In re Walker-Gordon Laboratory Co.
Cases that cite this one
3 later published cases cite this decision.
- A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. American Steel & Wire Co. (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1932)
- Wembley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Company (District Court, D. Maryland 1963)
- Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. Dura Electric Lamp Company, Inc., and Michael Portnow (3d Cir. 1957)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents, affirming the decision of the examiner of trade-marks^ refusing registration as a trade-mark of “ a substantially silver-colored caj) for milk bottles.”
It aj>pears that what appellant seeks to register is the physical article, that is, the cap itself, and the merchandise to which it is applied is the milk.
The drawing shows a form of bottle cap having imprinted on the top thereof the words “Walker Gordon” arranged in semicircular formation about the edge of the cap and “ Certified Milk ” in the center, the word “ Milk ” being underneath the word “ Certified.”
The commissioner’s decision states:
Tbe samples indicate that the milk bottle cap is of tinfoil or of a similar metal, the natural color of which is silverlike.
It is stated in the brief of appellant that the company has been using the cap for a period of about 87 years.
As we interpret the commissioner’s decision, registration was refused upon the ground that the ju’oposed mark being the physical article, it is a functional part of the bottled milk, having a mechanical utility, and is not, therefore, per se, registrable, and that since the particular words imprinted upon it are not registrable for obvious reasons (being in fact disclaimed), the issue finally turns upon the matter of color, and that mere color, independent of some design or symbol, is likewise not registrable.
We think the decision sound.
To grant registration of a mere functional element, or physical article, standing alone, as a trade-mark would be almost equivalent in its effect, to the grant of a perpetual patent, if such registration and trade-mark use could be sustained in the courts. It is not conceivable that Congress ever intended that such a result should be accomplished through the trade-mark registration statute. E. Regensburg v. Juan F. Portuondo, 142 Fed. 160; In re Oneida Community, 41 App. D. C. 260; Sawyer v. Horn, 1 Fed. 24; Goodyear Tire Co. v. Robertson, 25 F. (2d) 883.
For authorities upon the nonregistrability as a trade-mark of color standing alone, reference is made to Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 Fed. 727; Newcomer & Lewis v. Scriven Co., 168 Fed.
The decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.