In re Wetherell
Opinion of the Court
This is a petition praying for a review of a decision of the board .of general appraisers, assessing, on several lots of steel imported into the port of Boston by the petitioner, a duty of 50 per centum ad valorem, under the second proviso of paragraph 148 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, (26 Stat. 577.) The steel imported was in the form of strips from 3 to 3⅛ inches wide, more than 100 feet in length, less than 25-1000 of an inch in thickness, and valued at 6⅛ cents per pound. It was cold rolled to a surface finish, and was not cut or sheared from wider pieces. The collector levied a duty on the steel at the rate of two cents per pound, under the following clause in paragraph 146 of said act: “Steel in all forms and shapes, not specially provided for in this act;” and also an additional duty of one-fourth of one cent a pound, under paragraph 152, which provides for such additional duty “on all iron or steel bars or rods, of whatever shape or section, which are cold rolled, cold hammered, or polished in any way.” The petitioner duly protested against this additional duty, and contended that the steel was only dutiable at the rate of two cents per pound, under paragraph 146. The board of general appraisers decided that the collector was in error, and held that the article is specially provided for; that it is sheet steel in strips, and subject to a duty of 50 per centum ad valorem under the second proviso of paragraph 148, which is as follows: i
“That flat steel wire, or sheet steel in strips, whether drawn through dies or rolls, untempered or tempered, of whatsoever width, .twenty-five, one thousandths of an inch thick or thinner (ready for use or otherwise), shall pay a duty of fifty per centum ad valorem.”
Upon th§ present petition, the United States contend that the board of general appraisers was right, while the petitioner insists that the import in question was only subject to a duty at the rate of two cents per pound, under paragraph 146. It is admitted that the steel is neitber bars nor rods, and that, therefore, the collector was wrong in assessing the additional duty of one-fourth of one cent per pound, under paragraph 152. The whole question now in controversy turns upon the proper construction of the words “sheet .steel in strips” in the second proviso of paragraph 148. There appeared before the board of general appraisers three witnesses, who
It is contended on behalf of the United States that, as the steel in controversy had no clearly established commercial designation on October 1, 1890, and the term “sheet steel in strips,” in paragraph 148, had no specific commercial meaning at that time,; congress must have intended to have used the words “sheet steel in strips” in their ordinary sense, and that, as so interpreted, the words aptly describe the steel in question. The word “sheet,” it is said, signifies, in ordinary usage — First, thinness; secondly, breadth; and, if “the qualifying words “in strips” be added, there is eliminated the characteristic of width, leaving unaffected the characteristic of thinness, and that, as thus construed, the whole expression means a thin, narrow piece of steel of any length. On the other hand,¡it is urged by the importer that the steel in question could not have been intended by congress to be classified as “sheet steel in strips,” because it was never recognized among traders and importers' as sheet steel in any form, but always as a steel product which, wa,s cold rolled in a strip form, whereas sheet steel, whether in strips or
It seems to me that this case comes clearly wi thin this rule. The decision of the board of general appraisers is reversed, and it is determined by this court that the several lots of steel covered by said decision should be classified under paragraph 146 of the tariff act of October 1,1890, as steel in forms and shapes not specially provided for in said act, valued above four cents, and not above seven cents, per' pound, and subject to a. ditty of two cents per pound, and not sub-jéct to an additional duty under paragraph 152 of said act.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.