue'for payment at the treasury (if they are favorable to both claim■ants)- two certificates of judgment. It does now determine the several rights of the first claimant, and, in any event, will have to issue a certificate to him; and jt will have to determine the several rights of the ■other claimant, and then render a judgment for or against him. Whether these two judgments for these different parties are rendered oh the same day and included in the same order, or whether they are rendered ■at different times and announced by several orders appears to me not even to affect the regularity and certainly not the rights of any party.

dissenting:

I dissent from so much of the opinion of the majority of the court as permits the case of Edward Padelford to continue on the docket for further proceedings.

It is to me a new practice which authorizes a final judgment in favor of one of two parties to a suit at law upon the same record, and *225continues the action as to the other for another hearing and a second final judgment. It is a mode of proceeding by piecemeal, which is entirely anomalous and unprecedented so far as my knowledge extends. By this procedure one action is converted into two. The petition is made to serve a double purpose and to assist two different parties, who declare that they have no joint interest. It is frequently said that this courtis sui generis, and therefore it is often asked to do.many things which are unknown in the established practice of other tribunals. Henceforward I shall cease to wonder at whatever may be invited of it. I would as soon think of giving a judgment to a party for such portion of his demand as he has established by testimony, and then continue the cause on the docket, to enable him to make proof as to the residue of his claim, and afterwards give him another or other judgments, from time to time, as to continue this action on the docket after a final judgment has been pronounced in favor of one of the parties, waiting until time or circumstances shall enable the other party to receive a final judgment in his favor.

I have heard of interlocutory and final judgments; the former, Blackstone says in his Commentaries, are such as are given in the middle of a cause, and do not finally determine or complete the suit. Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action. The judgment for Mott comes in the middle of the suit, but yet it is not interlocutory; if it is, it gives him a stone instead of bread; it can scarcely be called final, since it does not at once put an end to the suit; if it is final, there must be several judgments, each of them final, in the same action and upon the identical record. Decrees in chancery do not in this respect differ materially from judgments; they are also interlocutory or final; the latter, Mr. Blackstone says, come after all issues are tried and settled and all references to a master ended. For Mr. Mott, and I may say as to Mr. Padelford, all the issues have been tried, and all the references are settled; hence, so far as he is concerned, whether we call his a judgment or decree, it is final. So far as Mr. Padelford is concerned it is interlocutory only. Then there must be a final judgment in reserve for him in the future. There can no more he two final decrees in one proceeding than two final judgments; so that, whether we proceed as at law or at equity, if the action is to he considered as pending for the benefit of Mr. Padelford, I find the same difficulties. If we are merely sitting in these cases as a court of inquiry to furnish information to the Treasury Department, upon which that department is to adjudicate, a proceeding like this might be sanctioned, *226but, in my opinion, not otherwise. But this court has always held that it was not in any sense a branch of the Treasury Department.

I consented to allow the motion to amend the prayer of the petition, as I supposed the counsel acting’ for Mr. Mott wished to protect his interests and enable him to receive a judgment to which he is, but Mr. Padelford is not, entitled; but I gave the consent under thfe expectation that the same judgment would be final by dismissing the proceeding as to Mr. Padelford. I desire now to place myself right in the matter as I consider it, so that no such irregular ruling shall receive my sanction as a precedent for the future.