Smith v. Harrison
Opinion of the Court
The suit is brought to recover demurrage for delay in receiving a cargo of sugar at this port, under charter dated December 10,1889, which provides that “the vessel shall be discharged with customary quick dispatch,” and that “for every day’s detention by respondents’ fault £85 sterling shall be paid.” It further provides that the discharge shall be at such wharf as the charterers designate. The vessel reached Philadelphia on Saturday, March 8,1890, and after entry at the customhouse, reported readiness to discharge. On the following Monday the respondents ordered her to pier No. 88 South wharves, whore she docked in the evening of that day. The stevedore (provided by respondents under the charter) was promptly ready, with gear erected to discharge from Iwo hatches. There are no platform scales at this pier, and the sugar was consequently weighed on temporary scales set up, which required each bag to be separately put on and taken off. This method of weighing is inconvenient, awkward, and so slow that the sugar could not be taken as fast as put oil from a single hatch, and consequently but one was used. The government requires such cargoes to be weighed before leaving the wharf; and they are usually weighed as taken from the vessel; though occasionally permission is obtained to deposit them on the wharf, in advance of weighing. This permission may always be had where the wharf is suitable for such deposit. The government is only interested to see that they are not removed from the wharf until the weight is ascertained. To authorize or justify such deposit, the wharf must be covered, (as this was,) and strong enough to support the weight. Formerly the usual method of weighing was that adopted in this instance. Within a few years past the large refineries have erected platform scales upon which carts and drays may be driven, and the sugar weighed as rapidly as it can be taken from two or more
In the view I entertain of the case, a more minute statement of the facts is unnecessary. As already seen, the charter requires “customary quick dispatch” in unloading. The signification of this language is well settled. It is the usual quick dispatch of the port where delivery is to be made, as distinguished from the common or usual dispatch employed there. It requires haste, — the ordinary haste of quick dispatch. The subject has been much, discussed, and the following cases may be cited: Carsanego v. Wheeler, 16 Fed. Rep. 248; Davis v. Pendergast, 16 Blatchf. 567; Keen v. Audenried, 5 Ben. 535; Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 469; Lindsay v. Cusimano, 10 Fed. Rep. 303; Bjorquist v. Steel Rail Cross Ends, 3 Fed. Rep. 718; Davis v. Wallace, 3 Cliff. 123; Kearon v. Pearson, 31 Law J. Exch. 1; Dahl v. Nelson, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 59; Pyman v. Dreyfus, 24 Q. B. Div. 157.
What customary dispatch in discharging cargoes of sugar requires— whether the use of modern conveniences for weighing — need not be considered. That customary quick dispatch does require the use of such conveniences, I cannot doubt. It is difficult to see how the dispatch can be hastened in any other way. Possibly it might by setting up several temporary scales, but this would require a large force of men, would occupy considerable space, and tend to embarrassment and confusion. It is not probable that the government would resort to this means for hastening the work. The only reasonably practicable method of securing haste is,-as the expert witnesses say, by the employment of platform scales.
The dispatch stipulated for in the charter largely influences the freight-rate. “Customary quick dispatch” gives the charterer a lower rate than “customary dispatch,” and I cannot doubt that when the respondents agreed to give the libelant such quick dispatch it was contemplated that the modern facilities for weighing should be employed. The specific governing object in providing such facilities is to save time, and thus discharge vessels speedily. Why then should not a vessel which has given the charterer the benefit of quick dispatch rates have the benefit of such
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.