Yancy v. Cothran
Opinion of the Court
This is a bill filed by Yancy, as assignee in bankruptcy of tbe firm of Cothran & Jackson, composed of II. D. Cothran and J. N. Jackson, against Mrs. Laura E. Cothran, her husband, H. I). Cothran, and others. The object of tlio bill is to recover from Mrs. Cothran 232 shares of the capital stock of the East Rome Town Company. The facts upon which this right to recover is based are substantially as follows, as shown by the pleadings and evidence: In April, 1874, H. D. Cothran was tbe owner in his own right of the stock in question. ITe had previously, in 1873, failed in business as a member of the firm of Cothran & Jackson. At the time named, in April, 1874, Cothran transferred the stock to Cothran & Jackson, which firm it would seem'was then endeavoring to wind up its old business. Tbe stock was pledged by Cothran & Jackson to the Rank of .Rome as security for the loan of $3,500. In August, 1874, tbe note for $3,500 was due, and tbe firm had not met it. H. D. Cothran was the president and manager of the Bank of Rome, the stock of tbe bank being all owned, or practically so, by the firm of Ogden & Brower, of New York. About this time H. D. Cothran went to R. F. Fouche,'and stated to him the facts about the hypothecation of the stock; that the debt was due; and that Cothran & Jackson were unable to pay it. He told Fouche that he and the cashier of the bank, C. O. Stillwell, had tried to sell the stock, but could not get an offer for it. Stillwell told Fouche the same thing. Cothran then asked Fouche if he would give his note at 90 days, take a transfer of the stock, and agree that Mrs.
The defendants in this case filed several pleas, and an answer. They set up, in substance, as defenses — First, the statute of limitations; second, that the facts do not make a case of fraudulent transfer of this stock as against the creditors of Cothran.
It is unnecessary to consider or to determine whether or not the facts established in this case as to the various transfers of the stock, and the circumstances in connection therewith, are fraudulent as against the creditors of Cothran, so as to have authorized a recovery of the same by the assignee in bankruptcy, if it appears that the assignee knew the facts, or had such information that by the exercise of proper diligence he could have known them more than two years before this suit was brought.
Section 5057, Rev. St. U. S., provides:
“No suit, either at law or in equity, shall be maintainable in any court between an assignee in bankruptcy and a person claiming an adverse interest, touching any rights of property transferable to or vested in such assignee, unless brought within two years from the time when the cause of action accrued for or against such assignee.”
The courts have, however, ingrafted on this act the recognized rule as to statutes of limitation, that if the facts on which any right of action is based have been fraudulently concealed by the parties in interest, or if the fraud is of such character as conceals itself, the statute will only commence to run from the date of the discovery of the fraud, or of such information as, if diligently followed up, would discover it. Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt. 390; Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342; Upton v. McLaughlin, 105 U. S. 640; Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 382.
This bill was filed January 22, 1885. The right of action now claimed, existed in 1875, when the assignee was appointed; so that about 10 years have elapsed since the right of action accrued. Complainant says, however, that the defendants Cothran and wife fraudulently concealed from him the real facts connected with the transfer of this stock, and that the same was only discovered by him within two years before filing this bill in this court.
What are the facts as to Yancy’s knowledge? It appears that in 1878 this stock was levied on by an execution in favor of one Forsyth, administrator, against Cothran & Elliott, and that the same was claimed by Brower. Yancy says in his testimony in this ease that he attended the trial of that claim case “for the purpose of gaining information as to the stock.” This trial resulted in favor of the claimant Brower. The testimony in that case did not disclose Mrs. Cothran’s connection with the stock in any way whatever; on the contrary, the testimony of Cothran and others showed regular transfers by hypothecation and sale, as shown on the certificates of stock. It is questionable whether the assignee in bankruptcy can be charged with any notice at that time, in view of the testimony in the case and the result. In Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt. 39C. Curtis, J., cites with approval the following language from Kennedy v Green, 3 Mylne & K. 719, 721, 722:
*690 “It is the well-established principle that whatever is notice enough to excite attention, and put the party upon his guard, and call for'inquiry, is notice of everything to which such inquiry might lead. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant with it.”
The same language is quoted with apparent approval in Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U S. 141. If this rule be strictly enforced, it may be that proof of the fact that Yancy had become suspicious as to the bona fides of the transaction about the stock would of itself be sufficient; but I am hardly prepared to so hold. The next Yancy knew of this stock was information that on a division of the assets of the Bank of Rome it was awarded by arbitration between H. D. Cothran and Brower to Brower. But in August, 1880, Mrs. Cothran brought suit to recover this stock of Brower. Yancy, with other counsel, was employed to represent Brower. They investigated the case, and in December following filed Brower’s answer. While that bill and answer do not show all the facts in this transaction as fully as they now appear, it did show enough to give any one a pretty fair knowledge of the matter. The bill alleged that Fouche held the stock for the benefit of Mrs. Cothran, and that the same had been held for her benefit since Fouche’s transfer. It seems to me that the facts thus disclosed were amply sufficient to put Yancy on inquiry, and that after a reasonable time for inquiry the statute would begin to run.
But it further appears that October 15, 1881, the testimony of Mrs. Cothran was taken in her case against Brower. Her answers, which were interrogatories in writing, are in evidence here. She testified that she became the owner of 232 shares of stock in East Rome Town Company, in August, 1874. “She bought it from R. T. Fouche. Her brother-in-law, W. S. Cothran, bought it for her. That her title was in writing. It was executed by R. T. Fouche at the time mentioned. It was delivered to her, and had been in her custody ever since.” It was not shown when these interrogatories were filed in office, but the presumption is that it was done at the next term of court. It would certainly be fair to Yancy to say that he must have seen them by the spring of 1882. On the twenty-seventh of October, 1881, R. A. Denny was appointed auditor in that case to take account of, and report the amount of, dividends received on the stock, amount due on notes for which it was pledged, etc. In January, 1882, Denny took testimony, and February 22, 1882, made his report. This report contained a transcript from the books of the Bank of Rome, showing W. S. Cothran’s notes, and that the stock stood on the books of the bank of Rome as collateral for their payment. So it will be seen that by the spring of 1882, at least, Mr. Yancy must have known every fact in connection with this matter that he knew in January, 1885, when he commenced his suit. Under all the authorities on the subject I think Mr. Yancy’s knowledge early in 1882 was sufficient for the period of limitation to commence to run. But it is argued, by complainant’s counsel that the statute did not begin to run until the verdict in Cothran v. Brower, 71 Ga. 357. They say 'that Yancy
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.