Howe v. Abbott

I shall not interfere to stop the cause from going to the jury. But it strikes me, that both of the objections are well founded. In the first place, it is admitted on all sides, that there is no novelty in the process, by which the stripping, or twisting, or curling, the palm leaf, is accomplished. The same process of twisting, and curling, and baking, and steaming, has been long known and used in respect to hair used for beds, mattresses, sofas, and cushions. It *658is, therefore, the mere application of an old process and old machinery to a new use. It is precisely the same, as If a coffee-mill were now, for the first time, used to grind corn. The application of an old process to manufacture an article, to which it had never before been applied, is not a patentable invention. There must be some new process, or some new machinery used, to produce the result. If the old spinning machine to spin flax were now first applied to spin cotton, no man could hold a new patent to spin cotton in that mode; much less the right to spin cotton in all modes, although he had invented none. As, therefore. Smith has invented no new procesé or machinery; but has only applied to palm leaf the old process, and the old machinery used to curl hair, it does not strike me, that the patent is maintainable. He, who produces an old result by a new mode or process, is entitled to a patent for that mode or process. But he cannot have a patent for a result merely, without using some new mode or process to produce it.

The other objection strikes me, upon the evidence, which is not controverted, to be equally fatal. The specification in the summing up is manifestly for the entire process or combination, and not for the several parts thereof. Now, the defendant does not use the entire process or combination, but a part thereof only, which certainly, therefore, is not a violation of the thing patented, which is the entire combination. Besides; the parts used were well known before; and, indeed, the entire process was well known before, as the evidence clearly shows. It may be, and it strikes me, that the defendant’s process is, probably, far less perfect in accomplishing its purposes, than that used by the plaintiff. But that constitutes no ground for a recovery. The question is not, which is best, or is most perfect; but whether the one mode or combination is an infringement of the rights secured by the other mode or combination. There are other difficulties upon the evidence; but I' venture to suggest, that unless these objections can be overcome, or the evidence controlled, they seem to be fatal.