Beale v. Pettit
Opinion of the Court
charged the jury. This policy is made in the name of one Leamy, for and on account of all persons concerned in the cargo. The plaintiff states himself to have been owner of a part of the return cargo; and if so, it is clear that he has a right to sue. But proof of his interest, and, (the policy being open,) of the value of it, must be made out to your satisfaction. It is of the very essence of this action, that he prove his interest. The protest of the captain is inapplicable to this point. The bill of lading, for the outward cargo, is no proof that the plaintiff was interested in the return cargo. The evidence most relied upon is, a paper delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff, in which they state, that no proof of property had been laid before them, but the declaration, on oath, of the supercargo; for which reason they refuse to pay. Now this paper does not make that declaration evidence, which we have declared is not evidence; particularly as the defendants state it as the ground of their refusal. Should the jury not be satisfied with the proof of property, they will find for the defendants. If otherwise, they will, find, subject to the opinion of the court, in a case to be stated, so as to enable us to decide more deliberately, the question,
This question is more difficult than I at first supposed it. Marsh. Ins. p. 484, says, that if the assured at the time he receives advice of the loss, or before he has abandoned, receives advice also that the property is recovered, he cannot abandon; because he can only abandon while it is a total loss, and he knows it to be so; not after he knows of the recovery. The rule, he says, is, that if the thing insured be recovered before any loss is paid, the insured
Parker, Ins. 145, says, that it may be collected from Roceus, that in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover for a total loss; it must continue total at the time the offer is made to abandon, at the time the action is brought, or at the time of the payment of the money.
Prom what is said above, it is clear, that if at the time of the offer to abandon, the assured had notice of the recovery, he cannot abandon. But the question is, if at that time the property was in fact recovered, and in safety, and this unknown to the assured, can he abandon, if afterwards the fact appears? In the case of Goss v. Withers, 2 Burrows. 683, and Hamilton v. Mendes, [supra,] the assured knew of the recovery before his offer to abandon. But the judge, throughout, in laying down principles, speaks of the fact of recovery, before action brought, or offer to abandon. Prom which I should conclude, that if before the action brought, or offer to abandon, it should appeal-, that the property was in safety, the assured can only recover as for a partial loss. But suppose at the time of the offer to abandon, she was still detained, by virtue of the capture, but liberated before action brought? This is the question which Lord Mansfield says he does not mean to decide. But I think it clearly proves, that the question depends upon the fact, not upon the assured having or not having notice of it. Indeed, I cannot see why that circumstance should make any difference in the principle, which certainly is intended to prevent a loss, partial in its nature, from being converted into a total one. In Marshall v. Delaware Ins. Co., decided in this court, [Case No. 9,127,] at a subsequent session, and affirmed in the supreme court, (4 Cranch, [8 U. S.] 202,) it was decided, that the right to abandon depends on the state of the fact, at the time of the offer, and not the state of the information received.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.