Newton v. Carbery
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The testimony is voluminous, and more' contradictory as to opinions than as to facts.
It appears from the evidence, that the testratrix was old, and singular in her manners and dress; penurious and miserly; and a religious devotee of the Roman Catholic Church; that she had always managed her own affairs, and particularly her money matters herself, with much worldly prudence; lending her money and receiving the interest with great punctuality, until three or four days before making her will, when she gave a power of attorney to Mr. Carbery to transact her business, and afterwards appointed him her executor. That she was eighty-seven years old, and her mind, perhaps, in some degree enfeebled by age, and by her disease, which was dropsy in the chest; a disease not directly affecting the intellect. That she had, ten years before, made a will containing a similar disposition of her estate, and bequeathing the residue to charitable purposes, after the payment of small legacies to her i-elatives, and to certain priests. That she had made an intermediate will, in which Mr. Clarke was named executor, and by which she gave similar small legacies to her relatives and to the priests, but omitted to dispose of the residue, which was the principal part of her estate. It was this will which she desired to alter, and which she revoked by the present will.
The principal facts relied upon to prove her insanity are ; first, that she was very old ; second, had many peculiarities, and was very singular in her manners and appearance ; third, that her mind seemed to dwell upon her riches, and money affairs, and
The testimony, on both sides, clearly shows- that the testatrix was extremely penurious and miserly; that her ruling passion was the acquisition of wealth ; and it is very apparent that the peculiarities in her manners; appearance, and dress, her denial of the necessaries of life for herself and her servants ; her suspicious and quarrelsome disposition, may all be traced to that source, and are evidence of that ruling passion only; not of mental insanity.
The story of her having buried bank-notes in the earth, if true, may, perhaps, be accounted for by the same ruling passion ; but the absurdity of the act which would make it evidence of insanity, discredits the fact itself. It is not probable that she did the act; or, if she did, it might have been upon some sudden alarm, or fear, and as a temporary expedient. The witness, who relates her conversation upon that subject, does not state what reason she gave, if any, for an act of such apparent folly. The fact is not corroborated by any other evidence; and the fact stated as part of the story, that “ it took two or three days to spread it over her bed and dry it,” seems quite as improbable as the fact of burying it in the garden.
The fact that she altered her will several times, is not, of itself, evidence of insanity; on the contrary, the consistency of the several wills with .each other, as to the general plan of disposition of her property, shows that the subject occupied much of her thoughts for many years, and that her mind was in a sound, disposing state. The will next preceding the last was imperfect, and would have left her intestate as to the bulk of her estate. That she wished to change it, is, therefore, no evidence of intellectual insanity.
These observations, we think, apply to all the facts which the witnesses against the will have adduced as the foundation of their opinions; and, without resorting to the opposite testimony, we think the facts not sufficient to justify the opinion expressed. They do not, in our judgment, show a primd facie case of testamentary incapacity; but, if they did, they are greatly outweighed by the facts stated by the witnesses in favor of the will, showing that she had, ten years before, made a will containing a similar disposition of the principal part of her estate; that she had continued to manage her affairs with prudence and great economy; that she had lent out her money, demanded and received the interest with punctuality; taken'the securities; hired out her own servants, and received their wages ; and provided for the wants of her family; and that in these transactions she evinced great acuteness of mind ; that this state of mind continued quite up to the 17th of December, the date of the will; and that when she executed it she declared, in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, that she had read every word of it, and that it was just as she wished.
If the case were to be decided by the opinions of the witnesses, we think those in favor of the will greatly preponderate ; without considering that of Mr. Lucas, of whose legal competency we doubt, notwithstanding the instrument of writing executed by him as a renunciation or release of his interest under the will.
We are, therefore, of opinion, that at the time of making this will, the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind, and capable of executing a valid deed or contract.
2. The second objection to the will is, that it was made by the testratrix under undue influence operating upon her mind ; and under mental delusion.
There is no evidence in this cause, of any influence whatever, exercised over the testatrix, by any person, in relation to this will, other than the influence of the general doctrines of the church of of which she was a member, as they were inculcated by the priests.
It was contended that the testatrix bequeathed the greater part of her estate to the church, and the orphan asylum connected
There is no evidence that the priests taught the testatrix any other doctrine, upon this subject, than that which is stated in the book above cited, as the general doctrine of the church.
Whether that doctrine be true or false, this Court has no jurisdiction to decide. If it was a delusion, it was a delusion common to all the members of that' Church, and would equally avoid the will of every Roman Catholic who should bequeathe, or had bequeathed, a legacy for masses for the repose of his soul.
This Court, therefore, cannot sáy that the will was made under undue influence or delusion.
The third ground of caveat, stated-in the record, is, that the bequests and devises, in the will mentioned, or many of them, cannot be carried into effect, and, are null and void.
This objection involved questions, of which the Orphans’ Court had no jurisdiction, and which this Court cannot decide, upon this
The sentence of the Orphans’ Court, that the will be admitted to probate, is affirmed with costs ; Thruston, J., absent.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.