Litle v. Ott's Heirs
Opinion of the Court
after stating fully the facts of the case, and the argument to show that the ground-rents sold by Mr. Bailey to Mr. Key included the ground rent of the lot sold to George Magruder, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Mr. Bailey’s deed to George Magruder passed only the legal estate in the term for years which Mr. Bailey possessed. It could not, contrary to his will, transfer any equitable right which he possessed ; so that Mr. Magruder, in consequence of that deed, acquired no right to call upon Mr. Key to convey to him the reversion in fee, even if he had received notice of that deed, of which there is no evidence; so that he stood in the predicament of a purchaser of a legal estate without notice of an' equitable incumbrance, if any existed.
It is true that the words of the deed are sufficient to carry the fee if Mr. Bailey had been competent to convey a fee; but as he was not, they can only be used as evidence of his intention to convey a fee. But he used also other words which are not usual nor necessary in conveying a fee ; and which are appropriate to the conveyance of a chattel interest only; namely, “ executors and administrators.” The expressions are, “ To have and to hold the said lots or parcels of land, unto the said George Magruder, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, forever.” The property conveyed by that deed consisted not
It was contended in argument, that when the tenant for years, obtained an equitable title to the reversion in fee, the term merged in the equitable reversion. But merger is the legal effect of the coincidence of legal rights only. There is no instance of the merger of a legal title in an equitable, so as to extinguish the legal title. The cases cited by Preston, in" his treatise upon the doctrine of Merger, in p. 7, 25, 28, 566, 569, are decisive upon this point. The dicta cited from 3 Yeates, 124, and 2 Binney, 138, in Phillips v. Clarkson, are loose, and rather inaccurate admissions.by the Court; and it is evident that the Court was not contemplating the distinction between the coincidence of a legal with a superior legal estate, and that of a legal with an equitable estate. The reference which the judge makes is evidently to the common legal doctrine of merger.
Mr. Key and his heirs seem to have been in the uninterrupted seizin of the reversion and the ground-rent, from January, 1800, to the year 1825, when this dispute originated; so that they are protected by limitation of time as well as by an actual legal title.
We are therefore of opinion, that the title of the late John Ott, the ancestor of the defendants, Mary C. Beatty and John W. Ott, was a chattel interest, — a term.for years, and not a fee-' simple, — and that the reversion in fee is in the defendants, the
Decree accordingly.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.