Manhattan Life Ins. v. Farmers' & Citizens' Nat. Bank
Opinion of the Court
This is a suit in equity brought to obtain a decree declaring the plaintiffs entitled to share, as creditors, in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent national bank, and enjoining any distribution of such assets otherwise than pro rata between the other creditors, and the plaintiffs as creditors to the amount of $10,-000 and interest.
The facts upon which the claim to this relief is based appear in the evidence as follows: On the 8th of August, 1867, one Beach, the president of the Farmers’ & Citizens’ National Bank, a corporation then, to all appearances, solvent, borrowed of the plaintiffs, for his own use, the sum of $10,000, upon the security of 550 shares in the capital stock of the bank. This bank had formerly been a state bank, with a capital of $160,000; but it had been changed into a national bank, as authorized by the national banking act, and its capital increased, or supposed to have been increased, to $300,000. The stock of the state bank held by each stockholder therein had been changed into stock in the national bank, to an equal amount, and the outstanding certificates of stock in the state bank were treat
It will be seen, from the facts above stated, that the transaction of the 8th of August, on the part of the bank officers, was a duplication of certificates for 550 shares of actual and valid stock of the bank then, as now, standing in the name of Beach, the president, upon the transfer books of the bank, but of which Beach was not then the owner, he having already passed away his title.
The main question in the case then arises— whether a fraud upon the plaintiffs was committed by Beach, when he passed to them, as regular and valid, such certificates as those of August 8th. Clearly, there was fraud. By necessary implication, Beach, when he delivered the certificates to the plaintiffs, represented that he was then the owner of the stock referred to therein; that no other person than the holder of those certificates! was entitled to that stock; and that the stock could not be transferred upon the books of the bank except upon a surrender of those certificates. "Whereas, Beach was not the owner of the stock, the holder of other certificates for the same Shares was entitled, upon a surrender thereof, to become the. stockholder thereof on the books of the bank, and, although a transfer of the shares, if actually made by the bank, upon a surrender of these certificates, would cut off the equitable .rights of otlier parties to the shares, still, such a transfer would be rendered impossible by a prior surrender of the old certificates and a transfer of the shares to the holders thereof, and could not be compelled, as against such holders, theirs being the prior of two equal equities. Herein lay the fraud upon the plaintiffs, and, by reason of that fraud, the plaintiffs became entitled, upon discovering it, to rescind the contract, give up the certificates, and demand their money. This they elected to do, and their demand is good
It is no answer to this view of the case, to say, that the certificates of August 8th were valid to give the plaintiffs a right of action against the bank in the event of a failure to obtain, a transfer of the shares represented thereby. Whether the certificates, passed to the plaintiffs, were or .were not sufficient security, is immaterial. They were not the kind of security that was agreed for, but of a different character; and the false representation of their character, which Beach, by necessary implication, made, when he signed and delivered them to the plaintiffs, gave the, plaintiffs the right, on discovering that fact, to reject them and sue for their money.
It has been contended, on the part of the defendants, that the act of Beach, in issuing the certificates of August 8th, in legal effect, cancelled the certificates of the shares of stock which he then had, and thereby rendered the certificates given to the plaintiffs regular and valid. But, the testimony is plain, that the certificates of August 8th were not intended to represent any of the shares certificates for which Beach then had. Beach expressly says, that he told Redfield, that ' those certificates were not to be cancelled, nor those shares transferred. None of those certificates ever were cancelled or surrendered, nor was any of that stock transferred. Besides, Beach had only 535 shares, and some of those were not in his name, while the certificates passed to the plaintiffs call for 550 shares standing in his name.
Equally unavailing is the suggestion, that the bank itself, when the certificates of August 8th were issued, owned a large number of its shares, being those of new subscribers, held as above described, and that these are to be deemed represented by the certificates issued to the plaintiffs, thus rendering them valid. As I understand the evidence, the bank had no shares whatever applicable to such a purpose; but, if it had the power so to deal with the shares referred to, none ,of them were ever placed in the name of Beach upon the books. The bank never authorized a transfer of any of them to Beach or to the plaintiffs, and it was never intended that the certificates of August 8th should represent any of those shares, but only shares the certificates of which had been given to Crawford, and were then outstanding. The fact, that the bank, in case of a surrender by the plaintiffs of the certificates of August 8th, might be able, if then so minded, either by the appropriation of Beach’s shares, or by a resort to shares of its own, to place in the name of the plaintiffs some other 550 shares would not constitute the certificates of August 8th lawful instruments, valid to enable the plaintiffs, at their option, to be placed on the books of the bank, as owners of the shares of stock which the certificates represented, nor would it make true the representation that Beach owned those shares, and that they were transferable upon a surrender of those certificates, and not otherwise; and it would have no effect to impair the right of the plaintiffs to reject those certificates because of the fraud, and to demand back their money.
My opinion, therefore, is, that, upon the view of this case above expressed, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief demanded. I am, also, of the further opinion, that, when the bank took and, without consideration, applied to its own use the money obtained by its president by means of the certificates of August 8th, and with full knowledge, not only through Beach, its president, but Redfield, its cashier, that the money had been obtained upon the faith of duplicate certificates of stock issued by the bank to a person not then the owner of the stock, the bank became directly liable to the plaintiffs for the money, as the borrower thereof, and cannot be permitted to say that Beach was not authorized so to obtain the money for the bank.
My conclusion, therefore, is, that, upon surrendering, for cancellation, the certificates of August 8th, according to the tender made, the plaintiffs are entitled to be treated as creditors of the Farmers’ & Citizens’ National Bank, to the amount of $10,000, with interest from August 9th, 1867, and that any distribution of the assets of that bank, otherwise than pro rata, among the other creditors and the plaintiffs, as such creditors, must be enjoined.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.