Boyd v. Hankinson
Opinion of the Court
This case comes up upon bill and answer, with the testimony, for a hearing on the merits. The facts of the case are these: The Southern Pine-Fiber Company, a corporation created by the laws of the state of New Jersey, owned in North Augusta, a town in Aiken county, S. 0., three acres of land. On this land had been erected valuable buildings containing machinery for manufacturing matting and other material from pine fiber. The company had ceased manufacturing operations, and had let" their property to the Hankinson Lumber Company. On March 8, 1897, W. H. Castle, treasurer of the Southern Pine-Fiber Company, made an offer to the Hankinson Lumber Company to sell this property to it for $5,000, of which $1,000 was to be paid in cash, and $1,000 each year for four years consecutively, represented by notes, each hearing 6 per cent, per annum, title to remain in the Southern Pine-Fiber Company until full payment, and bond for title to be made to the purchasers. The offer was made subject to the approval
It will be noticed that a bond for titles was one of the conditions of the proposed contract with the company. This letter shows that Hankinson was willing to carry out an agreement of the same tenor, provided proper papers be executed and a bond for title given. That letter was received on 10th. August. The reply was that, if his lawyer approves, he will gladly sign such a paper. It was never signed. The letter of 2d August was written by Mr. Foster, counsel for L. H. Hankinson, who notified Messrs. Fleming & Alexander of its con
This bill is filed hy James Boyd, William H. Castle, and Martin Lane, averring that they are creditors and stockholders in the Southern Pine-Fiber Company, acting in behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against Luther H. Hankinson, and Owen Aider-man, the sheriff of Aiken county. The purpose of the bill is to set aside the sale to Hankinson, and to place the property in the hands of a receiver for the use of the stockholders and creditors of the fiber company, unless Hankinson will pay the estimated value of the property, to wit, $5,000. The bill proceeds with a double aspect. It charges that Hankinson was under contract to- purchase this property for $5,000; that under this contract the property was to be sold at sheriff’s sale, to be bought in by Castle, and by him to be conveyed to Luther H. Hanldnson; that the purchase by the latter at sheriff’s sale, for himself, at the reduced price of $2,000, was a violation of his contract and a breach of trust. It also charges that the levy and sale were void, the sale having been made after the dissolution of the defendant corporation.
It will be noticed that in all the correspondence between Luther H. Hankinson and Mr. Oastle he always insists on proper titles. If, then, it be true that by this sale no title passed, surely he cannot be bound to take the property as in one prayer of the bill is asked.
The first question is, was there an existing contract between Hankinson and Oastle at the time of this sale? 'If the corporation has been dissolved, all executory contracts with it fell to the ground. Besides this, as Castle’s offer was subject to the approval of the stockholders, the dissolution prevents this aunroval. Was there after-wards any contract between Castle and Hankinson? It was suggested that Castle go on and get title as he proposed under execution. Hankinson consented, provided that he got the obligation of Castle that the property would not cost Hankinson more than $5,000. This
Was there any fiduciary relation existing between these parties binding the conscience of Ilankinson, and preventing him from bidding at the sale? The contract was still open. His condition had not been fulfilled. It: could have been fulfilled at any time before the sale. So he attended in order to see if this would he done. He did not see Castle there or either of the firm of Fleming & Alexander. He did not know what the business of Mr. Ban dal 1 was- at the sale, nor was he bound to inquire, nor was Mr. Bandall bound to tell him. At a public auction each bidder acts without obstruction or interference with the others. From the absence of Castle and of his attorneys he had every reason t:o- think that the plan had been abandoned, and he had the right to take care of himself.
The next question is as to the title. Was the sale a good one, and did it pass the title to the property? ■ The executions were levied in 1898. In South. Carolina the active energy of the execution lasts for 10 years! When a cause; has been tried, judgment obtained and entered, and execution issued and levied, the rights of the parties have become fixed. No new proceedings are necessary. If the defendant die after this, !his death does- not: prevent the sale under execution (Taylor v. Doe, 18 How. 287; Fishburne ad Verdier, 1 Speer, 347); nor his bankruptcy (Savage’s Assignee v. Best, 3 How. 111). This being so, if an execution gives vested rights, not in any way affected by the life or death of the defendant, the rule must apply as well to corporations which are dissolved as to natural persons. The death, natural or civil, of the latter does not defeat the right to sell. So the civil death of the former cannot defeat this rigid:. Besides this, all proceedings under an execution relate hack to its teste (Erwin’s Lessee v. Dundas, 4 How. 76), and it is so- treated. At the teste of this writ: the corporation was in full enjoyment of its franchises, and the sale is good. This- matter has been discussed as if the proclamation of the governor of New Jersey dissolved this
“See. 53. All corporations, whether they expire by their own limitation or be annulled by the legislature or otherwise dissolved, shall be continued .bodies corporate for the purpose of prosecuting- and defending- suits by or against them, and of enabling- them to settle and close their affairs, to dispose of and convey their property and to divide their capital, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which they were established.”
So this corporation continues as a body corporate for the purpose ' of prosecuting and defending suits. If it can bring and defend suits, it can issue executions, and have them issued against it, with the legal results of both.
As to the question which has been discussed involving the forfeiture of this charter and the construction of the law of New Jersey no opinion is expressed. The bill is dismissed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.