Standard Laboratories, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- House of Worsted-Tex, Inc. v. Deering Milliken & Company, Inc. (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1956)
- Burton-Dixie Corporation v. Restonic Corporation (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1956)
- Nestle's Milk Products, Inc. v. Baker Importing Co., Inc (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1950)
- Phillips Petroleum Company v. Knox Industries Corp (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1960)
- H. D. Hudson Manufacturing Company v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1956)
- The Quaker Oats Company v. St. Joe Processing Company, Inc. (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1956)
- L. J. Mueller Furnace Co. v. United Conditioning Corp. (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1955)
- Hat Corporation of America v. John B. Stetson Company (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1955)
- Dietene Co. v. Dietrim Co. (United States District Court, Nebraska 1954)
- North Star Mfg. Co. v. Wells Lamont Corp. (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1951)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of tbe court:
This case is before us by appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents, acting through the First Assistant Commissioner, reversing the decision of the Examiner of Trade-Mark Interferences sustaining the opposition of appellant to appellee’s application for registration, under the Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905, of the word “Stran” for use as a trade-mark for a shampoo preparation, 71USPQ 210.
Appellant’s opposition, notice of which is in conventional form, is based upon its ownership, by assignment from the original registrant, of the registration of the word “Stim” (registered under the TradeMark Act of February 20, 1905) as a trade-mark for use on preparations for falling hair, dandruff and itching scalp.
Although appellee’s answer to the notice of opposition challenged practically all the allegations of fact in the notice, appellant introduced no evidence other than a copy of the certificate of registration presented following notice given under Patent Office Rule 154 (e), This copy, as was held by the tribunals of the Patent Office, constituted prima facie evidence of appellant’s ownership but it cannot be accepted as evidence of other facts alleged in its notice of opposition but challenged by appellee. Appellee presented testimony bearing upon the researches made on its behalf before filing the application for
In the course of his decision the Examiner of Trade-Mark Interferences said:
Applicant’s application and the testimony adduced on applicant’s behalf indicate that applicant sells a shampoo. Opposer’s registration, on the other hand, indicates that it deals in a preparation for falling hair, dandruff and itching scalp. Doubtless these goods are specifically different in their composition, nevertheless, both are hair preparations sold over the same counters to the same class of purchasers and they are believed to be so intimately related in their trade appeal as to constitute clearly goods of the same descriptive properties.
With respect to the marks, he expressed the belief that “the similarities predominate to such an extent that the concurrent use of these marks on the goods in question is reasonably likely to result in confusion in trade.”
The First Assistant Commissioner pointing out that “there is no evidence on the subject,” and citing Lever Brothers Company v. Butler Manufacturing Company., 24 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1000, 88 F. (2d) 842, 33 USPQ 38; expressed doubt as to the “propriety” of the examiner’s finding that the goods are sold over the same counters to the same class of purchasers, but said further:
* * * in any event, the specific differences between applicant’s product, which is essentially a cleansing agent, and opposer’s product, which is essentially a medicinal preparation, must be considered in resolving the question of possible confusion. * * *
As to the words themselves, the First Assistant Commissioner was of opinion that the words “Stran” and “Stim” “have very little in common” and, in effect, he held that because of the differences in the goods and the difference in the words their concurrent use would not result in confusing the public or deceiving purchasers.
We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by the First Assistant Commissioner. In the absence of any evidence introduced by appellant except the registration upon which it relies, nothing can be determined as to the actual chemical properties of its goods, but we think it not improper to say that a preparation for the treatment of dandruff and the like is generally regarded as something different from a mere shampoo preparation applied as a hair cleanser. In any event, we feel confident that the marks themselves are so lacking in resemblance as to appearance, sound or meaning that there is no likelihood of confusion in trade.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.